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ABSTRACT
The on-going debate concerning appropriate macroeconomic policy has 
contributed to the growing popularity of inflation as the primary target of monetary 
policy. Issues such as reduced confidence in activist counter cyclical monetary 
policy, wide spread acceptance of the view that there is no long-run tradeoff between 
output (or unemployment) and inflation, arguments for the value of precommitment 
and credibility in monetary policy, and an increasing acceptance of the proposition 
that low inflation promotes long-run economic growth and efficiency have 
dominated the debate. However, adopting any particular monetary framework in a 
given country requires a clear understanding of the economic environment and 
behavioural relationship between macroeconomic variables.
This thesis is an attempt to examine both the need for inflation control, and the 
role of monetary policy in controlling inflation for the case of India. The empirical 
exercise is focused on analyzing the relationship between inflation and economic 
growth, identifying the inflationary process and examining the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy regime adopted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). It is posited 
that, in addition to monetary factors, structural factors play an important role in 
guaranteeing and sustaining the process of inflation. The analysis of the output gap 
and aggregate demand-supply structure indicates the dominance of supply-side 
factors in the inflationary process in the Indian economy, which means a monetary 
policy without adequate accounting of supply side effects may not be able to serve 
the objective of sustained growth with low inflation.
This study suggests economic growth is adversely affected when the inflation rate 
exceeds the 5!A percent level and that inflation increases with excessive money 
growth. A long-term negative effect of inflation on growth and a positive effect of 
excess growth of money on inflation also mean non-neutrality of money, but, in this 
situation, the excess money growth is detrimental to long-term economic growth. 
Therefore, it is pragmatic for monetary policy to concentrate on inflation in 
preference to anything else.
India has been following a monetary targeting approach since the mid-1980s. 
However, subsequent to the economic liberalization and financial sector reforms
initiated during the early 1990s, there has been vigorous debate about an appropriate 
monetary regime. It is observed that the actual money supply has exceeded the 
announced target in most years. At the same time, the existence of a high fiscal 
deficit and the provisions of directed credit make it difficult to distinguish between 
the demand and supply of money. This thesis demonstrates that in the case of India 
the relationship between broad money and output is not robust. In such a situation, it 
is inevitable to argue for an alternative policy regime such as the inflation targeting 
now practiced in several industrialized economies. However, successful inflation 
targeting requires an efficient inflation forecasting system, complete knowledge of 
the monetary transmission mechanism, independence and credibility of the central 
bank and transparency in operations. The analysis of money supply behaviour 
demonstrates fiscal dominance in the money creation process, which erodes the 
independence of monetary policy. Therefore, government commitment to fiscal 
discipline is a precondition to successful adaptation of inflation targeting.
The estimated equation for base money supply indicates historically a passive 
supply of base money to accommodate inflation, fiscal deficit and output growth in 
both the short and long run. However, there is evidence of short-run reaction to 
changes in real exchange rate but that is also accommodated in the long run.
The analysis of the monetary policy reaction function and effectiveness of the 
policy instruments such as cash reserve ratio (CRR), yield on short term government 
securities (CGS1) and call money rates (CMR) in controlling inflation and output, 
indicate that changes in these instruments do not appear to significantly affect the 
goal variables historically. It is argued that the effectiveness of these instruments 
may be lost due to passive supply of base money as a parallel action to the stances on 
these instruments. Particularly, increase in the supply of base money appears to 
follow an increase in the CRR, with a neutralizing effect. A better approach would be 
to use a price based instrument such as an interest rate to target inflation.
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GENERAL CONVENTIONS
In order to standardize notations in the text, following conventions are followed as far as 
possible unless otherwise mentioned.
• Most of the official annual data available on India is for the financial year, which 
starts on April 1 and ends on March 31. For the sake of convenience, the financial 
year 1971-72 is written as 1971, for which most months are covered
• Wherever applicable the data is converted to base 1993-94.
• All variables in small case letters (whether italicized or not) are taken in natural 
logarithms and log always means natural log in this thesis.
• Assigning a negative number equal to the lag length in a bracket following that 
variable represents lagged variable. Thus, X(-l) represents variable X with one lag.
• A A before a variable indicates its first difference. Thus, AX = X -  X (-1).
• Several variables such as inflation and per capita income growth are represented by 
the symbols as they are calculated. Therefore, a A may be a part of the variable 
representation as well as a part of re-parameterized variable in a particular 
specification such as an error correction model. Therefore, representations of basic 
variables for every estimation are explicitly defined in the relevant sections.
• Some variables have alternative notations in analytical and empirical chapters for the 
sake of simplicity and reducing clumsiness. However, they are systematically 
defined everywhere.
Examples:
Variable Transformation
procedure
Notation Alternative
Notation
Price P
Log of Price Log(P) P
Inflation Log(P/(P (-1)) Ap 71
Real gross domestic product (RGDP) Y
Population POP
Per capita RGDP Y/POP YPC
Per capita real GDP growth Log(YPC/(YPC (-1)) Ay p e
Call money rate (in fraction) CMR
Change in call money rate CM R-CM R (-1) ACMR
Chapter 1
Introduction
The growing consensus among policymakers, and particularly central banks, that 
inflation needs to be controlled, rests on some of the following propositions: (a) 
Activist monetary policy to reduce unemployment in the short-run might be 
undesirable because it can lead to higher inflation but not lower unemployment while 
in the long run price stability promotes a higher level of economic output and more 
rapid economic growth (Mishkin 1997); (b) Business and households are thought to 
perform poorly when inflation is high and unpredictable (Barro 1995); (c) Inflation 
reduces growth by reducing investment and productivity growth (Fischer 1993); (d) 
Inflation exacerbates tax distortions resulting in substantial net loss to gross domestic 
product on a perpetual basis (Feldstein 1996); and (e) inflation acts like a 
consumption tax, promoting a substitution away from work and consumption and 
towards leisure (Ambler and Cardia 1997).
The intrinsic disadvantages of price volatility are many. Volatile prices may 
reflect low credibility and commitment of government in responding to inflation 
shocks and thereby inducing expectations for higher inflation, which in turn makes 
inflation control more difficult. Inflation causes relative price distortions. For 
example, if the nominal interest rate is controlled, as is the case in many developing 
countries, the real interest rate becomes very low and the real exchange rate 
appreciates, causing a fall in export competitiveness. Fiscal problems are intensified 
with falling taxes in real terms, which are based on the nominal income of the 
previous year, while the prices of public utilities are not increased in line with 
inflation. In addition, given that most future business projections are stated in 
nominal rather than real terms, stable prices bring more stability in project planning 
and investment. In this context Goodfriend (1995) considers the underlying mandate 
of the central bank to aim for a level of inflation so low that ‘the expected rate of
1
change of the general level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business 
decision making’ (Goodfriend 1995:122).
It is therefore, argued that central banks should emphasize price stability as the 
single most important objective of monetary policy and eschew consideration of 
other goals such as growth or employment. The Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS 1998) observes that the desire to limit the objectives of monetary policy in this 
way is based on the near-unanimity among economists and policymakers that 
monetary policy cannot affect the long-term growth of an economy. According to 
this view, efforts to stimulate growth above its potential rate merely lead to higher 
inflation: accordingly, monetary policy can at most only moderate short-run 
fluctuations in output. Moreover, while many central banks may in practice continue 
to attempt to stabilize output, especially within a medium-term inflation target 
regime, they find it useful for their public mandate to be restricted to price stability 
alone, since this reduces their vulnerability to political pressure for expansionary 
policy.
It is further argued that monetary policy may not be able to achieve goals other 
than price stability in the case of developing countries due to shallow and volatile 
financial markets compared with industrialized countries. In industrialized countries, 
monetary expansion is generally believed to affect output in the short-run, even if 
such actions merely lead to changes in the price level over longer periods of time. 
However, in many developing countries, monetary expansion may immediately lead 
to higher prices either with little or a transitional impact on the level of activity 
particularly in countries with a history of high inflation and low central bank 
credibility. Under such circumstances, monetary policy may be required to 
concentrate exclusively on the goal of price stability.
In the purview of the monetary policy literature (for example Mishkin (1997, 
1999), Obsfeld and Rogoff (1995a)) three basic strategies are suggested for 
achieving price stability: (i) Exchange rate pegging with a large low-inflation 
country; (ii) monetary targeting; and (iii) inflation targeting. However, the choice of 
a particular strategy depends upon the commitment of the central bank to other 
objectives, apart from price stability and the suitability of the economic environment
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for adopting that particular strategy.1 Exchange rate pegging with a large country, 
which has consistently low inflation over a period, exerts direct influence on the 
inflation rate of the pegging country, which gravitates to the level of inflation in the 
anchor country, helped by the appropriate expectations. Although, quite successful in 
controlling inflation, it has been argued that the central bank loses its independence 
to the pegging country and is forced to contract or expand policy depending on the 
direction of exchange rate movements alone; shocks of the anchor country transmit 
to the pegging country leaving it vulnerable to speculative attacks.
In the pure form of quantity theory, inflation is attributed to an excessive rate of 
growth of monetary aggregates. Specifically, excessive money growth relative to the 
growth of real output results in rising prices because of more money chasing output. 
A strong and reliable relationship between the goal variable (inflation or nominal 
income) and the target monetary aggregate and stability of income velocity of 
money, which have eluded several countries, are important preconditions for the 
success of monetary growth targeting in controlling inflation. If there is velocity 
instability, so that the relationship between the monetary aggregate and the goal 
variable is weak, monetary aggregate targeting will not work (Mishkin 1999). A 
weak relationship implies that hitting the target will not produce the desired outcome 
on the goal variable and the monetary aggregate will not provide an adequate signal 
about the stance of monetary policy, and fixing inflation expectations.
The question typically raised by critics is why monetary authorities would resort 
to excessive growth of monetary aggregates? The explanation to this question is 
intellectual errors in the estimation of money supply requirements and judgments 
about the nominal rate of interest to be maintained and the amount of credit to be
1 As of December 31, 1999, countries which have adopted an inflation-targeting framework include Australia, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and in some form Israel, Poland, Brazil 
and Chile (International Financial Statistics 2000 May). In the same document, India is classified with countries 
like the United States, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Japan, South Africa, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Norway, and Nigeria among others, which have no explicitly stated nominal anchor but rather monitor various 
indicators in conducting monetary policy. Most developing countries reportedly follow a monetary framework 
with an exchange rate anchor, International Monetary Fund-supported regime or other monetary program. A few 
countries like Colombia, Malawi, and Slovenia are shown to follow a clear-cut monetary aggregate target 
framework, while several countries classified in the monetary aggregate targeting framework also have other 
nominal anchors.
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created for a stipulated rate of output growth. A related explanation is the 
discretionary policy and incentive for time inconsistency.
Several countries have recently switched from monetary targeting to inflation 
targeting in order to achieve price stability. Inflation targeting (IT) involves the 
central bank’s commitment to a pre-announced medium-term numerical target for 
inflation. The advantage of this strategy lies in its operational features. The central 
bank knows its objective and people know the objective of the central bank, allowing 
them to form expectations correctly. Thus, there is transparency in the central bank 
operations and the bank is accountable to its own commitments. Inflation targeting 
focuses on domestic considerations and uses all available information to arrive at a 
forecasted target inflation rate. This means an inflation-forecasting model needs to be 
developed for the economy as the first step along with imparting independence to 
central bank operations. However, in practice, the central banks and the government 
fix an inflation target to be achieved over a specified period.
However, there are also cases of inflation control within a framework having an 
inclination towards monetary targeting, as in Germany and Switzerland. But 
Germany is alleged to react asymmetrically to monetary target misses, raising 
interest rates in response to overshooting money-growth, but choosing not to lower 
interest rates in response to undershooting. Both have a long-term objective of price 
stability. The Bundesbank and Swiss National Bank actively engage in 
communicating the strategy of monetary policy to the public, thereby enhancing the 
transparency of monetary policy and the accountability of the central bank (Mishkin 
1999). Mishkin considers them "hybrid" inflation targeters as their practices are 
closer to inflation targeting than Friedman-like monetary targeting.
Although, price stability is emphasized as the major goal of central banks, in 
practice central banks in developing countries, being typically the dominant force in 
the financial market of the country, shoulder other responsibilities, including 
structural development of the financial system, adequate credit creation for the 
private and public sectors, and external balance. Several are heavily dependent on 
developmental aid from international organizations like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which impose their own agenda and stabilization 
policies. With an objective of inflationary control, many developing countries have 
relied on the exchange rate anchor notwithstanding its constraints on monetary 
independence.
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In the Indian debate, inflation is not considered entirely a monetary 
phenomenon. It is believed that inflationary pressure builds up from both the supply 
as well as the demand side. Supply-side shortfalls or shocks in the prices of primary 
products are also reflected in the manufacturing sector. To manage supply-side 
inflation government intervention is invoked in the form of physical controls and 
trade policy measures. Demand-side inflation is dealt with through appropriate 
macroeconomic policies involving control of the money supply and restricting 
monetisation of the fiscal deficit.
This thesis examines the importance of inflation control, the role of monetary 
policy in controlling inflation, and the possibility of India adopting inflation 
targeting. The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows: A brief account 
of monetary policy in India is given in section 1.1. Constraints on monetary policy in 
India are discussed in section 1.2. The current debate in India and the key questions 
are discussed in section 1.3, and the organization of the thesis is presented in section 
1.4.
1.1 MONETARY POLICY IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW
1.1.1 Objectives
Monetary policy in India is assigned the dual objective of: (1) maintaining a 
reasonable degree of price stability in the economy through the regulation of 
monetary growth and (2) ensuring adequate expansion of credit to assist economic 
growth (Rangarajan 1998:70). However, the relative emphasis placed on these two 
objectives has changed from time to time. Apart from these two main goals, more 
recently, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has also been engaged in maintaining 
orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market to curb destabilizing and self- 
fulfilling speculative activities (Reddy2 34 1999d).
2 See, for example, commentary on price and distribution in various issues of Economic Survey (particularly 
issues from 1993-94 to 2000-2001) and in a survey article by Bhattacharya and Lodh (1990). Economic Survey is 
the official document of the Ministry of Finance issued before the presentation of the annual budget of the 
Government of India.
3 Dr Rangarajan is a former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
4 Dr Y. V. Reddy is Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
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1.1.2 Intermediate Targets
Monetary policy in India since the mid-1980s has primarily been governed by the 
Chakravarty Committee Report (RBI 1985), which recommended that India pursue a 
monetary targeting approach. The supply of the broad money aggregate (M3)5, 
instead of the interest rate was chosen to be the intermediate target under the 
contention that the demand function for money in India has remained fairly stable 
with respect to a ’select set of variables’ (Rangarajan 1998).
The report of the Chakravarty Committee (RBI 1985), while recommending 
monetary targeting for India, qualified it by arguing that the ‘mechanical application 
of constant money supply growth rule has no place’ due to the significant structural 
changes required to facilitate the growth process. It is in this context that Rangarajan 
(1998:64) considered the Indian monetary regime a flexible monetary targeting 
regime. Another important aspect of the Chakravarty Committee Report was a 
presumed 4 percent target for inflation. However, it appears that over time the 
monetary authorities in India underplayed the importance of low inflation. Average 
annual inflation in India as measured by the wholesale price index (WPI) was 8.19 
percent during 1971-98 and 8.22 percent during 1991-98. On the other hand, trade 
weighted annual inflation in India’s five major trading partner countries6 7during the 
corresponding periods was 5.24 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively. The 
approximate position of monetary targeting with respect to targets and the actual 
values of broad money growth, the inflation rate and real output growth rate is 
presented in Table 1.1.
Clearly, the RBI has not been following an absolutely fixed growth rate of money 
supply. Significant variations ranging between 11 to 19 percent can be observed in 
targets across periods. The money supply growth target in India is derived from a 
long-run money demand function, where income is represented by the exogenously
n
given ‘anticipated’ growth rate and ‘tolerable’ rate of inflation (Vasudevan 1999). 
The desired level of reserve money is aligned with the targeted level of broad money 
expansion. However, the money multiplier is not used for this back tracking. Instead, 
backward tracking of reserve money has to be consistent with the likely fiscal and 
external payments position in view of the fact that the main sources of expansion of
5 See Chapter 6 for details on components of monetary aggregates
6 The United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany and France.
7 Dr A. Vasudevan is Executive Director in RBI
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reserve money are the RBI credit to government and net foreign exchange assets 
(Reddy 1999d). Thus, the money multiplier must be manipulated by using 
instruments of quantitative controls. Therefore, it is not surprising that the money 
multiplier in India has a unit root. In such circumstances, reserve money also 
becomes an intermediate target. Reddy (1999d) prefers to call it an underlying 
operating target.
Table 1.1 Target and actual rates of broad money (M3) growth, real output growth 
___________and inflation in India (1983-98)_____________________________________
Year M3 growth (%) RGDPF* growth
(%)
WPI-Inflation (%)
Target Actual Target
/objective
Actual Target/objective Actual
1983-84 < 16.2 18.2 - 8.3 - 7.6
1984-85 <18.2** 19.0 - 3.8 Curb Inflation 6.0
1985-86 <19 0*** 16.0 -3.8 4.1 Avoid resurgence 4.8
1986-87 <17.5 18.6 >4.1 4.8 Continue check 5.1
1987-88 <18.6 16.0 5.0 4.3 Avoid re-emergence 10.7
1988-89 <16.9 17.8 - 10.6 - 5.7
1989-90 <17.1 19.4 4-5 6.9 - 9.1
1990-91 <15.4 15.1 -5.0 5.4 - 12.1
1991-92 (April) <14.0# 19.3 4.0 0.8 Max 7.0 13.6
1991-92 (October) <13.0 3.0 Max 9.0
1992-93 <11.0## 15.7 - 5.3 8.0 7.0
1993-94 -12.0 18.4 5.0 6.2 Further Moderation 10.8
1994-95 (April) 14.0-15.0 22.3 5.0 5.3 -6 .8 10.4
1994-95 (October) 16.0 (Max) 5.5
1995-96 15.5 (Max) 13.7 5.5 7.2 -  8.0 5.0
1996-97 15.5-16.0 16.2 6.0 7.5 6.0 6.9
1997-98 15.0-15.5 17.6 6.5-7.0 5.1 5.0-6.0 5.3
1998-99 15.5-16.0 18.4 6.0-7.0 6.8 -5.0 4.8
Notes: * Real Gross Domestic product at factor cost; ** Growth of liquidity and primary money 
creation; *** Liquidity growth; # M3 Target was made consistent with the containment of gross fiscal 
deficit to 6.5 percent of GDP in 1991-92; ## M3 Target was made consistent with the containment of 
gross fiscal deficit to 5.0 percent of GDP in 1992-93.
Sources: Based on Mohanty and Mitra (1999). The cited sources of their data are Reserve bank of 
India Annual Report, various issues; Circulars issued by Credit Planning Cell/Monetary Policy 
Department, Reserve Bank of India. Table is updated for the period 1998-99 using data from the RBI 
annual report and Economic Survey (1999-2000). Some of the values for the period before 1990-91 
are quantified from implied statements like ‘less than previous year’ or ‘less than average of last four 
years’, given in Mohanty and Mitra (1999).
With freeing of commercial banks’ lending rates in 1997, the overnight call 
money rate has also been considered a supplementary operating target, proxying for 
the short-term interest rate. It appears the emphasis on the broad money growth 
target is bound to decline as the central bank has now begun to rely on an array of
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indicators. Information is being assembled on currency, credit extended, fiscal 
position, trade, capital flow, interest rates, inflation rate, exchange rate, refinancing 
and transactions in foreign exchange. The objective of the central bank in building 
such an information base to formulate a clear-cut interest rate channel of 
transmission was emphasized in its 1997-98 annual report (RBI 1998).
1.1.3 Policy Instruments and Operating Procedures
Since 1960, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has had a range of monetary policy 
instruments at its disposal, including direct (quantity) and indirect (price) instruments 
with their emphasis changing from time to time (Joshi and Little 1994). The most 
powerful direct instruments include the cash reserve ratio (CRR)8, Statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR)g, quantitative controls on Reserve Bank lending to banks and 
the commercial sector (“refinance”), and quantitative credit controls. The indirect 
instruments operate through the administrative setting of various interest rates. While 
the CRR affects reserve money directly by immobilizing banks’ cash holdings, the 
SLR affects reserve money indirectly by reducing the monetisation of fiscal deficits. 
The government finds a ‘captive’ market for its securities in the form of SLR, which 
leads to diversion of a large amount of bank resources to the government. SLR rose 
to 37.4 percent in 1992. It may be noted that most commercial banks in India are in 
the public sector. Therefore, government can easily influence them.
Following the recommendations of the Committee on Financial Systems10 (CFS), 
the financial sector reforms* 11 (FSR) were started in 1992. Since then, the central
8 Since 1962, the RBI has been empowered to vary the CRR between 3 and 15 percent of total demand and time 
liability. CRR in excess of 3 percent is currently remunerated at 4 percent per annum (Reddy 1999b).
9 Over and above the CRR banks are required to maintain a minimum amount of liquid assets in cash, gold, and 
government securities amounting to a specified share of their demand and time liabilities.
10 The report of the Committee on Financial System (CFS) was submitted in 1991 and Mr. M. Narasimham was 
the chairman of the committee. Therefore, CFS is also known as the Narsimham Committee report (1991). 
Subsequent to this report, the government appointed another committee, the Committee on Banking Sector 
Reforms (CBSR), again with Mr. Narasimham as committee chair with an objective to review progress made in 
reform of the banking sector and to chart the actions needed to strengthen the foundation of the banking system. 
The CBSR was submitted in April 1998. For a summary see RBI (1998b).
11 The reforms include inter-alia the free floating of the exchange rate, decontrol of interest rates, development of 
securities markets, greater reliance on open market operations, auctions of government securities, phased 
decontrol of the capital account, and putting in place the prudential norms and mechanism for supervision of 
banking sector in line with international standards and practices. For a comprehensive detail with analysis see 
Reddy (1999b). Also see IMF (1998), Ahluwalia (1999), Reddy (1999), Reddy (1999a), and Reddy (1999c).
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bank has been endeavoring to move away from quantitative controls towards an 
interest rate channel for monetary transmission. The central bank tends to rely more 
on open market operations (OMO) in dated Treasury Bills, repo operations, auction 
and private placement of Government securities in conjunction with the Bank Rate 
for maintaining medium and long-term interest rates and management of situations 
arising out of heavy borrowings by the government.
The structure of administered interest rates has almost been dismantled since 
1997. In the case of deposits, only the interest rate on savings bank deposits remains 
under RBI control. At present this is prescribed at 4.5 percent (May 2001). Among 
the lending rates the RBI now directly controls only the interest rate charged for 
export credit, which accounts for about 10 percent of commercial advances and 
indirectly controls the interest rate on small loans of up to rupee 200,000, which 
accounts for about 25 percent of total advances. Commercial banks are not allowed 
to exceed their Prime Lending Rate (PLR) in the case of loans up to rupee 200,000.
Thus among the more conventional instruments, CRR, SLR and sectoral 
refinance (export) are still in the armory of the RBI. Nevertheless, realizing that the 
reserve requirements amount to a tax on intermediation, which reduces the 
profitability of banks, these ratios are systematically being reduced. The statutory 
minimum for SLR has been brought down to 25 percent. However, commercial 
banks hold SLR more than the statutory prescription (Reddy 1999b). The cause of 
this phenomenon can be attributed to excess liquidity in the system where there is 
inadequate demand for bank credit (Rakshit 1994).
To reduce the role of quantity variables the RBI has taken initiatives to activate 
the rate variables through development of the government securities market as part of 
its policy reform in 1992. Measures taken to improve securitization of the money 
market, including permission for foreign institutional investors to invest in Treasury 
Bills (TB), are helping deepen the securities market (RBI 1999).
The market based exchange rate system14 with occasional intervention from the 
RBI was introduced in March 1993. Some initiatives have also been taken towards
12 For export credit the RBI provides refinancing at concessional rates that mitigate the burden of this particular 
control on the banking system.
13 Each commercial bank is statutorarily required to declare their Prime Lending Rate in advance.
14 According to the International Financial Statistics (IFS) the Indian Rupee is market determined since March 1, 
1993 and is classified as an independently floating exchange rate.
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Capital Account Convertibility (IMF 1998) in line with the recommendations of the 
Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (RBI 1997). As an initial step, import 
of gold15 by banks fulfilling certain criteria and by individuals returning to India was 
relaxed. Subsequently, restrictions on overseas borrowing and investment activities 
of banks and corporate bodies have also been relaxed. Up to 100 per cent foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is now permitted in several sectors. In the insurance sector, 
foreign equity is allowed up to 26 per cent. Norms for external commercial 
borrowing (ECB) have been substantially liberalized (see (GOI 1999; GOI 1999a; 
GOI 2000; GOI 2001)). However, the pace of capital account convertibility was 
dampened following the South East Asian financial crisis with some favorable results 
of avoiding contagion (Joshi 2001).
With these reforms, new dimensions have been added to the problem of liquidity 
management for the RBI. Currently, short-term liquidity management is done in the 
form of an Interim Liquidity Adjustment Facility (ILAF); liquidity is injected by the 
RBI through the Collateralized Lending Facility (CLF) to banks, export credit 
refinance to banks, and liquidity support to primary dealers (PDs) of government 
securities. All these facilities are available subject to (formula based) quantitative 
limits for a specified duration and at bank rates. Absorption of liquidity takes place 
through fixed rate repos (rates being announced on a day to day basis) and OMOs in 
government dated securities by the RBI. However, it is important to note that these 
operations are in the given framework of the CRR that directly affects liquidity and 
the Bank Rate (Reddy 1999d).
1.2 CONSTRAINTS ON MONETARY POLICY IN INDIA
The efficiency of a central bank is contingent upon the economic environment in 
which it works. Two aspects need to be clarified here. The first relates to central 
bank independence. The second relates to the financial depth, fiscal compulsions, 
overall economic structure, and the political mandate of the country, which 
determine the possibilities for monetary policy and the effectiveness of policy 
stances. The literature related to central bank independence is vast including 
literature on the rule versus discretion debate and political independence (see for 
example Cukierman (1992), McCallum (1993), McCallum (1995), Mas (1995),
15 India being the largest market of gold, this was considered a significant step in relaxing capital control.
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Walsh (1995), Blinder (1999), among others). In simple terms, ‘central bank 
independence means two things: first, that the central bank has freedom to decide 
how to pursue its goals and, second, that its decisions are very hard for any other 
branch of government to reverse’ (Blinder 1999). Fischer (1994) argued that the 
central bank should have instrument independence but not goal independence.
There is less controversy regarding who should set the goals, particularly, in a 
democratic system. Once the long-term mandates are set, the means of achievement 
can be left to the central bank. However, the debate concerning rule versus optimal 
policy decision has limited applicability in the context of developing countries, 
which face an environment that differs radically from that faced by central banks in 
advanced economies (Masson, et al. 1997). The choice of most senior civil servants 
to represent governments on the board of directors of central bank in the developing 
countries is common (Fry, et al. 1996:28), which reflects the amount of influence 
governments in these countries exert on the central bank to look after its fiscal 
interest. India is no exception and runs a large fiscal deficit. Therefore, it is 
important to focus upon the economic environment and the constraints under which 
the RBI operates.
1.2.1 Financial Deepening
As mentioned earlier, the RBI is struggling to move from a more controlling mode to 
indirect market-based techniques to implement monetary policy. This requires 
commensurate financial development in the country, which can be assessed by 
looking at the financial ratios.16 Cole and Patrick (1986) have used broad money to 
GDP ratio to measure financial deepening in developing countries. The banking 
sector plays a dominant role in financial intermediation in India, which is 
supplemented by several other types of financial institutions including insurance 
companies and mutual funds. Therefore, bank density in terms of thousands of 
people per branch of commercial banks indicates institutional expansion for
16 In the literature, (see for example Goldsmith (1969)) several measures are suggested to measure financial 
deepening. These include: (1) the Finance Ratio, which is the ratio of total financial claims issued during the year 
to national income; (2) the Financial Inter-Relation Ratio, which is the ratio of the total volume of financial assets 
at any point of time to the stock of physical assets at that time; (3) the New Issue Ratio, which is the ratio of 
primary issue to net physical capital formation, primary being defined as the financial claims issued by the non- 
financial sector; (4) the Intermediation ratio, which is the ratio of the volume of financial instruments issued by 
financial institutions to the volume of primary issues by non-financial units.
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intermediation. Table 1.2 compares some of these variables in India with the United 
States, Brazil, South Korea and Singapore. While United State represents the most 
developed market economy, Brazil, South Korea and Singapore belong to the group 
of fast growing developing economies with better economic condition than India.
Table 1.2 Some measures of financial deepening in India vis-a-vis Brazil, Korea 
__________Rep., Singapore and USA.____________________________________
Country Period Broad Money 
as percentage 
of GDP
Broad Money 
to Reserve 
Money Ratio
Deposit to 
Reserve 
Money Ratio
Commercial bank 
density (thousand 
people per branch)
India 1971-75 25.99 2.54 1.66 39
1976-80 34.70 2.88 2.10 24
1981-85 39.20 3.04 2.35 17
1986-90 45.60 3.06 2.44 14
1991-95 49.20 3.18 2.55 14
1996-98 52.20 3.64 2.97 15
India* 1996-98 47.80 3.46 2.33
Brazil* 1996-98 29.40 4.30 3.46
Korea Rep.* 1996-98 48.34 9.49 7.88
Singapore* 1996-98 95.73 7.42 5.90
USA* 1996-98 58.60 9.50 7.01
Note: Data marked * are comparable as these are calculated using consistent definition of series and 
the data from IFS. The other values given for India are calculated using the sources and definitions of 
data used for this study and given in Appendix AA.
Data Sources: (1) for * countries: IFS line 64x for CPI inflation, line 99b/99bc for GDP, line 14 for 
monetary reserve, line 35 for deposit as quasi money, line 34 plus line 35 for the broad money M2. (2) 
For the India data (without *): World development indicators CDROM2000 for GDP, RBI ( 1999, 2000) 
for broad money M3 and reserve money MO (defined in Appendix AA). Deposit is demand deposit 
plus time deposit. Based on these data the percentages and the ratios are calculated by the author.
The ratio of broad money to GDP in India has risen substantially from a level of 
about 26 per cent during 1971-75 to 52 percent during 1996-98 and is comparable 
with other countries. However, central bank liabilities in India in the form of reserve 
money are much higher than the other four countries in the comparison. The broad 
money to reserve money ratio is barely over one third that of the United States and 
Korea. The same situation holds for the deposit to reserves ratio. High reserve (of the 
order of rupees 26 trillion in 1998-99 and an average of rupees 6.8 trillion during 
1970-99), in India enables the government to borrow from the RBI at no cost either 
directly or through transfers of the RBI surplus. However, it limits advantage of the 
stances taken on instruments and may be more inflationary. Nevertheless, the 
encouraging aspect is higher growth in these ratios during the post liberalization 
period, which is the direct outcome of reduction in the CRR. It is imperative for the 
RBI to enhance its securitization process and the use of OMO, and reduce the CRR
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even further. Bank density stagnated during the 1990s and the number of banks per 
thousand people even fell as an after-effect of the financial sector liberalization in 
slowing bank branching in rural areas.
1.2.2 Quasi Fiscal Activity and Fiscal Constraints
It is not uncommon for governments of many developing countries to assign various 
quasi-fiscal activities to their central banks like collecting seigniorage , imposing 
financial restrictions and implementing selective credit policies (Fry 1993). These 
activities may erode the functional independence of central banks. The practice of 
revenue collection from seigniorage and inflation tax is well documented in 
Friedman (1971), Phelps (1973), and Fischer (1982). By expanding the currency 
issue faster, the central bank can raise the inflation and inflation tax rate, which in 
turn raises the opportunity cost of holding currency.
In the simplest model, the central bank can be assumed to hold assets equivalent 
to reserve money earning the market interest rate and liabilities of reserve money 
paying no interest, thus collecting profits. The inflation tax and seigniorage revenue 
can be calculated following the method used in Easterley, et al. (1995), Fry, et al. 
(1996) and Masson, et al. (1997). Numerical values calculated for India and four 
other countries are presented in Table 1.3 along with the combined fiscal deficit and 
monetised deficit of Central and State Government.
From Table 1.3 it may be noted that the record of fiscal deficits in India does not 
compare favourably to the reference countries of United States, Brazil, Korea and 
Singapore. However, there has been some improvement during the 1990s. 
Seigniorage is also consistently high. With a high fiscal deficit in the order of over 9 
percent, comparatively high seigniorage and monetisation become compulsive for 
the monetary authorities. However, a high inflation tax and a tendency to collect 
seigniorage at a higher level can feed further inflation and ultimately lead to a crisis 
situation. ‘Allowing monetary policy to accommodate fiscal pressures not only 
leaves the inflation rate determined by the fiscal authority, but - because of the 
possibility of multiple equilibria - also increases the likelihood that the economy will 
find itself operating at an inflation rate higher than it need be’ (Bruno and Fischer 
1990). Therefore, reducing the fiscal deficit by reducing expenditure and increasing
17 Central banks in developed countries also collect seigniorage. However, in the case of developed countries it 
may not be an intended source of public finance.
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the revenue base must be the government focus in order to allow monetary policy to 
do its job.
Table 1.3 Inflation tax, seigniorage and fiscal deficit in India, Brazil, Korea Rep., 
___________Singapore and USA.______________________________________________
Country Period Annual
Inflation
Inflation
tax
Seigniorage Fiscal deficit Monetised
Deficit
India 1971-75 10.96 9.34 1.04 5.48 1.00
1976-80 7.85 6.91 0.47 6.98 1.51
1981-85 6.40 5.98 1.09 9.04 1.23
1986-90 7.53 6.99 1.15 10.99 2.25
1991-95 9.64 8.76 1.46 9.38 0.66
1996-98 5.85 5.53 1.27 9.06 0.70
India* 1996-98 9.80 8.88 1.22 5.32
Brazil* 1996-98 8.63 7.73 0.52 -
Korea Rep.* 1996-98 5.60 5.29 0.27 1.85
Singapore* 1996-98 1.03 1.01 0.14 -13.52
USA* 1996-98 2.27 2.21 0.14 0.28
Notes: Data marked * are comparable as these are calculated using consistent definition of series and 
data from IFS. The other values given for India are calculated using the sources and definitions of data 
used for this study and given in Appendix AA. The inflation for India* is CPI inflation, while for 
India it is WPI inflation, which is the preferred price index in this study (see chapter 4 for more 
details). The inflation tax is calculated using the definition 100*7i/(100+7t), where n is period inflation 
in percentage. Then seigniorage is calculated as the inflation tax multiplied by the stock of monetary 
reserve money divided by nominal GDP. Fiscal deficit and monetised deficit are expressed as 
percentages of the GDP. Since 1997, the RBI has paid 4 percent interest on the deposits of 
commercial banks with the RBI, which forms part of reserve money. No adjustment is made for this.
Data Sources: (1) for * countries: IFS line 64x for CPI inflation, line 99b/99bc for GDP, line 80 for 
Central Government fiscal deficit (+ deficit & - surplus), line 14 for monetary reserve, line 34 plus 
line 35 for the broad money M2. (2) For the India data (without *): Economic survey various issues 
for WPI and combined deficit of both Central and State Governments, World development indicators 
CDROM2000 for GDP, RBI (2000) for Net RBI Credit representing monetised deficit. Based on these 
data the percentages and the ratios are calculated by the author.
It is encouraging to note that during the post reform period the extent of the 
monetization of the fiscal deficit (gap between the total outlay of Center and State 
Governments and total current revenue) expressed as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (at current prices) reduced from an average of 2.25 percent for the period 
1986-90 to 0.69 percent for 1991-98. Full period details are plotted in Figure 1.1.
The practice of automatic monetization of the fiscal deficit was completely 
abolished in April 1997. However, this has led to sharp increases in government 
borrowing. Figure 1.1 presents the ratio of net to gross borrowing of the Central and 
State Governments for the 1980s and 1990s, which dropped from 0.89 in 1991-92 to 
0.69 in 1998-99. This is a stark reflection of the erosion of the government’s 
borrowing potential. The RBI policy statement, 1999-2000, (RBI 1999b) observed
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that government borrowing was reaching its limits (the banking sector held 
government securities of around 33 percent of its net demand and time liabilities as 
against the minimum requirement of 25 percent).
Figure 1.1 Fiscal deficits, monetization and net to gross borrowing of Government 
(1970-98)
I I Fiscal deficit Net RBI Credit (Monetisation) ----- Net to Gross Borrowing Ratio
- L  0.4
Notes: Fiscal deficit and Monetisation are shown on left scale, while Net to Gross ratio is shown on 
the right scale
Data Sources: World Development Indicators CDROM 2000 for GDP; Economic Survey various 
issues for Fiscal deficit; RBI (2000) for Net RBI Credit, and Gross and Net borrowing of Central and 
State Governments. Based on these data the percentages and the ratios are calculated by the author.
While non-accommodating monetary policy is desirable in the presence of fiscal 
rigidities it is also important to ensure the country does not fall in to a high-interest 
rate trap (Rao and Rao 1998). Therefore, limited monetisation can still be helpful in 
order to control the rise in interest rates in the face of heavy Government borrowing. 
The central bank cannot afford to close its eyes to this problem. Under these 
circumstances, it can be argued that the independence of the central bank is de-facto 
compromised. In this light, in order to understand the money supply behaviour of the
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RBI it may be reasonable to include fiscal deficit as an alternative or additional scale 
variable in addition to output.
1.2.3 Policy of Directed Credit: The Structural Mandate
There is an explicit role in India for the banking sector to support priority sectors of 
the economy. Commercial banks are required to direct about 40 percent of their 
advances to such priority sectors, which consist of agriculture, small-scale industries, 
small-scale transport operators, artisans, etc. Within this aggregate ceiling, there are 
sub-ceilings for agriculture and for loans to poverty-related target groups 
(Ahluwalia18 1999). The interesting part of this control is that most borrowers in 
these groups are also small borrowers, less than Rs 200,000, in which case there is 
the upper limit to the interest rate determined by the prime-lending rate (PLR) of the 
respective banks. The conclusion that can be drawn here is that liberalization of 
interest rates has only been partial.
There are many arguments both in favour (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Stiglitz 
(1994)), and against directed credit (Fry (1997), Arestis and Demetriades (1997)). 
Projecting the nature of this self-defeating scheme is the most important criticism. 
Given that most banks fall under the public sector, political influence could be the 
single most damaging aspect, leaving aside general market failure.
The Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (CBSR) has observed that Directed 
Credit has a proportionately higher share in the non-performing assets (NPA) 
portfolio of the banks and has been one of the factors involved in eroding the quality 
of bank assets. While recognizing the importance of directed credit for agriculture 
and small business sectors, the CBSR recommended that the limit of directed credit 
be reduced to 10 percent and bank branch managers be fully responsible for 
identifying beneficiaries in order to improve the quality of banks’ assets. The CBSR 
also recommended eliminating the subsidy element in credit for priority sectors and 
deregulating loans under Rs 200,000 (as has been done in the case of Regional Rural 
Banks and co-operative credit institutions). The CBSR believes it is the timely and 
adequate availability of credit rather than its cost, which is material for the intended 
beneficiaries. The government has not yet (May 2001) accepted these 
recommendations.
18 Dr M.S. Ahluwalia is former Secretary, Finance, to the Government of India.
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There are important implications for these controls of monetary policy. First, in 
order to meet the targets of directed credit, commercial banks end up accumulating 
non-performing loans (NPL) and pushing excess money into the system that can 
cause inflation. Second, due to extraneous influences directed credit may not entirely 
go to productive purposes. Thirdly, the role of the interest rate as the opportunity cost 
of money is substantially weakened due to market failure in this sector. It is also 
possible that several banks facing a severe NPL burden due to directed-credit will 
prefer to reduce their overall credit in order to reduce the negative effects. There is 
no provision for trading between banks to transfer directed credit from one bank to 
another with more expertise in handling directed credit. Ahluwalia (1999) thinks that 
if such trading could be introduced it would reduce the total cost of directed credit.
1.2.4 Government Interventions in the Commodity Market
More than a quarter of the wholesale price index weight items come under direct or 
indirect intervention by Central and State Governments. In particular, prices of fuel 
and agricultural items are moderated. During the crop seasons, the Governments 
declare support prices and get involved in buying produce at a higher price than 
would have been possible otherwise. This policy has merits as well as demerits as it 
helps to protect farmers who are vulnerable to exploitation by wholesale dealers in 
agricultural produce. Poor infrastructure and lack of good storage facilities add to 
farmers’ vulnerability. It also reduces wide-ranging fluctuations in crop prices across 
seasons. However, the demerits lie in the fact that the prices declared by Government 
have political overtones and are capable of creating distortion in forecasting inflation 
and formulating monetary policy. This distortion may be greater in the case of 
intervention in imported items like fuel, because international fuel prices cannot be 
directly used to model inflation.
1.3 THE CURRENT DEBATE ON MONETARY POLICY IN INDIA AND 
THE KEY QUESTIONS
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear the Indian economy is passing through a 
stage where monetary policy needs to be re-examined and there is a vigorous debate 
on the appropriate monetary regime and policy objectives. Reddy (1999d), the 
Deputy Governor of the RBI, is concerned about several ‘dilemmas’ facing the 
central bank, including problems arising from a trade-off between growth and
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inflation in the short-run and management of public debt. He also recognizes that in a 
dynamic setting with continuous evolution in technology and financial systems, the 
stability of demand for money function may be undermined.
Vasudevan (1999) observes that the actual money supply (see Table 1.1) has 
exceeded the announced targets in most years, raising doubts about the stability of 
the broad money demand function or the correctness of adapting the operating 
procedure of targeting bank reserves. In a similar vein, Mohanty and Mitra (1999) 
observe that increasing market orientation of the financial structure and international 
capital flows has created the need to consider whether a monetary targeting approach 
could ensure internal and external stability. They argue that even if the money 
demand function shows some kind of stability, it cannot be guaranteed that targeting 
broad money will remain optimal in a changing environment of external and 
financial sector reforms.
It was inevitable that focus would shift towards an inflation-targeting framework 
as in many industrialized economies. Kannan (1999) reviewed the idea of inflation 
targeting in the Indian context and argues for completing the financial sector reforms 
before implementing inflation targeting. Kannan’s concerns about the development 
of a suitable inflation model for India and investigation into the effectiveness of the 
interest rate in conducting monetary policy are timely. However, making price 
stability an overriding objective of monetary policy itself could be a first step in the 
right direction of inflation targeting. Reddy (1999e) argues that the ‘short-term 
deviation in the relationship among money, output and prices ought not to be 
construed as a breakdown of the inherent linkages. Yet, there are a number of recent 
developments warranting intense research and analysis of the evolving relationship 
between growth in money supply and inflation’.
McKibbin and Singh (1999) conducted simulation studies using McKibbin Sachs 
Global (MSG) model for three alternative policy regimes for India, namely monetary 
targeting, inflation only targeting, and nominal income targeting and concluded that 
monetary targeting performed worst of the three regimes, while nominal income 
targeting may be the most preferred regime. Singh and Kalirajan (1999) using 
monthly data for the post reform period and using generalized impulse response 
functions, examined the link between monetary instruments, inflation and output 
growth and concluded that inflation needs to be controlled for a higher growth rate.
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Whilst the monetary authorities and academics are debating ways and means of 
conducting monetary policy, there is a growing consensus in favor of lower inflation. 
The inflation rates in the developed countries, which are India’s major trading 
partners, are in the order of 0-3 percent. Plausibly, in the same context, the Economic 
Survey 1997-98 stated Tn a growing economy 4 to 6 percent inflation rate could be 
regarded as acceptable’. In 1998-99, the economic survey advised restraint in the 
growth of money supply and fiscal deficit in addition to exercising a close watch on 
commodity prices in order to keep inflation under control. Most recently, the policy 
statement by the RBI Governor Bimal Jalan on monetary and credit policy for the 
year 1999-2000 (RBI 1999b) brought the issue of price stability to the forefront of 
the monetary policy debate. The Tarapore Committee on Capital Account 
Convertibility recommended a mandated rate of inflation for the three-year period 
1997-98 to 1999-2000 in the average range of three to five percent.
In view of the foregoing discussion and the fact that monetary policy in India is at 
a cross road, the following vital empirical questions emerge. These questions need to 
be analyzed and addressed in order to gauge the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
India in achieving the RBI’s stated objective of high growth and low inflation and to 
take a view on the potential monetary regime:
(1) Why should the RBI be concerned with inflation above anything else?
(2) How best can the inflation process in India be identified and modeled? More 
specifically, to what extent is inflation in India a monetary phenomenon and 
how much is it a supply side effect? Do all monetary aggregates behave alike 
or do they have different roles in determining inflation in India?
(3) What is the prospect of a money demand based monetary policy in India? 
What determines the money stock, is it money demanded or a reflection of 
money supply behaviour?
(4) How best can the behaviour of the RBI be explained with a policy rule for the 
existing monetary instruments? Specifically how best can CRR and interest 
rates be modeled for India in terms of goal variables and whether such policy 
stances are effective?
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1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
In order to shed light on the above issues, this thesis aims to undertake a systematic 
analysis of the behavioural relationships between inflation, output and monetary 
aggregates in India in the presence of other macroeconomic variables and policy 
instruments that are important in the decision process using annual data. It is 
organized as follows: The theory of inflation is presented and discussed in Chapter 2 
and a theoretical overview of monetary regime choice and design is presented in 
Chapter 3. These two chapters provide the standard literature that forms the core of 
modem central banking.
The causal relationship between inflation and economic growth and the existence 
of any optimal level of inflation in the Indian context is examined in Chapter 4. 
Whether inflation influences economic growth indirectly through the savings and 
investment channel is also examined in this chapter. In order to identify the sources 
of inflation, the output gap and the aggregate demand and supply functions, are 
critically analyzed in chapter 5. The nature of demand and supply curves and the 
relationship between contemporaneous output gap and inflation shed light on the 
problem of whether the economy is affected more from supply or demand side 
factors. With the identification of the demand function and the output gap, the 
determinants of inflation are estimated based on a hybrid mark-up price model, 
which includes money and supply side variables.
In the absence of fully developed financial markets for government securities, the 
monetary aggregate remains as the main channel of policy transmission. In this 
context, three common monetary aggregates - base money (MO), narrow money (Ml) 
and broad money (M3) are examined in Chapter 6. Specifically, Chapter 6 
scrutinizes the robustness of the relationship between real output and monetary 
aggregates in a variety of specifications in order to determine whether monetary 
policy based on demand for money function can be meaningful in the Indian context. 
In view of the fact that the fiscal deficit is high and about 40 percent of commercial 
bank credit is directed, doubt arises as to whether what the RBI considers as demand 
for money may in fact be supply of money. Therefore, Chapter 7 attempts to analyze 
money supply behaviour of the RBI. Specifically, it estimates the base money supply 
function and the broad and narrow money multipliers in order to examine the fiscal 
dominance in money creation.
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The main instrument for conducting monetary policy in India has been the cash 
reserves ratio (CRR). Interest rate instruments are also available but unlike the case 
in developed countries they have not been fully market determined, and are therefore 
expected to be comparatively less effective. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the 
RBI’s reactions to variations in major macroeconomic variables. Accordingly, an 
attempt is made in Chapter 8 to identify the reaction function of the RBI and the 
impact of the RBI's policy stances on major macroeconomic variables. The monetary 
policy instruments of CRR and annual yield on 1-5 year government securities 
(CGS1) and an indicator/supplementary target of the call money market rate (CMR) 
are analyzed and modeled in Chapter 8. It has been demonstrated that the RBI’s 
policy stances have not been effective probably due to the lack of coordination in 
application of quantity controls through CRR and reserve money. Finally, Chapter 9 
presents the concluding remarks and advocates a policy regime for India that should 
be dominated by inflation control as the main policy objective.
Annual data for the period 1970-71 to 1998-99 have been used for the 
quantitative analysis. The conclusions and inferences are based on the analysis of 
dynamic models, concepts of cointegration and error correction representation. A 
detailed description of data and quantitative methods are presented, respectively, in 
Appendix AA and AB of the thesis. Basic (untransformed) data is provided in Table 
AA.3, Appendix AA.
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Chapter 2
The Theory of Inflation
2.1 INTRODUCTION
There has been a long debate over the causes of inflation. Does inflation originate in 
the goods market, the money market, or the labour market? Does it originate through 
some kind of expectation process? Several competing theories have been developed 
over time to explain, model, and cure inflation. Nevertheless, the controversy 
remains unresolved because no single theory is robust to changes with respect to 
periods of analysis, episodes of normal inflation and stagflation (high inflation 
associated with low growth) and episodes of high growth with low inflation. Tobin 
(1981) attributes this disarray to the important reason ‘that there are several kinds of 
inflation and several diseases of which inflation is a highly visible symptom. Some 
countries suffer from one of these maladies and some from more than one 
simultaneously or sequentially. Some are cured without much effort, some are easy 
to cure, and some are intractable. There is no single sovereign remedy.’ As a result, 
empirical analysis of the country-specific behaviour of inflation has become 
important in its own right.
The purpose of this chapter is to survey some of the popular theories of the 
inflation process in order to place the empirical analysis of the Indian economy in the 
right perspective. Some of the important previous surveys on inflation (Laidler and 
Parkin 1975, McCallum 1990) have considered old theories of demand-pull and cost- 
push phenomenon as rudimentary. The discussion in this chapter is not bound to any 
specific school of thought, and commences with demand-supply framework in 
section 2.2. In section 2.3 the popular Phillips curve phenomenon is discussed. 
Theories based on wage setting and price formation behaviour, developed to provide 
micro foundation to Phillips curve are discussed in section 2.4. The quantity theory 
approach and inflationary process are discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 attempts
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to cover the ideas dealing with the discretionary behaviour of monetary authorities 
and biased inflation. The process of inflation in real business cycle models is 
discussed in section 2.7. The ideas of the structural hypothesis of inflation are the 
subject matter of section 2.8. Inflation as an international process and the 
transmission of inflation from abroad is discussed in section 2.9. Finally, section 2.10 
makes concluding remarks from the perspective of a developing country.
2.2 COST-PUSH AND DEMAND-PULL INFLATION
As the concepts of cost-push and demand-pull inflation have been at the heart of the 
inflation debate for a long time, it is appropriate to commence the discussion on short 
run inflation with these concepts. An appropriate tool to describe both concepts could 
be the system of aggregate demand and supply schedules given in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2, which is based on the ‘Six Equations Keynesian Model’ (see Annexure 2.1 of 
this chapter for a brief discussion which is base on Sargent (1987: Chapter II). 
Solving the model yields upward sloping aggregate supply and downward sloping 
demand schedules in the output price plane. In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, aggregate supply 
schedule is represented with lines SS and demand schedule with DD. The initial 
equilibrium is represented with point A, the corresponding price P0 and output Y0.
The shift parameters for the supply schedule are the capital stock, money wage, 
prices of other inputs (raw materials like oil etc.), and the parameters of the 
production function. An exogenous increase in the costs of factors or raw material 
shifts the aggregate short-run supply curve to the left, thus increasing prices and 
reducing output and profitability. Figure 2.1 demonstrates “cost-push” through 
movement of equilibrium from point A to point B after the supply schedule shifts 
from Si Si to S2S2 . This is a situation of stagflation that may not be acceptable to 
policymakers, particularly central banks, and the money supply may be increased in 
order to restore output by stimulating demand.19 The output level can be maintained 
only if there is an increase in demand, which shifts the demand curve to offset the
19 If there were no increase in money supply to accommodate the cost-push then the position of the demand 
schedule, D 1D 1 (Figure 2.1) will remain unchanged and there is reduction in the real cash balance. With the 
money market equilibrium disturbed, the interest rate mechanism also begins to work. The increase in the interest 
rate results in crowding out effects. An increase in the money wage alone also leads to an increase in interest 
rates. Both factors become costly and reduce firms’ profitability.
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effects of supply shock. However, this situation further adds to a rise in price, by the 
movement of point B to E.
Figure 2.1: Cost-push inflation
Real output
Figure 2.2: Demand-pull inflation
Real output
With the monetary accommodation of cost-push, monetarists claim inflation to be 
a monetary phenomenon. This also presents the well known dilemma of policy 
makers in fighting adverse supply shocks: any attempt to fight a price rise by 
reducing the money supply further reduces output, and attempts to maintain output
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by the use of expansionary policy means a higher price level. On the other hand, a 
positive technology (supply) shock leads workers to increase real wages (in line with 
improvements in the marginal product of labour), leading to increased output and a 
fall in prices; in turn, the subsequent shift of the demand schedule would determine 
the final price level.
The “demand-pull” parameters are government expenditure, taxes, money 
supply and expected inflation. In the case of an open economy, exports can be 
included in “demand-pull” parameters. An increase in government expenditure and 
money and a decrease in taxes shift the aggregate demand schedule to the right from 
D1D1 to D2D2, causing a demand gap of Y0 Y2 in Figure 2.2. The general price level
jumps accordingly. If the demand-pull is due to an increase in money supply the 
interest rate falls. If the demand-pull is due to a fall in taxes or a rise in government 
expenditure or in expected inflation, the interest rate rises. Thus, the real profit of 
firms depends on the increase in the marginal product of labour, and the real cost of 
capital will rise or fall depending on the cause of the demand-pull. To meet excess 
demand, firms attempt to employ more labour by raising the wage, while workers 
base their supply on the expected real wage (VF/Pe), with Pe being the expected 
price assumed to adjust with temporal lag. Workers suffer from money illusion and 
misread the new money wage as the real wage, and supply more labour; output 
increases to T, through movement along AC.
However, it can be argued that point C is not stable. After a certain period, 
workers realize their real wage has not risen sufficiently, and demand higher nominal
20 Gordon (1977) demarcated “demand-pull inflation” between Keynesian and monetarist schools of thoughts 
depending upon the causation of demand-pull, whether it was a fiscal pull or a monetary pull. He pointed out two 
major differences. First, the quantity theory has a dynamic setting with an upward shift in DD being fueled by 
continuous money injection, while Keynesian inflation could explain the increase in the price level from PQ to P{
or P, if the dynamic process were stable and explosive inflation with unstable parameters. However, Keynesian 
inflation could not explain stable inflation without the implicit assumption of unlimited supply of idle money or 
passive monetary accommodation. The second difference comes from the assumption of vertical supply curve S v
in quantity theory, which is allowed to explain continuous money-fueled inflation shifting the economy in Figure 
la from A to B and further north along the vertical supply curve. In contrast Keynesian models emphasize 
income distribution during inflation with several assumptions like money illusion, lags etc. In case of cost-push 
inflation Gordon (1977) also believes that only monetary accommodation can restore original output, thus 
sustained inflation could become ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ in the words of Friedman 
(1963 p.17).
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wages corresponding to the increase in price. At the new nominal wage, the supply 
curve shifts to the left from Si Si to S2S2 along CB, causing a further increase in the 
general price level as a result of adjustment of the supply function to a higher cost 
(Gordon 1977). Subsequent to increased nominal wages, induced demand-pull can 
add to a successive shifting of the demand curve until workers are satisfied with 
living conditions.
“Cost-push” and “demand-pull” inflation have different characteristics. While 
the factors cause a price rise in both cases, their effects on output, employment and 
real wage are opposite. Output falls in the “cost-push” case but rises in the “demand- 
pull” case. This difference in the effects of inflation can help identify whether it is 
“demand-pull” or “cost-push” inflation (Phelps 1961).
It may be argued that conflict in the demand and supply side stories of inflation 
arises because of the difference in theoretical perceptions. When demand and supply 
are analyzed in a system (as in Blanchard and Fischer (1989) chapter 10), Benassy 
(1986), and Gordon (1977) among several others), the problem reduces to the 
identification of the type of shock (demand or supply) that hits the economy, the 
speed of adjustment, and the subsequent actions (accommodation or activism) taken 
by policy makers.
2.3 PHILLIPS CURVE: THE TRADE-OFF THEORY OF INFLATION
A variant of excess demand inflation is a trade-off continuum with increasing 
inflation for additional employment and production. In the standard Keynesian 
model, the wage is given at any point of time and there is no provision to generate 
subsequent revisions in wages. However, A.W. Phillips suggested that recent values 
of the unemployment rate could explain the nominal wage rate in any period (Phillips 
1958).21 The hypothesis of the Phillips curve is that the change of the nominal wage 
in period t depends negatively on the unemployment rate. Thus, the original Phillips 
curve can be represented algebraically as follows22, where w,= logW, and UNt = 
unemployment rate (in fraction) for period t :
Aw, = / (UNt_x) ,  /  < 0 . (2.1)
21 Laidler and Parkin (1975) note several previous studies on wage inflation and unemployment.
22 Important work in formalization of this relationship is attributed to Lipsey (1960).
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In the absence of technical progress, A , the price level and the money wage rate 
will each grow in the steady state at the same rate, as does the money stock. With 
technical progress, the money wage will grow at a rate that exceeds the price-level 
Pt by a fixed amount equivalent to the rate of technical progress. The inflation rate 
will be high if, and only if, the growth of nominal wage is high; and consequently 
price and wage inflation denoted by AlogP, and AlogW,, will be perfectly 
correlated across steady states (McCallum 1989). This relationship implies a similar 
relationship between A log Pt and unemployment:
Ap, + A = f  (UNt_x) (2.2)
where Apt = A log Pt ,23 This emphasizes the existence of a trade-off between steady
state values of inflation and unemployment. An economy cannot permanently reduce 
its inflation rate without creating additional unemployment. However, just a simple 
form of a stable Phillip curve cannot explain the existence of phenomena like states 
of low growth/ high inflation (stagflation) or high growth/ low inflation.
Friedman (1966, 1968) and Phelps (1967) made important modifications to the 
original Phillips curve. First, it was argued that it is the real wage that matters for 
employment rather than the nominal wage. The growth in nominal wages was 
replaced by growth in real wages, which led to the widely known Augmented 
Phillips curve in the current form. The second observation made was that the trade­
off between inflation and unemployment was not stable under changing inflationary 
expectations and a distinction should be made between the short and long run 
Phillips curve effects of an unanticipated acceleration of aggregate nominal demand. 
Thus, with expectation of inflation formed at the end of period t-1 represented by 
Apf|(1 , the expectations-augmented Phillips curve can be written as wage growth
equal to the sum of expected inflation plus a function of unemployment:
23 As a general convention, in this thesis, a A before a variables denotes first difference and variables represented 
with small case letter represents that the variable is taken in log. Thus Ap represents growth in price or inflation 
in fraction.
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AH-,=/(OT,.,) + Ap,H (2.3)
With the mark-up wage given by Aw, = A + Ap( in the steady state, the modified 
Phillips curve can be written in the general form of:
Ap, + A. = f  (UN) + Apl|M (2.4)
This relationship implies that the short-run Phillips curve shifts in a parametric 
fashion when the expected rate of inflation changes; higher expected inflation shifts 
the curve up. Alternative expected rates of inflation would correspond to alternative 
Phillips curves and different extents of money illusion.
At the steady state Apt = Ap,_x, the Phillips curve Ap, + A = f (UNt_x) + Ap,|,_,,
reduces to A = f ( U N ), a relationship independent of inflation. In the long run, the 
Phillips curve is vertical. In other words, with fully anticipated inflation, there is no 
real effect. Friedman and Phelps labeled the unemployment rate existing in this 
steady state as the “natural” rate of unemployment, which has the property of 
remaining constant at each rate of inflation as long as that rate is fully anticipated 
(Frisch 1983:49). Friedman (1976) argued that the only way unemployment can be 
kept below the natural rate is by ever-accelerating inflation, which always keeps 
current inflation ahead of anticipated inflation. However, ‘since you can’t fool all of 
the people all of the time, the true long-run Phillips curve is vertical’.24
It is argued, and empirically shown in some prominent studies with adaptive 
expectations, that there is only partial adjustment in wage settings to expected 
inflation (Solow 1969, Gordon 1970). However, Sargent (1973) and McCallum 
(1976) pointed out that if expectations were rational and models consistent, almost 
full adjustment could be obtained. This leads to a modified Phillips Curve as follows 
with a lying in the open interval of zero and one:
Aw = Apt + A = f (UN t_x) + a Apf|,_, (2.5)
24 This is also known as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU): the unemployment rate at 
which inflation is neither accelerating nor decelerating (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994:512).
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However, Friedman (1976:229), reacting on the econometrics of testing natural 
rate hypothesis, observed that keeping inflation on the left hand side and 
unemployment or a function of unemployment on the right hand side as an 
exogenous variable implies unemployment could persist forever. ‘In effect, the 
implicit assumption that unemployment can take different values begs the whole 
question raised by the accelerationist hypothesis. On a statistical level, this approach 
requires putting unemployment f(U N ) or a function of that on the left hand side and 
not Ap ' Friedman (1976:229).
Another important modification in the Phillips curve came through the well- 
known Okun's Law. Okun (1970) studied the trade-off between unemployment and 
detrended output levels for the U.S. economy from 1950 to 1984 and demonstrated a 
negative relationship between unemployment and the departure of gross national 
output from potential. A rise in the unemployment rate from the natural rate would 
correspond to the negative departure of output from the trend (negative output gap) 
and vice versa. Therefore, combining Okun’s Law with the augmented Phillip’s 
curve, gap model of inflation, a relationship between inflation and output gap can be 
written as follows:
Apt = S + ß  f  (y, -  + a  A p,^  (2.6)
where yt is actual output and yfp is the potential output corresponding to the natural 
rate of unemployment both taken in their logs such that the output gap (GAPY) as 
fraction of potential output can be expressed as yt -  y f = GAPY . With this 
specification, the so called “negatively” sloping Phillips curve in an inflation- 
unemployment plane is now an “upwards” sloping curve in the inflation-output 
plane, because of the negative relationship between unemployment and the output 
gap. The output gap has recently been used in several studies to model inflation (see 
de Brouwer and Ericsson (1995), and Coe and McDermott (1997) for example).
Digressions in the Phillips Curve Debate
In his Noble lecture, Friedman (1977a) discussed three stages of the Phillips curve. 
The first is the “stable” Phillips curve, in which there is a stable trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. The second stage concerns the “natural rate hypothesis” 
where the distinction is made between the short-run Phillips curve corresponding to a
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given inflationary expectation and the long-run expectations adjusted Phillips-curve, 
which is vertical.25 Friedman conjectured a third stage (which is not fully explored in 
the literature) to accommodate the episodes of higher inflation accompanied with 
higher unemployment in the seven countries of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States during the period of 1960-75, which 
could be explained by a positively sloped Phillips curve in the inflation- 
unemployment plane.
Friedman considered the positively sloped Phillips curve a transitional outcome 
of prolonged political and institutional rigidities. In the long run, once the political 
and institutional arrangements adjust to new realities and the transition period is 
over, unemployment will be largely independent of the average rate of inflation. A 
high inflation rate is not likely to be steady during the transition period because it 
disturbs the anticipations of economic agents. Further, in order to arrest high 
inflation, the government engages in various conflicting policies, which further 
exacerbates the variations in anticipated inflation. Increased variability of actual and 
anticipated inflation adversely affects unemployment.
Some authors working on stagflation in developed countries do not agree with 
Friedman’s (1977a) hypothesis that high inflation is likely to increase inflation 
variability, which in turn slows down growth (for example Fischer 1981, Bruno and 
Sachs 1985). The emphasis in such studies is on the supply side of the economy, 
where it is agreed that shocks to supply side variables like raw material prices 
accounted for much of the variability in inflation and high inflation during the 1970s. 
The idea is that the shift in the short-run supply curve does not solely depend on 
changes in inflationary expectations; other variables also shift the short-run supply 
curve. Bruno and Sachs (1885:204) estimated the augmented Phillips curve for 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States for the period 1961-81, with inflation as the left hand side variable and 
unemployment and other variables like import price, changes in trend productivity 
growth, and the real wage gap as the right hand side of the equation. Their results 
show a significant negative coefficient for unemployment in four countries (Belgium, 
Germany, USA and UK), an insignificant negative sign for three countries (Canada,
25 Some authors consider a medium-run Phillips curve, which is steeper than the short-run trade-off Phillips 
curve.
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Denmark and Japan), and an insignificant positive sign for France with correct signs 
of shift variables in all cases. Interestingly, in the basic Phillips curve without other 
variables, the coefficient of unemployment is insignificant in all cases and has a 
positive sign in the case of Denmark and France. Thus, the supply-side effect on 
inflation is well supported but the robustness of the trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation remains a doubtful proposition. The question then becomes: should the 
state of the trade-off be treated as an empirical problem rather than a theoretical 
result and, even for the same economy, should it be revised periodically?
Bruno and Sachs (1985) provide a detailed analytical account of the supply side 
economics of inflation. Their analysis of factor adjustment to supply-price shocks is 
relevant in the Indian context. A permanent increase in the relative price of a factor 
of production like raw materials shifts the production frontier towards the origin. 
Since capital is fixed in the short-run, the new equilibrium output and profit depend 
on the relative flexibility of real wages and the legal system regarding labour laws. 
Consider a situation in which the wage is indexed to the price index and labour laws 
do not allow employers to fire workers easily. With a rigid real wage, unemployment 
should increase but does not due to the protective labour laws. Employment could 
also be forced to remain unchanged due to technological reasons (for example putty- 
clay technology). The result is a fall in profit and output. The market clearing output 
is lower, although potential output based on the capital and labour employed has not 
changed. This causes widening in the output gap with actual output falling below 
potential (thus a fall in the output gap in algebraic sense). In the long run, if raw 
material prices revert and expectations are corrected, the system can back track to the 
original frontier.
2.4 MICROFOUNDATION TO THE PHILLIPS CURVE: WAGE AND 
PRICE SETTING BEHAVIOUR
Although, the augmented Phillips curve is a widely used form of aggregate supply 
function, there are several other competing supply functions. These include inter- 
cilia, the monetary misperception based model of Lucas(Jr.) (1972, 1973); the sticky- 
wage theory based model of Fischer (1977); the relative price theory based models of 
Taylor (1979), Calvo (1983), Führer and Moore (1995); and the p-Bar model of 
McCallum (1994). These models are mostly directed to provide a micro foundation
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to the Phillips type relationship and better understanding of the inflationary process. 
Some are briefly discussed below.
Lucas Flexible Price, Monetary Misperception Model
In the monetary misperception type of model, the Phillips-type correlation results 
from the ‘mistaken’ belief of individuals about the macroeconomic conditions due to 
incomplete information about the state of the economy. The individual sellers, who 
observe changes in the prices of their product, may not completely know whether 
this was due to economy wide change or to a change in the relative demand for their 
product. Therefore, undecided about the quantum of increasing output the individual 
sellers settle for an output corresponding to an intermediate price between the 
economy wide average expected price and the price of their product. The 
misperception arises because, not knowing the current economy wide price, the 
individual seller forms expectations based on past information. In a simplified 
aggregate model, this comes out to be similar to the augmented Phillips curve, which 
can be expressed as
p, = p,\,-,+ cW ,-Y ,P) (2.7)
Here Pt̂ _x is the forecast of the general price for the period t, made at the end of 
period t-1 and Pt is the average aggregate price level of all firms, Ytp is the aggregate 
potential output of all firms, and Yt is the actual aggregate output of all firms. Taking 
variable in log and after a little algebra the relationship can also be expressed as
= ap ,|,-i + c ()\ - y!)  (2-8)
Output is high when actual inflation is greater than the expected value. This approach 
is different“6 because of the way the model is derived based on individual mistaken 
perceptions about the economy wide price. Therefore, the relevance of the theory is 
measured by the information gap. If timely data on monetary stock and prices of 
other goods is available, as is now the case in most economies, the relevance of the
26 The difference between the Friedman-Phelps augmented Phillips curve and the Lucas supply curves lies in the 
fact that the former stresses the time lag between the expectation formation and the inflation realization, while the 
latter stresses the discrepancy of each local and aggregate price.
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theory would diminish. With no mistake in perception about the money stock and 
hence the shift in aggregate demand curve, the seller would set the corresponding 
price and the Lucas supply curve would be vertical and free of rigidity. One 
important implication of the Lucas supply curve is the policy ineffectiveness theorem 
under rational expectation shown in Sargent and Wallace (1975).
Nominal and Real Rigidities and Sticky Prices
There are several other models commonly known as ‘New Keynesian tradition’ 
which seek to exploit rigidities in labour and goods market to explain short run real 
effect of monetary policy and hence the Phillips curve phenomenon. The paradigm of 
the literature dealing with this tradition can be summarized in the following three 
groups. (1) Labour contracts (wage bargaining) are made in nominal money terms 
through wage setting institutions, where different firms set their wages at different 
points of time and renegotiate at different intervals (staggered contracts) leading to 
sticky nominal wages (nominal wage rigidity). Producers prefer long-term contracts 
because negotiating is costly. In this situation, real wage is not equal to the marginal 
product of labour all the time and, therefore, real wage is also considered sticky.
(2) Monopolistically competitive firms face small ‘menu costs’ when they change 
prices such as those required to prepare and post new price lists and costs of 
annoying customers (Akerlof and Yellen 1985, Mankiw 1985, Ball, et al. 1988, 
Blanchard 1986). Therefore, monopolistically competitive firms do not have 
incentive to cut their prices when demand for their goods declines, which leads to 
stickiness in prices (sticky prices). (3) Firms may want to pay employees wages 
above the market clearing wage, in order to attract and maintain a quality workforce 
and to ensure they work hard and remain loyal (efficiency wage) (Yellen 1984). This 
also means, even with persistent unemployment, firms do not reduce wages because 
doing so may reduce productivity resulting in stickiness in real wages and real price 
of firms’ output (real rigidity). This theory, though helping to explain the existence 
of unemployment, by itself, does not explain slow changes in the nominal wage.
However, it is argued that real rigidities such as efficiency wages when 
considered together with price rigidity caused by menu costs may enhance nominal 
wage rigidities (Ball and Römer 1990). Menu costs prevent prices from falling in 
response to a reduction in aggregate demand; rigidity in real wages prevents wages 
from falling in response to the resulting unemployment. The failure of wages to fall,
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keep firms’ costs high and thus ensures they have little incentive to cut prices 
(Mankiw 1990). This provides a new explanation for Keynesian disequilibrium.
In practice, both nominal and real types of rigidities can be observed. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the short run is restored. However, one of the 
main issues in this chapter is to review theories which help explain the inflation 
process. What makes wages or prices change slowly and inflation persist? The 
literature identifies two sources of inflation persistence. Inflation can display 
persistence if the money growth rate displays persistence as would be predicted by 
quantity theory, discussed later. Walsh (1998:215) observes that if this were the only 
sense in which inflation appears to exhibit persistence, it could easily be explained 
within the context of flexible price models. If conduct of monetary policy is such that 
it introduces a high degree of serial correlation in money growth, it will get reflected 
in the behaviour of inflation. However, there can be inflation persistence in a non­
monetary sense as well, as demonstrated by models based on staggered wage setting 
and wage contracts. Some of these models demonstrate inflation persistence, while 
others demonstrate price level persistence. Therefore some of the widely cited 
models, such as those developed by Fischer (1977), Taylor (1979), McCallum (1994) 
are discussed below.
Fischer’s Model
The simplified idea behind Fischer’s (1977) two-period model of staggered wage 
setting is that sellers are split into two groups setting nominal wages that stay in 
effect for two periods. Doing this brings in wage/price stickiness. However, wages 
for the two periods would not be the same but would be at the market clearing level. 
Thus, for one half of the workers, wages are set at the end of the period t-1, which 
will continue for period t and t+1 and for the other half wages are set at the end of 
period t-2, which would continue in period t-1 and t. The supply of the output is 
assumed to be a decreasing function of the real wage. Let yt be log of output, yt full 
employment output, wt the log of nominal wage, z, the log of real wage and pt the 
log of price in period t such that z, = w, -  p t is the real wage for some group and z, 
the market clearing value of z, . Then, the expected value of the market clearing 
nominal wage at the end of period t-1 will be z.t|M + p t|M , which will prevail for 
periods t and t+1. For the other half of the workers, the period t nominal wage would
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have been set at the end of period t-2 at the level of z,|,_2 + p ,|,_2, which continued in
periods t-1 and t. Using these relationships, and aggregating the output supply of the 
two groups, Fischer postulated a log-linear aggregate supply function of the form:
y , ~ y ,  = a o +a,[0.5{p, - ( z ,H  + p,|,_i)} + °.5{p, + p,|f_2)}] (2.9)
With a demand function of the form of simple velocity equation, and solving the 
model rationally, Fischer (1977) demonstrated that monetary policy is not neutral in 
the short-run but supports the natural rate hypothesis. However, the model is 
criticized for its assumption that output is negatively related to the real wage on the 
ground that real wages do not exhibit the counter-cyclical behaviour predicted by 
Keynes’ General Theory (Mankiw 2001). As discussed earlier, in Keynes model, 
when the central bank contracts the money supply and prices fall, real wages rise, 
leading to a lay off of workers and hence the theory exhibits a short-run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment. However, Mankiw (2001) considered this 
argument patently false. In his opinion, firms lay off workers after monetary 
contractions not because real labour costs are high but because they cannot sell all of 
the output they want at the prevailing price. Prices do not clear goods market; and 
firms appear to have some degree of market power as discussed earlier.
Taylor’s Model
Taylor (1979, 1980) used another version of the wage bargain model, which is 
characterized by its forward-looking aspect. The basic model is also discussed in 
Hall and Taylor (1997:438-440). Recognizing that output is a function of 
employment, a simplified version of this type of contract is as follows. As above the 
wage contracts are again staggered in two (or more) periods by two (or more) groups 
and stay for two periods. Let xt be the log of the contract wage, in period t and the 
other symbols remain the same as used in discussing Fisher’s model earlier. This 
time the average wage is the average of the contract wage signed in the previous year 
for the first group, which is still outstanding, and the contract wage signed in the 
current year for the second group, which will also be in effect for the following year. 
Thus, the aggregate wage is the geometric average of the contract wage in two 
periods.
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w, =0.50, +*,-i) (2 . 10)
However, the critical part of Taylor’s approach is the way in which xt is set
taking into account the expected future average wage and the expected future excess 
demand (or equivalent unemployment) based on the information available at the end 
of period t-1, which means xt =x ,_ l . For that purpose, the contract wage
relationship chosen is of the form:
X,  = 0.5(w, +w,tlH ) + 0.5.5 [(y,|M - y )  + (y,+1|M -y ) ]  (2.11)
Equations of aggregate wage (2.10) and of contract wage (2.11) together yield the 
supply curve as:
x, = o.5(jc,_, + V i h ) +<5 [(y,|,-, - y ) + ( y , . in  - y ) i  (2.12)
To write Taylor’s model in terms of prices assuming a constant markup q = 0 , the 
log price level can then be expressed as pt = wt + q = w,. With this assumption, 
noting that now pt = 0.5(*, + jc,_j) and expressing an expectation eiTor 
77, = p t|,_2 -  pt , the price equation can be written as follows:
P, = 0-5(p,_i +  Pt+\\t-i) +
.  _ (2.13)
0.5S [(y,lM - y )  + (yf+1|M - y )  + - y )  + (yt{t_2 -  y)] + 0.5p,
In terms of inflation the equation can be expressed as follows:
ap , = ap ,.i m + <5 Ky,|.-i -> )  + ( y , « y)+(, -i|,-2 -  y) + (y+.2 -  y )]+ v, (2.14)
The value of pt is influenced by expectations of the future price and also the
price level of the previous period displaying inertia effect. However, there is no 
inertia in the rate of inflation. Instead, significantly, any policy of disinflation is 
costless and may be beneficial. Thus, the model can result in violation of the natural 
rate hypothesis. However, Führer (1994) characterized Taylor’s specification as
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satisfying the first-order natural-rate hypothesis (average output is independent of the 
average level of inflation) but not the second-order version (average output does 
depend on the rate of change of inflation). The model could not generate the kind of 
inflation persistence as shown by the data in the Führer (1994) experiment.
Taylor (1979) used a velocity equation in wage, money and excess demand to 
represent the demand equation and a function of aggregate wage as a policy rule of 
money supply to solve the dynamic rational expectation model. The resulting price 
(wage) equation is obtained in terms of the realized values of the prices (wage) and 
supply shock demonstrating the usefulness of the model over the simple augmented 
Phillips curve. The forward-looking part corresponds to the demand effect on the 
wage. The wage persistence comes from the backward looking part of the equation 
and depends on how accommodative aggregate demand policy is in relation to wage 
contract adjustments which are “too inflationary”.
P-Bar Model
McCallum (1989:189, 1994) has criticized the Taylor type model on several accounts 
considered important to specification of price. To McCallum, adherence to the 
“natural rate” hypothesis is a very important characteristic of the price model, which 
means monetary policy should not have a permanent effect on the output gap and the 
potential output for calculating the output gap should be tied to the inputs of 
production rather than to deterministic trend. Secondly, in the view of McCallum, 
money should not be excluded from the price equation. McCallum (1994) has 
revived“ the p-bar model in which pt is the price level consistent with yt = yt . The 
actual price level in the p-bar model is assumed to adjust as follows:
= p , - p ,-\ =y(y,-\  - ) ’,-i) + (p ,|,-i - p ,-i|,-i) (2-15)
The adjustment parameter y is assumed positive. The actual price level increases 
if output exceeded the natural rate in the previous period, or if p itself is expected to 
increase. In order to capture the lagged deviations of the actual level of output from 
the natural rate and the lagged deviation of the expected value of p-bar to the 
expected value of p-bar, the p adjustment equation is written as follows:
27 Taylor (1977) derived the supply equation in terms of wage instead of price.
28 McCallum (1994) lists a number of authors who have previously worked on a similar line.
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p, -  p, M = y (y,-i -  > ,-1)+ (p , 1,-1 -  ) (2 . 16)
Factors determining p-bar are obtained from an aggregate demand function of the 
following specification obtained from IS-LM framework, where vt is a disturbance 
term.
y, = A> + A <-m, -  p ,) + ß i ( p Hi\,-,- p ,\,-,) + (2.n>
On solving (2.17), for the realized value of p t and applying the condition that p-bar 
corresponds to the natural rate of output, gives a value of p-bar as follows:
p, = ä~Y7r lA  + + A p ,+i|,_i + + v, ~ y , ] (2'18)
p, = + A m, + A p ,*i|,-i + Ay,-! + w, -  y,] (2.19)
Pi Pi
Using the difference operator A, equation (2.19) implies
AÄ '- '= ß \ ß  + + A Ay,-i- Ay,|,-,l (2.20)
Then the inflation rate is obtained by plugging the value from (2.20) into equation 
(2.15) as follows.
=rAy,-> ~y, \.ßAm, | , - i  +  ß  ẑ p f+ i|i- i + AAy,-i -  Ay,|,_i ] ( 2 .21)
This is the main equation of price determination in the p-bar model designed to 
ensure that the natural rate hypothesis holds, which can be demonstrated after some 
algebraic manipulations. The model has the appearance of Taylor’s type models. 
However, the presence of the expected rate of money growth makes it significantly 
different from the other models. This model also makes prices but not inflation as 
persistent.
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The Current State of Phillips Curve
The inflation-unemployment trade-off is so integral to monetary policy, at least for 
some economists, that Alan Blinder (1997) has called the reliability of the modem 
Phillips curve the ‘clean little secret’ of macroeconomics. Such a trade-off is 
important for monetary policy because of the claim that changes in monetary policy 
push output and inflation in two opposite directions in the short run. A monetary 
injection first increases output and employment (sticky price effect), and later 
increases the price level. Thus, monetary policy has both real and nominal effects.
However, in a recent article Mankiw (2001), considered the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment as inexorable and mysterious. Inexorable, because it is 
impossible to make sense of the business cycle, and in particular the short-run effects 
of monetary policy, unless admitting to the existence of such a trade-off. Mysterious 
because of the lack of empirical support for such a trade-off. ‘The combination of 
low inflation and low unemployment enjoyed by the United States in the late 1990s 
suggests to some people that there is no longer a trade-off between the two variables, 
or perhaps that it never existed at all’ (Mankiw 2001).
Whatever stability of the augmented Phillips curve has been observed in data, it is 
mostly limited to the models, which include adaptive expectations. The rational 
expectations version of models with forward-looking behaviour lead to puzzling 
results not at all supported by data (Roberts 1997, Mankiw 2001) and the 
assumptions of rational expectation itself becomes questionable. However, the 
concept of rational expectations has penetrated theoretical economics so much that 
several theorists would not accept anything short of a rational model.
Mankiw (2001) examines four versions of the Phillips curve, two with adaptive 
expectations and two with rational expectations Representing inflation with n t
(=Apt ) and natural rate of unemployment with U , the four versions of Phillips
curves examined by Mankiw (2001) are presented below in equations 2.22 to 2.25 
(Table 2.1). The new Keynesian forward-looking model (equation (2.24), similar to 
the models derived by Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983), considered to be grounded 
more firmly in theory, is the favourite model under scrutiny. In his simulation 
Mankiw assumes an impulse response function of inflation following a 
contractionary monetary shock and calculates the inferred (or implied) impulse 
response function for unemployment by using each of these Phillips curves. The
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expectation from the model is to generate data showing an increase in the 
unemployment rate following a monetary contraction.
The figures in Table 2.1 indicate that the theoretically sounder model given in 
equation 2.24 generates an impulse response completely opposite to expectations. 
This is puzzling; ‘given a plausible impulse response function for how inflation 
reacts to monetary policy shocks, the new Keynesian Phillips curve implies a 
completely implausible impulse response function for unemployment’ (Mankiw 
2001). With a similar model, Ball (1994a) demonstrated that credible disinflation can 
cause a boom.
Table 2.1 Impulse response function to a contractionary monetary shock
Traditional backward look in g m odel n t = / r M - 1 / 8 ( 1 / , - ! / ) (2 .2 2 )
B ackw ard-look in g  m odel w ith  hysteresis
n t =7rt_l - l / S ( U l - U ) ,  
Ut = 0.9 TJt_x +o .i t/M
(2 .2 3 )
N ew  K eynesian  forw ard-look ing m odel 7 1 1 = n t+\\t - l / 8 ( t / f —U ) (2 .24 )
Fuhrer-M oore M odel n t  -  +  n t+\\t) / 2 - l / 8 ( t / ,  -  Ü ) (2 .2 5 )
Quarter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inflation 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.7 -1.9 -2.0 -2.0
Unemployment according to equation
(2.22) 0.0 0.0 +0.8 + 1.6 +2.4 +3.2 +3.2 +2.4 + 1.6 +0.8 0.0
(2.23) 0.0 0.0 +0.8 + 1.7 +2.6 +3.7 +4.0 +3.5 +3.0 +2.3 1.6
(2.24) 0.0 -0.8 -1.6 -2.4 -3.2 -3.2 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.0 0.0
(2.25) 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0
Source: Mankiw (2001), Table 1
Based on the above results and the existence of evidence of high growth with low 
inflation, it can be concluded that theoretical underpinning of a trade-off between 
inflation and employment is an unfinished agenda and practicing economists still 
have to rely on data more than theory.
2.5 QUANTITY THEORY AND INFLATION
In the absence of a clear-cut process to resolve the demand-supply and price wage 
nexus, the Monetarist School led by Milton Friedman presented an alternative 
explanation of inflation, declaring ‘inflation is at all times and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon’ (Friedman 1963:17). In the pure form of quantity theory, 
inflation is attributed to an excessive rate of growth of monetary aggregates, more
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specifically excessive money growth relative to the growth of real output. More 
money chasing few goods results in rising prices.
The question typically raised by critics is why the monetary authorities would 
resort to excessive growth of monetary aggregates? The explanation to this question 
is intellectual errors in the estimation of money supply requirements and judgments 
about the nominal rate of interest to be maintained and the amount of credit to be 
created for a stipulated rate of output growth. A related explanation is the 
discretionary policy and incentive for time inconsistency discussed in Section 2.6. 
Precisely estimated money demand function and stability of the velocity of money
29are central to the studies of monetary inflation. In its simplest form, money stock 
M , nominal income P Y (where P is price level and Y is the real income), and 
velocity V are linked through the relationship: MV = PY . Velocity of money is the 
number of times the money stock turns over each year in financing payments made 
to purchase the economy’s output. Taking logs and totally differentiating both sides, 
this equation can be written in growth form of variables. With lower case letters m , 
v , p , and y representing logs of money, velocity, price and output while a A before 
the variable indicating change, the equation marked as above can be transformed in 
an inflation ( n )  accounting equation in terms of growth of money, output and 
velocity as:
n -  Ap = Am -  Ay + Av (2.26)
The monetarists claim that inflation is predominantly a monetary phenomenon, 
implies that the velocity changes are very small. However, there is no economic 
reason to believe that velocity should be constant. In fact, if the income elasticity of 
real money is not unity then velocity can change due to that reason itself, without the 
influence of other reasons like financial innovations. Further, it is important to note 
that velocity should be a stationary process in order to assume a stable relationship 
between inflation, money growth and output growth. In addition to the assumption of 
stability of money demand function and small changes in velocity, there are several 
other important assumptions associated with the monetarist model of inflation in its 
original form. The role of interest elasticity is considered insignificant, money supply
29 It is not clear whether it should be cash balance or a broader aggregate of money.
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is exogenous and fully under control of the monetary authorities, whereby a money 
multiplier can be used as an effective policy instrument. There is unidirectional 
causality from money to price and not vice versa. Similarly, causality from money to 
income is assumed to be unidirectional, an assumption supported by Sims (1972) 
causal study, which is not widely accepted. Finally, in the long-run, money is 
considered neutral.
Friedman (1970), and Sargent and Wallace (1975), among others, have modified 
the static monetarist model presented above in different and important ways to 
incorporate real interest rate, wealth effects, inflationary expectations and money 
surprises. Dynamic monetarist models have been analyzed with both adaptive 
expectations as well as rational expectations. One of the popular early analyses in the 
adaptive version was developed by Cagan (1956) to explain hyperinflation. 
However, McCallum (1989:139) criticized the econometric formulation of Cagan’s 
problem. McCallum (1998:Chap 9) applied dynamic rational expectations hypothesis 
to the underlying money demand model of Cagan (1956) with distributed lag type 
money supply behaviour. The analytical solution to such a specific problem leads to 
one to one correspondence between money growth and price, a property in line with 
quantity theory.
In the rational expectation tradition, one of the major assumptions is that 
production depends on the surprises in prices ( Pt -  P̂ _x). Model of supply and
demand introduced by Lucas(Jr.) (1972) of the form y st = yQ + a(Pt -  Pt|(_,);
y f = yMt -  ßPt + £t has extensively been used in literature for analyzing output
behaviour with the disturbance term in the demand equation, assumed to be either a 
white noise or following an autoregressive process. In a simple analysis with 
disturbance as white noise, Henin (1986:339-340) has demonstrated that output 
diverges from the natural level as a function of unforeseen shocks and non- 
systematic components of money stock. This means that only unsystematic 
components of policy can affect output. However, with a supply function of the form 
of y* = y0 + or(Pf|M), only the foreseen part of money stock influences output, a
violation of the neutrality concept of money (Henin 1986:339-340). Therefore, the 
analytical results are model specific and sensitive to assumptions about supply 
function.
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2.6 INFLATION DUE TO MONETARY DISCRETION
In the introduction of this thesis, it was pointed out that several studies have shown 
inflation is costly and if there is no real benefit to having (say) five percent inflation 
on average, as opposed to one or zero percent, why are average rates of inflation 
observed that are consistently positive? Several sources of inflation have been 
discussed but they do not make it explicitly clear why inflation still exists? Literature 
on time inconsistency30 by Calvo (1978), Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and 
Gordon (1983), and Barro and Gordon (1983a) amongst others seeks to answer this 
question. In a discretionary regime, the monetary authority can print more money 
than expected and create more inflation than people expect. Based on the model of 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) and the discussion in Walsh (1998:chapter 8) and 
McCallum (1990), the above point is illustrated below.
While inflation is costly in various ways as discussed in Chapter 1, the benefits 
from surprise inflation come in at least two ways. One through the Phillips curve, 
where unanticipated monetary expansion reflected in higher expected inflation leads 
to an increase in real output. The other source of benefit involves government 
revenue in the form of seigniorage. The cost of inflation is assumed to rise at an 
increasing rate with the realized inflation rate, n. The central bank’s objective is 
welfare maximization or a loss (cost net of benefits) minimization problem subject to 
a set of structural constraints of economy.31 It is common in monetary economics 
literature to write the objective function as a loss function for the central bank which
needs to be minimized. Thus, the problem can be written as min Et V  S T~! L(xT) ,
' '  tt
subject to the structural constraint given by x = F(x,i,z) + e . Here, 0 -< 6 -< 1 is a 
discount factor, and x is a vector of endogenous variables, a few of which like 
output, inflation, interest rate, or the exchange rate may be objectives, which the 
central bank wants to stabilize around their average values; i is a vector of 
instruments (generally of size one); z is the vector of non-policy exogenous 
variables; and e is a vector of stochastic disturbances. The outcome of the
30 Walsh (1998:321) defines a policy as time-consistent if an action planned at time t for time t+i remains optimal 
to implement when time t+i actually arrives. If it was not optimal to respond as planned originally then such 
policy is time-inconsistent.
31 Such economic analysis is attributed to be initiated in works of Tinbergen (1952) and Theil (1961)
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optimization problem is a policy rule i* = H(z) to be followed by the monetary 
authorities. Since this rule is obtained as a product of optimization, the parameters of 
the rule change as and when new information is arrived.
The loss function can be specified in different ways depending upon the motive 
of the stabilization objectives. However, in order to demonstrate the inflation bias in 
the simplest possible way a specification similar to Barro and Gordon (1983) is 
considered here. Let the loss function be linear in output and quadratic in inflation 
given as below:
U n „ y , )  = ^ ( n ,  - n ' ) 1 - ß ( y , - y f )  (2.27)
where y p is potential output n* is target inflation, which is can be assumed as zero 
(7 1 * =0), and a , f i > 0  are the weights given to inflation stabilization and output 
deviation. Next, consider a Lucas type aggregate supply function
y, - y ? =  U x , - x ^ ) + e ,  (2.28)
and a policy rule, which links inflation (the state variable) with the instrument, the 
money growth (control variable) as
n t =<J)Amt +vt (2.29)
where v is the velocity shock. Now the loss function can be written as
Lt = —(nt)2 -ß[Ä(7Tt ) + £,], as considered in Barro and Gordon (1983).
Plugging the values from (2.28) and (2.29) into (2.27) gives rise to the following loss 
function.
Lt =^a((/)Aml +vt)2 -ß[Ä((pAml +v[ - ^ ,_,) + £,] 
Minimizing with respect to Am gives the value of money growth as:
(2.30)
Am, * = ßÄ / a > 0 (2.31)
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Using this value of money-growth the private agent’s actual inflation is obtained 
as nt = (J) ßA I a + vt . With private agents forming their expectation before observing 
vt , the expected average inflation would be nt̂ t_x = (p ßA /a , which is independent
of output. The economy suffers from positive inflation without any benefit. The size 
of the bias increases in the weight put on output ß  , the responsiveness of output to 
inflation surprise A , the responsiveness of inflation to money growth (p and 
decreases in the weight put on inflation a  . If the parameter A is a large positive 
value, the central bank has incentive to increase inflation. Since private agents know 
this, the inflation bias goes on increasing without any gains in output at the 
equilibrium. However, if A is a very low value, or negative then there is no incentive 
for the central bank to pursue inflationary policy.
Now, the loss under discretion Ldt can be calculated as 
L!‘ =-^a((f) ß A /a  + V')2 -  ß[A((f>ßA/a  + V'-(pßA/a) + e t ] and the expected loss
would be E[L\1 ] = - + ßA(J)Vt + — (v,)2 -  ß(Av ) - £ ) ] ,  which solves to give
2 a 2
£ [^ ] = ( ^ ) 1  + I (  )2 (2.32)
2a 2
Here it is assumed that E[v] = E[e] = 0 and cr2v is the variance of the random 
inflation control error v . The expected loss is increasing in the variance of the 
random control error v , the weight put on output ß  , responsiveness of output to 
inflation surprise A , responsiveness of inflation to money growth (p and decreasing 
in the weight put on the inflation a  .
To contrast the above outcome under discretion with that of a rule consider that 
the monetary authority is under a contract to set a zero money growth rate, Am =0. In 
other words, assuming that parameter (p = 0, inflation would be given by nt — vt .
Then, the expected loss under contract E[Et ] would be:
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(2.33)E[LC,} = U<J„?<E[LJ,}
Thus, the point made here is that the loss (or cost) under a rule is lower than that 
under discretion. The lower cost reflects the value of being able to make a 
commitment- that is, a contractual agreement between the policymaker and the 
private agents. Without these commitments, inflation ends up being excessive 
without benefit.
There are two reasons for inflation bias under discretion. First, the central bank 
has an incentive to inflate once private-sector expectations are set. Second, the 
central bank is unable to pre-commit a zero average inflation rate because of 
optimality condition (2.31), which does not involve any inflation term. Under the 
rule, if people are expecting zero inflation, then as noted previously, the policymaker 
would like to implement a positive inflation rate in order to secure some benefits 
from an inflation shock.
There is a large literature on how to deal with discretion, given the fact that rules 
are static and central banks should have a dynamic view in policy making. Rogoff 
(1985) is one of the early analyses in this area to emphasize that the government can 
achieve better control on inflation by appointing a conservative central banker with a 
greater disliking for inflation than that of the society as a whole. Some economists, 
like Minford (1995) and Blinder (1999) consider a public mandate in democratic 
society can enforce a low-inflation outcome. By setting the goals of central banks 
quite precisely, discretionary bias can be reduced. Targeting rules, like an inflation 
targeting rule, under which the central bank is judged on its ability to achieve a pre­
specified value for some macro variable, like forecasted inflation, are considered to 
be potential candidates for reducing inflation bias due to the inherent strength of the 
operational conditions. An optimal linear inflation target can be implemented if the 
central bank is required to target a rate that is actually less than the socially optimal 
rate of inflation (Svensson 1997b). The inflation-targeting rule says “set the 
instrument such that the conditional inflation forecast hits the inflation target in 
quarter T” (Svensson 1999). This presumes the central bank has instrument 
independence and not goal independence. More discussion on regime choice is 
presented in Chapter 3.
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2.7 REAL BUSINESS CYCLE (RBC) MODELS AND INFLATION
The RBC class of models does not recognize the existence of any relationship in the 
form of the Phillips Curve. Instead the RBC theories claim that observed Phillips- 
type correlations stem from the monetary system’s reaction to output fluctuations 
that are induced by real shocks to taste or technology -  not from the non-bank private 
sector’s reaction to monetary shocks. Thus, ‘the distinguishing characteristic of RBC 
models is denial that monetary policy actions have any significant impact on 
aggregate output and employment magnitudes’ (McCallum 1986). It assumes a 
perfectly competitive market with prices clearing all the time and that the changes in 
the real wage of labour, and decisions about labour supply take place in response to 
technology shocks, and its effect on the real interest rate and other variables.
Thus, the central idea of the theory of real business cycle is based on a constant 
return to scale production function with a random technology shock At . There is no
money in the behavioural system. The household maximizes its utility between 
expected consumption and leisure subject to their intertemporal budget constraint. 
Therefore, the labour supply decision is endogenous, which depends upon the 
interest rate and real wage unlike Keynesian models, where employment is a 
demand-based phenomenon. Both, a higher relative wage in the current period and a 
higher interest rate would motivate households to supply more labour during the 
current period32. The implication of the model is a negative relationship between 
consumption and employment as shown in Römer (1996: chapter 4), a proposition 
hard to support empirically. The Ricardian equivalence is an essential assumption in 
order to allow the household to take decisions about current labour supply in view of 
the government decision to increase its purchases, which would mean an increase in 
future taxes and hence expected erosion in future household consumption.
Realization of a new value of At for a given labour N t and capital Kt in time 
period t results in a new value of output Yt . In the case of an increased At over its 
average value, the marginal product of labour, and marginal product of capital, 
would be higher, as also would capital accumulation. With the increase in the 
marginal product of labour, the labour demand function in an employment-real wage 
plane would shift up and to the right. With the labour supply function remaining in
32 See Römer (1996:156) for analytical derivation. Institutively, a rise in real interest rate increases the 
attractiveness of working today and saving relative to working tomorrow.
47
the original position this means a rise in the real wage, higher employment and 
higher output as a result of both the increase in employment and increase in 
productivity. However, the wage effect is given little consideration in the quantitative 
models.
The RBC models are complex for analytical solution due to the inclusion of 
linear and non-linear functions. Therefore, numerical techniques with assumed 
parameters have been used in the literature to describe the model properties. 
Important studies in RBC theory in its quantitative versions include Kydland and 
Prescott (1982); Campbell (1994); and King, et al. (1991) among others. Römer 
(1996: chapter 4), based on parameter values from Campbell (1994) has presented 
several simulated effects of technology shock around a deterministic trend in a 
standard model. After hitting the economy, by assumption, the technology shock 
slowly dies down. Capital accumulates gradually and then returns to normal. The 
labour supply jumps and then declines relatively rapidly, acquiring even negative 
value before achieving the normal. With the jump in capital accumulation, labour, 
and technology, the output increases in the period of the shock and then gradually 
returns to normal. The wage jumps at the time of the shock but subsequently falls 
very slowly. This leads to the conclusion that, wage plays a minor role in 
determination of employment. On the other hand, the annual interest rate, after 
increasing with the technology shock, returns to normal quickly and even dips below 
the normal. Therefore, it is argued that movement in the interest rate is the primary 
cause of movements in the labour supply based on households’ intertemporal 
optimization behaviour.
Thus, in RBC framework, the fluctuations in price and inflation are not explicit; 
these are imbedded in the real quantities. The supply function is mostly dependent 
upon the evolving real interest rate due to the technology and other shocks hitting the 
economy. Since it is plausible that changes in technology have a significant 
permanent component, the RBC models are quite consistent with large permanent 
output fluctuations. However, Nelson and Plosser (1982) conducted empirical tests to 
establish that the cyclical components arising out of monetary disturbances 
contribute little variability to output and employment series in comparison to the 
fluctuation in the trend component of the variable. McCallum (1986) has criticized 
their remarks and a wholesome critical discussion of RBC models is presented in 
Römer (1996:174-189), which includes concerns about the efficacy of technology
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shock, propagation of the shock through intertemporal substitution in labour supply, 
omission of monetary disturbances from the model, and critical dependence of the 
model on a calibration exercise which may not be the unique optimal set. The most 
serious objection comes from application of the unobservable economy wide 
technology shock as if that applies to all producers alike. If that is not the case and if 
random shocks in different sectors are stochastically independent, their effects will 
tend to average out, yielding a relatively small variance in aggregate. Therefore, it 
does not provide a convincing way of modeling aggregate supply behaviour in an 
actual economy (McCallum 1989:195).
2.8 THE STRUCTURAL HYPOTHESIS OF INFLATION
“Structural” models are characterized by the assumption that economic activity can 
be aggregated into two sectors, a “progressive” (industrial) sector and a 
“conservative” (service) sector. Given different rates of productivity growth in the 
industrial and service sector, a uniform rate of growth of money wages throughout an 
economy must lead to permanent cost pressures in the service sector, which is 
assumed to have the lower productivity growth. Because firms in this sector use the 
mark-up pricing rule (a fixed profit margin imposed on rising unit labour costs), this 
cost pressure creates cost-push inflation for the economy as a whole. Structural 
inflation, therefore, implies a change in the relative supply price of the two sectors. 
The supply price of the service sector rises relative to the supply price of the 
industrial sector. Finally, in simple terms, this type of inflation assumes small price 
elasticity but a large income elasticity of demand for the output of the service sector 
(Frisch 1983:153-154). Some of the major contributions in developing this concept 
include Baumöl (1967), Maynard and Ryckeghem (1976), and Aukrust (1977). These 
works are directed towards explaining inflation in OECD countries. Similar attempts, 
using the concept of structural inflation, are made to explain inflation in developing 
countries although with a difference in the emphasis on the sectors.
Kirkpatrick and Nixson (1987) survey the structuralist model of inflation in 
developing countries. Here, the argument is based on the structural bottlenecks 
associated with the growth process. The economic, institutional and socio-political 
structures inhibit economic expansion by not allowing the price mechanism to play 
its role in the development process. The key bottlenecks generally are taken to be:
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the inelastic supply of foodstuffs, foreign exchange constraint and government 
budget constraints. With a rise of income in the manufacturing sector, the demand for 
food increases faster than supply in the presence of adverse terms of trade between 
agriculture and manufacture, shortage of foreign exchange and problems of balance 
of payments. The result is an increase in food prices, which in turn feeds into the 
price of manufactures due to wage bargaining and wage indexation in organized 
sectors. The problems of excess money creation and deficit financing are also 
considered a major cause of inflation in the developing world. However, causes of 
money creation may or may not be an error of judgment but certainly could be 
attributed to structural rigidities and various constraints on growth in the form of a 
low savings rate, difficulties in financing development projects, underdeveloped 
financial markets, and the scarcity of private investment capital, to name a few.
From the above discussion, it appears, what structuralists are saying is that 
monetary growth is in large part endogenous and a response to more fundamental 
underlying causes of inflation. ’It is extremely important to realize that structuralists 
do not deny that an inflationary process will require an expansion of the money 
supply’ (Ayre 1981:72).
2.9 INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF INFLATION
So far, the discussion has been based on a closed economy framework. In an open 
economy, the economic environment beyond the boundaries of countries, transmitted 
through the exchange rate route, can also affect both the supply and demand 
schedules of the home country. In this case, inflation is not only the manifestation of 
domestic activities but also of the international developments. There can be several 
interpretations of the international aspects of imported inflation. It can be regarded as 
an exogenous supply shock in the prices of intermediate goods, or as purely an 
international monetary phenomenon under the fixed/ flexible exchange rate regime, 
or a problem of traded and non-traded goods, or “ international demonstration 
effects” or as a combination of different processes (see Laidler and Parkin (1975), for 
an early survey on inflation). In a world of fixed exchange rates the quantity theory 
would predict inflation to be a worldwide phenomenon (Laidler and Parkin 1975, 
Darby and Lotihan 1983). Similar inferences are drawn from discussion of the 
monetary approach to balance of payments problems (see for example Hailwood and
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MacDonald 1995). However, inflation across countries may also vary with a fixed 
exchange rate, due to the presence of non-traded goods. It is in this context that the 
following aspects of international inflation are discussed.
Direct Effects of Foreign Inflation
When the economy is involved in trade, domestic prices are directly affected by 
disturbances taking place abroad and changes in the domestic tariff structure. Simple 
examples are the setting of oil prices by the oil producing cartel countries and the 
technology effects on prices of commodities like computer hardware and food 
products. Several such factors can be considered as exogenous supply shocks. 
Similarly, variation in commodity prices across countries lead to changes in foreign 
demand for domestic goods (it could be due to socio-political or other reasons), 
which in turn may lead to changes in the wage and price setting behaviour of the 
domestic firms leading to changes in inflation. However, a fall in foreign demand is 
likely to cause recession in the home country in a complex way.
Inflation as an Exchange Rate Effect
With given world prices and a given price of domestic tradable goods, variations in 
the exchange rates can affect domestic prices through the prices of tradable goods. 
Changes in the exchange rate directly affect the domestic currency price of imported 
final goods, which enter the price index and hence inflation. The other exchange rate 
channel is where the exchange rate affects the domestic currency price of 
intermediate inputs. Eventually, it will also affect nominal wages via the effect of the 
consumer price index on wage setting (like indexation). In both cases, it will affect 
the cost of domestically produced goods, and hence domestic inflation (Svensson 
2000). The real exchange rate affects the relative price between domestic and foreign 
goods, which in turn, would affect both domestic and foreign demand for domestic 
goods leading to a variation in inflation.
Inflation from Macroeconomic Interdependence
The Mundell-Fleming model of open economy (Mundell 1963, 1968; Fleming 1962) 
has been the static work horse of economic literature for demonstrating 
macroeconomic interdependence, which discusses the transmission of policy stances 
or economic events from one country to another in a variety of dynamic settings. 
Another framework that is widely used in the literature of international policy 
coordination is the two-country model developed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and
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Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), explicitly based on the assumption of optimizing agents 
in order to allow the model to address normative policy questions. Utility of the 
agents depends on consumption, real money holding and leisure implied by disutility 
of production. Analysis of the basic Obstfeld-Rogoff two-country model under the 
assumption that prices are set one period in advance generates nominal rigidity 
leading to real effects of unanticipated monetary disturbances (Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1996:chapter 10). Thus, both countries have an incentive to expand money supply 
leading to biased inflation.
The above approach is also the fundamental basis of modem large scale dynamic 
general equilibrium macroeconomic models like the McKibbin-Sachs Global (MSG) 
model, which is contingent upon policy regime choices, model parameters, and 
forecasting (forward lookingness) of some variables like the exchange rate and 
degree of international coordination. The dynamic predictions of such models are too 
complex to be discussed in this chapter. However, for simplicity, and in order to 
appreciate the international effects, the static results of the policy stances of one 
country on the inflation of another in a simple Mundell-Fleming two-country model, 
discussed in McKibbin and Sachs (1991) is represented by equations 2.34 through 
2.40 in Table 2.2.
It is assumed that each country produces one good that is an imperfect substitute 
of the other country’s good. Both goods are tradable. The home country and the 
foreign country have symmetric economies and expectations are static. Deviating 
from McKibbin and Sachs (1991), the exchange rate is defined here as number of 
foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. Therefore, appreciation of the 
domestic currency means a rise in value of the exchange rate and depreciation means 
a fall in the exchange rate. The goal is to use the model to find a policy multiplier of 
the sort dX / dY ; that is, the change in variable X as a function of a given change in a 
policy variable Y (Y might be fiscal spending, G, the money supply, M, and so 
forth).
The consequences of the international transmission of policy under the alternative 
assumptions about the exchange rate and wage regimes, and the degree of capital 
mobility are presented in Table 2.3. Studying the results in column p ‘* provide the 
effect of the policy action in another country (say country D) on the prices of the 
country under study (say T).
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Table 2.2 A static two-country model
Eqn.
No.
Equation Eqn.
No.
Equation
2.34 m -  p  = (f y  -  ß  i 2.34* m* -  p* = <p y  * ~  ß i*
2.35 y  = - S s - c r i  + jug + y y *  - v t 2.35* y* = S  s — <t  i* + ju g* + y  y -  vt*
2.36 p = w + 6 y 2.36* p* = w* + 6  y*
2.37 ii ^3
2.37* * II ^3
2.38 p ‘ = a p  + (1 - a ) ( - e  + p*) 2.38* p c* = a  p* + (1 -  a) (e  + p)
2.39 s = e -  p* + p 2.40 • • * i = i
Note: * indicates a foreign country variable. Variable are as follows: y  = real output; p ( = consumer 
price; m  = nominal money balance; p=  price level; S=real exchange rate; w= nominal wage;
Z=level of interest rate; £=exchange rate defined as the price of a unit of domestic currency in terms 
of foreign currency; g = real government expenditure; f=taxrate.
Source: The model is taken from McKibbin and Sachs (1991), Table 2.1. However, the definition of 
real exchange rate is changed
A monetary expansion in country D would result in a fall in the prices of country 
T, if country T has regimes of a floating exchange rate with indexed wages, 
irrespective of the extent of capital mobility. However, if country D also has wage 
indexation, under perfect capital mobility the price effect on country T would be 
zero. Under a regime of fixed exchange rate in country T, irrespective of the extent 
of capital mobility, a monetary expansion in country D would bring about a rise in 
the prices of country T with wage indexation and will have no effect with a fixed 
wage.
A fiscal expansion in country D would result in a rise in prices in country T under 
full capital control if wages in country T are indexed and the exchange rate is fixed 
and prices would fall under full capital control if the exchange rate is floating 
irrespective of the wage conditions. Under perfect capital mobility, the prices in 
country T would rise with a floating exchange rate, while it can go either way with a 
fixed exchange rate and indexed wages.
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Table 2.3 Transmission of policy stance of one country (D, home) on the price in 
_________ the other country (T, foreign)__________________________________
Exchange rate and wage regime Monetary
Policy
Fiscal
Policy
c* C r*
P ‘ p P p
P erfec t ca p ita l m obility
F lo a tin g  E x ch a n g e  ra te
Fixed wage + - - +
Foreign indexation + - ± +
Home indexation 1 0 ± +
F ix ed  E x ch a n g e  ra te  (h o m e  p e g )
Fixed wage 0 0 0 0
Foreign indexation 0 0 + +
Home indexation 0 0 + +
F ix ed  E x ch a n g e  ra te  (fo re ig n  p e g )
Fixed wage 0 0 0 0
Foreign indexation + + ± ±
Home indexation - + + +
Z ero  ca p ita l m obility
F lo a tin g  E x ch a n g e  ra te
Fixed wage + - + -
Foreign indexation + - + -
Home indexation + - + -
F ix ed  E x ch a n g e  ra te  (h o m e  p e g )
Fixed wage 0 0 0 0
Foreign indexation + + + +
Home indexation + + + +
F ix ed  E xch an ge  ra te  (fo re ig n  p e g )
Fixed wage 0 0 0 0
Foreign indexation + + + +
Home indexation + + + +
Source: McKibbin and Sachs (1991), Table 2.2
International Inflation and Small Open Economy
Two country and multi-country large-scale models provide a useful framework for 
the analysis of policy interaction in an environment in which development in one 
economy affects the other. However, for many economies, domestic developments 
have little or no impact on other economies. Decisions about policy can, in this case, 
treat foreign interest rates, foreign output levels, and foreign inflation as exogenous 
because the domestic economy is “small” relative to the rest of the world (Walsh 
1998:269). In this case the Phillips curve or the supply equation can be written as a 
function of unanticipated inflation and the real exchange rate (s), as follows:
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y,4 =a,s, +a„(n, (2.41)
Here y(A is the output gap expressed as the deviation of log output from the log 
natural rate output ( y,A = yt -  yj*) and as defined earlier, rise in the real exchange 
rate means currency appreciation.
Defining the output gap as above and taking all variables measured as deviation 
from the average level (Ball 1998b), used a different lag structure and his supply 
function gives
n, =n,-t + a y y?_, -  a , (s,_, -  s,_2) + e, (2.42)
Svensson (1998) using microeconomic foundation as applied in Woodford 
(1996), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), derived the supply function for an 
open economy as follows:
=a,nM + ( l- a „ ) /r , t3|, +aylyf ,̂ + £ ,(> £ , +eltZ (2.43)
where again the output gap is defined as above and all other variables are taken as 
deviations from their constant trend.
It may be noted that all three specification of the supply curve have different 
underlying assumptions. Equation (2.41) is simply a Lucas type specification with 
an additional term of real exchange rate. The assumption behind this supply function 
is that nominal wages are set in advance on the basis of expectations of the price 
level while actual employment is determined by firms on the basis of realized real 
wage and therefore on the actual price level. Equation (2.42) is derived as a linear 
combination of the average inflation of domestically produced goods and imported 
goods. Domestic goods inflation is given by n d = n t_x + a  y A, + et and the imported
inflation by n™ = n t_x - a s(st_x -  st_2) . The idea behind this is that the foreign firms 
desire constant real prices in their home countries, implying that real price in local 
currency is just the last period’s real exchange rate. Therefore, they adjust their 
prices for any change in the real exchange rate with a period lag. In Svensson's 
(1998, 2000) supply function of equation 2.43, inflation depends upon the expected 
future inflation as also the past inflation. The motivation of this model is derived
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from the consideration that monetary policy must forecast inflation two-periods 
ahead in order to have two period lags in the effect of monetary policy on inflation.
2.10 CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE TO INDIA
The foregoing discussion supports the point made at the beginning of this chapter, 
that the debate on the mechanism of inflation is far from settled. This brings to the 
forefront the importance of country specific empirical studies. However, it can be 
argued that money growth captures several sources of inflation, including that 
transmitted from abroad, and inflation can be influenced by controls on money 
growth. In the economies where the financial market is fully developed, instruments, 
such as short-term interest rates can find the same role. Nevertheless, wage setting 
behaviour, supply shocks, and structural rigidities are equally important in modeling 
inflation. It remains specific to the nature of economy, which model is the most 
appropriate.
As discussed in Chapter 1 certain specific issues pertaining to the Indian 
economy relating to the structure of the economy (structural rigidity), administration 
of some of the prices (government intervention), underdeveloped market clearing 
aspects of the economy (competitive equilibrium) and the absence of rule based 
monetary policy (to form rational expectations) make it hard to analyze the 
determinants of inflation in India using any specific model.
The possibility of supply side inflation accompanied by monetary 
accommodation is not ruled out. The main sources of supply shocks could be oil 
prices, currency devaluation, flow of foreign currency, weather conditions affecting 
agricultural prices, productivity improvements, and price competition together with a 
changing economic environment due to reforms. In addition, prices of several 
intermediate and agricultural goods constituting about a quarter of the commodities 
by weight in the wholesale price index basket of items is administered in one way or 
the other and public sector wages are indexed to the consumer price index, with a 
provision of periodic revisions and adjustments. Government interventions in the 
price setting of administered goods and lump sum increases in wages arising out of 
periodic adjustment also contribute to supply side effects on inflation.
Finally, in the absence of transparency and the desire to stimulate the economy to 
a higher growth path, monetary authorities can always generate inflation of the type
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of discretionary policy, though this may be with ad hoc decisions instead of model 
optimization.
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Annexure 2.1:
A brief note on ‘Six Equations Keynesian Model’
Let capital K,  and labour N be used to produce output Y per period, which is 
divided among real rate of consumption C , real rate of investment I , real rate of 
government purchases G , and real rate of depreciation of capital ÖK. Let n e be 
anticipated inflation, i the instantaneous rate on government bonds, Ö the 
instantaneous rate of physical depreciation such that the appropriate cost of capital is 
i -  n e + 6 . Let P be the price of the unit good, W the money wage of unit labour;
' i 'y
let <7be Tobin’s q and refers to the relative price" that governs firms’ demand to 
accumulate capital; and let wealth of the household be divided between money 
balance M , bonds B and value of the firms V . The six equations describing the 
Keynesian Model can be written as follows:
Y  = F ( K , N ) (A2.1)
w / p  = f n (A2.2)
C  -  C ( Y  T  S  K  M  + B n , i  n ) (A2.3)
P
1 = 1 ( q ( K , N , 6 , i - n ) - \ ) (A2.4)
Y  = C  + I + G + ö K ) (A2.5)
- j  = m { i ,Y ) (A2.6)
The important assumptions with the model are: ’ F k >0, F kk , F nn <0; m i <0;
my>0; 1>Cj>0; C2<0; /  >0; qi=n.<0 . The model differs from the classical 
paradigm, which includes two more equations to describe the labour market 
equilibrium. Labour supply N S = N S( W/ P ) and N = N s which results in 
N = N s (W / P) , such that the nominal wage is determined endogenously. The labour 
market in a Keynesian framework can be incorporated while keeping the money 
wage exogenous through a seventh equation of the type N s = N 5( WIP)and
N < N s , lying outside the above system ensuring an excess supply of labour with 
respect to the demand given by equation (A2.2).
q - —  (l + Se 71 ) +l = q(K,N, i -7Te,S) and /  =  /  ( S  K ) ) = I{ q - \ )
1-71 1-71
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The system of the above six equations can be totally differentiated and solved to 
get the standard IS34 and LM35 curves representing equilibrium in goods markets and 
money markets. General equilibrium in the money market and goods market 
determines output, which in turn determines labour demand N with real wages 
equalized to the marginal product of labour. Since the money wage is exogenous, the 
price level is determined by taking the ratio of money wage to the real wage. An 
increase in the money wage will amount to an increase in the price level for a given 
level of output. That disturbs equilibrium in the money market because it reduces 
real balance, forcing households to sell bonds to meet the excess demand for money. 
The interest rate rises, restricting investment and consumption, causing aggregate 
demand to fall short of aggregate supply, forcing the prices to fall back. This fall in 
price affects the labour market increasing real wages, and reducing employment and 
output until a new equilibrium is arrived at a higher interest rate and lower output. 
This has the same effect as shifting the LM curve to the left.
The general equilibrium of the above system in the short run (dK = 0 )  can also 
be represented in the price output plane. Solving the totally differentiated equations 
(A2.1) and (A2.2) yields the aggregate supply schedule, and solving the totally 
differentiated equations (A2.3) to (A2.6) yields the aggregate demand schedule:
Aggregate supply
d y = F ^ d W _  F 2n dP 
Fnn W Fm  P
(A2.7)
34 The name IS comes from the fact that in a closed economy, the condition that the quantity produced is equal to 
quantity demanded is equivalent to the condition that planned investment is equal to savings. The IS curve is 
down-ward sloping in the output-real interest rate plane because a higher interest rate reduces investment 
demand, reduces demand for consumer durables and, with a floating exchange rate, bids up the value of domestic 
currency and thereby reduces net export. Demand for output falls when the interest rate rises.
35 The name LM comes from the relationship between liquidity preference and money supply, which determines 
the equilibrium nominal interest rate in the money market. If the money supply is fixed by the central bank, a rise 
in aggregate income, by raising the demand for excess liquidity, raises the interest rate at which the money 
market clears.
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Aggregate demand
clY (1
(A2.8)
-  C,dT + dG - (C, + +
(C2 + I q ^ , )  M
(C2 + / ? , . , , )
With the assumption of FN,FK>0; F ^ , F ^ <0; mi<0; my>0; l>C t>0; C2<0; 
/ >0; # <0, stated earlier, it can be shown that the supply curve is upward sloping
and the demand curve is downward sloping in the output price plane as shown in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
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Chapter 3
The Theory of Monetary Regime 
Design
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A monetary policy regime is concerned with the choice of instruments, operating 
targets and intermediate targets, with the objective of meeting ultimate policy goals. 
This process results in a systematic rule (either simple or very complex) for adjusting 
the instrument (quantity or price) in response to new information. Goal variables are 
the ultimate variables of interest to policymakers and typically include inflation, real 
output or unemployment. However, the consensus that monetary policy is neutral in 
the long run restricts the set of feasible long-run goal variables for monetary policy, 
in that case inflation remains the most plausible long-term goal variable. 
Intermediate targets include exchange rates, broader monetary aggregates, nominal 
output, and more recently inflation forecasts. Operating targets could be bank 
reserves or overnight inter-bank short-term rates (like call money rates).
The instruments are the variables which the central bank finds in its direct control 
and which are easily manipulated to achieve a desired value for the operating and 
intermediate targets. Instruments include interest rates on borrowings from the 
central bank (interest rate on reserve money like overnight rates, ‘repo’36 rates or 90 
days bill rates) or a reserve requirement ratio (like cash reserve ratio, CRR) or central 
banks’ holding of government securities (treasury bills, TB). The problem facing the 
monetary authorities is to choose an appropriate instrument and intermediate 
target/targets, and a rule defining their interrelationship. This is what constitutes the 
regime of monetary policy. The problem that arises is which regime performs better 
in a given economic environment? Many answers are theoretically ambiguous and
36 Repurchase agreement of government securities
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thus the ultimate answer is to be found by empirical analysis of the regimes in 
simpler models like that demonstrated in de Brouwer and O’Regan (1997), Cecchetti 
(1998), Svensson (2000) among others or global models like McKibbin-Sachs Global 
(MSG2) model.' These models are used to generate profiles of inflation and output 
variability that can be compared across regimes. For a current discussion on 
performance of different monetary policy regimes reference can also be made to 
Mishkin (1999) and McCallum (1999) among others.
At this stage it is natural to ask, why should the central bank follow rules at all? 
This question has been discussed in the literature on the discretion vs. rule debate. 
Cecchetti (1998) gives two important reasons to support the adoption of rules. The 
first is the now established finding that when policymaking is based on pure 
discretion rather than rules, dynamic inconsistency can lead to high steady state 
inflation due to an inflation bias (see discussion in Chapter 2 and also Walsh 
1998:321-335). The second reason concerns the importance of policy transparency, 
which makes the central bank accountable for whatever target it fixes, and the way 
the central bank carries out its policies. Such arguments have found favour in a 
number of countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel to implement explicit targeting regimes.
There are several approaches followed in the literature on implementing 
monetary regimes. In the remainder of this chapter the discussion on theory behind 
some of the popular instruments, targets, rules and the monetary policy regime is 
organized as follows. The instrument choice problem is discussed in section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 discusses the intermediate target problem. Some of the common rules 
discussed in the literature are presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses common 
regimes of monetary policy and the strategies of inflation control in different 
regimes. Since several countries have adopted an inflation targeting regime and the 
RBI is also considering this option, a brief discussion on inflation targeting is 
presented in section 3.6. The concluding remarks are presented in section 3.7.
37See for example Bryant, et al. (1993); McKibbin (1993), Henderson and McKibbin (1993); Henderson and 
McKibbin (1993a); McKibbin (1997); McKibbin, et al. (1998).
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3.2 THE INSTRUMENT CHOICE PROBLEM
Traditionally, central banks work through a fractional reserve banking system where 
the two most common modes of operations are legislative controls and open market 
operations. In several economies the central bank holds the power to specify CRR 
requirements within legislatively specified limits, which allows it to have direct 
quantitative control on the monetary aggregates. In open market operations the 
central bank buys or sells government securities to influence the operating targets. 
With the interest rate as the main operating instrument, it is also effective to work 
through an announcement effect, where the central bank sends signals about the 
desired market rates by announcing the bank rates and the market often responds 
quickly to such announcements.
The central bank has the choice to use either quantity or price of the securities as 
the instrument. Since the price of the security is inversely related to the interest rate 
and changes in the stock of securities determines the changes in the reserve money 
and hence monetary aggregates, the eventual decision is to choose between monetary 
aggregate and the interest rate as the instrument. The classic analysis of this question 
is due to Poole (1970) which has since been extended in a number of other studies 
and has been useful in a variety of settings even beyond monetary policy issues like 
fixed versus flexible exchange rate and nominal versus indexing of wages . 
Following Poole (1970), Friedman (1990) and Walsh (1998), Poole’s approach can 
be illustrated in a simplified version as follows.
Choice Between Money and Interest Rate
Let the following equation represent the basic static stochastic IS-LM model in log 
terms with constant price p -  1. Let Yt , M t , and Rt be output, money and interest
rate at any time t , and Ytp, M t , R, be their trend (or equilibrium) values then these 
variables can be defined in terms of deviations from the trend as yf = log(Tr /Ytp), 
m(A =log( Mt / M t),  /,A =log(R, /R,) ,  with £ [y ]= 0 , £[m] = 0, E\i\= 0, where ‘E’ 
is an expectation operator.
y ^ - C c t f + U ,
m< = ß yy< -  ß t i  + v.
(3.1)
(3.2)
38 For example see Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Aizenman and Frenkel (1985), Fischer (1977a), Gray (1976)
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Equation (3.1) represents an aggregate-demand relationship in which yA is the 
measure of output gap from the equilibrium (or trend), /A is deviation in interest rate 
from its trend, a is positive coefficient and ut is an exogenous disturbance. 
Similarly the money demand (equation 3.2) is an increasing function of output and 
decreasing function of interest rate and is also dependent upon a random shock vt ; 
y6( and ß x are positive constants. At equilibrium money demand equals money
supply. Let, E[u]= e [v]= 0, £[w2J = c r , e [v2J = ct; ,  e [uv\= o uv = p uvo uo v.
Poole assumes a quadratic loss function for the central bank, which gives the 
expected loss function as L -  £[yfAJ . The objective is to minimize the variance of 
output deviation given by the loss function. With the above assumptions the 
equilibrium level of output gap in absence of shocks is zero and therefore, the 
objective is:
Minimize (3-3)
The two policy instruments, money and interest rate will give two different 
values of the above loss function and choice for the instrument will rest on the one, 
which gives minimum loss between the two.
If the policy instrument is money, the central bank sets mA = 0 , such that 
£LyA] - 0  (from (3.2)), at the start of the period; then shock u occurs which 
determines the values of endogenous variables yAand iA. For the equilibrium 
conditions these can be jointly determined from (3.1) and (3.2). The value of yA can 
be written as follows.
. a,mf  + ß tu, -  a y ,  _ ß,u, -  a,v,
ß, + aß,  “ ß, + aß ,  ( ' ’
Putting this value in (3.3) the value of loss function can be written as
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ß M + a f  a] - 2
Em (ßi + a iß y) 2
(3.5)
If the policy instrument is interest rate, the central bank sets iA = 0 such that 
(from ( 1 ) )  E\y^ J =  0 , at the start of the period; then shock v occurs in the money 
market, which determines the values of endogenous variables y A and mA. For the 
equilibrium conditions these can again be jointly determined from (3.1) and (3.2). 
The value of y A can be written as:
y ^ - a t f + u ,  =ut (3.6)
Now the value of the loss function is
E k l (3.7)
Comparing equation (3.5) and (3.7) can evaluate which policy gives lower 
variance in the output. The money stock policy is preferred to interest-rate policy if
E k ]  =°> z k ]  =
(ßi + a ißy)
(3.8)
This condition can be more usefully written as
1 > (Ä + a , ß y \  ß] + a,2 -  l a ß ,  — pu
at a,.
:(ß, +cc,ßj
f „ \ 2a  0 a, —  + ß.
<j „
Which is < (ß. +aiß ß
\
o,
(l + Puv)<j„
\2
Of,. —  + ß { 
<7 ..
and = *\> (ß .+ a iß vy a i —  + ß i  a,.
\ 2
feasible condition for money stock policy to be preferred.
(3.9)
Equation (3.9) means that feasibility condition for money stock policy to be 
preferred can be satisfied if —  < ß  . Thus, money stock policy would be preferred 
if aggregate demand shock and/or income elasticity of money is large. It can be
65
easily shown diagrammatically that the possibility of this condition to be satisfied 
considerably depends on the structural parameters (slope coefficients) of the system 
and money stock policy would be preferred if the LM curve is flat (low ß i / ß y) or
the IS curve is steep (small a t ).
With the interest rate as policy (equation-3.7), money is elastically supplied and 
therefore income is a shield from any shock affecting portfolio behaviour but there is 
no protection from the disturbances to spending behaviour. On the other hand, if 
money stock is fixed the interest rate fluctuates so as to damp the impact of 
disturbance to spending while income is exposed to disturbances in portfolio 
behaviour. Thus, if only demand shocks are present in the economy ( crv2=0), a 
money stock policy would lead to smaller variance in output. Under the money stock 
policy a positive IS shock leads to an increase in the interest rate, which acts to 
reduce aggregate spending, thereby partially offsetting the original shock. If only 
money demand shocks are present, (<r2=0), output could be stabilized perfectly
under an interest rate policy while under a money stock policy money demand shock 
causes the interest rate to move to maintain money market equilibrium which in turn 
leads to output fluctuations.
With both types of shocks, which instrument is preferable is an empirical 
question. It depends on the values of the two variances (<r~ and <j ] ) and covariance 
as well as the behavioural parameters of the model.
Choice Between Base Money and Interest Rate: Effect of Multiplier
One of the problems with broader money as instrument is that it limits the capability
of the central bank to set money stock exogenously. To solve this problem it is
suggested in the literature to derive money demand as a measure of indirect liability.
In that case, the instrument problem reduces to a choice between base money and
interest rate. Following Modigliani, et al. (1970) and Walsh (1998) the base money
and the money supply can be linked by an equation like:
m,A = bA + hiA +co, (3.10)
Where bA is the deviation of base money defined in the same way as mA, and w 
can be interpreted as the money multiplier shock. Now, it can be seen that while
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interest rate policy is still not affected, the base money policy would give a different 
expression for output and output variance as stated below:
a = (A +h)u, + a iw l - a ivt
ß i + h  +  CCißy
(ß, + h f a ]  + or,.V ; + a ;  - 2 o m) + 2{ßt + h)ccl(a um - cruv) 
(ßi + h + a iß y)2
(3.11)
(3-12)
The base money policy would be preferred only if Eb [yA ]2< £,[yAJ2=(T2. But 
an inspection of equations (3.12) and (3.5) indicates that Eb [yA J 2 >  Em [yA J 2 for 
o uv = o um = o vm = 0, due to the presence of money multiplier disturbances (cr2). 
This makes interest rate policy desirable over money stock policy if financial 
volatility increases (large cr2 ) or money demand become highly unstable (large <r2) 
and difficult to predict over a short period of horizon. In such situation, interest rate 
policy can have a better stabilizing effect and money stock could be left to fluctuate. 
However, if the main source of instability arises from aggregate spending then 
money stock policy would provide more stability. And if the income elasticity of 
money is very low or is not significantly different than zero, then interest rate policy 
should again be preferred.
The choice of instrument variable is an endogenous decision and would become 
more complicated when more than one variable is included in the objective loss 
function of the bank. For example, the policy makers may be interested in 
minimizing the variance of output as well as inflation with some weights assigned to 
them. Similarly, expectations and supply disturbances can also be included in the 
model. A survey of several supply-demand models, including neutrality and non­
neutrality of monetary policy presented in Friedman (1990), indicates that the choice 
of instrument may not be model invariant.
Specific mention can be made of the problem of price level indeterminacy 
obtained by Sargent and Wallace (1975) due to their rationality assumption in the 
model, which led them to conclude the interest rate instrument was not only inferior 
but also implausible on an a priori basis. This led to the notion that only money could 
be the instrument until McCallum (1981) demonstrated that this indeterminacy of 
price under interest rate instrument would follow only in the case in which the
67
central bank’s policy rule placed no weight on price (case of "pure interest rate peg" 
where money is entirely disregarded). McCallum showed that as long as some 
weight is placed on price in the policy rule function of the central bank determinacy 
would prevail. A similar outcome has been demonstrated in Henderson and 
McKibbin (1993a). In addition, the role of nominal anchor has also been emphasized 
in the literature (see Barro and Gordon (1983); Kydland and Prescott (1977); 
Mishkin (1999)) on other grounds, particularly as a constraint on the discretionary 
policy that helps in reducing the time-inconsistency problem (also see discussions in 
Chapter 2).
Combination Instrument Policy
Poole's basic model is based on the assumption that the interest rate could be 
observed while current values of output and underlying disturbances could not be 
observed. In case the money stock, income and the interest rate are continuously 
observed, then neither a monetary instrument nor an interest-rate instrument would 
be optimal. The ideal policy could then be a combination policy that permits both 
money supply and interest rate to change in response to disturbances and it may be 
pragmatic to supply money according to a more general relationship. With three 
possible instruments the base money b , the money supply m and the interest rate, a 
general policy rule can be written (with constants normalized to zero) in the 
following form representing how base money is varied by the central bank in 
response to interest rate variation (Walsh 1998).
*,4 = M 4 (3.13)
Here ju — > ° °  means an interest rate rule /u = 0 means base money rule and
= -h  means money supply rule.
Solving (3.1), (3,2), and (3.10) yield the following:
. a  v , - ® t + u , ß y
i = --------------------------------------------------------------
ß y a i +  ß i  +  M  +  h
(3.14)
a  _ ( f i i + M  + h)ut - w t )
ß y a i +  ß i  +  M + h
(3.15)
a 2 _ ( ß l + M +  a ]  +  (07  + )
( a , ß y  +  ß i  +  M  +  h ) ~
(3.16)
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For the sake of simplicity and clarity of exposition, equation (3.16) is simplified 
by assuming o uv = o um = o vm= 0.
Minimize the variance given by equation (3.16) with respect to jU, the optimal 
value of the policy parameter is obtained as:
*
M
ß ,o .
(3.17)
Thus, none of the above policy is optimal. Instead, the policy response to interest 
rate changes will depend on the relative variances of the underlying economic 
disturbances. In the model it is assumed that the current value of the output and the 
underlying disturbances could not be observed. But suppose that the shocks u , v and 
UJ are observed and the central bank can respond to them by using a rule of the form 
bf = juuut + juvvt + JumUJl where juu, fuv and /^  are parameters. With this rule, (3.1) 
(3.2), and (3.10) can be solved to get
= + (! + / / > ,  this cas6j now it can
/9,a,+A+fc
seen that the variance in output is minimized if juu, jum and juv are selected such that 
Mu -  ~(fii + h ) / a i , jum = - la n d  juv =1.
With these as the expected values of the parameters and forecast of the 
disturbances ü , v and w the linear policy structure can be written as:
I a ßi + h „
bt = - ( ------) U '+V'-a7t - (
ß i + h
<*i
*  * A
M it (3.18)
Here üt =Suif ,  vt = Svi* , uj, and it is assumed that the forecasts of
disturbances depend on the interest rate. If it were the case that the forecast of 
underlying disturbances are based on the observed interest rate then the optimal 
policy response can be said to represent an optimal response to the central bank’s 
forecasts of the underlying disturbances. However, in a more general setting the 
underlying disturbances may also depend on other variables such as the exchange 
rate, and assets and commodity prices.
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Now suppose the interest rate is observed continuously but money stock is known 
with a one-month lag and income with a quarter lag. Then the combination of policy 
cannot be followed because it is impossible to maintain a fixed relationship between 
money and interest rate. Friedman (1977) suggested controlling the policy interest 
rate and changing that rate in response to the monthly observations of the money 
stock as a feasible alternative. From the literature and the practices of central banking 
it appears in general that the modern central banks predominantly use interest rate as 
the key policy instrument.
3.3 INTERMEDIATE TARGET PROBLEM AND GOAL VARIABLES
Conventionally, central banks appear to use some kind of intermediate target for 
conducting monetary policy. The main idea behind using an intermediate target is the 
fact that these variables are more up-to-date in information content than the ultimate 
target variables. The selected instrument, whether an interest rate or non-borrowed 
reserves or base money itself and the intermediate target, together form a policy rule 
in a form that the intermediate target could be systematically influenced by the 
instrument variables. As noted by Svensson (1997:1126), an ideal intermediate target 
‘is highly correlated with the goal, easier to control than the goal, easier to observe 
by both the central bank and the public than the goal, and transparent so that central 
bank communication with the public and public understanding and public prediction 
of the monetary policy are facilitated’. Observations for such variables are available 
on a more timely and continuous basis than the ultimate target variables like output 
and general prices. The intermediate target variables are in fact endogenous variables 
determined by the models.
In conventional monetary targeting, the growth rate of monetary aggregate takes 
the role of intermediate target but any other endogenous variable can also provide 
useful information and thus be used as an intermediate target. The important point 
here is that under a dynamic setting the value of the intermediate target can be 
observed before some policy decision or adjustment to earlier policy decision is 
made but the values of the goal variables cannot be observed at the same time. 
However, deviation in the intermediate target from its expected path indicates likely 
deviation of a goal variable from its target and thus provides a signal to adjust the
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instrument and the operating target variable accordingly. This requires a very tight 
relationship between the goal variable and the intermediate target.
The information contained in the intermediate target variable can be used in two 
ways. One is to choose the instrument setting in such a way that the expected 
deviation in the intermediate target variable from its target be minimized. The second 
is to use the information to derive an optimal feedback rule by relating the value of 
the policy instrument to the observed value of the information variable. Under the 
optimal feedback rule, the information in the intermediate target is used to choose the 
value of the policy variable that minimizes the loss function itself. Thus the stress 
here is to minimize the expected deviation of the goal variable from its target instead 
of minimizing the expected deviation of the intermediate target variable from its 
target. This kind of use of the information variable dates back to Kareken, et al. 
(1973). Friedman (1975, 1977) demonstrated that intermediate targeting is 
inefficient compared to the optimal feedback rule, with both an interest rate as the 
instrument or reserves as the instrument. Rules obtained in the case of the former did 
not minimize the variance in the output when compared to the later. Walsh (1998) 
draws a similar conclusion where the objective function is to minimize expected 
squared deviations of the inflation rate around a target level. It is shown that the 
optimal feedback rule out-performs intermediate money targeting, however an 
intermediate target does better than a policy which does not respond to new 
information so long as money-demand shocks are small.
Besides growth of broader aggregates of money, the nominal exchange rate has 
also been used as an intermediate target, particularly as a means to control inflation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, with the breakdown of the relationship between 
monetary aggregates and goal variables, such as inflation and output, several 
countries have recently adopted inflation itself as the target, where forecasted 
inflation is promoted as a potential intermediate target. In the case of an inflation 
forecast as the intermediate target, Svensson (1997) claims it to be an ideal 
intermediate target as it is by definition the current variable that is most correlated 
with the goal. The choice of inflation as the main goal variable is also prompted from 
the consensus that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, which restricts the set 
of feasible long-run goal variables for monetary policy, nevertheless, inflation is not 
the only possibility.
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A number of economists such as Bean (1983), Taylor (1985), Hall and Mankiw 
(1994), McCallum (1997b), McCallum and Nelson (1999) have advocated nominal 
income as an alternative intermediate target. Nominal GDP growth, which can be 
thought of as “velocity corrected” money growth (that is, if velocity were constant, 
nominal GDP growth and money growth would be equal, by definition), has the 
advantage that it does put some weight on output as well as prices. Under a nominal 
GDP target, a decline in projected real output growth would tend to be stabilizing. 
However, as a matter of revealed preference, in recent years, several countries that 
have adopted explicit policy framework, virtually all have opted for targets expressed 
in terms of inflation rates, not money stock or nominal income growth rate 
(McCallum 1999, Bemanke and Mishkin 1997).
There are two major practical disadvantages with the nominal GDP target 
compared to inflation as target. First, information on prices is timelier and more 
frequently received than on nominal GDP, which requires collection of data on both 
current quantities as well as current prices. Second, the public can more easily 
understand the concept of an inflation target than the concept of nominal income 
targeting and therefore inflation targeting better serves the objectives of 
communication and transparency.
In addition, nominal income targeting is not free from theoretical criticism. As 
can be inferred from the studies of Bean (1983) and West (1986), alternative choices 
of supply functions give rise to entirely opposite results between choosing nominal 
income or monetary aggregate as a policy target.40 With a backward-looking supply 
function, Ball (1997) has shown nominal income targeting as an unstable proposition 
(also see de Brouwer and O'Regan 1997). Therefore, the results of nominal income 
targeting are also not model invariant. Further, Hall and Mankiw (1994) point out 
that the equal weighting of real output growth and inflation implied by nominal GDP
39 Other early works advocating nominal income targeting include Meade (1978), Tobin (1980), Brittan (1981)
40 In his study on a comparison of nominal income targeting with money supply targeting, Bean (1983) used a 
rational expectation model and measured the desirability of policies by their effect on variance of output around a 
certain full information level and concluded that monetary policy based on nominal income as an intermediate 
target is likely to be preferable to a policy based on exogenously determined money provided elasticity of 
aggregate demand with respect to real balances is less than one. On the contrary, West (1986), showed that, if the 
objective of monetary policy is to minimize the unconditional variance of output, nominal income targeting can 
be preferred to fixed money stock if, and only if, the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real balances 
is greater than one, a completely opposite result to Bean (1983).
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targeting is not necessarily optimal and, in general, the relative weight put on the two 
goal variables should reflect social preferences.
3.4 REPRESENTATION OF REGIMES BY SIMPLE RULES
As discussed above, calculating an optimal feedback rule requires a complex process 
of constrained optimization in which the policy instrument is supposed to respond to 
a range of information in a given time period. In practical models there could be 
vector of targets or goal variables, a vector of predetermined state variables, a vector 
of forward looking variables and a vector of innovations to the state variables. This 
brings about uncertainty about the true model and complicates the derivation of the 
optimal feedback rule. McKibbin (1997) points out that it is difficult to distinguish 
between discretion and a complex rule and advocates the use of simple rules as an 
alternative. At the same time it is cautioned that such rules must be robust to 
different models of the economy in addition to the model in which that was 
developed. These range from simple ad hoc rules to analytically derived optimal 
feedback rules such as the nominal money rule, ‘Taylor rules’ (Taylor 1993), ‘CC 
rule’ (Henderson and McKibbin 1993), ‘nominal-income targeting rules’ (McCallum 
1989), and ‘inflation forecast targeting rule’ (Svensson 1997, 1999). Some of the 
popular interest rate rules are presented in Table-3.1.
Table 3.1 Alternative interest rate instrument rules
1. Money Rule i, =i ,  + ß ( m - m t ) (3.19)
2. Nominal-Income Rule h = i , + ß ( p ,  + y, - p <  + y<) (3.20)
3.
3a.
Bryant-Hooper-Mann Rules
Henderson-McKibbin (or CC) 
Rule i, = i t + cc(7T' +  y t - n ,  + y ,) (3.21)
3b. Taylor Rule i, = rt + 7Tt + 0 .5 (7T, - / r , )  +  0 .5 (y , - y t ) (3.22)
4. Inflation-only rule i, = r , + n , + y l (K, - (3.23)
5. Change rule «, = ' ,  + * ,  + T M ,  - n , )  + r 2( y , - y , ) (3.24)
6. Constant-real-interest rate rule
+II (3.25)
Where: i = nominal interest rate; r = real interest rate; 71 = inflation rate; p  = log of price 
level; y = log of output; m = log of money and; c = constant; a bar over a variable indicates a 
desired value
Sources: McKibbin (1997); de Brouwer and O’Regan (1997)
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The importance of looking into the future has been realized in several economies 
where central banks interpret current economic and financial market data with an eye 
to anticipating future inflationary forces in order to counter them by taking advance 
action. In recent years, monetary policy in G7 countries has been driven more by 
anticipated future rather than lagged actual outcome (Clarida, et al. 1998). The 
forward-looking behaviour in policy rules is incorporated such that the rule feed back 
from expected value of future inflation. A generic form of such a forecast- based rule 
discussed in Batini and Haldane (1998) can look like:
r, =rr,-l + ( l - r ) r ‘ +e(7TltJ]- n )  (3.26)
where rt = it -7i t+i|f , i is nominal interest rate, y , 6 and j  represent degree of
interest rate smoothing, policy feedback parameter and targeting horizon 
respectively. According to this rule, monetary authorities control deterministically 
the nominal interest rate so as to hit a path for the short-run real interest rate. 
Forward looking policy rules can also be derived analytically by including forward 
looking variables into the model or incoiporating forward looking demand and 
supply schedules into the model41.
3.5 ALTERNATIVE POLICY REGIMES AND STRATEGIES OF 
INFLATION CONTROL
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear there are two central characteristics of 
regime design that can differentiate between the regimes. These are: (1) policy 
structure of the regime, which indicates the extent of the systematic component of 
the operating procedure of the monetary policy and (2) the policy mode of the 
regime, which indicates the degree of discretion applied in conducting the monetary 
policy. An approximate classification of the monetary policy regimes based on the 
above two characteristics is presented in Table 3.2, which is based on the discussion 
provided in Lindsey (1986) and Masson, et al. (1997). The arrows in the two
41 Forward-looking behaviour can be incorporated in Phillips curve (see discussions in Chapter 2 and also Roberts 
(1995)). Woodford (1996) and McCallum and Nelson (1997) use aggregate demand curve consistent with 
intertemporal optimization which can be reduced to incorporate forward looking behaviour.
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columns below the ‘type of policy mode’ indicate the extent of discretionary and 
non-discretionary nature of the policy mode.
Among the several possibilities emanating from the above imprecise matrix of 
regimes the popular literature4- focuses on three basic strategies for achieving price 
stability, which are: (i) exchange rate pegging with a large low inflation country; (ii) 
monetary targeting; and (iii) inflation targeting. Some countries follow a mix of 
strategies.
Table 3.2 Alternative monetary policy regimes
T y p e  o f  P o l ic y  S tru c tu re T y p e  o f  P o l ic y  M o d e
^  Non-discretionary Discretionary ^
(1 )  S im p le  R u le s  w ith o u t  
f e e d b a c k
A
e .g . C u r r e n c y  b oard , F ix e d  
E x c h a n g e  R a te  T a r g e tin g
B
e .g . O n c e  fo r  a ll d e v a lu a t io n  or  
c h a n g e  in  m o n e y  g r o w th  ru le  fro m  
k p e r c e n t  to  k + x  p e rcen t
(2 )  S im p le  f e e d b a c k  R u le s C
e .g . m o n e y  r u le s  p r o v id e d  in  
T a b le  2 .1
(3 )  In te r m e d ia te  n o n -m o n e ta r y  
ta r g e t in g  w ith  fe e d b a c k
D
e .g . n o m in a l in c o m e  ta rg e tin g
(4 )  In te r m e d ia te  m o n e ta r y  
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IT
(In f la t io n  ta r g e t in g )
Sources: Based on Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997), Lindsey (1986)
Exchange rate pegging with a large country which has consistently low inflation 
over a period exerts direct influence on the inflation rate of the pegging country. In 
other words inflation in the pegging country gravitates to the level of inflation in the 
anchor country. It gravitates because inflation has to be brought down to maintain 
competitiveness. Thus, with expectations working in the right direction, price 
stability is quickly achieved. Though quite successful in controlling inflation, it is 
alleged the central bank loses its independence to the pegging country and is forced 
to contract or expand policy depending on the tendency of the exchange rate alone. 
The growth objective and independent response to domestic/extemal shocks are 
totally sidelined. Rather the shocks of the anchor country transmit to the pegging 
country. In such situations the economy is vulnerable to speculative attacks.
42 Mishkin (1997), Mishkin (1999), Obsfeld and Rogoff (1995a)
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For example, when inflation in the United Kingdom reached the order of 15 
percent in October 1989, and continued at around that level until September 1990, a 
hard peg was introduced under the European Exchange Rate Regime (ERM) to bring 
down inflation, but the restrictive interest rate regime could not be maintained as the 
economy went into recession. The interest rate was lowered. With a lower interest 
rate, parity with the restrictive German monetary policy could not be maintained and 
interventions failed to offset large scale selling of Sterling, which ultimately led the 
United Kingdom to pull out of ERM in late 1992. Subsequently, a search for an 
alternative nominal anchor led the United Kingdom to follow an inflation target 
(Bowen 1995).
Another failure of the fixed exchange rate regime was experienced in Sweden, 
which had a fixed exchange rate for a very long period with occasional realignment. 
From the end of 1989, the krona suffered several speculative attacks, which the 
Riksbank fended off without any devaluation. However, two consecutive speculative 
attacks in September and November 1992 were too severe to be defended and in 
November 1992, some 160 billion krona of foreign exchange was lost, inducing the 
Riksbank to float the krona. Thus, the traditional nominal anchor of the monetary 
policy was lost. However, price-stability was retained as the goal of monetary policy. 
In January 1993, the Riksbank announced the policy of achieving a CPI inflation rate 
of 2 percent with a tolerance interval of plus minus 1 percent for 1995 and later years 
(Svensson 1995).
Strict monetary targeting, which requires constant-money-growth for a chosen 
monetary aggregate, is rarely practiced; a significant deviation from targets can be 
sighted across different countries such as the United States (McCallum 1989:10). 
Though capable of coping with domestic problems and allowing the central bank 
more independence than exchange rate targeting, its success is highly dependent 
upon the stability of money demand function and the controllability of the chosen 
target. Both these factors are important in the formation of expectations about future 
inflation. An unreliable relationship puts a question mark on the central bank’s ability 
to control inflation and meet other commitments, as happened in the case of Canada 
and Australia (Grenville 1997).
However there are a few success stories of inflation control through monetary 
targeting as in the case of Germany and Switzerland. But Germany is alleged to react 
asymmetrically to target misses, raising interest rates in response to overshooting of
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the money-growth, but choosing not to lower interest rates in response to 
undershooting. Both have long-term objectives of price stability and the Bundesbank 
and Swiss National Bank actively engage in communicating the strategy of monetary 
policy to public, thereby enhancing the transparency of monetary policy and 
accountability of the central bank Mishkin (1999). Mishkin considers them "hybrid" 
inflation targeting as their practices are closure to inflation targeting than Friedman- 
like monetary targeting.
Inflation targeting involves a public announcement of a medium-term numerical 
target for forecasted inflation that the central bank has pre-committed. However, in 
practice the central bank is assigned an inflation target to be achieved. This leads to a 
clear objective for the central bank with increased accountability and transparency. It 
focuses on domestic considerations and uses all available information to arrive at the 
target, which provides it with an edge over narrow targeting. With inflation as the 
target of monetary policy, such countries have registered impressive success in 
achieving their targets under required bands (see Table 3.2). However, it is worth 
noting that all those countries, which have successful record of using inflation 
targeting, had low inflation rates at the time of its implementation. The interesting 
question is whether inflation targeting would produce similar results in countries 
experiencing higher inflation rates.
Although, it is too early to make a complete assessment of this new framework of 
monetary policy, it has nevertheless, generated considerable interest among central 
banks. In view of the fact that the idea of inflation targeting is on the current agenda 
of discussion in Indian policy circles, details of its pre-requisites will be discussed in 
the following section 3.6
3.6 INFLATION TARGETING:
Literature on the analytical framework of inflation targeting includes inter-alia 
works such as Leiderman and Svensson (1995), McCallum (1996), Haldane (1997, 
1997a), Svensson (1996, 1997, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999, 2000), and Bemanke and 
Mishkin (1997). Svensson’s (2000) analysis of open economy inflation targeting has 
particular emphasis on the exchange rate channel in monetary policy. Based on the 
existing literature a brief conceptual framework of inflation targeting in a highly 
simplified version of a closed economy case is presented in section 3.6.1 followed by
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the specific features of inflation targeting in section 3.6.2. The chapter conclusion is 
presented in section 3.7.
3.6.1 Conceptual Framework of Inflation Targeting
Let the central bank have a long-run socially optimal inflation target n and two 
short-run goals of stabilizing output and inflation around the long-run inflation 
target.43 The central banks’ period loss function can be written as,
L(jz„y^) = ~[(n,  - n f + X y f - }  (3.27)
A >0 represents relevant weight on output stabilization (for A =0 it becomes 
single goal objective). With 0 < S < 1 as discount factor the intertemporal objective 
function become
min Et ^ S T~'L(7rT, y f ) (3.28)
Subject to:
Supply function: zrf+1 = nt +cc y f  + £t+l (3.29)
Demand function: y A+1 = ß yy* -  ß r{it- n t ) + rjl+x (3.30)
where y f  is output gap (log actual relative to potential output), n t = p t -  is 
inflation rate, it is monetary policy instrument (say short-term interest rate), p t is 
log of price level, 77,, and et are white noise shocks in year t and are not known in 
year t — 1. Coefficients a vand ß r are positive, while ß y is non-negative but less
than one. The interest rate affects output with one-year lag, and hence inflation with 
two-year lags, thus two year is the control lag in the model. Transmission channels 
include an aggregate demand channel and expectation channel. With the aggregate 
demand channel, monetary policy affects aggregate demand, with lag, via its effect 
on the short-run real interest rate and credit availability. Aggregate demand then 
affects inflation, with another lag, via an aggregate supply equation probably like a
43 In a more general set up a central bank can include several other variables such as exchange rate and interest 
rate in its loss function. However, such considerations will reduce the weight on inflation stabilization. For 
expositional simplicity, only two-variable loss function is considered here.
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Phillips curve. The expectation channel allows monetary policy to affect inflation 
expectations, which, in turn, affect inflation, with a lag, via wage and price setting 
behavior.
Taking expectations of equation 3.30, the central bank’s reaction function can be 
written as follows.
1 a ß  y ah = * . - j y ^ + j y , (3.31)
Now, equation 3.31 will represent the optimal reaction function of the central 
bank if the forecasted value of output gap, yA,|f is chosen optimally. In order to find
optimal yA+1|f the optimization problem is carefully formulated as follows. Equations
(3.29) and (3.30) can be expressed as equations (3.32), (3.33) and (3.34), where 
(3.34) is obtained by advancing equation (3.29) one period ahead and using the 
relationship obtained in equations (3.32) and (3.33).
^ t +1 ^ f + i | / " ^ / + i
V,A+1 =  y?+i\t+  ^ + 1
n t+2\t+1 = 7 T + 1  JrCCy y f + \ -  n ,+\\t + a y y t l \ t  + ( £ r + l  JrCCy V t+\ )
(3.32)
(3.33)
(3.34)
With the above transformations, the problem of dynamic program can be stated in 
terms of the value function as follows with one-period-ahead expected output gap 
yt+l|, as the state variables.
V(*,t i|,) = + A y,t,|,2]+<5E,V(^„2H )J (3.35)
Subject to: n M +(£■„,  + a,t7,+l) (3.36)
Let the conjectured solution of the above problem be as given in equation (3.37) 
'/ (*,+1|,) = * „ + L ( tf ,+l| , - t f ' ) 2 (3.37)
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Using the corresponding Bellman equation for the above problem and the 
conjectured solution of (3.37) the first order condition can be obtained as follows.
^t+2\t
*- n A
öayk y%1|, (3.38)
Equation (3.38) is at the heart of the concept of the inflation targeting problem 
(Svensson 1999). It says that select the instrument such that deviation between the
two-year conditional inflation forecast is ------  times the negative of the one-year
Sctyk
output-gap forecast. The above relationship is derived involving both inflation and 
output forecast. In case only inflation forecast is involved in the targeting rule, A =0, 
the strict inflation targeting rule is obtained as:
x t+2\t =n  (3-39)
Equation (3.39) says ‘set the instrument such that the conditional inflation 
forecast at the two-year horizon (or, more generally, at the shortest horizon at which 
inflation can be affected) equals the inflation target’ (Svensson 1999:629). 
Advancing (3.29) by one period and taking expectation the expected output gap in 
period t , the one period ahead conditional forecast of output gap can be written as
y$r l|r r+2|r (3.40)
Using equation (3.40), the first order condition (3.38) can also be written as 
follows:
nt+2\t 71 -  c{A)(nt̂ t n ) (3.41)
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Where c(/1) is defined as c = ---------— , which fulfills 0 < c < 1 and
A + S a 2yk
dc dc—  > 0, ----- < 0 ,44 Now, the targeting rule of the form of equation (3.41) says ‘set
dA d a y
the instrument such that the two-year conditional inflation forecast’s deviation from 
the inflation target is the fraction c(A) of the one-year conditional inflation 
forecast’s deviation’.
Using the first order condition (3.38) and relationships presented in equations 
(3.40), (3.41), and (3.29), the optimal reaction function (3.31) can now be written as 
follows:
S a yk l -  * V  ß y
ß r *
\  t+2\t ~ n  r ~ ß
S a k  /
=  7Tr
Sayk
I' ) + y '
ß r
8a]k
y + AA -I- Sayk y,
(3.42)
K, +b,(n, -f
here bm
S a yk ^ l-c (A )  
ß \ A  + S a 2yk) ß ra y
>0 and
Sa)k  
A + Sa]k + ß\
1 -c(A) + ß y
ßr
>0. Thus, the optimal reaction function (3.42) says that the instrument
interest rate is increasing in excess of the two-year inflation forecast over the 
inflation target, or in excess of current inflation over the inflation target, in addition 
to increasing in output. Weight on output stabilization motivated a gradual 
adjustment of the inflation forecast towards the long-run inflation target. Less weight 
on output stabilization means faster adjustment towards the long-run inflation target. 
In the case of pure inflation targeting the reaction function reduces to the following, 
which is similar to the Taylor rule.
1 / l + /»v A
(3.43)
44 See (Svensson 1997) for proof and derivation of ‘k’.
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3.6.2 Features of Inflation Targeting
Three main features of inflation targeting emerge prominently, and have received 
most attention in the literature. (1) Provision of a nominal anchor in the form of a 
socially optimal inflation target for monetary policy and inflation expectations; (2) 
central bank’s independence, increased transparency and accountability of the 
procedures with commitment of reducing inflation bias of the monetary policy; and 
(3) an explicit role given to the lags of monetary policy in period by period choice of 
instrument setting and ability to forecast inflation closely. Given these features, 
important prerequisites are drawn for implementation and monitoring of IT 
framework.
3.6.2.1 Overriding Commitment for Inflation Target
Giving more weight on the variable other than inflation in the loss function of the 
central bank leads to an increase in the variance of expected inflation and therefore 
likely more variation in the realized inflation. This requires setting a wider band for 
the target inflation. More effective inflation targeting can be achieved by sacrificing 
any firm commitment by authorities to target the level or path of any other nominal 
variable like exchange rate, wages or output. Only some degree of stabilization could 
be committed, while inflation enjoys overriding priority.
3.6.2.2 Central Banks Independence
The central bank should be capable of conducting monetary policy with a degree of 
independence, in the sense that the central bank should be able to gear freely the 
instruments of monetary policy towards the attainment of some nominal objective. 
This only means instrument independence and not goal independence. The goal can 
be the social optimal value.
The independence of monetary policy is linked to fiscal dominance. Therefore, it 
is required that direct public borrowing from the central bank be as low as possible. 
The government should develop its own broad revenue base and not depend 
significantly upon revenue from seigniorage. Fiscal driven inflation arising out of 
monetisation of the deficit undermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. In 
particular, the independence of the central bank in developing countries is alleged to 
be greatly compromised inter-alia, due to a weak banking system, shallow capital 
market, administered interest rates, selective credit policy, compulsory placement of
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public debt and heavy reliance on seigniorage (see Fry (1993); Fry, et al. (1996); 
Mas (1995); Cukierman (1992)).
Masson, et al. (1997) considers that a country facing inflation of the order of 15- 
25 percent for a number of consecutive years will be unable to rely on monetary 
policy alone to target any significant and lasting reduction in the rate of inflation.
3.6.2.3 Model for Inflation Forecast
As discussed earlier, inflation targeting implies inflation forecast targeting where 
forecasted inflation becomes the intermediate target. The monetary instrument (say 
repo rate) is adjusted during the control period so that the forecast exactly coincides 
with the long-term inflation target set by the central bank as the socially optimal 
value. Therefore, the success of inflation targeting hinges on the efficiency of the 
inflation-forecasting model. Forecasting errors associated with model specification, 
identification of true shocks, projection of exogenous variables and probability 
distribution of inflation outturn are critical.
This calls for a sensitivity analysis with baseline projections for different 
assumed paths of exogenous variables to get an idea of probable uncertainties around 
baseline projection. The baseline projection is also required to be modified to 
accommodate off-model information like policy-makers judgments and monetary 
aggregate through continuous practice of working with forward looking operating 
procedures and determination of lags in monetary transmission. Efficient forecasting 
may thus require experimenting with structural changes in model and off-model 
information. All the sources of imperfect controls e.g. aggregate demand and supply 
shocks, instability of velocity, information asymmetries; instrument instability and 
other information variables can be considered in arriving at the forecasted inflation, 
which is an intermediate target in this case.
3.6.2.4 Features of Inflation Targeting Countries
This section provides a survey of common practices followed in some of the inflation 
targeting countries based on current literature (for example Leiderman and Svensson 
(1995), Masson, et al. (1997), Debelle (1997), Hoffmaister (1999)). A summary 
feature of inflation targeting countries is provided in Table 3.3.
In many of the IT countries IT was adopted after disappointment with monetary 
targeting. For some it was adopted in the aftermath of a failed attempt to use the 
exchange rate as the main anchor of monetary policy (e.g., the U.K., Sweden, and
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Finland). In others, like Canada and Australia, it was a breakdown of the relationship 
between monetary aggregate and inflation that prompted the use of inflation 
targeting.
Table 3.3 Summary of inflation targeting framework in selected countries
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Sources: Debelle (1997); Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997); Hoffmaister (1999); CPI inflations 
for the periods 1999 and 2000 are taken from IFS April 2001 which does not exclude the volatile 
components. * Australia experienced high inflation during 2000 due to implementation of goods and 
services tax (GST), the underlying inflation was about 2 %.
The central bank independence (CIB) ranking of these countries in terms of less 
fiscal dominance, and ability to operate monetary policy instruments is below 12
84
(Cukierman 1992) as against 21 for India (a lower rank is considered better). The 
central banks in these countries use the short-term interest rate as their main 
operating instrument and their financial market is considered well developed to allow 
for efficient transmission of monetary actions. Also, inflation in these countries at the 
time of adoption was considerably low, which reduced the risk of cost associated 
with bringing down inflation while at the same time low inflation provided them with 
a degree of credibility before actually committing themselves.
Underlying inflation based on the consumer price index (CPI) with a bandwidth 
appears to be the preferred target in most cases, with some preferring to target 
headline inflation. The target ranges are to be achieved within an announced time 
horizon between one to two years. In most cases the inflation targets were set by the 
central bank or by mutual agreement between fiscal and monetary authorities and the 
inflation reports published for public information. New Zealand and the U.K. also 
publish the inflation forecast, which increases their credibility and commitment.
The literature4' on designing, implementing and monitoring an inflation target based 
monetary regime highlights the need to address several issues. One of the major 
issues relates to the choice between price level targeting and inflation level targeting. 
Under a price level objective, deviations in price level from the target require to be 
offset. Thus, a price rise requires a deflation to reduce the price level, which may 
result in greater variability of inflation. Under a policy that cares only about the 
inflation target, such a price rise is permanent; policy ensures that the inflation rate 
returns to the target level, but no attempt is made to restore the initial price level. 
Bygones are bygones. It has been pointed out that, in the case of inflation targeting 
with random errors, uncertainty about future price level increases with the forecast 
horizon and hence price level forecast may be preferable (Fischer 1994, Svensson 
1996).
However, inflation stability is more common than price level stability. Even in 
Countries with legislative price-stability objectives, such as New Zealand, the 
operational conduct of policy has focused on achieving a desired inflation target
45 Yates (1995), McCallum (1996), Svensson (1997), Haldane (1997), Haldane (1997a), Masson, et al. (1997), 
Debelle (1997), Hoffmaister (1999).
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(Walsh 1998:326). With this consideration, the necessary issues are discussed in 
reference to inflation stability.
Level of Target
There is no uniform opinion among economists regarding the desired level of 
inflation. At present almost all of the inflation targeting countries have a positive 
(rather than zero) rate as their inflation target. According to the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), 2 to 3 percent often surfaces in discussions in industrial countries, 
taking into account the difficulties in statistical measurements and relative price 
adjustments taking place due to differential productivity trends in various sectors 
(BIS 1998). Some argue that the inflation target in rapidly developing countries 
needs to be somewhat higher because (i) relative price adjustments will be more 
significant in economies where productive gains in tradable sectors will be large and 
(ii) price liberalization in the presence of downward rigidity in prices is likely to 
increase inflation. A two percent rate of inflation is considered by some central banks 
(e.g. Bank of England, Bundesbank) as tantamount to price stability (Feldstein 1996). 
Due to rigidities in prices, some economists (e.g. Summers (1991)) favor small single 
strict inflation of 2 to 3 percent in the long term. Fischer (1994) suggested a range of 
1 to 3 percent.
Target Band
To allow for the variation in target measurements, constraints in fine-tuning and 
dampening the effects of supply shocks, most inflation targeting countries have an 
explicit band for inflation. However, too wide a band can render slackness in 
monetary discipline. Analytically, the band can be interpreted as a confidence 
interval, proportional to the unconditional standard deviation of inflation, the square 
root of the sum of the variance of the conditional expectation of inflation and the 
variance of the inflation forecast error (Svensson 1997).
When the central bank’s loss function has multiple goals (e.g. output, exchange 
rate stabilization) in addition to inflation then the band for realized inflation 
incorporates the unconditional variance of the deviation of inflation forecast (short- 
run inflation targets) from the inflation target (the long-run inflation target), in 
addition to the variance of forecast errors. The implicit band for inflation forecast is 
an increasing function of the weight on additional goals. A wide band then indicates 
a significant stabilization goal of the central bank.
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Time Dependence and Speed of Approach to Target
Speed to approach the inflation target depends on the level of current inflation and 
the needs of stabilization of output and other goal variables, as there is a trade-off 
between the variability of inflation forecast from the target and the stabilization of 
output and other goals. Some economists prefer a gradual reduction in inflation to 
cold turkey while others prefer fast reduction. For example (Ball 1994b) considered a 
gradual reduction of inflation costly in real terms as opposed to fast reduction. On the 
other hand, a slower adaptation to a new regime irons out the difficulty and learning 
problems of the process without losing the much-needed credibility. It can also be set 
as medium term and long-term goals. For example, in the UK the target has been 1 to 
4 percent in medium-term and 1 to 2.5 percent in the long run.
Monetary Transmission (Control) Lag
The monetary policy actions affect the final goal variables with a lag. The 
transmission lag may be long or short but at the same time it may also be unstable. In 
the case of inflation targeting, knowledge about the lags in monetary transmission is 
critical. The central bank’s inflation forecast must be formed in advance by a period 
at least equal to the lag in monetary transmission. Haldane (1997a) has addressed this 
issue and shown that underestimating the monetary lag may have a more damaging 
effect on inflation control than overestimating it; in certain situations 
underestimating may lead to explosive cycles. Thus, a forward- looking dimension in 
monetary policy may be necessary.
Operational Considerations
Among the key operational considerations of inflation targeting is the prompt ability 
of monetary authorities to counter the effects of possible external shocks arising from 
unforeseen changes in exchange rate, import-price, foreign output, or climatic- 
change. While there is little conflict in resolving the price and output conflict arising 
from demand shocks, it would be a formidable problem if the conflict in stabilizing 
price and output arise from supply shock.
Instrument Instability
Instrument instability is indicated by the increase in variance of the real interest rate 
and the real exchange rate consequent upon the need to swing the interest rate and 
exchange rate in order to maintain the target around a narrow inflation target band. A
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frequent swing may result from the particular nature and type of shocks, instrument 
effectiveness and the target band.
Transparency and Credibility
It is argued that transparency forces the central bank to continuously improve its 
analyses. Under inflation targeting, the central bank pre-commits itself to an 
objective, which require most accurate knowledge about the structure of the 
economy, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the possible outcomes 
of the policy. Failure to do this will result in missing the target and loss of credibility. 
At the same time, too much flexibility to accommodate inadequate knowledge also 
leads to a loss of credibility. Therefore, sometimes central banks may need to mix 
simple rule with discretion by announcing an inflation target along with an escape 
clause.
3.7 CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS IN RELATION TO INDIA
This chapter has presented a survey of the developments that have led to the current 
framework of conducting monetary policy. Financial market volatility has led 
modern central banks to choose interest rates as the main instrument for conducting 
monetary policy, and at the same time a breakdown of the stable relationship 
between output and monetary aggregate and the failures of exchange rate pegs has 
motivated most central banks to adopt an inflation rate as the primary goal of 
monetary policy. Recently, inflation forecasting has emerged as one of the key 
intermediate targets for monetary policy because of the argument that it is to be 
highly correlated with the socially optimal inflation rate, the goal variable.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that among the different monetary 
regimes inflation targeting on the one hand requires relatively more discipline in 
terms of fiscal management and central bank independence while on the other hand it 
requires greater financial depth and sophistication in manipulation of instruments. 
Developing countries, such as India, find it hard to qualify on these accounts. With 
the combined fiscal deficit of Central and State Governments (during 1990s) 
remaining in the range of 8-10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), more than 
25 percent of the time and demand liability of the banking sector held in government 
securities as SLR and the ratio of gross to net borrowing of the government resting 
around 0.67 does not bode well central bank independence in India. Because of the
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high fiscal deficit the central bank finds it difficult to reduce CRR drastically. In 
order to avoid interest rates rises in the face of otherwise borrowing needs of the 
Government the RBI is constrained to finance it at lower cost.
There has been no liberalization in the area of directed credit. Commercial banks 
are required to direct 40 percent of their commercial advances to the priority sector, 
which consists of agriculture, small-scale industry, small-scale transport operators, 
artisans etc. At present the percentage of directed credit appears to be too high and 
needs to be narrowed down to potentials growth and highly focused areas.
Further the reforms are a very recent phenomenon in India. Financial depth is 
beginning to develop. Thus, it will take quite some time before the pre-requisites of 
inflation targeting as available in the developed economies is achieved in India. After 
the financial sector reforms commencing in 1991 the situation must have improved 
particularly with the abolition of automatic monetisation, decontrol of most of the 
deposits and lending rates and reduction in quantitative controls since 1997. 
Therefore, it does not prevent the monetary authorities in India from commencing the 
process of inflation targeting. The spirit of the monetary regime directed towards 
inflation control need not necessarily be the exact inflation targeting, practiced in 
developed countries. The most important thing is to understand the behaviour of the 
economy and develop an inflation model based on the maximum available 
information and start working with model improvements as time passes. The 
objective of this report has the same spirit.
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Chapter 4
The Inflation-Growth Nexus in 
India
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Achieving and sustaining high economic growth has been the top priority of 
policymakers around the world. While the process of achieving high growth may 
lead to an increase in inflation due to the pressure on inputs exerted by the excess 
demand, sustaining the growth requires that inflation be kept under control. In the 
long run, inflation reduces growth by reducing the efficiency of investment and 
productivity growth. Several recent studies, for example, Fischer (1993), Gregorio 
(1993), Barro (1995), Fry, et al. (1996), Ambler and Cardia (1997), and Ghosh and 
Phillips (1998) have shown a long-run negative relationship between inflation and 
growth based on cross-country and panel regression analyses. Corden (1996) 
observed that one of the strong features of newly industrialized economies like 
Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand was very low levels of inflation over a 
long period between 1961-91. During this period these countries had an average 
annual inflation level ranging between 1.7 and 4.0 percent.
Although there is no single optimal level of inflation, two per cent inflation is 
considered a benchmark of price stability by Feldstein (1996) and certain other 
studies.46 The inflation targeting countries also have inflation targets in a similar 
range of 1-3 percent. On several occasions, the then Governor of the Reserve bank of 
India (RBI), Rangarajan (1998), stressed the need for bringing down the inflation
46 Fischer (1994) suggests a range of 1-3 percent; Summers (1991) considered that optimal inflation should be 
positive; ‘perhaps 2-3 percent’ as the losses from a low inflation level are likely to be small.
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rate in India to be on par with its trading partners’ level of inflation47. Rangarajan’s 
concern seems to emerge from the following channel of adverse effect of inflation. 
For a given nominal exchange rate and foreign inflation, a higher rate of domestic 
inflation means a higher rate of appreciation for the domestic currency with an 
accompanying loss of export competitiveness. An adverse impact on exports may 
affect economic growth in different ways, such as a decrease in imports of 
technology and intermediate products, balance of payment pressures and a net fall in 
aggregate demand.
However, some other studies have concentrated on specifying a threshold level of 
inflation. For example Sarel (1996) and Bruno and Easterly (1998) show that the 
harmful effects of inflation are not universal, but appear only above the 'threshold' 
level of inflation. In a cross-country analysis, Sarel (1996) finds evidence of a 
significant structural break at 8 percent inflation in the function that relates economic 
growth to inflation.
Some country specific time series studies have explored the relationship between 
inflation and output (Bullard and Keating 1995), and inflation and productivity 
(Jarrett and Selody 1982 and Cameron, et al. 1996). However, these studies lack 
concentration on growth. If inflation is found to impact on the growth rate, this effect 
is likely to be more important than any one-off impact on the level of output or 
productivity (Grimes 1991). Grimes (1991) study is one among very few country 
specific studies which have tried to analyze the relationship between economic 
growth and inflation. Based on analysis of 21 industrialized countries, Grimes (1991) 
concludes that even a low rate of inflation is likely to be detrimental to economic 
growth.
Kannan and Joshi (1998) recently analyzed a small sample of Indian data from 
1981-95 in a static model and concluded six percent as the threshold of inflation
47 It can be pointed out that the widely quoted Chakarvarty Committee report (RBI 1985), recommended an 
inflation level of about four percent for India. On the relevance of this recommendation of the Chakravarty 
Committee report, Rangarajan (1998:63) observes ‘No one in this country is advocating absolute price stability or 
even the order of price stability that is being sought as an objective in the industrially advanced countries’. 
Inflation during the recent period of 1991-98 in countries which are the major trading partners of India, like the 
United State of America (USA), Japan, Germany, United Kingdom and France has been at much lower levels of 
about 2.66, 1.04, 3.01, 2.95 and 1.76 percent, respectively, compared with 8.22 percent in India. It may be noted 
that average annual inflation in these countries for the entire sample period of 1971-98 was 5.10, 4.07, 7.71, 3.35 
and 5.96, respectively compared with 8.2 percent in India.
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before output growth is adversely affected. This could hardly have been a surprising 
result, given that the specific period contained only three points of less than six 
percent inflation. However, they considered a six percent inflation rate may be 
‘unacceptably high from the point of view of equity and other welfare considerations 
and may need to be contained at a feasible lower level’ (Kannan and Joshi 
1998:2727).
Such literature, which emphasizes the negative effects of inflation on output 
growth, casts serious doubts on an approach to conducting monetary policy, which 
tries to exploit a short-run trade-off between inflation and output. At the same time, 
if such a negative relationship exists, targeting inflation should become the central 
theme in conducting monetary policy. From this point of view, it is important to 
know the causal relationship between inflation and growth, particularly in view of 
the fact that inflation and economic growth are both endogenous variables.
It is in this context that this chapter examines the inflation-growth nexus in India 
using annual data for the period 1971-98. Particularly, the questions addressed in this 
chapter are: (1) Does inflation affects economic growth (measured by the growth of 
per capita real gross domestic product) in India, (2) whether there is a threshold level 
of inflation, and (3) Besides its direct effects, does inflation exert any indirect effect 
on economic growth through other variables? Specifically, how does inflation affect 
savings and investment in India? The period of this study is reasonable, given that it 
covers a variety of inflation episodes, while at the same time data on most other 
variables are systematically and reliably available beyond 1970.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The pattern of inflation in India is 
discussed in the following section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the causal relationship 
between output growth and inflation is discussed. Estimation of the growth models 
with non-linear effect of inflation on growth is examined in section 4.4. The effect of 
inflation on savings and investment is modeled and examined in section 4.5, and 
section 4.6 presents the concluding remarks.
4.2 CHOICE OF INFLATION MEASURE
Five different price indices are published in India. Three are consumer price indices 
(CPI) targeted to three different groups of consumers. The other two are the gross 
domestic product (GDP) deflator and the wholesale price index (WPI). The three
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consumer price indices are: CPI (IW) for industrial workers (IW) calculated with 260 
commodities; the CPI (UNME) for the Urban Non-Manual Employees (UNME) 
calculated with 180 commodities and CPI (AL) for Agricultural Labour (AL) 
calculated with 60 commodities (GOI 1996:77). However, CPI-AL, which has 1960- 
61 base weights, has become outdated due to the change in the consumption pattern 
of rural population (GOI 1994:58; 1996:77).
It should be noted that none of the above three CPI can be considered a general 
consumer price index in the same broad sense as is understood in developed 
economies and they are seldom used for policy analysis in India. Henceforth, a 
reference to CPI means CPI (IW), which is the broadest of the CPI measures. The 
other two measures of CPI will not be referred to at all in this study. The GDP 
deflator is an implicit price index, which can be derived from the national accounts 
for GDP, consumption or investment. It covers all three sectors of services, industry 
and agriculture and largely represents producer prices. However, the GDP deflator 
can be known only with a big lag in the order of two to three years when accounts 
are final. At the same time, it is not well understood by the economic agents 
compared with the directly published prices indices. Further, in the context of 
monetary policy analysis, information on price movements are needed at quick 
intervals in order to allow policy makers to forecast inflation trends and take the 
necessary measures. Probably due to these reasons the GDP deflator is not a popular 
measure of price index for analyzing the Indian economy.
The wholesale price index (WPI) includes service charges from wholesalers and 
retail profits; it covers 447 commodities spread over primary articles, fuel products, 
and manufactured items. However, it does not include the services sector per se. WPI 
is by far the most commonly used index for the following reasons. First, WPI 
estimates are available with a lag of just two weeks compared to CPI, which is 
available with a one-two month lag. Second, the WPI has an economy-wide 
coverage of price movements and moves closely with the GDP deflator.
The difference between the CPI and WPI also stems from the different 
composition of the basket of commodities and the weight given to them. For 
instance, the WPI includes manufactured goods with a weight (1980-81 base) of 57 
percent in the basket, while primary articles account for 32 percent of which food 
items have a weight of 17.4, excluding manufactured food, and the remainder about 
an 11 percent weight is given to fuel, power, light and lubricant. In contrast, the CPI
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has a weight of about 57 percent for food articles alone. Thus, the WPI has a lesser 
weight to volatile elements and can be considered a closer proxy of core inflation. 
Finally, the WPI captures larger components of import, which reflects on domestic 
inflation.
It is also emphasized here that monetary authorities must be fully aware of the 
broadest possible inflation and any model of inflation must be able to explain price 
variations as a whole. Therefore, the WPI has been adopted as the preferred measure 
of price index in this study. Henceforth, any reference to price in this thesis, means 
the WPI unless otherwise specifically stated.
4.3 CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROWTH AND INFLATION 
IN INDIA
Inflation and output growth are endogenous variables and both may be argued to 
respond to change in the other. Therefore, as suggested by Sims (1972), it is 
important to examine the direction of causality and the legitimacy of their 
precedence. The scatter plot between inflation and per capita output growth for the 
period 1971-98 is presented in Figure 4.1, panels a to c. As discussed above, the 
wholesale price index converted to base years 1993-94 has been chosen as the 
preferred price index in this study. Economic growth is measured by the growth of 
per capita real gross domestic product with base years 1993-94. The per capita real 
output (real gross domestic product) is represented by YPC, while price is 
represented by P. Logs of the variables are expressed by their lower case letters, and 
the first difference is expressed by placing a A before the variable. Thus, 
Aypc represent the growth rate of real output per capita (economic growth) and Ap 
represents the inflation in fractions.
It is clear from Figure 4.1 (panel a), that there is evidence to suggest a negative 
relationship between contemporaneous inflation and economic growth. Lagged 
inflation and economic growth appear to be positively related (panel b), while lagged 
economic growth and inflation appear to be negatively related (panel c). The 
contemporaneous relationship is also negative (panel a). Thus, while the panel-b 
result is intuitive, the other two results appear to be counter-intuitive and need further 
analysis. In addition graphs in Figure 5.1 do not reveal anything about the direction 
of causality. The relationship between the contemporaneous and lagged or future
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variables can be exploited using statistical methods to establish the direction of 
causality and hence the precedence between these two variables as a first step to 
further analysis.
Figure 4.1 Scatter plot of inflation (Ap) and per capita real GDP growth (Aypc) 
(1971-98)
(a) Contemporaneous relationship
0.25 T
0.20 - -
0.15 ••
0.05 ■■
Aypc
(b) Lagged inflation and contemporaneous per capita real GDP growth
0.25 T
0.15 -
• 0.10 -  •
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Aypc
Ap(-1)
(c) Lagged per capita real GDP growth and contemporaneous inflation
0.25 T
0.20
0.15
0.05*-
Aypc (-1)
Ap
95
There are different forms, in which such causality tests can be undertaken. Hsiao 
(1979) and Jacobs, et al. (1979) argue that different studies, which use the same data 
set but different methods of testing, often report results that are not in conformity 
with one another. Therefore, this study uses the two tests described below before 
arriving at the conclusions.
Granger Non-Causality Test
The multivariate version of the Granger non-causality test is known as the ‘block 
Granger non-causality test’, which can be carried out in a VAR set up. Following 
Hamilton (1994:309), and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997:121-131), the concept of the 
‘block Granger non-causality test’ can be described as follows: Consider the 
following simple VAR of order p  for a m x  1 vector z, of jointly determined 
endogenous variables.
z, = a o + Z °* .v ,-  + M, C4-1)
i = i
Now, suppose the variables of VAR are categorized into two groups as 
represented by mx x 1 vector of subset zu and m2 x 1 vector of subset z2t such that
z, = ( z lf , z 2t) and m, + m 2 = m . Then z, can be decomposed into two blocks as 
follows.
1=1 1=1
(4.2)
Z 21 ~  a 20 + £ * , 2 1 ^  i,22̂ 2,i-i + U 2t (4.3)
Here, a x0 and a 20 are mx x 1 and m2 x 1 vectors of constants respectively and 
O . u , 0 , 12, 0 , 21, a n d 0 ,22 contain autoregressive coefficients. The subset zu is said 
to be block exogenous in the time series sense with respect to the variables in subset 
z2t if the elements in subset z2t are of no help in improving a forecast of any 
variable contained in subset zu that is based on the lagged values of all the elements 
of zu alone. In the system defined by equations (4.2) and (4.3) zu is block
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exogenous when O jl2=0 for i = 1,2,..., p . In other words, the hypothesis that the 
subset z2t does not ‘Granger-cause’ zu , which means zu is block exogenous, is 
defined by
H g -® 12 = ° ,  where,012 = ( 0 , 12,0 2 X 2 p X 2 ). (4.4)
Sims Non-Causality Test
In a seminal paper about the implications of the Granger causality, Sims (1972) 
proposed an alternative way of testing Granger non-causality. Following Hamilton 
(1994:304) Sims’ proposition can be stated as follows. Consider following a linear 
projection of y, on past present and future x ’s , with b . and d . defined as
population projection coefficients, that is the value for which E(rjt *r ) = 0 for all 
t and z . E is an expectations operator.
yt = c + ^ bjx,-j + ' Z d jx,+j+rlt (4-5)
7=0 7=1
Then, y fails to Granger -cause x if and only if dj=  0 for j  = 1,2....
As pointed out in Hamilton (1994:305) a problem with Sims’ form is that the 
error term p is in general autocorrelated. Thus, a standard F test of the hypothesis 
that d . =0 for j - 1,2, — in (4.5) will not give the correct answer. To overcome this
problem and still be able to carry out a Sims type bivariate-test of Granger non­
causality Geweke, et al. (1983) (also see Hamilton 1994 ch .ll for more details) 
suggested the following modified specification.
y, = c ~ ' Z a iy,-j + Y j ß i x.-i + v. <4-6)
j =1 j =0 7=1
The null hypothesis that y does not Granger-cause xcan be tested by truncating 
(4.6) at some order p and carrying out a F test of yx- y 2-  y p = 0 . The 
assumption is that y did not cause* can be true if and only if the future values of *
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do not have any power to explain the current value of y . In that sense it is also a test 
of the ability of y in forecasting x.
Considering that in the case of annual data contemporaneous variables can have 
powerful effects, the outcome of a Sims test, which includes contemporaneous term 
with the two-sided distributed lags, may give a different result compared to the block 
Granger non-causality test, which involves only lagged explanatory variables. 
Further, given the small size of the time series data, the order of the VAR is decided 
by using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) of model selection. After obtaining 
the lagged structure, the equations are estimated accordingly.
Both variables are stationary based on the ADF test (see Annexure 4.2 of this 
chapter) and the order selection criterion of the VAR supports the choice of order 1 
for the bivariate system including Ap and Aypc . As both variables are stationary in 
the ADF test, the non-causality test in VAR of order 1 would be consistent. The 
results of the Granger block non-causality test and Sims’ two-sided forecasting 
ability test are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
At the 10% significance level, the Granger block non-causality test (Table 4.1) 
does not rule out a possibility of bi-directional causation in VAR-1, while Sims’ test 
(Table 4.2) rejects the unidirectional causation running from per capita output growth 
to inflation but does not reject causation running from inflation to per capita output 
growth. Thus, the hypothesis that inflation influences growth is not rejected by either 
of the tests.
However, in view of the fact that the block Granger non-causality test in VAR-1 
suggests the existence of a bi-directional causation, it is important to see which of the 
two variables has a more persistent effect on the other. In order to verify this, the two 
tests are repeated such that the regression equations include lags of two, three and 
four. The estimated equations for each case are presented in Annexure 4.3 and 4.4 
corresponding to Granger block non-causality tests and Sims tests, respectively. The 
results of the hypothesis tests are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
With more lags in the system, the Granger block non-causality test now 
unambiguously rejects the hypothesis that inflation does not cause per capita output 
growth, but does not reject the hypothesis that per capita output growth does not 
cause inflation. A look at the estimated equations of Ap in Annexure 4.3 clearly 
shows that the coefficients of lagged Aypc are not significant and the VAR-1 result
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was not robust. On the contrary, inflation appears to have a more persistent effect on 
per capita output growth. Importantly, the conclusions from the Sims test remain 
unaltered. Thus, both tests now support unidirectional causation running from 
inflation to growth. And, it can be safely concluded that inflation is an important and 
legitimate explanatory variable in explaining economic growth in the case of India.
Table 4.1 ‘Block Granger non-causality’ test between per capita real GDP growth
and inflation in a bi-variate VAR. Direction of non-causality being tested 
is from x to y (1971-98)
Test variable (lagged x ) Ap Aypc
Dependent (y ) Aypc aP
VAR - 1 CHSQ (1) 3.450 [0.063] 4.384 [0.036]
VAR - 2 CHSQ (2) 4.130 [0.130] 2.989 [0.224]
VAR - 3 CHSQ (3) 8.030 [0.045] 1.528 [0.676]
VAR-4 CHSQ (4) 12.74 [0.013] 3.770 [0.438]
Note: P-values for Chi-Square statistics are given in square brackets []. The statistics are to test the 
null hypothesis in a Wald test that coefficients of the explanatory variables x  in the equation of the 
y variable are zero according to the equation 4.5. A lower P-value means rejection of the hypothesis 
and therefore that demonstrates existence of the causal direction. Individual estimated equations are 
presented in Annexure 4.3 and 4.5.
Table 4.2 Sims test of forecasting ability between per capita real GDP growth and
inflation in a bi-variate OLS regression. Direction of non-causality being 
tested is from y to a: (1971-98)
Test variable (future 
X) Ap
Aypc
Dependent (y ) Aypc Ap
One past value of x and y and 
one future value of x
CHSQ (1) 1.620 [0.203] 3.507 [0.061]
Two past value of x and y and 
one future value of x
CHSQ (1) 0.618 [0.431] 5.460 [0.019]
Three past value of x and y and 
one future value of x
CHSQ (1) 0.176 [0.675] 8.650 [0.003]
Note: All equations include the contemporaneous value of x in accordance to equation 4.6. P-values 
for Chi-Square statistics are given in square brackets []. The statistics are to test the null hypothesis in 
a Wald test that coefficient of the future value of the x variable }  in the equation for the y variable 
is zero. A higher P-value means that the hypothesis of zero coefficients for future value of x is not 
rejected and therefore that demonstrates non-rejection of the non-existence of the causal direction 
from y to x supporting non-existence of causal direction from y to x . Estimation is done 
according to equation 5.6.
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The regression results of the above test of causal relationships presented in 
Annexures 4.3 and 4.4 of this chapter clearly show that lagged inflation has a 
positive influence on economic growth, while contemporaneous inflation has a 
negative influence. In the subsequent section, the robustness of this relationship is 
tested by adding more variables related to economic growth.
While it may be simpler to argue that the past experience of higher inflation may 
be a motivation for higher production, it is not easy to interpret the negative effect of 
current inflation on growth. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, and as 
also discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the literature dealing with inflation and output 
growth provide several explanations, depending upon whether the explanation is 
provided for stagflation or for cases of high growth with low inflation. In both cases, 
the standard conviction of the Phillips curve type trade-off is completely at odds. 
With inflation the purchasing power of the currency falls, and problems in clearing 
the goods market may arise due to imperfect competition, and or institutional 
rigidities. Thus, country specific characteristics facilitate in making an argument for 
the negative impact of current inflation on growth in India.
Drawing on the study of Bruno and Sachs (1985), it was emphasized early in 
Chapter 2 that a permanent increase in the relative price of a factor of production like 
raw material could shift the production frontier towards the origin. As capital is fixed 
in the short-run, the new equilibrium output and profit depend on the relative 
flexibility of the real wage and legal system regarding labour laws. While there is 
some kind of wage indexation in most organized sectors, Indian labour law does not 
allow employers to fire workers easily. With a relatively rigid real wage, 
unemployment should have increased but has not done so because of the protective 
labour laws. Where there are such protective labour laws, employment could be 
forced to remain unchanged in the short-run, which could also be due to 
technological reasons (for example putty-clay technology). The result is a fall in 
profit and output. International competitiveness is also reduced resulting in a loss of 
export demand. The market clearing output is lower, although the potential output 
based on capital and labour employed has not changed. In the long run if raw 
material prices revert and expectations are corrected, the system may back track to 
the original frontier.
As a result of inflation in inputs and intermediate goods, the general price level 
rises leading to reduced purchasing power of the currency. In the short run loss of
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purchasing power is not compensated with a commensurate increase in general 
income. Market confidence is shaky about investment and output. However, the 
government may resort to expansionist policy to restore growth. But, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, if the demand schedule is inelastic, the government intervention may 
further fuel inflation. Thus, inflation can cause output to fall more sharply under a 
situation of institutional rigidities and ill-timed expansionist policies in countries like 
India. Since the implications of inflation can be assigned to both supply and demand 
side effects, it is rational to examine its effects in a proper framework of fully 
specified regression for per capita real income growth. More specifically, in such a 
model, the question is whether inflation is a fundamental determinant of growth as 
are other variables such as investment, human capital, weather conditions and 
population growth. The same is attempted in the following section, which also 
examines the non-linear effects of inflation on growth in the case of India.
Inflation may affect economic growth through its effects on investment by 
affecting the real interest rate and investors’ expectations about consumer 
confidence. Therefore, it is also important to examine the effects of inflation on 
investment and its determinants. Therefore, analysis of this aspect is done later in 
section 4.5 of this chapter.
4.4 INFLATION IN A GROWTH REGRESSION
Following the seminal work of Barro (1991), the recent empirical literature on 
economic growth (for example inter alia Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin 
(1997a; 1997b)) has identified a number of both supply and demand side variables 
that are partially correlated with the rate of economic growth. Variables like the 
initial level of income, the investment rate, various measures of education, 
population growth, terms of trade, and policy indicators like inflation, black market 
premium, fiscal surplus and many others have been found significant.
In order to identify variables to be included in the growth regression, it is 
proposed to build the empirical model as a regression analogue of growth 
accounting, which can facilitate identifying the mechanism through which 
macroeconomic variables like inflation affect economic growth. Consider the 
production function:
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Yt = F(Kt,Lt H t ,At) (4.7)
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour, H is human capital and A can be 
considered to represent other variables that can affect output either independently or 
through its effect on the efficiency of the factors of production. In growth accounting 
literature A is generally known as factor efficiency. Differentiating (4.7) with 
respect to time and after dividing throughout by Y and rearranging, the growth 
accounting equation is obtained in the following form:
Y/Y = ock (K/K)  + a L(UL) + ocH (HI H)  + a A(AJ A) (4-8)
where a i is the share of factor payments in total product or the elasticity with
respect to argument i in equation (4.7). Now, let the population growth of the 
economy proxy the growth rate of the available labour force. With this assumption, 
the equation for per capita economic growth can be written in the form of equation 
(4.9).
Aypc = ( Y /Y - L / L )  = ccK (KI K ) + (a L -  1)(L/ L) + a H {HI H)  + a A (A/ A) (4-9)
As mentioned above, the last term in equation (4.9) can be considered to 
represent those variables that can affect the output growth either independently or 
through its effect on the efficiency of the factors of production. For a given change in 
capital stock, population growth and the change in human development, changes in 
the weather conditions and the price level can force per capita output growth to 
deviate from its potential path. As pointed out by Laidler and Parkin (1975), inflation 
also has income redistribution consequences. With inflation the purchasing power of 
the rupee deteriorates, which affects consumption patterns especially for the poor, 
leading to social tensions and adverse effects on economic growth as a fall-out. In an 
agriculture dominated economy, deviations of rainfall from normal can have 
important affects on economic growth by increasing productivity of agricultural
48assets and labour, which also feeds into the productivity of the industrial sector.
48 See Kalirajan and Sankar (2001) for a recent analysis of the role of agriculture sector in economic growth in 
India
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Representing deviation of rainfall from normal with DRAIN and change in price 
level with INF, the effects of such variables on the economic growth can be written 
as follows.
A/A = (/)0 + 0, DRAIN + </>2INF (4-10)
In developing countries like India, the government is involved in large-scale 
production activities, and the efficiency of investment is not the same as that of the 
private sector. Therefore, it can be rational to consider two types of mutually 
exclusive investments: first, the gross domestic investment in private sector 
(GDIZPV) and other in the public sector (GDIZPB), both taken as a fraction of gross 
domestic product (GDP). Further, following the earlier convention of representing 
the variables taken in logs with their lower case letters, while a A before the variable 
represents its first difference, the population growth can be written as Apop. In the 
growth literature variables such as years of education and literacy rates have been 
used to proxy human capital. Therefore in this study, data on the literacy rate among 
total young adults as a fraction of the population aged above 15 years, is represented 
by LIT, and chosen to proxy human capital. Thus, replacing H with ALIT, L/L 
with Apop, INF with Ap and K IY with two types of investments GDIZPV and 
GDIZPB as defined in the above equations 4.9 and 4.10, after making some 
adjustments in the parameters, will yield the equivalent reduced form of real per 
capita growth equation (4.8) as presented below in equation 4.11.
&ypcl = ß 0 + ß pv(GDIZPV),+ßPB(GDIZPB)l + ß L(Apop),+ßH(ALIT),
.  „ (4.11)+ ß KDRAIN,+ßmFApt
Where,
DRAIN Deviation of rainfall index (June-Sep) from its 50-year average taken as fraction of the 
average.
GDIZPB Gross domestic investment in public sector taken as fraction of gross domestic product at 
current market price (GDP)
GDIZPV Gross domestic investment in private sector taken as fraction of GDP
LIT Literacy rate among total young adult taken as fraction of people aged above 15 years
POP Population in millions (mid year estimate)
P Wholesale price index (WPI) of all commodities converted to base 1993-94
Y Real gross domestic product (RGDP) at 1993-94 market prices (rupees millions)
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YPC Per Capita RGDP (rupees per person). YPC = Y/POP
Ap Inflation in fractions. Ap=log(P/P(-1))
Apop Population growth. Apop=log(POP/POP(-1))
ALIT Change in literacy rate. ALIT=LIT-LIT(-1)
Aypc Per capita real GDP growth. Aypc=log(YPC/YPC(-1))
Non-Linearity
Asymmetry between the relationship of inflation and growth has been highlighted in 
several studies (see Sarel (1996) for example), arguing that inflation has an adverse 
effect on economic growth only after it crosses a threshold limit, below which there 
is no negative effect on growth. Specifically the three questions to be addressed are: 
(1) is there any threshold level of inflation in the case of India above which inflation 
becomes detrimental? (2) Is such a structural break statistically significant? (3) What 
is the optimal level of inflation in the case of India? In order to examine such effects, 
equation 5.11 can be modified to include a dummy variable PIDEt defined as 
follows:
Let Ap* = the rate of inflation at which the structural break occurs. Let a dummy 
variable be defined as DD = 1 if Ap> Ap*, and DD = 0 otherwise. Then, a variable 
taking into account the extra inflation over Ap* is defined as P/D£'I=DD*( Ap- 
Ap*), where i symbolizes the value of Ap*. For example, the variables PIDE0.020, 
PIDE0.025, and PIDE0.200 represent extra inflation at Ap*= 0.020, 0.025, and 
0.200, respectively. When the OLS regression is estimated with PlDEi and Ap as 
the regressors, the relevant estimators for contemporaneous inflation are as follows: 
When inflation is low (Ap<Ap*), the PIDEt = 0 by construction and the relevant
estimator for inflation is Ap. However, when inflation is high (Ap>Ap*), the 
relevant estimator is the sum of the two coefficients: the coefficient of Ap and 
PlDEi . With a chosen basic model, the OLS regression is iterated with different 
PIDEi variables. This generates a series of regression statistics corresponding to 
different chosen values of Ap*. The structural break occurs at the value of Ap*, for 
which the R-Square value is the maximum. The coefficient of PIDEi shows the 
effect of inflation on growth when the former exceeds the threshold level and its
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Standard error (or t-statistic) value tests whether or not the structural break is 
significant.
Estimation
A summary description of data is provided in Annexure 4.1 of this chapter, while 
further details like sources and derived data are given in Appendix AA of the thesis. 
Following the tradition of time series analysis, all variables are tested for their time 
series properties. The unit test results are presented in Annexure 4.2 of this chapter. 
DRAIN, ALIT, Apop, Aypc, and Ap are all stationary while GDIZPV and GDIZPB 
are integrated of order one in the ADF based unit root test. Thus the data set of the 
explanatory variables contains variables, which are integrated of different orders, 
while the dependent variable is stationary. However, since one of the objectives of 
this analysis is to examine the long-term effects of these variables on growth, it is 
proposed to carefully estimate the equation with particular emphasis on the 
diagnostic properties of the residuals. As a preliminary check, all the variables taken 
together are found to be cointegrated in a test for cointegration following Johansen’s 
method discussed in Appendix AB of this thesis. Therefore, the ordinary least 
squares estimation is expected to be consistent and free from the spurious regression. 
The basic equation is estimated in a distributed lag specification of the following 
form.
Y, = <* + £  A , (4. 12)
i= l i=0
Here a  is a vector of constants, Yt is (nx 1) vector of endogenous variable, X t is 
(&jcl) vector of explanatory variables as, A( and Bt are (nxn)  and (nxk)  matrices 
of coefficients, and jut is a stochastic error term. A preliminary experimentation with 
the data indicated that a lag of order one should be enough, which is reasonable for 
annual data.
From the general unrestricted estimate, the specific model is obtained by a 
downward specification search, as suggested by Hendry (1995) (see section AB.4, 
Appendix AB for a note on general to specific modeling). Both the unrestricted 
model YPC1 and the restricted model YPC2 are presented in Table 4.3. It may be 
noted that both have satisfactory statistical properties, free of problems such as serial
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correlation, and reasonably high R-square values. The long-run coefficients and their 
standard errors are also estimated using variance-covariance matrices and reported in 
Table 4.3 The sum of the coefficients of Ap and Ap(-l) in simple linear models 
YPC1 and YPC2 is not significantly other than zero. This means there is no long­
term effect of inflation on growth in this linear model, while the short-run effect is 
significantly negative.
However, the possibility of non-linear effects of inflation on growth needs to be 
incorporated, using seventeen series of inflation dummy variables, PIDEt , defined 
earlier, as follows:
Aypc, =a0 +al(GDIZPV)t +a2(GDIZPV)t_l +a3(GDIZPB)t +a4(GDIZPB)t_ ,
+ as(Apop)t_x + a6(ALIT)t_x + a1 DRAIN t + asDRAIN (4.13)
+ a9&p, + ax0Apt_x + auPIDEit + p,
in order to find the value of PIDE that provides the best non-linear model, the 
following procedure is adopted.
1. Profiles of R-bar squares, and the Logs of Likelihood function for the base 
model are plotted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 to indicate what value of Ap* 
maximizes the value of the base regression.
2. Size and significance level of the sum of coefficients of Ap and PIDE (a9 + 
a l l )  are plotted in Figure 4.4 to determine the contemporaneous effect of 
higher than Ap* inflation on growth.
3. Size and significance level of the sum of coefficients of Ap, Ap (-1), and 
PIDE, (a9 + alO + al l )  are plotted in Figure 4.5 to determine the long-term 
effect of higher than Ap* inflation on growth.
On examining Figures 4.2 and 4.3, where R-bar squares and logs of likelihood 
functions are plotted, the function is maximized for Ap* =0.055. This also means the 
sum of the squared residuals from the regressions is minimized for Ap* =0.055. 
Corresponding to this value of inflation, the regression results are presented in 
models YPC3 in Table 4.3. Model YPC3 explains 95 percent of economic growth in 
India and, at the same time, has very satisfactory statistical properties. For this 
particular model the sign of a9 + a l l  is negative and significant as is clear from 
entries in the last row of Table 4.3. This means that effect of contemporaneous
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inflation on economic growth is significantly positive when the inflation rate is less 
than 5.5 percent, and its effect on economic growth is significantly negative when the 
inflation rate exceeds 5.5 percent.
Table 4.3 Regression results of per-capita real GDP growth: selected models 
__________(1972-1998)_____________________________________________
Unrestricted
Model Restricted Model
Restricted Model 
with non-linear 
inflation
Model Number YPC1 YPC2 YPC3
Regressor/ Dependent variable Aypc Aypc Aypc
Intercept -0.07 (0.08) -0.03 (0.05) 0.002 (0.04)
Real per capita output growth ( Aypc ) (-1) 0.08 (0.16)
Deviation of rain from normal (DRAIN) 0.075 (0.03)** 0.09 (0.03)* 0.10 (0.02)*
Deviation of rain from normal (DRAIN)(-1) -0.073 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.02)*
Population growth ( Apop  ) -1.03 (0.95)
Population growth ( Apop ) (-1) -3.33 (1.19)** -3.37 (1.19)** -2.59 (0.89)*
Change in Literacy rate (ALIT) 7.48 (5.68)
Change in Literacy rate (ALIT) (-1) 13.28 (5.09)** 9.96 (4.70)** 6.50 (3.55)***
Private investment to GDP (GDIZPV) 0.49 (0.19)** 0.51 (0.17)* 0.46 (0.13)*
Private investment to GDP (GDIZPV) (-1) -0.30 (0.18) -0.25 (0.17) -0.41 (0.13)*
Public investment to GDP (GDIZPB) -0.48 (0.40) -0.37 (0.35) -0.23 (0.26)
Public investment to GDP (GDIZPB) (-1) 0.41 (0.37) 0.50 (0.35) 0.18 (0.27)
Inflation ( Ap  ) -0.23 (0.06)* -0.24 (0.06)* 0.34 (0.16)**
Inflation ( Ap  ) (-1) 0.22 (0.06)* 0.19 (0.06)* 0.25 (0.05)*
Inflation Dummy PIDE0.055 -0.75 (0.19)*
R-Square 0.93 0.91 0.95
R-Bar-Square 0.85 0.85 0.92
S.E of Regression 0.012 0.012 0.009
F statistic, F (k-1, n-k), n=27, k= no. of 
regressors including intercept 12.72 [0.00] 15.48 [0.00] 27.76 [0.00]
Diagnostic Tests
LM (1) serial correlation 0.84 [0.36] 0.08 [0.78] 0.88 [0.35]
LM (3) serial correlation 3.1010.38] 2.63 [0.45] 3.97 [0.35]
ARCH (3) test CHSQ (3) 0.22 [0.98] 0.96 [0.81] 1.95 [0.58]
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 1.53 [0.22] 0.01 [0.93] 1.96 [0.16]
Normality CHSQ (2) 1.54 [0.46] 0.71 [0.70] 0.49 [0.78]
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 1.54 [0.96] 1.56 [0.96] 2.04 [0.92]
Residual Unit root 
Test statistics (DF) 
Long-term Coefficients
-5.27 -4.87 -4.00
Deviation of rain from normal 0.002 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03)
Population growth ( Apop  ) -4.36 (1.52)* -3.37 (1.19)* -2.59 (0.89)*
Change in Literacy rate (ALIT) 20.77 (9.06)** 9.96 (4.70)** 6.50 (3.55)***
Private investment to GDP (GDIPVT) 0.19 (0.20) 0.26 (0.16) 0.06 (0.13)
Public investment to GDP (GDIPUB) -0.07 (0.26) 0.13 (0.23) -0.05 (0.17)
Inflation ( Ap  ) -0.007 (0.08) -0.05 (0.07) -0.16 (0.06)*
Contemporaneous Coefficients 
Sum of current inflation and dummy -0.41 (0.06)*
Note: Predictive failure tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 1992. Unit root test statistics are 
presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in a unit root test with second order ADF. 
^significant at 1% level, ^^significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
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In order to analyze the long-term impact, the coefficients of lagged inflation also 
need to be taken into account. While comparing the positive impact of inflation in the 
current and previous periods with the negative impact of PIDE, the sum of their 
coefficients a9+al0+al1 is also negative and significant at one percent level. Thus, 
in the long run, economic growth is adversely affected by inflation when it exceeds 
the 5.5 percent level.
Figure 4.2 Log Likelihood of regression with base model YPC2
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Figure 4.3 R-Bar- Square of regression with base model YPC2
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Figure 4.4 Contemporaneous non-linear effect of inflation on economic growth
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Figure 4.5 Long-run Non-Linear effect of inflation on economic growth
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Further, it can be easily seen from Figures 4.4 and 4.5 that the size of the effect of 
inflation is fairly constant at a lower level of inflation of below 5.5 percent, while it 
increases for a higher level of inflation. Therefore, a lower level of inflation is 
desirable from the point of view of policy planning. The plots of the values of log- 
likelihood and R-bar-square for model YPC3, presented in Figures 4.2, and 4.3, 
indicate that these curves are quite flat from the left side, while a steeper slope can be 
seen from the right side. This also indicates that higher than 5.5 percent inflation 
must be avoided and lower than 5.5 percent inflation should be preferred.
The analysis in this section differs in several aspects from the earlier study of 
Kannan and Joshi (1998). First, the data series in this study is longer than that of 
Kannan and Joshi. Second, their analysis is based on a static model, which is
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generally not appropriate for examining the impact of inflation in India. Third, in the 
process of their identification of the threshold level of inflation, the statistical tests 
they used produce two different results. Briefly, their R-square was the maximum for 
a 7 percent inflation level. However, the result of their encompassing tests between 
the 6 and 7 percent specification revealed no significant difference. This may 
necessitate doing encompassing tests between the different rates of inflation, which 
they did not carry out. When an encompassing test between the 5.5 percent inflation 
rate and different rate below and above 5.5 percent was carried out in this study, the 
5.5 percent rate consistently identified as the best goodness of fit indicating the 
structural break (see Table 4.4).
Finally, in Kannan and Joshi’s (1998) study, the sum of the coefficient of 
inflation and the variable ‘extra’ (equivalent to variable PIDE in this study), which 
indicates the effect of inflation on economic growth when the former exceeded the 
threshold level, appears to be insignificant. This raises overall doubt about their 
conclusions.
Table 4.4: Alternative test for non-nested regression models
M odel M 1 M ode l M 2 A k a ik e ’s In fo rm a tio n S c h w a r tz ’s B ay esian
M odel Y P C 2  w ith M ode l Y P C 2  w ith C rite r io n  o f  M l  v e rsu s C rite r io n  o f  M 1 versus
P I D E , P I D E , M 2 fav o u rs : M 2  fav o u rs :
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P 1D E 0 .020 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 2 5 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P1D E 0.030 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 3 5 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 4 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 4 5 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 5 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 6 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 6 5 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 7 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 7 5 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 8 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .0 9 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .1 0 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .1 5 0 M l M l
P ID E 0 .0 5 5 P ID E 0 .2 0 0 M l M l
The results from model YPC3 in Table 4.3 show the following additional 
information for the Indian economy. First, private sector investment has a significant 
positive effect on growth in the short-run; the long-term effect is also positive but not 
significant. Public sector investment does not appear to have a significant effect, 
either in the short or long run, most probably because of the prevailing inefficiencies
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in the majority of public sector enterprises in India (see for example Sankar (1992)). 
The policy implication of this result favours more involvement for the private sector 
in the Indian economy.
Second, the coefficient of population growth is significantly negative. This 
supports the well-known proposition that high population growth is in fact 
detrimental to growth in the long run, at least in developing countries like India, as it 
puts pressure on resources.
Third, it can be noticed that change in the literacy rate has a significantly positive 
coefficient. There is a large literature that advocates the development of human 
capital as an important factor in the growth process. The literacy rate in India 
amongst individuals aged 15 years and above has grown from about 33 percent in 
1970-71 to about 58 percent in 1998-99. While not a particularly impressive 
performance, this still had a very significant effect on growth. Possibly realizing the 
importance of these factors, the Indian government now (2000-2001) appears to be 
increasing the participation of private agents in the core sector of the economy 
through second-generation reforms, which would allow state efforts to be directed 
towards improving literacy, health care and infrastructure development.
Finally, the significance of the coefficient of DRAIN implies that agriculture 
growth, which improves with better rain conditions, is an important factor 
contributing to overall economic growth, at least in the short run.
The important result is that the threshold level of inflation appears to be 5.5 
percent. When inflation exceeds this level, economic growth is significantly 
adversely affected. An increase in inflation by one percentage points above this level 
will result in a fall in economic growth by 0.16 percentage points in the long run and 
0.41 percentage points in the short-run. It may thus be concluded that India cannot 
tolerate inflation above 5.5 percent, which is close to the figure of 6 percent the 
former Governor of the RBI, Dr Rangarajan (1998a, 2001) has been suggesting.
4.4 EFFECTS OF INFLATION THROUGH SAVINGS AND 
INVESTMENT
The foregoing discussion has shown the positive effects of private sector investment 
on growth, in line with theoretical expectations. However, as pointed out earlier, 
investment itself can be an important channel of transmission for the indirect effects 
of inflation. Therefore, it is important to examine this issue.
I l l
Investment and national savings rates are highly positively correlated in virtually 
all countries (Baxter and Crucini 1993). This is puzzling for developed countries, as 
it apparently implies a low degree of international capital mobility. 49 On the other 
hand, for countries like India where international capital flows are known to be 
restricted, such a relationship should not be a puzzle. Most aggregate investment in 
India (more than 90 percent) comes from domestic savings. Therefore, the analysis 
of savings behaviour and the effects of inflation on savings are important for the 
analysis of investment. It may be recalled that investment in the growth models 
distinguished between private and public sector investment. While private sector 
investment has a significant positive effect on growth, public sector investment has 
an insignificant effect. Further, public sector investment can be considered more like 
an exogenous variable in the Indian context, where such investments have a lot of 
political and welfare overtones rather than profitability considerations. Therefore, the 
analysis in this section, focuses on private sector investment (GDIZPV) and gross 
national savings (GNSZ)50, both expressed as a fraction of gross domestic product.
Another important aspect of the Indian economy is that household saving forms 
more than 70 percent (and up to 80 percent during some periods) of total savings. 
The theoretical literature on aggregate consumption and savings behaviour is not 
unanimous regarding determinants. Some consumption is accounted for by life- 
cycle-permanent-income consumers, and some by simple Keynesian consumers. This 
is partly due to liquidity constraints and evidence to support the existence of buffer- 
stock saving (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994:316). For a developing country like India, 
three major considerations for savings can be identified in simple terms. First, in the 
absence of state social security, individuals are concerned with future survival. 
Second, the social order requires bulk spending on occasions like the marriage of
49 In economic literature this is known as the ‘Feldstein Horioka Puzzle’ after their famous paper on domestic 
saving and international capital mobility (Feldstein and Horioka 1980)
50 Some earlier studies on savings in India (for example Athukorala and Sen (2001) and Muhleisen (1997)), 
which focus more on the components of savings, have criticized the data compilation procedure on savings in 
India. Muhleisen (1997) has even generated his own series of different components. However, since the purpose 
of the present analysis is to examine the effect of inflation on overall savings at aggregate level, the aggregate 
data on national savings is taken from The World Bank CDROM-2000, where the gross national savings is 
calculated by subtracting total consumption expenditure from the gross domestic product and adding net income 
and net current transfers from abroad. Therefore, in a way the analysis of savings is also an analysis of 
consumption behaviour. Full detail of data sources is provided in Appendix AA of this thesis.
112
children and several other religious ceremonies and people feel gratified by such 
expenditure. Thirdly, there is a strong desire to leave a bequest for children and 
spouse. Therefore, most individuals keep their own needs to a minimum and 
maintain a savings target.
In such a situation, saving is likely to increase in proportional terms with any 
increase in permanent or current income. Savers receive return in the form of interest 
or dividend and capital gains on stocks. Therefore, saving is also expected to 
increase51 if interests on deposits are more and government provides incentives in the 
form of infrastructure like institutional expansion and tax relief on savings.
However, savings behaviour becomes distorted in the presence of inflation. It 
may be cut short to meet already minimized physical consumption or small savers 
may become biased towards leveraged investments in tangible assets, especially real 
assets, like jewelry and consumer durables. Kane (1980) argues that, in the presence 
of deposit rate ceilings, accelerating inflation simply victimizes small savers who are 
disadvantaged in access to credit. On the other hand, if individuals are faced with 
economic uncertainty, they are expected to save more as predicted by the literature 
on precautionary savings. Athukorala and Sen (2001) proxy such economic 
uncertainty with inflation and argue that inflation may cause savings to rise. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the relationship between inflation and 
savings in order to appreciate the full effects of inflation on investment.
Drawing on the literature (see for example Athukorala (1998); Joshi and Little 
(1994); Frenkel and Razin (1994); Krishnamurty, et al. (1987); Davidson (1986); 
McKinnon (1973); Shaw (1973)) on savings, investment and development, and on 
the foregoing discussion, the following reduced form functions are considered 
appropriate for analyzing the effect of inflation on economic growth through an 
investment channel.
GDIZPV = f(RLRSBI, GNSZ, CGAPZ)
+  - /+
(4.14)
GNSZ = f (yp,  DR1, Ap, UTID, TOT, CBDN) 
+ + - +/-
(4.15)
51 It may be noted that when saving is considered only as a means to finance retirement, it is likely that less 
saving would be required with an increased interest rate. Therefore, some economists believe that interest rates 
should either reduce savings or they cannot have any effect.
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Here, GNSZ, GDIZPV, and Ap are the same as defined earlier. The other new 
variables are described as follows: RLRSBI is the real interest rate on lending by the 
state bank of India (SBI) calculated by subtracting the current annual inflation from 
the nominal lending rate (LRSBI). With increasing lending rates investment is 
expected to fall.
CGAPZ is the gap between combined total outlay and combined total current 
revenue of central and state governments as a percentage of GDP and is a proxy for 
the fiscal deficit. In the development literature, government spending on 
development projects has been considered to play an important role in boosting 
private investment (Bardhan 1984). However, excess government spending also 
leads to higher fiscal deficits, which is considered inflationary (Catao and Terronesi 
2001) and an indicator of poor fundamentals from the point of view of private 
investor confidence. With an increasing fiscal deficit, it is also expected that 
resource allocation will become distorted and the private sector may find credit 
costly, causing private sector investment to fall. Yet a substantial portion of the 
deficit may be argued to arise from government expenditure on development 
projects, including in the agricultural sector, which has a stimulating effect on private 
investment. Therefore, it is preferred to use overall government deficit in the 
investment equation rather than expenditure alone. However, in view of the 
possibilities of mixed effects, the sign of CGAPZ is an empirical matter. The role of 
fiscal deficit in the creation of money and hence inflation will be discussed later in 
Chapter 7.
yp is the log of permanent income calculated from real GDP using the error- 
learning hypothesis of Laidler (1985:88) with a geometric weight of 0.5 for the 
current year and the remaining geometric weights distributed over the previous 10 
years (see Appendix AA of this thesis for more details). An increase in permanent 
income is expected to increase savings and hence investment. DR1 is the interest rate 
paid by commercial banks on 1-3 year deposits. With an increase in deposit rates, the 
time deposits in commercial banks are expected to increase. At the same time, this 
may erode profitability of the banking sector in the presence of institutional rigidity 
and controls on lending rates, a point raised in Chapter 1.
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UTID is the dividend paid by Unit Trust of India (UTI)52, which is a proxy for the 
loss of financial savings, particularly of the public sector (a higher dividend would 
have a negative effect on national savings) but it also provides an incentive for small 
savers in mutual funds, which may increase investment. TOT is terms of trade 
expressed in terms of ratio of unit value index of export (UVIE) to unit value index 
of imports (UVII). TOT is expected to have a positive correlation with both gross 
domestic product (GDP) and gross national savings (GNS). However, the effect of 
TOT on GNSZ may be positive or negative depending on the relative magnitude of 
its effect on GDP and GNS. CBDN is commercial bank density in the country 
measured as thousands of people per branch; it is expected that a fall in bank density 
would mean more banking facility for small saver in time deposit.
In order to capture the overall effects of direct and indirect variables on private 
investment, equations 5.14 and 5.15 can be written in reduced form as follows, where 
the real lending rate (RLRSBI) is now replaced with the nominal lending rate 
(LRSBI) and inflation, so that the overall effect of inflation on private investment 
can be measured in a straight forward way.
GDIZPV = f  (LRSBI, CGAPZ, yp, DRl Ap, UTID, TOT, CBDN) (4.16)
A summary of data is presented in Annexure 4.1 of this chapter. More details on 
data like sources and constructed data are provided in Appendix AA of the thesis. 
Again, all variables are tested for the unit root using the ADF method and test results 
are presented in Annexure 4.2. The key variables do not have the same order of 
integration. Particularly, GNSZ, Ap, yp , and CBDN are stationary when tested with 
intercept and no trend, while GDIZPV, LRSBI, CGAPZ, UTID, DRl, and TOT are 
integrated of order one. After taking the first difference, all the variables are 
stationary. However, in modeling savings and investment, it is important to capture 
some of the long-run relationships along with the short-run behaviour of the 
explanatory variables. This calls for modeling in the error correction framework.
Initial attempts to model through the cointegrating vector error correction 
modeling (VECM) approach failed to provide clear identification of the long-term 
relationships due to the presence of several stationary variables which resulted in
52 UTI is the largest mutual fund in India
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several cointegrating vectors. However, the alternative method of the single equation 
restricted error correction modeling (RECM) procedure of Hendry (1995), which 
allows the model to include lagged dependent and independent variables along with 
the terms of difference, proved to be more flexible (see section AB.4, Appendix AB 
for a note on general to specific modeling). A careful estimation with respect to the 
diagnostic properties of the residuals will guard against any spurious content. For this 
purpose the distributed lag model presented in equation 4.12 can be rearranged in 
terms of differences and lagged levels in the following unrestricted error correction 
form as follows.
m - 1 ffi-1
az, = « + £ a’ay,_, + X b; a x ,_, + c0y,_„ + c,x,_m +
1=0
(4.17)
where Cr = -
(  «  "v
c x =
(  m  \
2 *.
v  !'=> ) V ‘=0 )
and C0‘C, represents the long-run
multiplier for the system. Considering equation (4.17) as the ‘maintained hypothesis’ 
of the specification search, the general model is ‘tested down’ by the ordinary least 
square regression starting with adequate lags permitted by the sample size. The 
insignificant lagged terms are dropped systematically until a statistically acceptable 
model in a priory theoretical framework is obtained. The estimated reduced form 
model for private investment is presented in Table 4.5. The model is tested for 
possible unit root in the residuals, using the ADF method and the results are 
presented53. The diagnostic tests indicate that the model is statistically satisfactory 
and acceptable. The CUSUM test and the CUSUM-square test on the recursive 
residuals (not presented here) did not indicate any sign of structural breaks. The R- 
square and the R-bar square for the model are 0.90 and 0.76, which is high enough 
for reasonable predictions. The long-term relationship of GDIZPV with other 
variables is reproduced at the bottom of Table 4.5 with standard errors of coefficients 
estimated using variance-covariance matrix.
53 Considering the fact that the sample size is small, test statistics for unit root test applicable for multivariable 
case may not be reliably obtained from standard tables. However, considering the unit root test on residual as a 
single variable case, the 95 percent critical value is -3 .00  for the present sample size, which shows that the test 
statistic is satisfactory.
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In the context of the subject matter of this chapter, the important conclusion 
emerging from this estimation is that inflation is not a significant determinant of 
private investment per se, either in the long or the short run. The above finding leads 
to a conclusion that inflation does not exert any indirect influence on economic 
growth through private investment.
Table 4.5 Estimated model of gross domestic investment in private sector as
___________fraction of gross domestic product (1972-97)___________________
Model: GDIZPV
AGDIZPV = -0.882** - 0.948 GDIZPV (-1)* - 1.060 LRSBI (-1)* + 0.683 CGAPZ (-1)**
(0.337) (0.179) (0.293) (0.288)
+ 0.084 yp(-1) *-0.934 DR1 (-1)** + 0.085 Ap (-1) + 0.405 UTID(-l)**
(0.024) (0.426) (0.060) (0.174)
- 0.215 TOT (-1)*- 0.556 ALRSBI *** + 0.228 Ayp - 0.581 ADR 1 + 0.076 A(Ap)
(0.057) (0.300) (0.216) (0.391) (0.052)
- 0.540 AUTID - 0.090 ATOT
(0.176) (0.037)
R-square = 0.90, R-bar-square = 0.76. SE of regression = 0.0087, F-Statistic F (14, 11) = 6.71[0.002]. 
DW statistics = 1.86. LM serial correlation CHSQ (1) = 0.226 [0.63], LM serial correlation CHSQ (3) 
= 2.125 [0.55]. Heteroscedasticity CHSQ (1) = 2.684 [0.10], ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 1.15 [0.76]. 
Functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 0.015 [0.90]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 2.020 [0.36]. Unit root test 
for the residuals in second order ADF based on SBC model selection criterion = - 4.36. Predictive 
failure test (Chow’s second test) after breaking the sample at 1992 CHSQ (5) = 1.37 [0.93].
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
Long term coefficients of private investment
GDIZPV = constant-1.118 LRSBI*+ 0.721 CGAPZ** +0.088 yp * - 0.990 DR 1*** 
(0.415) (0.384) (0.023) (0.525)
+ 0.089 Ap + 0.427 UTID*** - 0.227 TOT**
(0.066) (0.221) (0.081)
Other important conclusions that can be drawn from the results in Table 4.5 are 
as follows. Nominal interest rates on lending as well as saving deposits tend to 
decrease private investment54. It may be pointed out that high deposit rates may lead
54 However, in the context of interest rate liberalization and directed credit, Ahluwalia (1999) argues that it is the 
timely availability of credit, which matters more than the interest rate.
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to high lending rates, particularly in the face of likely inefficiency of the banking and 
the financial institutions, most of which are in the public sector in India. The 
coefficients of nominal interest rates and inflation do not appear to suggest that there 
is significant consideration of the real interest rate by investors in India. This may be 
due to the fact that inflation in India was still generally less than two digit levels 
during the sample period.
A significant positive sign of combined fiscal deficit in the long-run shows that a 
one percentage point increase in the combined deficit leads to an increase in private 
investment to the extent of about 0.72 percentage points in the long-term. This 
indicates that significant government spending is directed towards development 
activities and motivating the private sector. In this context, it can be argued that 
government spending on infrastructure, such as railways, roads, communication and 
subsidies like manufacturing fertilizers, motivate the private sector to increase 
investment. While fiscal deficit appears to positively affect private investment, its 
overall positive effect on economic growth through investment may be significantly 
less than its negative effect through inflation itself, which is discussed in Chapter 7 
on money supply.
As expected, growth in permanent real income has a favourable effect on savings 
and investment. The terms of trade has a negative sign, which shows that the effect 
of improvement in the terms of trade is more in increasing consumption than savings 
and investment. Similarly, the increases in UTI dividends motivates saving and 
hence investment in the long term, but in the short-run it appears to increase 
consumption rather than re-investment. The change in bank density CBDN is not 
found to add to the explanatory power of this model, although it has been found 
significant in explaining savings in some studies such as Athukorala (1998).
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the effect of inflation on economic growth has been systematically 
analyzed from different perspectives.
In an interesting survey, Shiller (1996) poses the question “why do people dislike 
inflation?” In the Indian context, there could be several answers to this question. The 
important result is that inflation directly affects economic growth. Inflation is also 
inequitable because it hits poor people the most. The government can draw some
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benefits by way of collecting an inflation tax but that tax may not help the large mass 
of people in India living below the poverty line. On the contrary, increasing the 
purchasing power of the rupee by reducing inflation would directly help them more.
The results show that the threshold level of inflation for India is around 5Vi 
percent, which was more or less the average inflation rate of its major trading 
partners during the sample period of 1971-98. Thus, India should be cautious that 
inflation should not exceed 51/2 percent. It is found in this thesis that every 
percentage point increase in inflation over 5 V2 percent causes per capita output 
growth to fall by about 0.16 percentage points in the long run, which is a significant 
impact. Therefore, Indian policy makers should not be satisfied with containing 
inflation just below the two digits level. What can be inferred is that India should aim 
to keep inflation at least on par with the average rate of its trading partners, which is 
about the threshold level of 5 V2 percent. The results also show that inflation does not 
exert any significant indirect effect on economic growth through investment. Further, 
while the nominal interest rate on lending as well as deposits appear to decrease 
private investment, the fiscal deficit seems to exert positive influence on private 
investment.
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Annexure 4.1 Summary description of data used in Chapter 4
Sym bol V ariable description and unit o f m easurem ent
C B D N B ank  density : p o p u la tio n  (thousands) p e r b ran ch  o f  co m m erc ia l bank .
C G A P Z Fiscal D efic it: C o m b in ed  gap  b e tw een  T o ta l O u tlay  an d  C u rren t R evenue  
d iv id ed  by g ro ss d o m estic  p roduct.
DR1 1-3 Y ear co m m erc ia l b an k s  av e rag e  an n u a l d ep o s it ra te s  taken  in frac tion .
D R A IN D ev ia tio n  o f  ra in fall index  (June-S ep ) fro m  its 5 0 -y ea r av e rag e  taken  as 
fra c tio n  o f  th e  average.
G D IZ P B G ross d o m estic  in v es tm en t in pub lic  se c to r  taken  as fra c tio n  o f  G D P
G D IZ P V G ross d o m estic  in v es tm en t in p riva te  se c to r  tak en  as fra c tio n  o f  G D P
G D P G D P  a t m arke t p rices  at cu rren t p rices ( ru p ees  m illio n )
G N S G ross n a tional sav ings, inc lud ing  N C T R  a t cu rren t p rices  (ru p ees m illion )
G N S Z G ross national sav in g s taken  as fra c tio n  o f  G D P . G N S  = G N S /G D P
L IT L ite racy  ra te  am ong  to ta l young  ad u lt tak en  as fra c tio n  o f  p eo p le  aged  
abo v e  15 years
L R S B I A v erag e  annua l len d in g  ra te  o f  S ta te  B an k  o f  In d ia  (S B I) taken  in 
frac tion .
P W h o lesa le  p rice  index  (W P I) o f  all c o m m o d itie s  c o n v e rted  to  b ase  1993- 
9 4 = 1 0 0
P O P P o p u la tio n  in m illions (m id  y ear e s tim a te )
R L R S B I A v erag e  real annual lend ing  ra te  o f  s ta te  b an k  o f  In d ia  taken  in  frac tion . 
R L R S B I = L R S B I -  Ap
T O T T erm s o f  T rad e  (u n it v a lu e  o f  ex p o rt (U V IE ) as ra tio  o f  un it va lu e  o f  
im p o rts  (U V II). T O T  = (U V IE /U V II)
U T ID U n it T ru s t o f  Ind ia  (U T I) annual D iv id e n d  R a te  taken  in  frac tion .
Y G ross d o m estic  p ro d u c t a t con stan t (1 9 9 3 -9 4 ) m a rk e t p rices  (rupees 
m illions)
Y P C P er C ap ita  G D P  at co n s tan t m arke t p rices  (ru p ees  p er p erson ). 
Y P C  = Y /P O P
Y P P erm an en t real in co m e ca lcu la ted  fro m  rea l G D P  at fa c to r  co s t ac co rd in g  
to  th e  e rro r-le a rn in g  hypo th esis  d isc u sse d  in L ad le r  (1 9 8 9 :8 8 ) w ith 
w eig h t o f  0 .5  fo r cu rren t y ea r an d  rem a in in g  g eo m etr ic  w eigh ts  
d is trib u ted  o v er p rev io u s  10 years.
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Annexure 4.2 Unit root test for variables used in Chapter 4 in levels and first 
differences
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
an intercept but not a trend.______________an intercept and a linear trend
Variable Lagstructure 95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
CBDN DF - 2.980 -6.68 -31.01 -32.26 - 3.594 -2.01 -30.35 -32.24
ADF (1) -3.58 -31.67 -33.56 -1.92 -31.35 -33.07
ACBDN DF - 2.985 -3.13 -34.06 -35.28 - 3.60 -5.02 -29.70 -31.53
ADF (1) -2.60 -34.42 -36.25 -4.50 -29.86 -32.30
CGAPZ DF - 2.980 -1.47 81.63 80.37 - 3.594 -1.80 81.27 79.38
ADF (1) -1.18 81.71 79.82 -1.21 80.91 78.40
ACGAPZ DF - 2.985 -7.24 80.43 79.21 - 3.603 -7.47 80.42 78.59
ADF (1) -3.95 79.43 77.61 -4.23 79.46 77.02
DR1 DF - 2.980 -1.71 85.73 84.48 - 3.59 -2.99 87.77 85.89
ADF (1) -1.75 84.88 82.99 -4.74 91.64 89.12
ADF (2) -1.16 87.12 84.60 -3.18 90.67 87.53
ADR1 DF - 2.985 -4.55 80.47 79.25 - 3.587 -4.55 79.78 77.95
ADF (1) -5.72 83.52 81.70 -5.70 82.91 80.47
ADF (2) -4.71 83.93 81.49 -4.61 83.22 80.18
DRAIN DF - 2.975 -7.32 19.68 18.42 -3.587 -7.51 19.57 17.68
ADF (1) -3.74 18.77 16.88 -3.95 18.57 16.06
GDIZPB DF - 2.980 -1.64 82.75 81.49 - 3.594 -1.98 83.71 81.82
ADF (1) -1.23 82.00 80.11 -1.36 83.76 81.25
ADF (2) -0.80 82.19 79.67 -0.50 89.22 86.07
AGDIZPB DF - 2.985 -6.21 78.57 77.35 - 3.603 -7.00 79.91 78.08
ADF (1) -5.44 79.33 77.50 -8.38 86.04 83.60
ADF (2) -2.37 80.26 77.82 -4.63 85.42 82.37
GDIZPV DF - 2.980 -2.50 69.26 68.00 - 3.594 -4.57 73.66 71.77
ADF (A) -A .33 70.48 68.59 -2.93 72.BO 70.2B
ADF (2) -0.95 70.08 67.56 -2.44 71.80 68.65
AGDIZPV DF - 2.985 -8.54 67.27 66.06 - 3.603 -8.35 66.28 64.45
ADF (1) -5.49 67.29 65.46 -5.36 66.29 63.85
ADF (2) -3.71 66.51 64.08 -3.54 65.53 62.48
GNS DF - 2.980 -3.52 79.52 78.26 - 3.594 -3.94 80.09 78.21
ADF (1) -3.12 78.66 76.78 -3.44 79.11 76.60
ADF (2) -3.02 79.15 76.63 -2.85 78.85 75.71
AGNS DF - 2.985 -6.24 71.74 70.52 - 3.603 -6.22 71.06 69.23
ADF (1) -5.37 72.39 70.56 -5.50 72.09 69.65
ADF (2) -2.94 71.60 69.16 -3.10 71.20 68.15
LIT DF - 2.980 -0.35 155.08 153.82 - 3.594 -1.72 155.64 153.76
ADF (1) -0.40 155.09 153.21 -1.24 154.96 152.45
ADF (2) -0.40 154.10 151.59 -1.29 154.09 150.94
ALIT DF - 2.985 -6.35 149.47 148.25 - 3.603 -6.26 148.61 146.78
ADF (1) -3.74 148.47 146.64 -3.70 147.61 145.17
LRSBI DF - 2.98 -2.62 73.36 72.11 - 3.59 -1.39 72.98 71.09
ADF (1) -2.57 72.38 70.49 -1.09 72.09 69.58
ADF (2) -2.53 71.53 69.01 -0.51 72.14 68.99
ALRSBI DF - 2.99 -4.62 66.84 65.62 - 3.60 -5.88 69.50 67.67
ADF (1) -3.45 65.94 64.11 -5.27 70.18 67.74
ADF (2) -2.39 64.95 62.51 -4.78 70.70 67.65
P DF - 2.980 -1.05 38.18 36.92 - 3.594 -3.20 41.70 39.82
ADF (1) -0.92 37.90 36.01 -4.93 46.33 43.82
ADF (2) -0.93 38.80 36.28 -4.28 45.75 42.61
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Lag
s truc tu re
The D ickey-F u lle r regress ions include 
an in te rcep t bu t not a trend.
The  D ickey-F u lle r reg ress ions include 
an in te rcep t and a linea r trend
V ariab le 95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC S BC
95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC SBC
value va lue
Ap DF - 2.985 -4.10 38.41 37.19 - 3.603 -3 .97 37.41 35 .58
A D F (1) -4 .43 39.00 37 .17 -4 .29 38.01 35 .57
A D F (2) -3 .57 38.16 35.73 -3 .47 37 .18 34 .14
pop DF - 2.980 -2.58 116.48 115.22 - 3.95 -0 .22 115.49 113.61
A D F  (1) -2 .63 115.76 113.88 0.04 114.77 112.26
Apop DF - 2.985 -4 .29 108.46 107.24 - 3.603 -5 .48 110.94 109.11
A D F (1) -2 .54 107.54 105.71 -3 .83 110.16 107.72
TO T DF - 2.985 -2 .07 21.54 20.33 - 3.603 -4 .28 27 .23 25 .40
A D F (1) -2 .36 21.31 19.48 -4 .66 27 .53 25 .09
A D F (2) -1 .73 20.53 18.09 -3 .84 26 .59 23 .55
A TO T DF - 2.991 -4.16 19.46 18.28 - 3.612 -4 .26 18.97 17.20
A D F (1) -4.11 19.52 17.75 -4 .40 19.55 17.20
A D F (2) -4 .34 20.15 17.79 -5 .23 21.90 18.96
UTID DF - 2.985 -1.01 64.64 63 .42 - 3.603 -1 .42 64 .34 62.51
A D F (1) -1 .12 64.33 62.50 -2 .27 65.48 63 .04
A D F  (2) -1 .12 63.36 60.92 -2.96 66 .30 63 .25
AUTID DF - 2.991 -3.81 61.52 60.34 - 3.612 -3 .79 60 .68 58.91
A D F  (1) -2.86 60.52 58 .75 -2 .85 59.68 57 .32
yp DF - 2.980 3.31 71.96 70 .70 - 3.594 -1 .03 71 .99 70.11
A D F (1) 2.34 71.01 69.12 -1 .04 71 .06 68 .54
Ayp DF - 2.985 -3 .46 66.12 64.90 - 3.603 -4 .52 68 .09 66 .26
A D F (1) -2 .69 65.22 63 .40 -3 .92 67.61 65 .17
ypc DF - 2.980 1.31 53.17 51.92 - 3.594 -1 .80 54.48 52 .59
ADF (1) 1.57 52.65 50.76 -1.57 53 .74 51 .22
Aypc DF - 2.985 -5 .38 50.10 48.89 - 3.603 -5 .92 50.81 48 .98
A D F (1) -3.62 49.12 47 .29 -4 .27 50.12 47 .68
A D F (2) -2.86 48.17 45 .73 -3 .59 49 .39 46 .35
Note: ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. SBC = Schwarz
Bayesian Criterion of model selection. The order of ADF test is chosen as two in all the cases. 
Numbers o f observations vary from 23 to 26.
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Annexure 4.3 Estimated equations used in determination o f causal relationship o f
precedence in ‘block Granger non-causality’ test (1971-98)
VAR-1 VAR-2 VAR-3 VAR-4
Dependent
Variable
Aypc Ap Aypc Ap Aypc Ap Aypc Ap
R egressor
Intercept 0.004
(0.01)
0.093*
(0.02)
-0.003
(0.021)
0.123*
(0.34)
-0.031
(0.03)
0.128**
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.14*
(0.04)
Ap (-1) 0.229***
(0.13)
0.076
(0.20)
0.286***
(0.153)
0.087
(0.249)
0.388**
(0.166)
0.088
(0.28)
0.46*
(0.16)
-0.05
(0.20)
A p  (-2) -0.036
(0.141)
-0.300
(0.230)
-0.12
(0.175)
-0.266
(0.30)
-0.14
(0.19)
-0.38
(0.24)
Ap (-3) 0.28***
(0.15)
-0.171
(0.25)
0.16
(0.17)
0.18
(0.22)
AP  (-4) 0.14
(0.15)
-0.54*
(0.19)
Ay pc (-1) 0.165
(0.21)
-0.673**
(0.33)
0.175
(0.244)
-0.505
(0.397)
0.246
(0.272)
-0.364
(0.462)
0.23
(0.27)
-0.14
(0.34)
Aypc (-2) 0.238
(0.272)
-0.383
(0.362)
0.093
(0.248)
-0.194
(0.422)
0.04
(0.25)
-0.21
(0.32)
Aypc (-3) 0.233
(0.225)
-0.201
(0.383)
0.004
(0.23)
0.38
(0.20)
Aypc (-4) -0.14
(0.21)
0.13
(0.27)
R-Square 
LM (1) serial 
corre lation
0.12 
0.39 
[0.531
0.20
0.13
[0.581
0.15
0.17
[0.681
0.28
0.73
[0.391
0.28
1.18
[0.281
0.23
11.3
[0.001
0.47
1.76
[0.181
0.56
3.19
[0.071
Note: *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
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Annexure 4.4 Estimated equations used in determination of causal relationship of
precedence in Sims test of forecasting ability (1971-98)
One lag System Two lag system Three lag system
Dependent Variable A ypc Ap Aypc Ap A ypc Ap
Repressor
Intercept 0.049**
(0.02)
0 .083*
(0.02)
0.052**
(0.026)
0.110*
(0.026)
0.025
(0.038)
0.080**
(0.035)
A p -0.308**
(0.11)
-0.351*
(0.119)
-0.353*
(0.119)
A p ( - 1 ) 0.204***
(0.12)
0.260
(0.17)
0.289**
(0.136)
0.360***
(0.202)
0.391**
(0.167)
0.424***
(0.227)
Ap(-2) -0.158
(0.124)
-0.423*
(0.170)
-0.204
(0.160)
-0.377***
(0.210)
A P  (-3)
0.172
(0.177)
-0.033
(0.200)
A ypc -0.839*
(0.27)
-0.913*
(0.271)
-0.836*
(0.289)
Ay pc  (-1) -0.116
(0.20)
-0.571**
(0.28)
-0.031
(0.212)
-0.310
(0.318)
0.107
(0.242)
-0.100
(0.329)
A ypc (-2 ) 0.068
(0.193)
-0.255
(0.378)
0.041
(0.228)
-0.073
(0.808)
A ypc (-3) 0.146
(0.477)
0.121
(0.671)
A ypc (+1) 
Ap (+1) -0.142
(0.11)]
0.500***
(0.27)]
-0.091
(0.116)
0.600**
(0.257)
-0.082
(0.681)
0.787*
(0.268)
R-Square 
LM (1) serial 
correlation
0.44
0.66[0.42]
0.52
0.79[0.38]
0.52
2.41 [0.13]
0.65
0.66[0.42]
0.56
2 .02[0 .16]
0.69
3.29[0.03]
Note: *significant at 1% level, ^^significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
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Chapter 5
The Inflation Process in India
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 established a strong case that inflation needs to be controlled in India, at 
least whenever it has a tendency to breach the 5.5 percent level. In order to identify 
the role of monetary policy in targeting inflation, it is important to understand and 
model the inflation process.
Identification of the inflation process requires examination of the determinants of 
economy wide aggregate demand and supply. There are different ways of specifying 
the aggregate supply and demand functions in the literature in order to deal with the 
problem of identification during estimation. The supply function in this chapter has 
been specified in terms of output gap and the demand function is specified following 
Römers’s (2000) suggestion, which emphasizes a downward sloping aggregate 
demand curve in the inflation output plane. Due to several unknown shift parameters, 
the supply schedule is complex to specify. The implication of such unknown 
parameters can be captured in relationship between inflation and output gap. The 
output gap is treated in the literature, as one of the most important economic 
variables for theoretical as well as empirical analysis of monetary policy. The 
equations for aggregate supply and at times aggregate demand are generally 
expressed in the form of output gaps as the dependent variable in economic models.
As discussed in Chapter 2, trade-off between inflation and the output gap is 
crucial to the explanation of business cycle following demand shocks. However, the 
relationship between the output gap and inflation can also be an important empirical 
tool to identify nature of the economy, whether it is dominated by supply side factors 
or demand side factors, an aspect, which is less exploited in the literature. The 
information content of the output gap can play a useful role in developing an 
inflation model. This aspect is particularly examined in the present analysis. As
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pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2, in the case of India, supply side factors are 
considered as important in the inflationary process as demand side factors. How 
important are the supply side effects to the inflationary process in an economy is 
crucial to both modeling inflation as well as conducting monetary policy. This also 
requires supply side effects to be deciphered. Therefore, emphasis is given to 
identification of supply as well as the demand side factors, which are crucial to the 
inflationary process. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:
A simple analytical role of the output gap is developed in the following section
5.2 in order to identify origin and process of inflation, and whether it is dominated by 
supply side or demand side factors. In particular, it is shown that in the standard 
system of downward sloping aggregate demand and upward sloping aggregate 
supply schedules, if contemporaneous output gap and inflation are negatively related 
the economy can be considered to be dominated by supply side effects. Section 5.3 
estimates an aggregate demand schedule in the inflation output plane and discusses 
the structure of the demand side of the economy. Section 5.4 estimates output gaps in 
four different ways. The supply-side structure of the economy is examined by 
estimating a basic Phillips curve in the inflation output gap plane in section 5.5 using 
the lagged output gap. The effects of contemporaneous supply and demand side 
effects are examined by adding a contemporaneous output gap to the basic Phillips 
curve in section 5.6. Section 5.7 develops a hybrid inflation model for India by using 
the disequilibrium in mark-up price, discretionary money growth and other supply 
side variables identified by exploiting the information content of the output gap. In 
this section, the output gap is further analyzed to firm up the exposition of the Indian 
economy, particularly the supply side effect. Section 5.8 concludes. A summary of 
the data used for analysis is presented in Annexure 5.1 of this chapter with additional 
details provided in Appendix AA of the thesis.
5.2 THE ROLE OF OUTPUT GAP
The simple meaning of the output gap is the difference between actual and potential 
output. Actual output Y may refer to either output demanded or output supplied, and 
therefore the output gap can also be referred to as the demand gap or the supply gap. 
When the output gap is expressed as a fraction of the potential output, then for any 
time period t , it can be written as follows:
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GAPYt = (Yt - Y p) / Y p (5.1)
Here, Y is the actual output and Y p the potential output. Alternatively, this 
expression can also be written as follows, where y and y pare the log of actual and 
potential outputs respectively.
GAPYt ~ (y, -  y p) (5.2)
As noted in Chapter 2, with the above definition of the output gap, a widening of 
the output gap with negative sign means a fall in the output gap, while a widening of 
the output gap with positive sign means an increase in the output gap. Thus, for a 
given potential output, algebraically, an increase in actual output will increase the 
output gap while a decrease in actual output will reduce the output gap. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, a specific aggregate demand -  aggregate supply diagram 
drawn in inflation (7t) output (Y) plane with aggregate schedule sloping downward 
and aggregate supply schedule sloping upward. Lines DD and SS represent aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply schedules, respectively. The point of intersection of 
these two schedules gives the period output and inflation levels. Point A is some 
reference point corresponding to time t=l, where the output gap as defined earlier is 
zero. Point B is obtained after a negative supply shock shifting S1S1 to S2S2. Point 
D is obtained after a positive demand shock shifting D1D1 to D2D2, and point C is 
obtained after a combination of demand and supply shock. The corresponding 
inflation levels and the output gaps are labeled on the diagram.
Following the algebraic relationships of equation 5.1 or 5.2, and assuming that 
potential output is unity, GAPYb < GAPYc < GAPYd- At point A, GAPYa is zero. 
It may be noted that the width of GAPYb is more than the width of GAPYd but their 
algebraic signs are opposite. Therefore, for a given potential output, an increase in 
actual output will increase the output gap, while a decrease in actual output will 
reduce the output gap in the algebraic sense.
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Figure 5.1: Movements of the output gap with demand and supply shocks for a given 
potential output
GAPY„
Now looking at Figure 5.1 and point A as a reference point, it is clear that any 
point of intersection of SS and DD will lie above and to the left of A (second 
anticlockwise quadrant with A as origin) and below and to the right of A (fourth 
anticlockwise quadrant with A as origin) if movement in SS dominates movement in 
DD. In other words association between algebraic changes in n and GAPY will be 
negative if SS moves more than DD which means supply side shocks dominate. 
When demand side shocks dominate, this relationship will be opposite and the points 
of intersection would lie in the first and third quadrants. Therefore the following 
proposition holds at least for Figure 5.1:
dj n t) 
d (GAPY,) 
d(n t) 
d{GAPYt)
< 0 if supply shock dominates and
> 0 if demand shock dominates
(5.3)
(5.4)
In a static setup the above proposition can be algebraically demonstrated as 
follows. Let potential output be unity so that A GAPY = A Y and supply and demand 
be represented by the following two equations, where coefficients bs and bd are 
positive scalar quantities, which are assumed to be fixed and ensure dynamic
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stability. The usual intercept and shift parameters are represented with vectors as and 
ad . Different values of the shift factors give rise to different equilibrium points.
Demand: Yd = a d - b d7l (5.5)
Supply: Ys =cis +bsn (5.6)
Taking the differential of the variable terms and representing the differential with 
a A before the term, the two equations can be written as equations (5.7) and (5.8).
(5.7)
(5.8)
For equilibrium Ay, = Ayv = AY , equations (5.7) and (5.8) solve to yield
A Y <i = A a d ~ b < A n  
A Ys = A ,as + bsAn
An _ Aad -  Aas 
AY bdAas +bsAad
(5.9)
For the supply side effects to dominate the demand side effects:
An A a , -  A a
----< 0 which m eans------- -------- -—  < 0  (5.10)
A Y bdAas +bsAad
Proving its converse proves the above proposition. The converse is: if condition 
(5.10) holds then the supply side must be the dominant effect. The same is attempted 
below taking two possible cases.
Case (1): Aas and Aad are both either positive or negative. Then the sign of (5.9) 
will be determined by nominator alone, which means 
Aad - Aas < 0 Aas dominated Aad in both cases.
Case (2): Aavand Aad have opposite sign. Then the sign of (5.10) will be 
determined by denominator, which means
(bs!bd)Aad - Aas< 0 Aas dominated Aad in both cases sufficiently.
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Thus, a negative relationship between inflation and the output gap in a system 
with positively sloping supply schedule and negatively sloping demand schedule 
means dominant supply side effects in the economy.
This also means that even if potential output moves over time in a dynamic setup, 
the economy can be considered to be affected more by supply shocks if data show 
that there is a significant negative relationship between contemporaneous inflation 
and the output gap.
However, the above result is based on specific characteristics of the aggregate 
demand and supply schedules, in which demand is downward sloping while supply is 
upward sloping in the output-inflation plane and dynamic stability is presumed. 
There could be various characteristics of demand and supply schedules with respect 
to direction and relative amount of slopes, when the above proposition does not hold. 
By knowing the nature of demand and supply schedules, particularly if the 
assumptions about the direction of their slopes holds in the case of India, the 
relationship between the contemporaneous output gap (or change in the output gap) 
and inflation can be used to find whether the economy is supply-side or demand-side 
dominated in the short-run. It is important because not all of the shocks are 
identifiable. It is likely that the economy will be simultaneously hit by both demand- 
side and supply-side shocks during the year. In that case, the relationship will depend 
on the relative strength of the two shocks
As pointed out earlier, in the case of India, supply side factors are well 
recognized. However, it needs to be verified under the purview of the above 
proposition. This requires estimating the following: (a) a basic aggregate demand 
schedule, (b) the output gap in alternative ways (c) a basic short-run supply schedule, 
and finally (d) the inflation model applying information of the previous three steps. 
As mentioned earlier, in order to identify demand and supply schedules, the basic 
supply schedule will be a simple estimation using lagged output gap, while the 
equation for aggregate demand will be identified by incorporating several variables. 
The basic idea of supply is that suppliers use previous year’s information about the 
output gap to form prices in the current year. However, the contemporaneous output 
gap is an outcome of current state of supply and demand shocks.
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5.3 INFLATION AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
The complexity of modeling the inflationary process attempted in the subsequent 
section requires the understanding of basic supply and demand behaviour in India. A 
plausible relationship between inflation and aggregate demand has been developed in 
the following section 5.3.1, where two arguments are considered. One is specific to 
the nature of the Indian economy while the other draws from an assumption that 
central banks have a mandate to follow a de facto real interest rate rule. The basic 
idea of the second argument is drawn from Römer (2000). In Section 5.3.2 an 
equation for aggregate demand is estimated for the Indian data in order to analyze the 
structure of the demand side of the economy.
5.3.1 Conceptual Framework
The aggregate demand (AD) curve represents the general equilibrium of the money 
market (represented by the LM curve) and the goods market (represented by the IS 
curve). The properties and effects of the slope and shift parameters of these two 
curves were discussed in Chapter 2 on the theory of inflation. In the standard 
Keynesian model, the intersection of the IS and LM curves represents the 
equilibrium interest rate and the output with the assumption that inflation is zero, 
such that the real and nominal interest rate are equal. The other important assumption 
is that the central bank targets the money supply. Thus, the IS-LM model is not 
useful for analyzing the effects of inflation unless an aggregate supply (AS) curve is 
added to make it an IS-LM-AS system or AD-AS system. The AD schedule is 
downward sloping derived from IS-LM in the output-price plane for a given money 
stock. In the standard form, the AS schedule is upward sloping in the output-price 
plane where the assumption is the higher price leads to higher output, a notion 
already discussed in Chapter 2.
Thus, in the standard literature, the AD and AS curves are considered in the 
output-price plane. These are not in inflation-output planes, which is more 
interesting. The important difference here is that inflation may still fall while prices 
continue to rise. The expected inflation n e is assumed to be determined outside the 
model in a standard IS-LM-AS system. This would lead to an upward sloping AD 
curve in an output-expected inflation plane. This happens because of the vital 
assumptions that consumption and investment are both inversely related to the real 
interest rate, and the real interest rate falls with an increase in expected inflation.
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However, this assumption may not produce as clear a picture as desired because of 
their interrelationship through savings.
The above assumption means that general consumption, particularly the 
consumption of consumer durables, will increase in anticipation of future inflation. 
This will be more so if the society is near an autonomous consumption level. This 
increase in consumption will cause a drop in savings and funds available for future 
investment. Considering that investment is directly dependent on savings, the fund 
rate is bound to bid up which would then reduce investment demand and growth in 
general as seen empirically to happen in the Indian case in Chapter 4. In a situation 
of scarcity of capital, the investment effect may dominate the consumption effect and 
the AD curve would then be downward sloping in the inflation output plane. This 
leaves the important observation that the nominal interest rate is in fact dependent on 
expected inflation. In the case of the United States (USA), Taylor (1993b) found that 
the Federal Reserve’s setting of the funds rate over the past 15 years is well 
described by a simple function of inflation and output alone. Therefore, the major 
policy concern of central bankers is to set the interest rate near such that goal 
variables hit their targets. The money supply should be a secondary concern.
In a recent article, Römer (2000) has highlighted the inconsistency associated 
with the concept of conventional IS-LM-AS analysis and the practices of the central 
banks. As previously pointed out, in the common textbook approach of deriving AD 
curve, the assumption is that the central bank targets money supply. Thus, for a given 
stock of money, the LM curves shifts down to the right along the IS curve with a fall 
in the price level as it increases the real stock of money. Thus, for a given expected 
inflation, both nominal and real interest rates fall, giving rise to different levels of 
equilibrium aggregate demands and hence different equilibrium output levels. In the 
process, what happens to the real interest rate if expectations about inflation were not 
fixed is not clear. In Römer’s opinion, this assumption is far away from the point of 
view of practices of modern central banking. Even countries which resort to 
monetary targeting tailor monetary targets with an eye on movements in the short­
term nominal interest rate and inflationary expectations55. In developing countries,
55 For example, see Clarida, et al. (1998); Bernanke and Mihov (1997); Bernanke and Mihov (1995). These 
studies indicate that in the case of Bundesbank, the adjustments to interest rate in response to the variations in 
output, inflation and exchange rate are more prominent than the adjustment in money supply, which is the 
declared target of monetary policy.
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administering the interest rate is often justified due to the presence of an imperfect 
capital market.
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the main objective of central banking is to achieve 
maximum sustainable growth at low and stable inflation. Römer (2000) argues that 
realization of these objectives can be better explained with an assumption that central 
banks follow a real interest rate rule rather than target the money supply. It took 
some time for the Indian central bank to be able to realize this but with the financial 
sector reform commencing in the early 1990s it has been attempting to establish a 
clear-cut interest rate as the main instrument of monetary policy. However, the real 
interest rate has always been important for the expansion of credit needs 
commensurate with growth targets, while at the same time doing every thing possible 
to contain inflation.
Given the fact that the interest rate is more important to central bankers than the 
money supply, Römer (2000) has proposed that the LM curve of the IS-LM 
framework may be replaced by the Monetary Policy (MP) curve, which is a 
relationship between the interest rate and inflation in its simplest form. However, 
central banks may also prefer to include other variables in the monetary policy 
function, particularly output, in order to reduce the fluctuations in these variables. In 
the short run, central bank changes the nominal interest rate but in the medium-term, 
they must reconcile with the real rate. Therefore, Römer calls it the real interest rate 
rule, which is a flat curve for a given level of inflation when only inflation is 
included in the monetary policy function. When the monetary policy schedule 
includes both inflation and output, the MP curve would be upward sloping. The 
important assumption here is that, with an objective of dampening output 
fluctuations, central banks are likely to cut the real interest rate when output falls and 
raise it when output rises.56 This assumption means r = r (Y, 7t), with the function 
increasing in both arguments and giving rise to an upward sloping monetary policy 
curve. Further, as it is believed that high output tends to increase inflation while low 
output decreases it, such a policy would also dampen inflation fluctuations.
The IS curve remains a conventional IS curve sloping downward in the real 
interest rate output plane. By assumption, an increase in inflation causes the central 
bank to raise the real rate. Thus, the MP curve shifts up. The shift of the MP curve
56 With long lags output may be an indicator of inflationary expectations.
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causes the economy to move up along the IS curve, causing output to fall. Applying 
the condition of output equals aggregate demand the inverse relationship between 
inflation and aggregate demand (AD) is thus established as shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Derivation of aggregate demand schedule in inflation-output plane
Notes: In the above diagram r is the real interest rate, n is the annual percentage inflation, Y is the 
output, MP is the monetary policy schedule, AD is the aggregate demand schedule. Diagram is based 
on Römer (2000)
All the factors that can shift the conventional IS-curve are still applicable. 
However, the role of a change in the stock of money is complicated. In the 
conventional IS-LM set-up an increase in money stock would shift the AD-curve 
proportionately to the right. Now, an increase in the money stock at a given level of 
inflation would lower the real interest rate due to lowering of the nominal rate. With 
a lower nominal rate the AD curve would shift to the right for all levels of inflation, 
provided prices have some inertia and do not adjust instantaneously, which is a 
realistic assumption. Thus, it is seen from the above discussion that downward 
sloping aggregate demand curve in the inflation output plane can be justified in both 
the conventional and new set-up of Keynesian analysis. For the Indian data, such a
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possible aggregate demand curve is estimated in simple form in the following 
section.
5.3.2 Estimation and Discussion
Aggregate demand for output in its simplest reduced form can be expressed as a 
function of the real interest rate, world output, and the real exchange rate. Output 
demand is expected to fall with an increase in the real interest rate (due to a fall in 
investment) and a currency appreciation (due to a fall in competitiveness). With an 
increase in world output, aggregate demand is expected to increase. However, in 
order to capture the full individual effect of inflation, the interest rate is used in its 
nominal values as a shift parameter for the aggregate demand. The key question is 
what should be the effect of inflation in such a model? Current inflation can proxy 
expected future inflation for the annual data series. In a fully developed financial 
market, money could be replaced with the interest rate, but in India the interest rate 
was largely administered until 1997. Therefore, it is appropriate to keep both money 
and the interest rate in the aggregate demand function.
Following the convention of the earlier chapters, the log values are represented 
by lower case letters and a A before a variable represents first differences. The 
interest rate for this chapter is the lending rate taken in fractions and represented by 
LRSBI, which is the average lending rate of the state bank of India (SBI). The real 
exchange rate REER is the effective rate based on trade weighted five-country index 
as discussed in Appendix AA of this thesis; defined such that a rise in the index 
means appreciation of the currency. A composite index of industrial production for 
the five industrialized countries IPIG5 proxy world output as explained in Appendix 
AA of this thesis and summarized in Annexure 5.1 of this chapter. Following the 
convention of the earlier chapters, the monetary aggregates and output are taken in 
logs. As earlier, inflation is expressed in decimals obtained by taking the first 
difference of logged values of wholesale price index and it is stationary. Among the 
three monetary aggregates broad money and narrow money are chosen to be included 
in the aggregate demand function alternatively after a preliminary trials, which 
indicated base money had no explanatory power. These two monetary aggregates 
give rise to two different sets of alternative models to be discussed later.
Output, nominal lending rate, world output, real exchange rate, and nominal 
broad and narrow money are all 1(1) with or without trend. Broad money is 1(1)
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without trend and stationary with trend. Both output and money are trended 
variables. Inflation, expressed as the first difference of log of the wholesale price 
index, is a stationary variable (see Annexure 5.2 for unit root test results). A test of 
cointegration between the 1(1) variables with trend and VAR of order one, as 
explained in Annexure 5.3, indicates they are not cointegrated according to the 
chosen criterion of maximum eigenvalue or trace test in maximum likelihood 
estimation at 5 percent level. However, when inflation is included in the list of 
selected variables, cointegration is confirmed (see Annexure 5.4 for the test results). 
Because inflation is a stationary variable, this may be the reason for obtaining a 
cointegrating vector, but this test indicates that the OLS estimation of distributed lag 
model would be consistent and free from possibilities of spurious regression.
Therefore, it is preferred here to model aggregate demand using distributed lag 
specification and the procedure of general to specific modeling with due care for 
serial correlation in the resulting error terms. The regression residuals are also tested 
for a unit root and the test results are presented. The model is identified as aggregate 
demand because it includes theoretically acceptable demand side variables. Such a 
distributed lag model estimated with a general to specific approach, which allows for 
significant variables to appear in the final model with different lags, will also be 
appropriate for examining the relationship of aggregate demand and inflation.
Since key variables are highly trended, the model is specified around a trend by 
including a deterministic trend. In case trend is found to be insignificant, it would 
mean all variables are co-trending, and the trend term will be removed from the 
model in line with the method of general to specific modeling. Alternatively, if the 
trend term is significant, the results can be interpreted as the effects of variables on 
aggregate demand around its trend growth path. However, in order to see the effect 
of ignoring trend, both a model without considering trend and a model with trend are 
estimated. Thus, four alternative models are discussed, two with broad money, with 
and without trend, and two with narrow money with and without trend.
The result of the estimation is presented in Table 5.1. Model ADI has narrow 
money and trend, AD2 has narrow money but no trend, AD3 has broad money and 
trend and AD4 has broad money but no trend. All other variables are almost 
common. In order to simplify the discussion in this section, a set of general 
observations with respect to all four specifications is presented first and then the 
specific property of one of the models, namely ADI, is discussed and compared with
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other specifications in order to bring about the structural property of the Indian 
economy with respect to the selected variables.
It may be noted that the trend is significant in all formulations with the selected 
set of variables. With the trend in the models, lagged output is insignificant, while it 
becomes significant once the trend is excluded but the R-square of the regression 
falls. This shows that the model with trend contains more information. The statistical 
properties of all four models are satisfactory in almost all respects. There is no sign 
of serial correlation or unit root in the residuals . The predictive failure test and the 
test for stability of coefficients are also satisfactory. The CUSUM of recursive errors 
and the CUSUM of square of recursive errors tests also show that there is no 
structural break (however, test results for model ADI only are presented in Figures 
5.3 and 5.4). Finally, the in-sample predictive errors of the models are very small 
with high adjusted-R-square around 0.999. However, the models with trend have 
better fit. The signs of most of the key variables are also as expected. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the models are satisfactorily estimated.
The long-run functional relationship between the coefficients of inflation and 
output is estimated using the variance-covariance matrix and the result is presented 
in Table 5.1. The long-term inflation elasticity of aggregate demand at the 10 percent 
level of inflation ranges between -0.023 and -0.029, which is significant at almost 
the one percent level in all cases. This shows a robust downward sloping aggregate 
demand curve in output-inflation plane with steep slope.
World output does appear to positively affect demand for domestic goods. An 
increase in world output has a positive effect on aggregate demand in India, which 
seems to get a positive boost with real depreciation. It may be recalled that the real 
exchange rate in this thesis is defined such that a rise in the index means appreciation 
of the currency. Thus, high domestic inflation implies an appreciation of the 
currency, which further lowers aggregate demand.
The advantage of including the nominal instead of the real interest rate is clear. 
The negative relationship between the interest rate and aggregate demand is 
demonstrated unambiguously, while at the same time the overall independent effect 
of inflation is estimated. Both variables are significant and therefore the conclusion
57 Due to small sample size the multivariate version of test statistics are not available. However, considering the 
single variable test of residual the results are satisfactory.
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should remain the same even if the real interest rate were considered separately. 
Further, it may be noted that the nominal interest rate is more relevant in situations of 
liquidity constraints and understanding the effects of taxation.
Table 5.1 Estimated equations of aggregate demand (distributed lag structure) 
__________(1972-98)_______________________________________________
D e p en d e n t V a riab le y y y y
A D I A D 2 A D 3 A D 4
R e g re sso r
IN P T 10.42(1 .83)* 6 .8 4 1 (1 .2 1 )* 17 .28 (3 .1 3 7 )* 8 .0 4 6 (1 .5 9 5 )*
y(-D 0 .1 2 3 (0 .1 2 3 ) 0 .2 5 4 (0 .1 2 )* * 0 .0 3 5 4 (0 .7 9 1 ) 0 .2 5 1 (0 .1 3 5 )*
Ap -0 .421 (0 .0 6 5 )* -0 .4 4 7 (0 .0 6 4 )* -0 .3 9 2 (0 .0 6 3 )* -0 .4 4 9 (0 .0 7 5 )*
Ap(-i) 0 .2 1 6 (0 .0 6 5 )* 0 .2 2 8 (0 .0 7 1 )* 0 .1 8 0 (0 .0 7 )  ** 0 .2 4 5 (0 .0 7 6 )*
L R S B I -0 .838 (0 .2 2 )* -0 .3 8 0 (0 .1 3 4 )* -1 .1 5 (0 .1 9 )  * -0 .9 9 (0 .2 2 )* * *
r e e r (. {) -0 .3 9 7 (0 .0 3 2 ) -0 .1 0 (0 .0 2 9 ) * -0 .0 6 7 (0 .0 3 )* * *
i p i g  5 0 .3 6 1 (0 .1 2 0 )* 0 .5 0 3 (0 .1 1 4 )* 0 .3 7 2 (0 .1 1 7 ) * 0 .2 3 0 (0 .1 3 3 )* * *
ml (-1) 0 .10 7 (0 .0 5 )* * * 0 .2 0 4 (0 .0 3 8 )*
m3 -0 .3 9 (0 .1 7 )  **
m3 (-1) 0 .1 9 4 (0 .0 4 1 )*
T 0 .02 1 (0 .0 0 9 )* * 0 .1 0 (0 .0 0 3 ) *
R -S q u a re 0 .9 9 9 2 4 0 .99898 0 .9 9 9 2 8 0 .9 9 8 9
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .9 9 8 9 0 .99867 0 .9 9 8 9 6 0 .9985
S .E  o f  R eg re ss io n 0 .0 1 3 2 0.0145 0 .0 1 2 8 0 .0155
D ia g n o stic  T ests
D W (h )-S ta tis tic s 0 .1 7 2 (0 .8 6 4 ) -0 .508  [0 .612} -0 .3 7 1 (0 .7 1 1 } 0 .521 [0 .6 0 2 ]
L M  (1 ) se ria l co rre la tio n 0 .02  [0.89] 0 .24  [0 .63] 0 .09  [0 .76] 0 .13  [0.72]
L M  (3) se ria l co rre la tio n 2 .16  [0.54] 3 .67  [0 .30] 4 .7 2  [0 .19] 1.39 [0.71]
H e te ro sc ed as tic ity  C H S Q ( l) 0 .05  [0 .82] 0 .0 0  [0 .98] 0 .28  [0 .60] 1.49 [0.22]
A R C H  (3) te s t 1.50 [0.68] 1.49 [0 .68] 1.42 [0 .70] 2 .47  [0.48]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 0.31 [0.58] 1.81 [0 .18] 0.01 [0 .93] 0 .01 [0.92]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 2 .96  [0.23] 3 .29  [0 .19] 0 .3 2  [0 .85] 1.39 [0.50]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q  (6) 1.74 [0.94] 2 .54  [086] 2 .17  [0 .90] 1.26 [0.97]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q (1 0 ) 10.2 [0.42] 3 .99  [0.95] 13.0 [0 .23] 5 .32  [0.87]
S tab ility  te s t C H S Q  (9) 10.3 [0 .33] 4 .03  [0 .78] 7 .0 0  [0 .64] 4 .91 [0.77]
R esid u a l U n it  ro o t
T es t s ta tis tic s  (A D F ) -4 .70 -5 .197 -5 .0 6 -4 .57
F u n ctio n a l R e la tio n
( a 3 + a 4 ) /( l - a 2 ) -0 .2 3 3 (0 .0 7 7 )* -0 .2 9 3 (0 .0 9 4 )* -0 .2 2 0 (0 .0 6 7 )* -0 .2 7 3 (0 .1 0 2 )*
Note: Predictive failure test and parameter stability tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 1992 
and 1988; unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an 
unit root test with second order ADF; *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and 
^♦significant at 10% level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets 
[] are p-values. Estimation method: OLS.
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Figure 5.3 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive residuals in model ADI
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Figure 5.4 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive residuals in model ADI
1.5 t
1.0  - -
0.5 --
1972 1982 1987 1992 1 997
The s t raight  l ines represent  cri t ical  bounds  at 5% s igni f i cance
All four models are tested for non-nested encompassing and the results indicate 
the models with trend, namely ADI and AD3, encompass models AD2 and AD4, 
respectively, which do not have trends. The AD3 model, which has broad money, 
encompasses the ADI model, which has narrow money but ADI has a better 
specification in terms of the following conceptual framework. First, an increase in 
the money supply is expected to shift the aggregate demand function out to the right, 
which is clearly shown in model ADI but not in model AD3. Broad money changes 
sign depending upon whether trend is in the model or not, but narrow money shows 
consistency in respect of sign, making it a more robust variable than broad money. 
Second, the coefficient of the trend term in Model ADI is much smaller at 0.021 
when compared to 0.10 in model AD3, which is more desired as economic variables 
have more to contribute in explaining output. Further, for the sample period it may
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be noted the average growth of the Indian economy has been around 4.6 percent. 
Therefore, a 2.1 percent trend growth rate in model ADI is a better baseline for the 
present analysis, and further discussion is based on ADI as the main model.
The trend is a highly significant variable in model ADI with a positive 
coefficient of 0.021, which indicates the effects of the other variables can be 
interpreted around a mean growth level of 2.1 percent. The inflation elasticity of 
aggregate demand is -0.023 at the 10 percent inflation level. The elasticity increases 
at lower levels of inflation and falls at higher levels. With steep aggregate demand 
curve, the economy is sensitive to supply side effects. Any negative (or positive) 
shock to supply will have large effects on inflation. On the other hand with a flatter 
supply schedule, the demand side stimulus to the economy synchronized with a 
positive supply shock may be successful in increasing output without much increase 
in inflation compared to the stimulus given when there is an adverse supply shock.
Therefore, it may be a better strategy to synchronize the demand side stimulus 
with positive supply side shocks like good rain, low prices of intermediate goods like 
imports, and investment on research and development aimed at reducing input costs 
and increasing general productivity. A trend growth rate of the money supply may 
lack such synchronization and produce general inflation and reduced growth. It may 
be noted that government consumption expenditure as a fraction of gross domestic 
product is not found to be significant in the present specification. Therefore, reducing 
lending rates and increasing narrow money supply may provide demand side 
stimulus. According to the preferred model ADI, the long run elasticity of aggregate 
demand output with respect to narrow money is around 0.10, while at the 10 percent 
interest rate the interest elasticity of aggregate demand is 0.08, which appears to be 
reasonable. The average lending rate is about 14.5 percent.
5.4 ESTIMATION OF THE OUTPUT GAPS
The output gap is not observable and its measurement requires estimation of 
potential output. There are several techniques applied in the literature to measure 
potential output and these can be broadly classified into two categories.
The first and most common method concerns the use of the time series data of 
actual output itself and tries to filter out a hypothetical series or fit a trend which is 
treated as the supply or the potential output. This approach can be called the
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univariate approach. Fitting a linear trend or fitting a quadratic trend is the simplest
c o
of the univariate approaches. Hodrick and Prescott (1997)' suggested a detrending 
procedure to estimate the potential output, which is now widely known as the 
Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. This involves minimization of a quadratic loss 
function with a chosen weight for smoothing the series. What makes the filtered 
series a potential one, is freeing it of cyclical fluctuations. Alternative techniques of 
finding trend are also used in the literature. For example, Coe and McDermott (1997) 
use the nonparametric regression method. Multivariate versions of the HP filter trend 
and methods of unobservable components are also used in the literature to estimate 
potential output (see de Brouwer (1998) for discussion and application of these 
methods for Australia).
The second method is based on the production function approach, which 
facilitates measuring the potential output more accurately than the univariate 
approach. This is because the production function theoretically shows the maximum 
possible output a country can produce with its given resources and technology. It is 
generally calculated after removing the cyclical fluctuations from the employment 
and total factor productivity series using the HP type filter. However, the accuracy of 
measuring the output gap depends on how precisely the production function itself is 
estimated.
In the univariate approach to estimation of potential output, it is not clear how the 
output is technically determined, whereas the production function approach considers 
the factors of production and the way they are used to get the output through the 
entire production process. Therefore, the production function approach followed in 
this study could provide a structurally superior method of estimating potential output. 
The simple trend, quadratic trend and the HP filter trends are also estimated for 
comparison with the production function estimates.
5.4.1 Simple Trend Approach
In the simple trend approach, actual output is regressed against a time trend and the 
fitted value of the regression is taken as the potential output. The equation to be 
estimated is as follows:
58 The paper was written in 1980 as working paper of Carnegie Mellon University but was not published until 
1997.
141
yt = a +b t t -  1,2... n (5.11)
A simple ordinary least square regression of logged real output on time is presented 
below, which shows a trend growth rate of 4.8 percent for the period 1970-98, with 
R-square of 98 percent. As explained in the previous chapter, real gross domestic 
product at 1993-94 market price proxy output. The actual growth during the period 
has been 4.64, which is close to the estimated value.
y p = 14.851 +0.0481 t* 
(0.0195) (0.0011)
R-square = 0.98, R-bar-square = 0.99, SE =0.05, ML serial correlation CHSQ (3) =14.25 [0.0031, 
ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 8.49 [0.037], functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 21.92 [0.00], normality 
CHSQ (2) = 1.02 [0.547], *significant at 1% level. Estimation method: OLS.
5.4.2 Quadratic Trend Approach
In the quadratic trend approach, output is assumed to have quadratic function in time 
as expressed below. The quadratic term captures the non-linear components of the 
time series.
yt = a + b t + c t2, t=l,2.. .n ; t 2 = l,4 ...  n2 (5.13)
The equation is estimated by the ordinary least squares method considering t and r  
as two different variables and the result is presented below. Clearly, the quadratic 
trend equation is better estimated than the simple trend.
y p = 14.96 + 0.0275 t* + 0.00069 r *  
(0.015) (0.0024) (0.000076)
R-square = 0.996, R-bar-square = 0.996, SE =0.026, ML serial correlation CHSQ (3) =4.93 [0.177], 
ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 8.68 [0.034], functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 3.287 [0.07], normality 
CHSQ (2) = 0.397 [0.82], *significant at 1% level. Estimation method: OLS.
5.4.3 Hodrick - Prescott Filter Approach
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter selects the series of potential output component of 
the output that minimizes the following loss function, L. It involves fitting the trend
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path for y p subject to the constraint that the sum of the squared second differences 
of the trend series is not too large.
L = 'Z(yl ~yt)2 + * 5 > V +i ) 2 (5.15)
r=l t - 2
Here, X  is the smoothing parameter on the potential output growth and s is the 
sample size. The selection of X  is important because the results are sensitive to that. 
As X  increases and approaches infinity, the loss function is minimized by penalizing 
the change in the potential growth, which is done by keeping potential output growth 
constant leading to a linear trend growth rate. On the other hand, as the value of X  
approaches zero eliminating the difference between actual and potential outputs 
minimizes the loss function. The selection of X  also depends upon the frequency of 
the data. For annual data a value of 7 is suggested in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997:47), 
that is what is followed in this chapter. The values of y p that minimize the above 
loss function are listed in Table 5.4. It can be noted here that the HP filter can 
generate spurious cyclical patterns as shown by Harvey and Jaeger (1993). However, 
the advantage of the HP filter is that it renders the output gap stationary over a wide 
range of smoothing values (Hodrick and Prescott 1997).
5.4.4 Production Function Approach
The production function approach concerns the type of production technology used 
with core inputs, and how effectively inputs and technology are applied. Thus, the 
production function approach encompasses the entire production structure and 
process. Theoretically, a production function shows the maximum possible output 
that can be produced with the given level of inputs and technology. The maximum 
possible output is generally called the potential output. Therefore, estimation of the 
potential output requires the knowledge of the share of capital (K), share of labor (L), 
value added (Y) and total factor productivity (TFP) of the economy, which can be 
estimated using the observed values of Y, K, and L.
In the case of India, it is not expected to be able to decipher cyclical changes in 
unemployment and productivity where unemployment is not documented in the same 
way as in developed economies. Further, Indian government laws do not permit an 
easy way of firing labour. Therefore, filtering employment or TFP for the cyclical 
effects is not expected to make much sense.
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With such limitations, a direct approach to estimate the production function itself 
is considered as an alternative way to fit potential output for India with total 
productive labor force (LABT) available in the economy as the proxy for labour. A 
simple Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function with the following specification in 
value added (Y), capital K and labour L is considered to obtain potential output Y p .
y; =A[ef ' [K]ß[LY ß + y  =1 (5. 16)
In the above equation A is a constant, a  is technical progress, and ß and y 
represent the shares of capital and labour, respectively, in the total output. Actual 
output need not be equal to potential output due to weather conditions, supply 
bottlenecks of other inputs, organizational factors and demand conditions. For 
example, a given labour and capital will produce more output with favourable rain 
than drought. Thus, the actually observed output can be represented as follows:
Yt =Ytp +et (5.17)
Where, et is the deviation of output from potential output and can be named as 
the output gap. Also, £, is assumed to capture other leftover effects of any factor on 
output, measurement errors in output and deviation from the assumed production 
structure. Any possible first order auto correlation in et has been corrected applying 
the method discussed in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). The first order auto correlation 
correction can also be interpreted as the correction for the fluctuation in utilization of 
capital and labour in the production process.
With the estimated series of Ytp , the time series for the output gap (GAPY) can 
be calculated, as et itself represents the difference between actual output and 
potential output as per the definition stated earlier. However, et represents not only
the difference between output and potential output, but also, the impact of other left 
out variables, deviation from the assumed Cobb-Douglas technology and 
measurement errors.
Now, concerning the estimation of the potential output, output Y is the real gross 
domestic product at market price. The measure of capital is the real net fixed capital
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stock (NFCS), which is obtained by the method of perpetual inventories with five 
percent depreciation and 1993-94 as the base year as discussed in Appendix AA of 
this thesis. The instruments include lagged values of NFCS, LABT, deviation of rain 
from normal (DRAIN), net direct foreign investment as a percentage of gross 
domestic investment (FDINZI), and real imports (RIM). A summary of data is 
provided in Annexure 5.1 of this chapter while full details are provided in Appendix 
AA of the thesis. All variables appearing in non-linear two-stage least squares 
estimation of output are transformed into indices with 1993-94 as 100. Similarly, 
time is considered relative to 1993-94, with r=0 for 1993-94. Estimation results of 
the non-linear two-stage least squares are given in Table 5.2. The period of 
estimation is 1972 to 1998 (27 observations). The instruments used are: NFCS(-2), 
DRAIN, LABT(-2), FDINZI(-l), and RIM(-l). The value of ‘e’ in estimation 
equation (5.19) is taken as 2.71828.
Table 5.2 Non-Linear Two-Stage Least Squares estimation of potential output
(1972-98)
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob]
A 1.018 0.0047 216.6 [0.00]
a 0.0098 0.0038 2.58 [0.02]
P 0.721 0.1206 5.98 [0.00]
Y = (1-ß) 0.279
GR-Squared = 0.996, GR-Bar-Squared59 = 0.996, R-Squared = 0 995, R-Bar-Squared = 0.994, S.E. of Regression 
= 2.28, Sargan’s CHSQ(l) = 2.29[.130]
Diagnostic Tests
LM(1) test for Serial Correlation CHSQ(l) = 1.257 [0.26]; Sargan’s test statistic for serial correlation 
CHSQ(3) = 4.53 [0.21]; Ramsey’s RESET test of Functional Form CHSQ(1)= 0.070 [0.79];
Normality test based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals CHSQ(2) = 0.77 [0.68]; 
Heteroscedasticity test based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values CHSQ( 
1)= 0.04 [0.84]
The above coefficients are estimated quite precisely. The shares of labour in the 
national income during the period of 1993-94 to 1996-97 are presented in Table 5.3 
to show that the above estimates compare very well with the actual data. At the same 
time, the estimation is statistically sound with all the diagnostic results well within 
limits. Since the actual factor shares and the estimated factor shares of capital and 
labour are very similar and this indicates that the impact of other left out variables
59 Generalized R-Squared and Generalized R-Squared Bar are appropriate measures of overall fit when estimation 
is done by using instrumental variables as discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1994)
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and the deviations of the production structure from the assumed Cobb-Douglas 
framework are not important. Thus et can be expected to represent output gap 
reasonably well.
Table 5.3 Actual factor incomes during 1993-94 -  1996-97
Y ea r G D P  at 
cu rren t  
M ark et P r ice  
(R s  m il lio n )
C E  at cu rrent 
M ark et P r ice  
(R s  m il lio n )
O S /M I  at 
current 
M ark et P r ic e  
(R s  m il lio n )
N D P  at 
cu rrent  
M ark et P r ic e  
(R s  m il lio n )
C E  as
p e r ce n ta g e  o f  
G D P
C E  as
p e r ce n ta g e  o f  
N D P
1 9 9 3 -9 4 8 7 6 9 5 2 0 2 5 2 9 4 4 0 4 6 3 1 7 4 0 7 1 6 1 1 8 0 2 8 .8 4 3 5 .3 2
1 9 9 4 -9 5 1 0 3 7 8 4 2 0 3 0 0 8 2 0 0 5 4 5 5 8 8 0 8 4 6 4 0 8 0 2 8 .9 9 3 5 .5 4
1 9 9 5 -9 6 1 2 1 7 9 6 3 0 3 5 2 5 3 8 0 6 3 6 5 9 1 0 9 8 9 1 2 9 0 2 8 .9 4 3 5 .6 4
1 9 9 6 -9 7 1 4 0 9 8 4 9 0 4 0 5 3 5 5 0 7 4 8 6 2 2 0 1 1 5 3 9 7 7 0 2 8 .7 5 3 5 .1 3
Note: CE = Compensation to employees; OS = Operating surplus; MI = mixed income; NDP = net 
domestic product; GDP = Gross domestic product.
Source: National Accounts Statistics 1999, Government of India.
5.4.5 Estimated Output Gaps
The complete series of the potential output estimated from the four methods 
discussed earlier are presented in Table 5.4 along with the actual output and the gaps 
calculated as a percentage of the potential output. All the output gap values are 
multiplied with 100 in order to convert them in terms of percentages. Depending 
upon the method of finding the potential output, the output gaps are named as simple 
trend gap (GAPYT), quadratic trend gap (GAPYT2), HP filter gap (GAPYH) and 
production function gap (GAPY).
Potential output in the case of the simple trend, quadratic trend, and HP filter are 
given in natural logs. Therefore, for calculating the output gaps with these 
approaches, equation (5.2) has been used where output gap = ((y, — y p). In the case 
of the production function method, the fitted value is in the form of an index with 
base 1993-94=100. Therefore, equation (5.1) has been used to calculate the output 
gap in this case as the fraction of potential outputs where output gap (GAPY) = 
(Yt - Y P) I Y P. The values of production function gap, GAPY for the period 1970
and 1971 are lost due to the lagged value of the instruments used in the non-linear 
least square estimation.
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Table 5.4 Estimated values of the output gaps (percentage) from the four methods.
Y ear Y Y I _y___ S im ple  T ren d Q u a d ra tic  T ren d H P  f ilte r P ro d  F u n c tio n
F itted G A P Y T F itted G A P Y T 2 F itted G A P Y H F itted G A P Y
1970 3 3 3 0 0 2 2 37 .97 15.02 14.90 11.96 14.99 3 .32 15.01 1.24
1971 3 3 9 0 5 0 4 38 .6 6 15.04 14.95 8.95 15.01 2 .1 6 15.02 1.19
1972 3 3 6 9 5 7 7 3 8 .4 2 15.03 15.00 3.52 15.05 -1 .55 15.05 -1 .47 36 .26 5 .96
1973 3469121 3 9 .5 6 15.06 15.04 1.62 15.08 -1 .87 15.07 -1 .1 2 38 .82 1.92
1974 3 5 1 0 4 8 2 4 0 .0 3 15.07 15.09 -2 .00 15.11 -4 .06 15.10 -3 .15 40 .48 -1 .12
1975 3 8 3 3 0 9 6 43.71 15.16 15.14 1.98 15.15 1.23 15.14 1.78 42 .69 2 .4 0
1976 3 9 0 1 2 0 0 4 4 .4 9 15.18 15.19 -1 .06 15.18 -0 .65 15.18 -0 .48 43 .48 2 .32
1977 4 1 8 1 9 2 7 4 7 .6 9 15.25 15.24 1.08 15.22 2 .52 15.22 2 .5 0 4 6 .3 4 2 .92
1978 4423231 5 0 .4 4 15.30 15.28 1.88 15.26 4.21 15.26 4 .48 47 .95 5 .19
1979 4 1 9 1 0 9 3 4 7 .7 9 15.25 15.33 -8 .32 15.30 -5 .2 4 15.29 -4 .26 4 9 .7 0 -3 .84
1980 4 4 6 8 4 0 3 50 .95 15.31 15.38 -6 .72 15.34 -3 .0 2 15.33 -1 .65 54 .76 -6 .96
1981 4 7 6 0 3 6 5 54 .2 8 15.38 15.43 -5 .2 0 15.39 -1 .0 2 15.37 0 .36 56.53 -3 .99
1982 4 9 4 0 3 6 6 5 6 .3 4 15.41 15.48 -6 .30 15.43 -1 .77 15.42 -0 .64 58 .57 -3.81
1983 5 3 0 7 2 6 6 6 0 .5 2 15.48 15.52 -3 .94 15.48 0 .7 9 15.47 1.49 61 .59 -1 .73
1984 5 5 0 2 4 7 6 62 .7 5 15.52 15.57 -5 .14 15.52 -0 .3 4 15.52 -0 .07 63 .4 9 -1 .17
1985 580 3 3 7 5 66 .1 8 15.57 15.62 -4 .62 15.57 0.11 15.57 -0 .09 66.81 -0 .95
1986 6 0 8 5 9 7 5 6 9 .4 0 15.62 15.67 -4.67 15.62 -0 .15 15.63 -0 .9 0 69 .96 -0 .80
1987 6 3 7 6 2 2 9 72.71 15.67 15.72 -4 .82 15.67 -0 .6 4 15.69 -2 .03 73 .8 9 -1 .59
1988 7 0 0 8 9 7 3 7 9 .9 2 15.76 15.76 -0 .17 15.73 3 .53 15.75 1.54 78.31 2.05
1989 7 4 6 9 6 3 4 85 .18 15.83 15.81 1.39 15.78 4 .47 15.80 2 .3 0 81 .09 5 .04
1990 7 8 9 2 4 8 3 9 0 .0 0 15.88 15.86 2.08 15.84 4.41 15.85 2 .67 85.13 5.71
1991 7 9 2 5 8 9 4 9 0 .3 8 15.89 15.91 -2 .30 15.89 -0 .86 15.90 -1.71 90 .14 0.27
1992 8 3 5 5 5 1 0 9 5 .2 8 15.94 15.96 -1 .83 15.95 -1 .4 2 15.95 -1 .43 97 .8 4 -2 .62
1993 8 7 6 9 5 2 0 100.00 15.99 16.00 -1 .80 16.01 -2 .5 6 16.01 -2 .0 6 103.10 -3 .0 0
1994 9463351 107.91 16.06 16.05 1.00 16.07 -1 .05 16.07 -0 .48 109.29 -1 .27
1995 10222850 116.57 16.14 16.10 3.91 16.14 0 .4 2 16.13 0.88 115.45 0 .97
1996 10964331 125.03 16.21 16.15 6.11 16.20 1.04 16.20 1.47 122.38 2 .17
1997 11510140 131.25 16.26 16.20 6.16 16.27 -0 .63 16.26 0 .0 0 130.82 0 .33
1998 12210365 139.24 16.32 16.25 7 .26 16.33 -1 .38 16.32 -0 .36 140.82 -1 .12
Notes: Y = real GDP at 1993-94 market prices in rupees million; YI = indexed value of Y with 1993- 
94=100; y = natural log of Y; GAPY = output gap calculated using production function approach of 
estimating potential output; GAPYT = output gap calculated using simple trend approach of 
estimating potential output; GAPYT2 = output gap calculated using quadratic trend approach of 
estimating potential output; GAPYH = output gap calculated using HP filter approach of estimating 
potential output. All gaps are expressed as percentage of the respective potential outputs i.e. 100 
multiply all values of output gaps.
Source: Real output Y from WDI2000 CDROM. Other values are author’s estimation and calculation. 
All values are rounded off up to second digit at the last stage of calculation, therefore, exact values of 
the output gaps may not be obtained on calculating them taking values of output and potential output 
from this table.
5.4.6 Time Series Properties of The Output Gaps
The graphical presentation of the above four measures of gap is given in Figure 5.5. 
The similarity of the patterns of all four measures suggests that all should lead to 
similar results when applied in the system. However, a method that contains more 
information to facilitate better modeling of inflation needs to be identified by using 
the output gap measures in predicting inflation. There are other aspects depending on 
how the output gaps are calculated. These aspects include the stationarity properties, 
relative movements over time and information content in explaining inflation. It is
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expected that the gap should be stationary and mean reverting. If the output gap were 
not stationary, shocks to the gap would be persistent. To examine this, the unit root 
test for the gaps calculated by the above four methods is presented in Table 5.5.
Figure 5.5 Output gaps calculated using different measures of the potential output
15.00
I  10.00
«
I  5.00
6
0 )
Z o.oo
o
5?</)
to -5.00
&o
- 10.00
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Year
Notes: The output gaps values are multiplied by 100 to get convert them into percentages.
Table 5.5 ADF based unit root tests for the four estimates of the output gaps.
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend.
Variable Lag structure 95% critical 
value
Statistic AIC SBC
GAPYT DF -2.980 -1.55 53.72 52.47
ADF (1) -1.42 52.72 50.84
AGAPYT DF -2.985 -5.70 50.48 49.26
ADF (1) -3.83 49.48 47.65
GAPYT2 DF -2.980 -3.57 59.09 57.83
ADF (1) -3.35 58.47 56.58
AGAPYT2 DF -2.985 -6.20 51.75 50.53
ADF (1) -4.45 51.11 49.28
GAPYH DF -2.980 -4.67 63.82 62.56
ADF (1) -4.13 63.45 61.57
AGAPYH DF -2.985 -7.02 54.50 53.28
ADF (1) -5.05 54.35 52.52
GAPY DF -2.991 -2.43 51.94 50.76
ADF (1) -3.20 52.98 51.22
ADF (2) -2.47 52.03 49.68
AGAPY DF -2.997 -4.02 47.55 46.41
ADF (1) -4.03 47.70 46.00
Note: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion and SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion of model
selection.
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The unit root test has been conducted using the ADF test with order of lag taken 
as two. Since a trend is not expected in the GAP estimate, the relevant test statistics 
are the one with intercept. The test for the first difference of the variable is also 
conducted to confirm they are stationary in the differences. The results presented in 
Table 5.5 show that the simple trend method does not lead to stationarity while other 
measures do. GAPY is stationary with one lagged term. All the measures of the gap 
are stationary in first difference. However, looking at Figure 5.3, it can be seen that 
the gap measured by simple trend also reverts to mean, but after a longer time 
interval. This shows limitation of the unit root test in the case of small sample, as is 
the case here.
5.5 A BASIC SHORT RUN SUPPLY SCHEDULE
Following the discussion in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, a basic and simple augmented 
Phillips curve type short-run supply function can be written as follows.
APl =c, + ax A/?; + ß\ (GAPi + en (5.18)
Equation (5.18) represents a basic and simple augmented Phillips curve, which 
says that current inflation depends on expected inflation and the past output gap. 
Following the earlier convention, inflation is represented by Ap , where the variables 
expressed in lower case letter means taken in their log and a A before the variable 
represents first difference of the variable. Variable GAPt represents the four 
measures of the output gap: GAPY, GAPYT, GAPYT2 and GAPYH, as discussed 
earlier. One period lagged inflation Ap (-1) proxy the expected inflation Ap et . It may 
be recalled from earlier Chapter 4 that Ap is stationary (see also Annexure 5.2). 
Taking different measures of the output gaps, equation 5.18 is estimated for the 
period 1973-98 and the results are presented in Table 5.6.
From the results of the above regression, presented in Table 5.6, it is clear that the 
lagged value of the output gap is positively related to inflation irrespective of its 
measure, although it is significant for the production function estimation only. It 
indicates the existence of a positively sloping short-run supply function. This result is 
critical as, together with the fact that the aggregate demand schedule estimated 
earlier is downwards sloping; it invokes the proposition presented in equations 5.3
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and 5.4. The positive sign throws light on the price formation behaviour of the 
suppliers, who base their current prices based on the last period’s output gap. 
However, the explanatory power of the lagged output gap is very poor, except in the 
case of the production function approach, which has an adjusted R-square value of 
10 percent (Table 5.6). With a production function based output gap, the model 
INFA1 also shows significant inflation stickiness at the 10 percent level, while other 
models INFA1T, INFA1T2 and INFA1H show insignificant stickiness.
Table 5.6 Basic models of inflation, the augmented Phillips curves (1973-98)
Dependent Variable Ap Ap AP Ap
Model number INFAl INFA1T INFAl T2 INFAl H
Regressor
Constant 0.050 (0.020) ** 0.060 (0.02) * 0.056 (0.023) ** 0.058 (0.024) **
Ap(-i) 0.374 (0.202) *** 0.287 (0.207) 0.320 (0.249) 0.2927 (0.263)
GAPY (-1) 0.580 (0.33) ***
GAPYT (-1) 0.190(0.28)
GAPYT2 (-1) 0.251 (0.54)
GAPYH (-1) 0.170 (0.70)
R-Square 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.07
R-Bar-Square 0.10 0.002 -0.009 -0.016
S.E of Regression 0.051 0.054 0.054 0.054
Diagnostic Tests
LM (1) serial correlation 0.32 [0.57] 0.05 [0.82] 0.66 [0.42] 1.23 [0.27]
LM (3) serial correlation 1.88 [0.60] 2.80 [0.42] 6.26 [0.10] 6.45 [0.09]
ARCH (2) test 4.35 [0.111 7.79 [0.021 8.80 [0.011 8.80 [0.01]
ARCH (3) test 8.78 [0.03] 8.51 [0.04] 8.87 [0.03] 9.22 [0.03]
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 0.15 [0.70] 0.46 [0.50] 0.95 [0.33] 1.22 [0.27]
Normality CHSQ (2) 2.94 [0.23] 0.85 [0.65] 1.31 [0.52] 1.18 [0.56]
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 1.21 [0.98] 1.79 [0.94] 0.64 [0.99] 0.65 [0.99]
Stability test CHSQ (3) 1.36 [0.71] 2.01 [0.57] 0.73 [0.87] 0.73 [0.87]
Residual Unit root test
Test statistics (DF) -4.00 -4.90 -5.21 -5.10
Notes: Predictive failure test and parameter stability tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 
1992; unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an unit 
root test with second order ADF; *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and 
***significant at 10% level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets 
[] are p-values. Estimation method: OLS.
5.6 EFFECT OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OUTPUT GAP
With the notations discussed earlier, equation 5.18 can be rewritten to incorporate a 
contemporaneous output gap as presented in equations 5.19 to 5.20.
Ap , -  c2 + a 2 AP' + ß 2 (GAPi),_, + y 2 (GAPt), + et2 
Ap, = c3 + a 3 Ap et + ß 3 A (GAPl ), + £t3
(5.19)
(5.20
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Equation 5.19 is the same as equation 5.18 with contemporaneous gap terms 
added, while equation 5.20 is obtained by modifying equation 5.19 to see the effect 
of change in the output gap. Again taking different measures of the output gaps, 
equations 5.19 and 5.20 are estimated for the period 1973-98 and the results are 
presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively. Adding the contemporaneous output 
gap term significantly improves the in-sample predictive power of all the models, 
irrespective of the method of measurement of the output gap and, most importantly, 
the contemporaneous output gap is significantly negative in all cases as shown in 
Table 5.7. Therefore, it can be concluded that inflation in India is significantly 
dominated from supply-side. The improvement in models INF2T (with GAPYT) and 
INF2 (with GAPY) are also associated with the fact that the lagged output gaps in 
these models are also significant, while this is not the case in the other two models 
(with GAPYT2 and GAPYH). Further, the statistical property of models INFA2 and 
INFA2T are better than for INFA2T2 and INFA2H. However, because of the serial 
correlation problem in model INFA2H, its R-square value may be spurious.
Replacing the lagged and contemporaneous output gaps by the change in output 
gap (Table 5.8) improves the statistical as well as the predictive power of all models, 
while change in output gap term is significantly negative in all cases. However, the 
improvement in models INFA3T2 and INFA3H is more pronounced than in the other 
models. With the problem of serial correlation removed, the R-squared values of 
these models, which is much less that for INFA2T2 and INFA2H, are now more 
reliable. It may also be noted that in this formulation the output gap as measured by 
the production function approach remains the best performer.
An overall examination of the results in Tables 5.6 to 5.8 shows that the models 
containing the output gap as measured by the production function method have better 
explanatory power and statistical properties than the models containing output gaps 
calculated by other methods. Owing to this, further discussion and inflation modeling 
will use the production function approach of the output gap measurement (GAPY).
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Table 5.7 Basic models of inflation: effect of contemporaneous output gap (1973-98)
Dependent Variable Ap aP Ap Ap
Model number INFA2 INFA2T INFA2T2 INFA2H
Regressor
Constant 0.050(0.015)* 0.048 (0.017)* 0.053 (0.019)* 0.061 (0.0189)*
Ap(-i) 0.345 (0.155)** 0.426 (0.178)** 0.337(0.201)*** 0.251 (0.206)
GAPY (-1) 1.240 (0.30)*
GAPYT (-1) 1.050(0.40)*
GAPYT2 (-1) 0.690 (0.50)
G APY H(-l) 0.200 (0.56)
GAPY -1.276 (0.31)*
GAPYT -1.061 (0.3)*
GAPYT2 -1.364(0.4)*
GAPYH -1.710(0.4)*
R-Square 0.54 0.39 0.42 0.45
R-Bar-Square 0.47 0.30 0.34 0.38
S.E of Regression 0.039 0.045 0.044 0.42
D ia g n o st ic  T ests
LM (1) serial correlation 0.27 [0.60] 0.05 [0.82] 1.93 [0.17] 8.88 [0.003]
LM (3) serial correlation 3.52 [0.32] 4.67 [0.20] 5.04 [0.17] 9.66 [0.02]
ARCH (3) test 3.32 [0.51] 4.49 [0.22] 0.95 [0.87] 1.13 [0.77]
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 4.58 [0.03] 4.65 [0.03] 5.49 [0.02] 5.50 [0.02]
Normality CHSQ (2) 0.32 [0.85] 1.37 [0.50] 0.03 [0.99] 0.02 [0.99]
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 3.04 [0.80] 1.55 [0.96] 1.74 [0.94] 1.39 [0.97]
Stability test CHSQ (4) 3.40 [0.49] 1.73 [0.79] 1.92 [0.75] 1.55 [0.82]
R e s id u a l U n it  r o o t  te st
Test statistics (DF) -4.73 -5.34 -4.80 -4.40
Notes: Same as Table 5.6.
Table 5.8 Basic models of Inflation with change in output gap (1973-98)
Dependent Variable A p Ap Ap Ap
Model number INFA3 INFA3T INFA3T2 INFA3H
Regressor
Constant 0.050(0.014)* 0.048 (0.017)* 0.0432 (0.017)** 0.0420 (0.018)**
Ap(-l) 0.352(0.143)** 0.427 (0.171)** 0.471 (0.177)** 0.491 (0.1865)**
AGAPY -1.260 (0.263)*
AGAPYT -1.061 (0.30)*
AGAPYT2 -1.11 (0.33)*
AGAPYH -1.14(0.37)*
R-Square 0.54 0.39 0.38 0.34
R-Bar-Square 0.50 0.33 0.32 0.28
S.E of Regression 0.038 0.044 0.044 0.046
D ia g n o s t ic  T ests
DW-statistics 1.80 1.82 1.84 1.79
LM (1) serial correlation 0.17 [0.68] 0.04 [0.84] 0.02 [0.88] 0.00 [[0.99]
LM (3) serial correlation 3.33 [0.34] 4.67 [0.20] 6.78 [0.08] 7.17 [0.07]
ARCH (3) test 2.81 [0.42] 4.48 [0.21] 4.62 [0.20] 3.23 [0.36]
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 4.49 [0.03] 4.60 [0.03] 2.96 [0.09] 3.03 [0.08]
Normality CHSQ (2) 0.46 [0.80] 1.37 [0.50] 0.11 [0.94] 0.26 [0.88]
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 3.24 [0.78] 1.64 [0.95] 1.74 [0.94] 1.49 [0.96]
Stability test CHSQ (3) 2.87 [0.41] 1.30 [0.73] 1.48 [0.69] 1.31 [0.73]
R e s id u a l U n it  r o o t  te st
Test statistics (DF) -4.76 -5.34 -5.72 -5.64
Notes: Same as Table 5.6
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5.7 INFLATION MODEL
The above analysis has identified both demand and supply effects on inflation via the 
output gap. Unfortunately this is not too helpful for policy, because the output gap is 
difficult to identify fully, particularly when supply side effects dominate. The 
contemporaneous output gap does not show the possibility of trade-off between 
inflation and output. It may be recalled that the earlier discussion reveals that both 
supply and demand shocks can produce an output gap. Therefore, output gap has the 
power to explain inflation, though in itself the output gap may not be the cause, as 
would have been the case under the situation of positive relationship between 
inflation and the output gap. Therefore, an attempt is made in this section to model 
the inflation process as a reduced form function of supply and demand factors. The 
catch is to identify at least some of the variables that both cause gap in the short run 
and at the same time can be considered economically relevant in price formation or 
demand creation.
A survey of recent research on inflation in India indicates the monetarist way of 
modeling inflation to dominate the Indian literature, where the price equation is 
obtained by inverting the demand for money equation.60 For the reason stated above, 
a pure monetarist model can at best provide a poor and incomplete specification of 
the inflation process in India, because long-term price movement may not be simply 
on account of excess money over nominal income alone as predicted by such models.
Nevertheless, fiscal deficit arising out of increases in government investment 
without improvement in the tax base must be substantially monetised to ensure that 
excess government borrowing does not lead to a credit crunch in the private sector, 
resulting in excess money in the system and inflationary pressure. Therefore, any 
model of inflation in India cannot ignore money. As seen earlier, the aggregate 
demand schedule is steep, which means adverse supply shocks and increases in the 
shift factors of the demand schedule, such as money growth, will together produce 
more inflation than output. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 reveals that
60 Pradhan and Subramanian (1998), (Arif 1996), Rangarajan (1998:ch 2), are some of the studies where a 
predominantly monetarist approach has been used. Most recent among these, Pradhan and Subramanian (1997) 
model the CPI for urban non-manual workers (CPI-UNME) and the CPI for agricultural labour (CPI-AL), which 
are dominated by food items. However, it may be pointed out that the series on CPI-AL has already been 
rendered outdated (GOI 1994:58; 1996:77) and the CPI-UME has limited application in conducting monetary 
policy because of very small basket size, which is directed to address a particular group of the labour force.
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money is regarded as the single most important variable in explaining the 
inflationary process. McCallum (1994) posits that money should not be ignored from 
any price equation. Further, in view of the possibility of discretion in conducting 
monetary policy in developing countries like India, money growth becomes a 
potential variable for explaining inflation.
However, it is also important to identify a potential monetary aggregate that can 
be treated as exogenous to the inflationary process. Most of the studies in India use 
broad money to explain inflation, without considering the possibility of it being 
endogenous to inflation. In the present study an attempt is first made to identify the 
best monetary aggregate to be introduced in the inflation model using statistical 
methods such as causality tests.
In recent years, there seems to have been fewer attempts in India to address 
supply side problems and structure of price formation behaviour on the basis of 
nominal wages and prices of important inputs and intermediates at the aggregate 
level. However, Balakrishnan (1991; 1992; 1994)6' modeled manufactured prices 
through an error correction model, using annual data for 1952-80, and found that 
labour and raw material costs are both significant determinants of inflation in the 
industrial sector. Joshi and Little (1994:257-263) have modeled food and non-food 
inflation separately by using money, consolidated fiscal deficit, food production and 
non-food production and import prices as explanatory variables. Callen and Chang 
(1999) modeled WPI based annual inflation for the period 1957/58-1997/98, with 
output gaps in industrial and agricultural components of GDP taking them separately 
as well as combined.62 They found that the lagged industrial gap was insignificantly 
positive, while the lagged agricultural output gap was significantly negative and the 
lagged combined output gap insignificantly negative. This led them to conclude the 
existence of structural inflation in India. They did not analyze the contemporaneous 
gaps.
With the above considerations inflation, in India can be modeled in a rather 
unconventional way by considering three main components of the inflationary
61 Balakrishnan uses a dataset of same vintage, which is very old and probably cannot be updated due to 
discontinuation in data compilation. Therefore, the usefulness of such a study is necessarily limited.
62 Callen and Chang (1999) also model quarterly inflation using index of industrial production based output gap 
and report signs of output gap term, which is difficult to explain in the standard framework of gap based inflation 
models.
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process: (a) a long-term relationship between wage and general prices in order to 
capture the adjustment process in a non-homogeneous markup-pricing framework; 
(b) volatile components of inflation representing short-term expectational impact on 
general price variation (Ape); and (c) inflationary impact of discretionary component 
of money growth. The scheme can be written as follows:
Ap = / ( Markup Adjustment, A,pE, Descretionary Money Growth) (5.21)
Additional variables such as real exchange rate change63 (Areer) and growth in 
the world output (Aipig5), which are important variables in explaining aggregate 
demand, will also be considered for the final model. The estimation of the final 
equation of inflation requires estimation of time series for the markup adjustment, a 
time series for discretionary money growth and identification of variable responsible 
for expected price variation. The discretionary money growth is obtained as 
deviation from the long-term growth path of selected monetary aggregate. The 
markup adjustment is calculated using the concept of cointegration between price 
and wage. The rest of the discussion is organized as follows: section 5.7.1 discusses 
the markup adjustment. Expectational components are presented in section 5.7.2. 
Section 5.7.3 chooses proper monetary aggregate and estimates the discretionary 
component of money. Section 5.7.4 presents the final model of inflation and 
demonstrates how the information content of contemporaneous output gap is taken 
out as direct price forming variables add to the model. Chapter conclusions are 
provided in section 5.8.
5.7.1 Estimation of Markup Adjustment
Mark-up pricing is the key to several inflation models and has an enduring presence 
in the literature (de Brouwer and Ericsson 1995). The main idea being that in the 
long run the domestic price level is a mark-up over total unit costs, including labour 
costs, import prices, and energy prices. A general form of the price equation based on 
costs can be written as follows.
63 Exchange rate change is calculated as first difference of log of real exchange rate. Therefore, it is appreciation 
with positive sign and depreciation with negative sign.
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( 5.22)
n
i = l
Here, X t is the cost of the i,h factor, a  is the share of the i'h factor in total cost 
and p, is a constant capturing the mark-up. Taking log, the above equation can be 
represented in the log linear form representing long run relationship in levels. In 
view of non-availability of clear-cut costs of factors, the homogeneity condition is 
relaxed, which means the mark-up will include the cost of unaccounted factors. A 
proxy of labour cost is used as the main cost, determining price in the long run.
The emoluments of public sector employees (WAGP) can be considered as the 
benchmark salary for workers in other sectors. It is suitable to consider public sector 
emoluments per capita as the proxy for the cost of price forming agents at the 
aggregate level. Representing the log of variables by lower case letter, the above 
equation can be written in log linear form as follows.
Deviation from the equilibrium causes mark up to adjust. The markup adjustment 
term can be defined as
In the empirical literature for time series, the widely accepted method of 
estimating long run relationships is to apply the principle of cointegration to get the 
cointegrating vector for the variables under consideration. Following the tradition of 
the time series analysis, p and wagp are tested for unit roots and the results indicate 
that both are integrated of order one. Their first differences are stationary (see 
Annexure 5.2). The long run relationship between the variables is established 
through the maximum likelihood test of cointegration applying the likelihood ratio 
test on the maximum eigenvalue and trace of the stochastic matrix in a vector error 
correction model (VECM) specification (Pesaran, et al. 2000). The structure of the 
vectors is modeled according to the generalized restriction discussed in Pesaran and 
Smith (1998). A brief note on the framework of VECM with cointegration is 
presented in Annexure 5.3 of this chapter and Appendix AB of this thesis. Since both
Pi =a0, + a\wagpr (5.23)
Markup Adjustmentt = f ( p  -  alwagp)t_l (5.24)
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variables are highly trended, the cointegration is carried out with restricted trend and 
unrestricted intercept in a VAR of order two. The VAR order was selected according 
to the SBC order selection criterion.
The cointegration test presented in Annexure 5.4 supports the presence of a long 
run relationship between the two variables. The structural design of cointegrating 
vector is presented in Annexure 5.5 and the resulting long-term relationship between 
price and wage is summarized in the following equation 5.28 with standard error 
given in parenthesis. ERPB is the error term and the short-run dynamics of the price 
will be a function of this error term. The unrestricted constant of estimation of the 
short-run equation of price will be combined constant for short as well as long run. It 
may be recalled from the earlier discussion that the inflation equation is the 
conjectured short-run price equation.
pt = 0.62836 wagpt * + ERPBt 
________ (0.0097)_____________________
Note: The standard errors are shown in parenthesis ().
(5.25)
The above long run relationship says that for each percentage point increase in 
total emoluments of public sector employees the WPI increases only by about 0.63 
percentage points. The markup has to adjust long run deviations according to ERPB 
in equation 5.25. There are two main reasons why it can take longer for wage 
increments to convert into general inflation. First, the employer retains a part of the 
wages increase as compulsory savings so that they do not immediately reach the 
hands of labour for consumption. This particularly happens in the public sector. 
Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, any lump-sum payments received are saved for 
future bulk expenditures. In both cases, the effects of a wage increase will be 
delayed.
Markup Adjustmentt = f(E R B )t_x (5.26)
5.7.2 Expectational Components of Short-Run Price Variation
As discussed earlier, the explanatory power of the contemporaneous output gap with 
a negative relationship with inflation is derived from the fact that it captures the 
effects of supply shocks from several sources not appearing in the parsimonious
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models in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. However, important information regarding the nature 
of the Indian economy is there, which must be considered when formulating 
monetary and fiscal policies. Further, the negative sign of the change in the output 
gap clearly points towards the dominance of supply shifts relative to the demand 
shifts in the Indian economy. The agricultural sector that forms slightly more than 
one quarter of GDP is particularly susceptible to weather conditions like rain 
deviations. Such a supply shock quickly transmits to the manufacturing sector, 
because a large proportion of agricultural produce is input to the manufacturing 
sector. This affects general price levels. Some supply shocks are also introduced 
through the use of new technology and efficiency methods.
Other sources of supply shock can be identified by careful scrutiny of different 
components of the basket of wholesale price index. After a detailed examination, the 
annual percentage change in the WPI and its important and volatile components for 
the sample period 1971-72 to 1998-99 are summarized in Table 5.9, while Table 5.10 
presents the correlation matrix of inflation in selected components of the WPI.
The long-run average and overall coefficient of variation (a measure of 
volatility) of WPI based inflation is very close to that of the manufacturing sector, 
which supports the stand taken by this study to use the WPI as representative of core 
inflation in India. The volatility of inflation in manufactured goods and food prices is 
almost the same, which is the minimum among the subgroups. Control on food price 
inflation is mostly due to the outcome of strong government interventions.
The primary articles have three main components: food articles with a weight of 
17.39, non-food articles with a weight of 10.08 and minerals with a weight of 4.83. 
Non-food articles are raw cotton, raw jute, oil seeds and other non-food articles, 
while minerals include petroleum crude, metallic and other minerals. It can be noted 
that the prices of these primary articles feed into the price of manufacture articles as 
they form the input and raw material for several articles included in manufacturing. 
As expected, energy sector inflation has the highest volatility, mainly due to mineral 
oil price (PMO) inflation.
Within the manufacturing sector, edible oil price (PEO) inflation is the most 
volatile component. Edible oil is a very sensitive item of general consumption in 
India. Following earlier convention, mineral oil and edible oil price inflation can be 
represented with Apmo and Apeo, respectively. An important observation can be 
made from Table 5.10 about the influence of mineral oil and edible oil price inflation
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on other components of inflation. Although the weight of mineral oil and edible oil in 
the overall WPI is just 6.7 percent and 2.45 percent, respectively, they are expected 
to have compounding effects on economy wide prices, as can be seen from their high 
correlation with other components.
Table 5.9 Pattern of WPI based inflation in India (1971-98)
O v era ll
W P I
P rim ary  sec to r
F u e l, p o w er, lig h t and  
lu b ric an t
M a n u fac tu rin g  sec to r
T o ta l T o ta l F o o d T o ta l M in e ra l oil T o ta l
E d ib le
O il
1971-75 10.96 10.14 9 .89 15.68 18.88 10.75 6 .00
1976-80 7.85 7.21 4.75 9 .6 0 9 .5 4 8.15 10.46
1981-85 6 .40 6 .7 0 8 .29 9 .04 7 .46 5.37 5.84
1986-90 7.53 7 .68 8.11 6 .06 5 .72 7 .7 0 12.90
1991-95 9 .64 9 .93 10.28 5.78 8.32 9 .44 6.07
1996-98 5 .86 7 .35 9 .06 16.19 8.91 4 .1 4 4 .82
M ean 8.19 8.22 8.35 9 .98 9 .26 7 .84 7 .89
M a x im u m 22 .47 24 .63 22 .75 41.31 52 .48 19.07 40 .2
M in im u m -1 .09 -6 .98 -5 .6 4 -1 7 .5 2 0 .0 0 0 .17 -24 .2
S tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n 5.21 6 .74 6.81 10.54 11.35 4 .9 4 13.25
C o e ff ic ie n t o f  V a ria tio n 0 .64 0 .82 0.63 1.06 1.16 0.63 1.68
W eig h t in  th e  W P I index
(% )
100 32 .3 0 17.39 10.66 6 .67 57 .0 4 2 .45
Note: All the values of inflation are provided in terms of percentage annual variation. Food is part of 
primary sector, edible oil is part of manufacturing sector and mineral oil is part of fuel power and 
lubricant.
Source of basic data: Economic survey (Government of India), various issues. Percentage variations 
are calculated by author.
Table 5.10 Correlation matrix of sectoral inflation (1971-98)
Ap A pfpl A ppr A p m f A pfd A pm o A peo
Ap 1
A ppfp l 0 .5 4 1
A ppr 0 .9 0 0 .4 2 1
A p m f 0.91 0 .4 0 0 .66 1
A pfd 0 .78 0 .43 0.91 0.51 1
A pm o 0 .77 0 .85 0 .60 0 .6 4 0 .55 1
A peo 0 .66 0 .1 0 0 .86 0 .4 2 0.71 0 .28 1
Note: Ap: all commodities WPI inflation; Apfpl: fuel, power and lubricant price inflation; Appr: 
primary product price inflation; Apmf: manufacturing sector price inflation; Apfd: Food price 
inflation; Apmo: mineral oil price inflation; Apeo: Edible Oil price inflation.
Interestingly, edible oil inflation, which is part of the manufacturing sector, is not 
highly correlated with that sector. It can be noted here that edible oil is one of the 
essential consumption items for Indian households and forms a significant part of 
food product imports despite the large quantity produced domestically. Thus, the
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two oil prices together also proxy a sensitive component of import price in India. 
However, in line with expectations, Apmo and Apeo , are not themselves correlated. 
Therefore, both can be allowed in the inflation model as supply-side variables.
Given the above arguments, it should be the case that the changes in the output 
gap can be significantly explained with the help of mineral and edible oil price 
inflation and deviation from normal rain as shown in Table 5.11. Clearly, good rain 
will shift the supply schedule to the right increasing the output gap, while oil price 
inflation creates expectation about an increase in general inflation, leading to a shift 
in the aggregate supply schedule to the left reducing the gap. Money growth is not 
found to be significant in explaining the variation in the output gap, probably due to 
the fact that the aggregate demand schedule is steep.
However, growth in foreign exchange reserves (Aferu) significantly explains 
change in the output gap. There has been significant growth in India’s international 
reserves during the 1990s, which is not particularly due to export earnings but to 
non-traditional reasons such as repatriation and deposits by non-resident Indians. The 
economic survey for 1995-96 (page: 76) reports several measures including increase 
in cash reserve ratio (CRR), taken during that period to moderate foreign exchange 
inflows. It is important to recognize the mechanism through which this money can 
affect the economy. The bank cannot prevent a non-resident individual from sending 
money to his relatives in India, but fears of excess liquidity cause measures to control 
overall money growth to be put in place. The result is a shortage of liquidity for 
business from official sources. The cost of money increases in the informal market 
and exerts a negative supply shock. Prices rise and the output gap falls. Growth in 
international reserves can proxy such effects and therefore, the same is used in the 
regression presented in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11 Determinants of the output gap (1972-98)__________________________
AGAPY = 0.013*** + 0.079 DRAIN* * - 0.076 Apmo *** - 0.073 Apeo ** - 0.043 Aferu **
(0.007) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) (0.017)
R-square = 0.60, R-bar-square = 0.52. F statistics F (4, 21) = 7.71 [0.00]. SE of regression = 0.02, LM 
serial correlation CHSQ (1) = 1.02[0.31], LM serial correlation CHSQ (3) = 5.22[0.16]. ARCH (3) 
CHSQ (3) = 0.56 [0.91]. Functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 0.26 [0.61]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 
1.63 [0.44]. Estimation method: OLS.
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
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The variables included in Table 5.11 form an important subset of variables, which 
can be considered potential variables in explaining inflation in India. However, while 
several variables like money have demand side effect, they are not found to explain 
gap, but can be important in explaining general inflation because the gap itself does 
not fully explain inflation.
The short-run price variation is dependent on the factors responsible for the 
inflationary expectations. As identified above such variables which affect inflation 
expectations in short term (Ape) and generate output gap include mineral and edible 
oil price inflation and deviation of rain from normal. As discussed in the context of 
determinants of the output gap, increases in foreign money are also expected to cause 
supply side inflation. In addition, expectations about current inflation can also be 
influenced by wage inflation during the period and past general price inflation. 
Therefore, such variables are presented in equation 5.27 to explain the short run price 
variation. It may be noted that first three terms of equation 5.27 can also be derived 
from equation of the form of 5.22 as inflation accounting.
Ap E = f(Axvagp, Apmo, Apeo, DRAIN, Afern, Ap(-l)) (5.27)
5.7.3 Choice of Monetary Aggregate and Discretionary Money Growth
Money growth is identified as the key demand side inflationary variable. An 
examination of the causal relationship between inflation and monetary aggregates 
can lead to proper choice of macroeconomic specifications for analyzing inflation.64 
As discussed earlier, the three most commonly used monetary aggregates, of the base 
or reserve money MO, the narrow money Ml, and the broad money M3 are used for 
causality tests. The tests are conducted in a bi-variate setup using two variables, 
inflation and growth rate of one of the monetary aggregates at a time, because the 
main motivation of the tests is to understand the relative precedence between 
inflation and money growth.
64 Recently, Jadhav, et al. (1992) studied causation between nominal broad money growths and inflation and 
concluded broad money and inflation had reverse causality. However, they did not study the other monetary 
aggregates, which is attempted here.
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In line with the arguments presented in Chapter 4, two versions of causality tests, 
the Sims’ and the block Granger non-causality test, are also used in this chapter 
before arriving at conclusions. Chapter 4 is referred for discussion of the 
methodology. Following the earlier convention, lower case letters represent variables 
in their log and a A before a variable represents the variable in its first difference.
All three monetary aggregates are non-stationary but first difference of their log 
value AmO, Ami, Am3, respectively, representing monetary growth, are stationary 
(see Annexure 5.3 for test results) and the same are used for the causality test. 
Inflation is represented by the first difference of log value of the wholesale price 
index (Ap).  The results are presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 according to the two 
versions of the tests. These results lead to important conclusions. Most importantly, 
according to both tests, only narrow money Ml demonstrates unambiguous 
unidirectional causation for inflation. The block Granger non-causality test (Table- 
5.12) indicates bi-directional causality in the case of the other two monetary 
aggregates of MO and M3.
According to the Sims procedure (Table-5.13), the hypothesis that inflation fails 
to cause base money MO and broad money M3 is rejected at the 5 percent level, 
while the hypothesis that MO or M3 fail to cause inflation is not rejected at the same 
level. Thus, the Sims test supports unidirectional causation from Ml to inflation and 
from inflation to MO and M3. However, the relative P-values in Table 5.12 suggest 
that causality from inflation to MO and M3 is stronger than causality from MO and 
M3 to inflation.
Table 5.12 ‘Block Granger non-causality’ test of precedence between money growth 
and inflation in a bi-variate VAR. Direction of non-causality being tested 
is from jt to y (1972-99)
Monetary Base (MO)_______ Narrow Money (M l)_______ Broad Money (M3)
Test variable (lagged X ) AmO Ap Ami AP Am 3 AP
Dependent( y  ) Ap AmO Ap Ami Ap Am 3
CHSQ (1) 6.096 8.131 4.289 15.680
[0.014] [0.004] [0.038] [0.00]
CHSQ (2) 7.724 1.261
[0.021] [0.532]
Sign of relationship (+) (-) (+, -) (-, +) (+) (-)
Notes: The order of VAR, selected according to SBC selection criteria is 1 for MO and M3 while it 
is 2 for M l. P-values for Chi-Square statistics are given in square brackets []. The statistics is to test 
the null hypothesis that coefficients of the lagged values of the explanatory variable x in the equation 
of the y variable are zero. A lower P-value means rejection of the hypothesis and therefore that 
demonstrates existence of the causal direction from x to y .
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Table 5.13 Sims test of forecasting ability between money growth and inflation in a
bi-variate OLS regression. Direction of non-causality being tested is from 
y to ^ (1972-99)
M o n e ta ry  B ase  (MO) N arro w  M o n e y  ( M l) B road  M o n ey  (M 3)
T es t v a riab le  ( fu tu re  X ) Ap AmO Ap Ami AP Am 3
D e p e n d e n t ( y  ) AmO Ap Ami Ap Am 3 Ap
C H S Q  (1) 2 .7 7 0 5 .3 8 0 4 .397 1.929 1.346 14.033
[0.096] [0.02] [0 .036] [0 .165] [0 .246] [0 .000]
S ig n  o f  re la tio n sh ip (+) (-) (+) (-) (+ ) (-)
Note: One past and one future value are considered in system for MO and M3, while two past and one 
future value is considered for system with Ml. P-values for Chi-Square statistics are given in square 
brackets []. The statistics is to test the null hypothesis in a Wald test that coefficient of the future value 
of the x variable )  in the equation for the y variable is zero. A higher P-value means that the 
hypothesis of zero coefficients for future value of x is not rejected and therefore that demonstrates 
non-rejection of the non-existence of the causal direction from y to X supporting non-existence of 
causal direction from y to X. Equation estimated for this test is
y t -  c -  j y t j + ^ ßjX, j + ^ Yjx i+j + v, • ^or detail of this test, refer to Chapter 4.
7=1 7=0 7=1
Thus, for explaining inflation as a monetary phenomenon, the appropriate 
monetary aggregate for India is clearly Ml. The other two monetary aggregates of 
M3 and MO appear to be influenced by considerations of accommodating inflation by 
the monetary authorities. Therefore, these aggregates are not appropriate for 
modeling inflation in India.
Having selected narrow money as the preferred monetary aggregate for modeling 
inflation, the discretionary component of monetary growth is calculated under the 
assumption that in the long term monetary authorities would have planned the same 
trend growth rate which best fits the data. Any deviation from that trend growth rate 
is surprise growth in money due to the discretionary considerations. The trend 
growth rate of Ml for the sample period, estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
method of adjustment for first order serial correlation, is obtained as 14.089 percent. 
Therefore, the discretionary or surprise growth in Ml ( Amldis) is obtained using the 
following relationship:
A midis = Ami-0.14089 (5.28)
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5.7.4 Final Model of Inflation
Considering equations 5.21, 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28, the final model for inflation can be 
written in the following distributed lag framework, which will also be consistent with 
error correction representation of the relationship between price and wage, in which 
case other variables than deviations in price and wage can be considered additional 
short term price determinants.
n\ n l  n3 n4
Ap = a + Y jaiERB,-i + Y b‘AwaSPt-i + Y jc^Pmo‘-i + l dAPe°.-i
i'=l ;=0 ;=0 i=0
n 5 n 6 n l  nS
+ E eA ferut-i + E f i D R A I N '-i + E g A nAdist-i +E hA reer,-i (5-29)
i=0 i=0 i'=0 i=l
n9 nlO
+ E J A i p ' g S . - i  + Y j k A p , - i  +  £ ,
i= 0 i'=l
The estimation is carried out starting with a general lag structure of two for all 
variables (nl = n2 = n3 = n4 = n5 = n6 = n7 = n8 = n9 = nlO =2), and the model is 
then searched downwards. Equation 5.29 does not include contemporaneous real 
exchange rates, as it contain contemporaneous inflation in its construction. However, 
contemporaneous nominal exchange rate change (Aneer) and world inflation 
( Acpig5) were examined for explanatory power (see Annexure 5.1 for definition of 
these variables). Variables found to be insignificant in contributing to the
explanatory power of the model are systematically removed. The estimated final 
form model is presented in Table 5.14. It may be noted that DRAIN, lagged inflation, 
lagged real exchange rate change, lagged and contemporaneous nominal exchange 
rate change, world inflation, and world output growth did not significantly improve 
the model and therefore do not appear in the final model.
The variables that significantly explain general inflation in India are growths in 
public sector wages, oil prices, narrow money stocks and foreign exchange reserves 
as shown in model INFB1. In a related context Woo (1984) has demonstrated that 
among several foreign trade variables, the price of imported oil alone along with 
domestic wage in the private non-farm economy leads to an acceptable specification 
for prices of non-food, non-fuel products in the United States.
Model INFB1 is precisely estimated with satisfactory statistical properties. Its 
explanatory power with R-square of 93 percent is much higher than the simple
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models of Tables 5.6 to 5.8. The fitted and actual values of the model are shown in 
Figure 5.6. The short-run forecasting properties of the model appear to be 
satisfactory (see Chow’s predictive failure and coefficient stability test results in 
Table 5.14 and one year ahead forecasted value in Figure 5.6). The errors of 
prediction for the model are well within two standard error bands. The CUSUM and 
CUSUM of squares plot provided in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, respectively do not indicate 
any signs of structural break.
Model INFC1 has been tested for stability using Chows F-test by breaking at 
various points as permitted by the number of variables in the model. It appears that 
the variable of growth in the international reserve became important only during 
1990s, when India’s international reserves increased substantially. Other variables 
are found to be stable for most periods.
There are several other sources of supply and demand side changes, which may 
not be easy to model specifically. Therefore, output gaps could still have some 
additional information content. Particularly, the combined effects of DRAIN, 
exchange rate appreciation foreign output, technological improvements and 
economic reforms have an impact on the inflationary process. With this 
consideration, it is logical to include the output gap and test the model for any 
improvement.
After adding the output gap with model INFB1, the results are presented in model 
INFB2. Clearly, output gap now contains less information, as the size of its 
coefficient is significantly lowered to 0.3 from 1.25 in model INFA2 in Table 5.7. 
The adjusted R-square improves by only 2 percentage points. The fitted values from 
model INFB2 are shown in Figure 5.10, which indicates improvements in in-sample 
forecasting inflation particularly during the 1990s. Further, the negative sign 
associated with the contemporaneous output gap indicates it is an outcome of shocks 
dominated by supply side inter alia improvements in productivity, weather 
conditions or the positive effects of economic reforms. It may also be noted that 
variables explaining the output gap in Table 5.11 have opposite signs in model 
INFB1 and INFB2, which shows consistency in the transmission mechanism of 
inflationary process.
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Table 5.14 A hybrid model of inflation for India with money and markup price 
__________(1972-98)_______________________________________________
D e p e n d e n t V a r ia b le In fla tio n  ( Ap  ) In fla tio n  ( Ap  )
M o d e l n u m b er IN F B 1 IN F B 2
R e g re sso r
C o n s tan t -0 .5 4 4  (0 .1 6 5 )* -0 .801 (0 .1 5 9 )*
M a rk u p  ad ju s tm e n t E R P B  (-1 ) -0 .2 2 9  (0 .0 6 5 )* -0 .3 3 2  (0 .0 6 3 )*
W ag e  in f la tio n  AW C lgp 0 .1 6 7  (0 .0 7 3 )* * 0 .2 0 6  (0 .0 6 1 )*
M in e ra l o il p r ic e  in f la tio n  Ap if lO 0 .2 3 5  (0 .0 3 6 )* 0 .2 1 3  (0 .0 3 0 )*
E d ib le  o il p r ic e  in f la tio n  Ap e o 0 .1 3 7  (0 .0 3 3 )* 0 .1 1 9  (0 .0 2 8 )*
E d ib le  o il p r ic e  in f la tio n  ApeO(-l) 0 .0 7 8  (0 .0 3 7 )* * 0 .0 7 3  (0 .0 3 0 )* *
D isc re tio n a ry  m o n ey  g ro w th  Affl\d is 0 .1 9 7  (0 .0 5 5 )* 0 .1 6 8  (0 .0 4 6 )*
D isc re tio n a ry  m o n ey  g ro w th  Alfl ld is  (-1) 0 .2 3 0  (0 .0 6 5 )* 0 .1 9 9  (0 .0 5 4 )*
G ro w th  in F o re ig n  E x ch an g e  re se rv es  Af e r u 0 .0 2 7  (0 .0 1 4 )* * * 0 .021  (0 .0 1 2 )* * *
C o n te m p o ra n e o u s  o u tp u t gap  G A PY -0 .3 3 4  (0 .1 0 8 )*
R -S q u are 0 .9 3 2 0 .9 5 7
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .9 0 2 0 .9 3 4
S .E  o f  R e g re ss io n 0 .0 1 6 5 0 .0 1 3 6
F  s ta tis tic , F  (k -1 , n -k ), n= 27 ,
k=  no. o f  re g re sso rs  in c lu d in g  in te rcep t
D ia g n o stic  T ests
3 0 .8 9  [0 .00] 4 1 .7 2  [0 .00]
D W -sta tis tic s 1.60 1.78
S eria l c o rre la tio n , L M  ( l ) 1.90 [0 .1 7 ] 0 .5 6  [0 .45 ]
S eria l co rre la tio n , L M  (2) 3 .7 6  [0 .15]
S eria l co rre la tio n , L M  (3) 3 .33  [0 .15] 8 .47  [0 .04]
S eria l co rre la tio n , F  (3, 13) 1.23 [0 .33] 2 .13  [0 .14]
H e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  C H S Q  (1) 0 .1 0  [0 .75] 0.81 [0 .37]
A R C H  (3) te s t 4 .8 0  [0 .19] 0 .07  [0 .99]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 0.51 [0 .47] 0 .13  [0 .72]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 0 .1 6  [0 .92] 1.78 [0 .41]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  (a) C H S Q  (6) 3 .94  [0 .68] 6 .17  [0 .41]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  (b ) C H S Q  (1) 2 .05  [0 .15]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (9) 
S tab ility  te s t C H S Q  (10 )
R es id u a l U n it  r o o t  te s t
13.4 [0 .15]
15.56 [0 .11]
T es t s ta tis tic s  (D F ) -4 .05 -4 .15
Notes: Predictive failure test (a) is done after breaking the sample at 1992. Predictive failure test (b) is 
done for future values beyond 1998, the estimation period. The wage growth data for 1999 is assumed 
to be similar to 1998 for predicting 1999 inflation as the same is not available. The parameter stability 
tests are conducted after breaking the sample at 1987. The unit root test statistics are presented 
corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an unit root test with second order ADF; 
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values. The error term ERPB is 
obtained from equation (5.28). Estimation method: OLS.
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Figure 5.6 Actual, fitted, and forecasted values of inflation in model INFB1
Actual Fitted Forecas t
0 . 2 0
- 0 . 05
0) 0) 0) 
T— T— T—
O O O O O O
Figure 5.7 Plot of the residuals and two standard error band in model INFB1
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Figure 5.8 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals in model INFB1
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Figure 5.9 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals in model 
INFB1
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Figure 5.10 Actual, fitted, and forecasted values of inflation in model INFB2
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5.8 CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter indicates the concept of the output gap can successfully 
be used in the case of India to identify whether the economy is dominated by supply 
side factors. The most interesting outcome is the negative association between 
inflation and the contemporaneous output gap. With a downward sloping aggregate 
demand schedule and upward sloping supply schedule, a negative relationship 
between inflation and the output gap indicates the profound impact of the supply side 
of the economy on inflation. It also shows that the output gap contains important 
information about the inflationary process in India and both supply and demand side 
variables are important in understanding the inflationary process.
This chapter reviewed two major approaches for determining the output gaps. 
One is the univariate approach, which includes three methods of linear time trend, 
quadratic time trend and the HP filter, and the other is the production function 
approach. The profiles of the output gaps generated by all four methods are quite 
similar and produce the same kind of results when used to model simple supply 
function. However, despite broad similarity in the results, the output gap calculated 
using the production function approach appears to be superior in reducing ex post 
prediction error in modeling inflation in the simple way.
Using the information content of the output gap, a mark-up price model of 
inflation with discretionary narrow money growth, wage inflation, oil prices 
inflation, and growth in international reserves has been developed and evaluated. It 
shows that such a model performs well in explaining inflation in India and the 
performance of the model can be enhanced if more information about the output gap 
can be foreseen. To the basic question of ‘can monetary policy affect inflation in 
India’ the answer is clearly ‘yes’. It is important to note that narrow money growth 
has been systematically introduced in the model based on the causal relationship of 
this variable with inflation. There is a clear unidirectional causality running from 
narrow money growth to inflation in India and not vice-versa as was found in the 
case of base money and broad money. Therefore, narrow money is an important 
causal variable for explaining inflation. To control inflation, the monetary authority 
should be concerned with the growth rate of narrow money rather than with other 
aggregates. On the other hand, narrow money is not an instrument controlled by the 
central bank; the instrument is base money or the interest rate or cash reserve ratio
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(CRR). Therefore, the narrow money multiplier needs to be modeled using these 
instruments, which is done in Chapter 7.
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Annexure 5.1 Summary definition of data used in Chapter 5
S ym b o l V a r ia b le  d e s c rip tio n  and  u n it o f m e a s u re m e n t
C P IG 5 T ra d e  w e ig h te d  co n su m e r p rice  in d e x  o f G 5 c o u n tr ie s  (G e rm a n y , F ra n ce , Ja p a n , U K  and 
U S A  ) ca lcu la te d  from  m o n th ly  se rie s  (line  64) o f IFS. B ase : 9 9 3 -9 4 = 1 0 0 )
D R A IN R a tio  o f ch a n g e  in ra in fa ll in d e x  from  th e  5 0 -ye a r a v e ra g e  in d e x  fo r  Ju n e -S e p .
F D IN Z I F ore ign  d ire c t in ve s tm e n t, n e t in flo w s  as p e rce n ta g e  o f G D I
F E R U F ore ig n  e xch a n g e  rese rve s  in c lu d in g  go ld  (US $, m illio n )
G A P Y O u tp u t G ap  m ea su re d  as fra c tio n  o f th e  po ten tia l o u tp u t, w h ich  is m e a su re d  by p ro d u c tio n  
fu n c tio n  m ethod
G A P Y T O u tp u t G ap  m ea su re d  as fra c tio n  of th e  p o ten tia l o u tp u t, w h ich  is m e a su re d  by s im p le  
tre n d  m ethod
G A P Y T 2 O u tp u t G ap  m ea su re d  as fra c tio n  o f th e  po ten tia l o u tp u t, w h ich  is m e a su re d  by q u a d ra tic  
tren d  m ethod
G A P Y H O u tp u t G a p  m ea su re d  as fra c tio n  of th e  p o ten tia l o u tp u t, w h ich  is m e a su re d  by H P filte r  
m ethod
IP IG 5 T ra d e  w e ig h te d  indus tria l p ro d u c tio n  in d e x  of G 5 c o u n tr ie s  (G e rm an y , F rance , Ja p a n , U K  
and U S A ), ca lcu la te d  from  m o n th ly  in d ice s  (line  66) o f IFS . B ase : 9 9 3 -9 4 = 1 0 0 )
LA B T T o ta l la b o u r fo rce  (m illion)
LR S B I A v e ra g e  a nnua l lend ing  ra te  o f S ta te  B a n k  of In d ia  (S B I) e xp re sse d  in fra c tio n s . F o r the  
d a ta  g ive n  in ranges  the  m id d le  po in t is taken .
MO B ase  (R e se rve ) M on e y  (ru p e e s  m illion ). MO = C u rre n c y  w ith  th e  P u b lic  (C U P ) + C u rre n cy  
in h a n ds  o f co m m e rc ia l b a n ks  (C IB ) + B a n k e rs ’ D e p o s its  w ith  RBI (B D R ) + O th e r D epos its  
w ith  R BI (O D R )
M1 N a rro w  M o n e y  (rupees  m illion ). M1 = C u rre n cy  w ith  th e  P u b lic  + D e m an d  D e p o s its  w ith  
B a n ks  (D D ) + O th e r D e p o s its  w ith  RBI
M 3 B ro a d  M o n e y  (rupees  m illio n ). M 3 = M1 + T im e  D e p o s its  w ith  B a n ks  (TD )
N E E R N o m in a l trad e  w e ig h te d  e ffe c tive  e xch a n g e  rate  o f G 5  c o u n tr ie s  d e fin e d  su ch  th a t an 
in c re a se  in d ica te  a p p re c ia tio n
N F C S E stim a te d  ne t fixe d  ca p ita l s to ck  a t 1 9 9 3 -9 4  p rices  w ith  5%  d e p re c ia tio n  (ru p e e s  m illion ).
P W h o le s a le  p rice  in d e x  (W P I) o f all c o m m o d itie s  co n v e rte d  to  ba se  1 9 9 3 -9 4  = 100
P E O W P I fo r  e d ib le  o il in c luded  in the  b a ske t o f gen e ra l W P I a t ba se  1 9 9 3 -9 4  = 100
P M O W P I fo r m in e ra l o il in c lu d e d  in the  b a ske t of ge n e ra l W P I a t b a se  1 9 9 3 -9 4  = 100
RIM Im po rts  o f g o o ds  and se rv ice s  at c o n s ta n t p rice  (ru p e e s  m illio n )
R E E R T ra d e  w e ig h te d  real e ffe c tive  e xch a n g e  rate  of G 5 C o u n tr ie s  d e fin e d  su ch  th a t an in c rea se  
in d ica te  a p p re c ia tio n
W A G P E m o lu m e n ts  o f p ub lic  s e c to r  e m p lo ye e s  e xp re sse d  as ru p e e s  p e r c a p ita
Y G ro ss  d o m e s tic  p ro d u c t at c o n s ta n t m a rke t p rices (ru p e e s  m illio n s )
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Annexure 5.2 Unit root test for variables used in Chapter 5 in levels and first 
_________ differences___________________________________________________
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
Lag
structure
an intercept but not a trend, an intercept and a linear trend
Variable 95%
critical Statistic A IC  SBC
95%
critical Statistic A IC SBC
value value
GAPY DF -2.991 -2 .43 51 .94 50 .76 -3.612 -2 .36 50 .95 49.18
A D F  (1) -3 .20 52.98 51 .22 -3 .12 52 .00 49.64
A D F (2) -2 .47 52 .03 49 .68 -2.41 51 .04 48 .09
AGAPY DF -2.997 -4 .02 47 .55 46.41 -3.622 -3 .92 46 .57 44 .87
A D F (1) -4 .03 47.70 46 .00 -3 .96 46 .79 44.51
-3 .36 46.92 44 .65 -3 .32 46.06 43.22
GAPYT DF -2.980 -1 .55 53.72 52 .47 -3.594 -2 .13 54 .93 53 .05
ADF (1) -1 .42 52 .72 50 .84 -1 .85 54.22 51.71
AGAPYT DF -2.985 -5 .70 50.48 49 .26 -3.603 -6 .10 50 .85 49.02
ADF (1) -3 .83 49.48 47 .65 -4 .35 50.18 47 .74
GAPYT2 DF -2.980 -3 .57 59 .09 57 .83 -3.594 -3 .50 58.16 56.27
ADF (1) -3 .35 58 .47 56 .58 -3 .30 57.58 55.06
AGAPYT2 DF -2.985 -6 .20 51 .75 50 .53 -3.603 -6 .10 50 .85 49.02
ADF (1) -4 .45 51.11 49 .28 -4 .35 50.18 47 .74
GAPYH DF -2.980 -4 .67 63 .82 62 .56 -3.594 -4 .57 62 .83 60 .95
ADF (1) -4 .13 63 .45 61 .57 -4 .05 62 .49 59 .97
AGAPYH DF -2.985 -7 .02 54 .50 53 .28 -3.603 -6 .88 53 .54 51.71
ADF (1) -5 .05 54.35 52 .52 -4 .93 53.37 50.93
ip ig 5 DF -2.98 -0 .33 50.17 48.91 -3.59 -2 .86 53 .09 51.20
A D F  (1) -0 .37 49 .42 47 .53 -4 .38 56.51 54.00
A D F (2) -0 .27 50.52 48 .00 -3 .62 55.80 52 .65
M p i g 5 DF -2.98 -4 .67 48.40 47 .19 -3.59 -4 .63 47.60 45 .78
A D F (1) -5 .07 49 .40 47 .57 -4 .98 48 .52 46.08
mO DF -2.980 -0 .17 33 .69 32 .44 -3.594 -2 .95 36.86 34 .97
A D F (1) -0 .15 32.71 30 .82 -3.41 37 .20 34.68
AmO DF -2.985 -4 .93 32.06 30 .84 -3.603 -4 .83 31.08 29 .25
A D F (1) -4 .17 31 .64 29.81 -4 .09 30 .68 28.24
ml DF -2.980 1.07 33.00 31 .74 -3.594 -2 .19 34 .70 32.81
A D F (1) 1.49 33 .54 31 .65 -1 .77 34 .56 32 .05
Ami DF -2.985 -6 .30 31.52 30 .30 -3.603 -6.91 32 .39 30.56
A D F (1) -4 .03 30 .59 28 .76 -4 .88 32 .14 29.70
m3 DF -2.98 0.23 58 .45 57 .19 -3.59 -3 .20 62 .26 60.38
A D F  (1) 0 .23 57.51 55 .62 -3 .70 62 .82 60.30
A D F  (2) 0 .28 56 .96 54 .44 -3 .77 62 .70 59.56
Am 3 DF -2.99 -5 .08 55.66 54 .44 -3.60 -4 .98 54.71 52.88
A D F (1) -4 .10 55 .09 53 .26 -4 .02 54 .14 51.70
P DF -2.980 -1 .05 38.18 36 .92 -3.594 -3 .20 41 .70 39 .82
A D F  (1) -0 .92 37 .90 36.01 -4 .93 46 .33 43.82
A D F (2) -0 .93 38.80 36 .28 -4.28 45 .75 42.61
Ap DF -2.985 -4 .10 38.41 37 .19 -3.6027 -3 .97 37.41 35.58
A D F (1) -4 .43 39 .00 37 .17 -4 .29 38.01 35 .57
A D F (2) -3 .57 38.16 35 .73 -3 .47 37.18 34 .14
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The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
an intercept but not a trend.________________an intercept and a linear trend
Variable i _ a ystructure 95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
peo DF - 2.980 -1.23 15.26 14.00 - 3.954 -3.65 19.67 17.78
ADF (1) -1.23 14.33 12.44 -4.57 21.48 18.97
ADF (2) -1.41 21.42 18.90 -1.90 22.23 19.08
Apeo DF - 2.985 -5.89 16.91 15.69 - 3.6027 -5.65 15.91 14.08
ADF (1) -7.86 22.17 20.34 -7.63 21.37 18.93
ADF (2) -3.84 21.21 18.78 -3.76 20.38 17.33
pmo DF - 2.980 -2.42 20.16 18.90 - 3.954 -3.85 24.19 22.30
ADF (1) -2.19 19.85 17.96 -4.77 26.62 24.11
ADF (2) -2.50 21.32 18.81 -3.90 25.95 22.80
Apmo DF - 2.985 -3.55 18.15 16.93 - 3.603 -3.64 17.59 15.76
ADF (1) -4.07 18.89 17.06 -4.35 18.90 16.46
ADF (2) -3.51 18.17 15.74 -4.00 18.78 15.73
re er DF - 2.98 0.09 29.29 28.03 - 3.59 -1.90 30.44 28.56
ADF (1) 0.00 28.40 26.52 -2.02 29.85 27.34
A reer DF - 2.99 -4.44 28.14 26.92 - 3 .60 -4.37 27.21 25.39
ADF (1) -2.91 27.27 25.44 -2.84 26.31 23.87
LRSBI DF - 2.98 -2.62 73.36 72.11 - 3.59 -1.39 72.98 71.09
ADF (1) -2.57 72.38 70.49 -1.09 72.09 69.58
ALRSBI DF - 2.99 -4.62 66.84 65.62 - 3.60 -5.88 69.50 67.67
ADF (1) -3.45 65.94 64.11 -5.27 70.18 67.74
ADF (2) -2.39 64.95 62.51 -4.78 70.70 67.65
wagp DF - 2.980 -0.46 33.24 32.02 - 3.594 -3.50 37.71 35.88
ADF (1) -0.13 34.17 32.34 -2.63 36.71 34.27
ADF (2) 0.85 39.15 36.71 -1.28 39.19 36.15
A wagp DF - 2.985 -6.38 35.53 34.35 - 3.603 -6.29 34.79 33.03
ADF (1) -6.35 37.87 36.11 -6.45 37.58 35.23
ADF (2) -4.48 37.44 35.08 -5.11 38.54 35.60
y DF - 2.980 1.24 53.29 52.04 - 3.594 -2.13 54.93 53.05
ADF (1) 1.58 52.98 51.09 -1.85 54.22 51.71
Ay DF - 2.985 -5.70 50.48 49.26 - 3.603 -6.10 50.85 49.02
ADF (1) -3.83 49.48 47.65 -4.35 50.18 47.74
Note: ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. SBC = Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion of model selection. The order of ADF test is chosen as two in all the cases. 
Numbers of observations vary from 23 to 26
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Annexure 5.3
A brief note on cointegration and ECM
An (n x 1) vector time series yt is said to be cointegrated if each of the series taken 
individually is 1(1), that is, nonstationary with a unit root, while some linear 
combination of the series a yt is stationary or 1(0) for some nonzero (nx 1) vector a. 
In a specific representation, distributed lag models can be rearranged to incorporate 
variables in their levels as well as their differences allowing the analysis of both 
short-run and long run properties of the variables called the Error Correction Model 
(ECM).
Drawing on Hamilton (1994: chapters 18, 19), Johansen (1995: Chapter 4), 
Pesaran & Smith, (1998), Pesaran and Shin (1998), a description of a cointegrated 
vector error correction model (VECM) with generalized restrictions for empirical 
analysis is also provided in Appendix AB of the thesis. Briefly, with y; as a mx  1 
vector of all jointly determined endogenous variables, which can be represented as 
the underlying p th-order augmented vector auto regression is as follows:
0(L )yf = a0 + axt + vFwf + ut (A5.1)
Where O(L) = /„ - 0 ,L - 0 :L2------ <]> Lp; L is the lag operator such
thatLy, = yt_x; wt is a <7 jcl vector of exogenous 1(0) variables, ut is a mx  1 vector 
of unobserved disturbances. {0(,/ = 1,2, — /?} and 'F are m x m  and m xq  
coefficient matrices, respectively. The intercept and trend coefficients a0 and ax are 
mx  1 vectors and t is a linear time trend. The unobserved disturbances are also
assumed to satisfy the conditions: E(ut) = 0; E^utur 1 = £ for all t, where
1 , 2 is a m x m  positive definite matrix, = 0 for all
t = t' and E(pt\wt)= 0. The roots of / _ _ 0 satisfy |z| > 1 or z = 1
In view of the fact that most of the variables are expected to have deterministic 
trend, the estimation includes a trend. To avoid any quadratic trend in the solution for 
yt , a linearity restriction is imposed by including it in the cointegrating vector. This 
also allows testing the significance of trend in the model. The intercept is kept
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unrestricted as it appears in VECM specification. With trend included in the vector 
of variables the coefficient matrix of cointegration will have a size of (m + l )x r  and 
the estimated VECM is rewritten as follow:
p -1
Ay, =a0 -  aß\ (y*_x) + £  T, Ay t_. + TV, + u, (A5.2)
Here y*_x = (f, and ß t =
f - y \
ß . The VECM is estimated by maximizing
the log likelihood function of the VECM for a selected rank of FI* = aß* which is 
equal to the number of cointegrating vectors. The number of cointegrating vectors is 
obtained by applying likelihood ratio tests on the maximum eigenvalue and trace of 
the stochastic matrix. The test statistics are computed in Pesaran et al. (2000). The 
structural estimation of the cointegrating relation requires maximization of a 
concentrated log-likelihood function subject to appropriate just-identifying or over­
identifying restrictions on ß . The procedure of identification is motivated by the 
desired long-run equilibrium properties of the underlying structural economic 
model.65
Annexure 5.4 Test results for cointegration between variables included in models 
__________ADI and AD3_______________________________________________
___________ Maximum Eigenvalue Test______________________________________Trace Test_______________
Hypothesis_________  Statistic Critical values______________ Hypothesis________  Statistic Critical values
Null Alternative 95% 90% Null Alternative 95% 90%
AD1: Variables included: y, ml, SBI, ipig5, Ap, reer, and Trend,
r = 0 r = 1 49.46 43.61 40.76 r = 0 r = 1 139.61 115.85 110.6
r<= 1 r = 2 43.64 37.86 35.04 r<= 1 r<= 2 90.15 87.17 82.88
r<= 2 r = 3 16.84 31.79 29.13 r<= 2 r<= 3 46.50 63 59.16
r<= 3 r = 4 14.55 25.42 23.10 r<= 3 r<= 4 29.67 42.34 39.34
AD3: Variables included: y, m3, SBI, ipig5, Ap, reer, and Trend,
r = 0 r = 1 51.73 43.61 40.76 r = 0 r = 1 144.59 115.85 110.60
r<= 1 r = 2 37.55 37.86 35.04 r<= 1 r<= 2 92.86 87.17 82.88
r<= 2 r = 3 26.27 31.79 29.13 r<= 2 r<= 3 55.31 63.00 59.16
r<= 3 r = 4 14.41 25.42 23.10 r<= 3 r<= 4 29.03 42.34 39.34
Note: The test for cointegration is done by applying likelihood ratio test on the maximum eigenvalue 
and trace of the stochastic matrix in VECM specification with restricted trend and unrestricted 
intercept (Pesaran, et al. 2000). The number of cointegrating vectors is indicated by ‘r’ in table below. 
Order of VAR is selected according to the order selection criteria based on SBC criteria of model 
selection.
65 All the computations in respect of cointegration are conducted with the help of Microfit-4 software.
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Annexure 5.5 Test results for cointegration between price and public sector wage
_________ Maximum Eigenvalue Test_____________________________ Trace Test________________  No. of
Hypothesis_________ Statistic Critical values_____ Hypothesis________  Statistic Critical values vectors
Null Alternative___________ 95% 90% Null Alternative___________ 95% 90% Selected
Model Ref. INFB1 & INFB2: Variables: p wagp Trend; Period: 1973 -  98; Order of VAR = 2. 
Eigenvalues: 0.59893, 0.31562,0.00
r = 0 r = 1 23.75 19.22 17.18 r = 0 r= 1 33.61 25.77 23.08 1
r<= 1 r = 2 9.86 12.39 10.55 r<= 1 r<= 2 9.86 12.39 10.55
Notes: The test for cointegration is done by applying likelihood ratio test on the maximum eigenvalue 
and trace of the stochastic matrix in VECM specification with restricted trend and unrestricted 
intercept (Pesaran, et al. 2000). The number of cointegrating vectors is indicated by ‘r’ in table below. 
Order of VAR is selected according to the order selection criteria based on SBC criteria of model 
selection.
Annexure 5.6 Structure of the cointegrating vector for modeling inflation with 
__________ public sector wage_________________________________________
Model: INFB1 & INFB2:_List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: p WClgp Trend, 
Period: 1973- 98, Order of VAR = 2, Selected number of vectors =1.
Imposed Restriction: a 1=1_______________________________________________________________________
p wagp Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -1.004 0.0472
Std. Error (NONE) (0.366) (0.0460)
Imposed Restriction: a l= l;  a3=0_________________________________________________________________
Vector: a 1.000 -0.6284* 0.000
Std. Error (NONE) (0.0097) (NONE)
Log Likelihood (LL) subject to exactly identified restrictions (a l= l)  = 96.011
LR test of additional restriction (a 1 = 1; a3 = 0): CHSQ (1) = 1.507[0.22], LL subject to over identified restrictions 
= 95.257_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: The structure of the vectors is modeled according to the generalized restriction discussed in 
Pesaran and Smith (1998). Values in parenthesis () are standard errors. *significant at 1% level,
**significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level.
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Chapter 6
Money Demand Based Monetary 
Regime: Prospects and Pitfalls
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to identify the inflationary process in 
the case of India and it was demonstrated that inflation in India is affected from both 
supply and demand side factors. Money growth significantly explains inflation. Slow 
adjustment of prices provides a stabilization role for monetary policy. However, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation depends on the way it is 
conducted. The current monetary policy in India is mainly based on targeting broad 
money (M3) growth. A stable and predictable long-term relationship between 
monetary aggregates and a scale variable such as output has been a central 
requirement to monetary targeting. However, such a relationship has eluded several 
countries.
Amongst developed countries, several have switched from intermediate monetary 
targeting to a final inflation target, because of the observed instability of the demand 
for money function, leading to an uncertain relationship between monetary 
aggregates and the inflation rate. Thus, the developed countries began to abandon 
monetary targeting during the 1980s, conducting monetary policy through price 
variables like interest rates. With interest rates as the main channel of monetary 
transmission, open market operations (OMO) and announcements of official interest 
rates have become key instruments, which can be used to bring the market interest 
rate near target.
As was made clear in Chapter 1, in developing countries like India, where the 
interest rate is still far from market determined, the outcome of OMO can at most 
have only a partial effect and some control on monetary aggregates will still be
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required until such time as the interest rate channel is fully developed. With a 
monetary aggregate based monetary policy there are two possibilities. If inflation 
control is the major goal of the central bank, it can legitimately miss whatever target 
it fixes for money growth. Such a regime does not need precise function of demand 
for money. Instead, an inflation model, such as the one discussed in Chapter 5, can 
be a guiding model. A second alternative, which takes the form of a strict money 
growth targeting, requires a tight model of demand for money balance in terms of 
price, output, inflation and some measures of opportunity cost. As mentioned above, 
such a relationship has eluded several countries. Because the financial innovations 
radically change the portfolio behaviour of economic agents, leading to a breakdown 
of the relationship between monetary aggregates output and price.
Further, even with a stable demand function, Goodhart’s Law60 suggests that 
tightening or loosening monetary control loosens the relationship between money 
and the concerns of monetary authorities, particularly the stability of output. In a 
similar context another important, widely referred work is Lucas Critique (Lucas 
1976). Poole (1970) suggested that when financial sector volatility (money multiplier 
shock or money demand shock) increases, interest rate oriented policy procedure is 
more desirable than monetary aggregate procedure.
However, research conducted by the RBI does not appear to support the view that 
such a possibility has occurred in India. The long run income elasticity of real broad 
money (M3R) in India is considered at about 1.58 (RBI 1998a: 34&69).
Nevertheless, there is an important question of whether the stock of money 
existing in the economy is a result of private sector demand or represents supply 
behaviour of the RBI. In the case of India, the notion that the stock of money is based 
on a meaningful function of private sector demand for money is doubted for two 
reasons. First, there is consistent high fiscal deficit (averaging around 8 percent of 
GDP during the sample period of 1970-98), which is financed either by money (the 
RBI buys government securities) or by debt (government borrows from public). In 
the first case, the monetary base increases directly, while in the second case the 
monetary base can also increase if the RBI has concern for an overshooting interest 
rate in the face of heavy government borrowing. Creation of such money directly or 
indirectly may not be based on the demand of real productive activity. However, it
66 See Courakis (1981) and Evans (1985) for more details on Goodhart’s Law.
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can be argued that under an independent central bank with broad money target and 
no concern for the interest rate, there is no automatic link between fiscal deficit and 
monetary base, but it is hard to assume such independence for the RBI. Therefore, 
the influence of the fiscal deficit on the monetary base is examined in the following 
Chapter 7. Second, there is an obligation for commercial banks to supply about 40 
percent of their credit to priority sectors, which may not be productively utilized. In 
such a situation, may what the RBI calls demand for money in reality be the supply 
of money based on rules of thumb?
In addition, financial sector reforms have now opened the economy to more 
means of finance and, hence, money market volatility is likely to increase. Therefore, 
how far the critical notion of sensible function of demand for money exists in India is 
an important question. If the demand function is not stable, it is important to correct 
the expectations of the prevailing monetary regime and flag the need for an 
alternative policy regime.
This chapter attempts to investigate whether there exists a meaningful demand 
function for money using three main monetary aggregates popular in the Indian 
economy. The key question is whether there is a meaningful robust and stable 
relationship between monetary aggregates and real output in the case of India? If not, 
what should be the alternative policy?
Three alternative approaches in the framework of long-term demand for money 
function are used to examine the relationship between money and output. The first 
approach uses simple static models of long-term functions, second the dynamic 
partial adjustment model and third the concept of cointegration for estimating the 
long-term relationships. Annual data for the period of 1970-98 have been used for 
the empirical analysis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section presents a 
brief review of recent studies with respect to demand for money in India. Section 6.3 
discusses preliminary analyses of monetary aggregates such as velocity, and money 
multiplier. Section 6.4 examines demand for money functions and the relationship 
between money and output. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.5.
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6.2 A BRIEF REVIEW OF RECENT STUDIES ON DEMAND FOR 
MONEY IN INDIA
Past studies have analyzed demand for the two most commonly used monetary 
aggregates in India, narrow money Ml, and broad money M3. The recent studies of 
the demand for money in India include Arif (1996), Joshi and Saggar (1995), Nag 
and Upadhyay (1993), and Moosa (1992). Moosa (1992) has modeled real currency 
in circulation, real narrow money, and real broad money (narrow money + quasi 
money) using quarterly data on industrial production index (IPI), and money market 
rate from 1972:1 to 1990:4.67 Nag and Upadhyay (1993), modeled nominal narrow 
money using monthly data on IPI and yield on ordinary share from 1982:4 to 1991:1 
and conclude that Ml is cointegrated with real economic activity.
Arif (1996), and Joshi and Saggar (1995) have used annual data from 1960-61 to 
1992-93 and modeled real broad money (M3R) and real narrow money (MIR) using 
annual data. Both studies report stable long-term relationship between money and 
real output. However, these studies cover the pre-reform period only. Modeling base 
money (MO) with annual data has not been attempted in any of the known studies.
While modeling real money, these studies have assumed it does not depend on 
the price level, which implies demand for money means demand for real balance. 
With these assumptions, the partial adjustment models are estimated with lagged real 
balance instead of lagged nominal balance deflated by current price (see Arif 1996). 
Such maintained hypothesis is based on two assumptions. First, the price level 
elasticity of demand for the real balances is zero and second, that a change in the 
price level affects the demand for money without lag. These assumptions have been 
extensively scrutinized and contested in many studies, such as Goldfeld and Sichel 
(1987), and Spencer (1985). A second important aspect, which is found to be rather 
inadequately emphasized, is the role of inflation as the opportunity cost of money, 
particularly in view of the fact that interest rate variables have been found less 
informative.68 Third, the monetary aggregates, price and output, are highly trended 
variables and may not necessarily be co-trended. Therefore, long-run relationships 
need to be scrutinized for spurious content through sensitivity analysis.
67 Moosa (1992) concludes currency in circulation and narrow money to be better aggregates for conducting 
monetary policy. However, the signs of the error corrections terms in his estimated equations are positive, which 
indicates that the estimated equations are unstable.
68 Arif (1996) has used inflation as the opportunity cost but reports that the results were not satisfactory.
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6.3 AN OVERVIEW OF MONETARY AGGREGATES
In this section, compositions of the three most commonly discussed monetary 
aggregates (base or reserve money MO, narrow money M l, and broad money M3) in 
India are examined and a brief analysis made with respect to the income velocity of 
these aggregates and money multipliers as a lead to the formal analysis of demand 
for money.
6.3.1 Definitions
Base money (MO) has four components: currency with the public (CUP), cash in 
hand of commercial banks (CIB), bankers’ deposits (BDR) with the RBI, and other 
deposits with the RBI (ODR)69. Narrow money (Ml) has three components: currency 
with the public (CUP), demand deposits (DD) with commercial banks and other 
deposits (ODR) in the RBI. Broad-money (M3) is the sum of Ml and time deposit 
(M3 = Ml + TD).
A broad picture of these components and money multipliers (MM3 and MM1), 
the statutory cash reserve ratio (CRR), the actual liquidity position of the banking 
sector represented by cash liquidity ratio (CLR), the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), 
the currency with the public per person in nominal and real terms (CUPPP & 
CUPPPR) are presented in Table 6.1.
SLR represents banks’ holdings of government securities. The major commercial 
banks were nationalized in 1969 and quantity controls like CRR and SLR imposed. 
The result can be seen in the sharp increase in BDR during the 1970s, which 
continued during the 1980s. With financial liberalization there was a reduction in 
CRR and SLR during the 1990s. However, looking at the values of CRR and CLR, it 
seems that banks tend to maintain more liquidity than statutorily required. Despite 
large increases in bank branches, the currency holding per person (CUPPP) in 
nominal terms as well as in real terms (CUPPPR) have considerably increased during 
the sample period. Incidentally, CUP constitutes a major part of narrow money, 
which as demonstrated in the previous chapter is causal to inflation.
69 ‘Other’ deposits with the RBI comprise mainly (i) deposits of quasi-government and other financial institutions 
including primary dealers, (ii) balances in the accounts foreign central banks and governments, (iii) accounts of 
international agencies such as IMF, (iv) provident, gratuity and guarantee funds of the RBI staff and some 
temporary accounts netted for balance under certain accounts, (v) profits of the RBI held temporarily under the 
deposit pending transfer to the central government.
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Table 6.1 Components of monetary aggregates in India (1970-98)
1970-71 1980-81 1990-91 1998-99 1970-98
V a lu e  in  m illio n  ru p e e  (end  o f  p e rio d  stock )
M O = C U P + C IB + B D R + O D R 4 8 2 3 0 194520 8 7 7 7 9 0 2 5 9 3 4 5 0
M l= C U P + O D R + D D 7 3 7 4 0 2 3 4 2 4 0 9 2 8 9 2 0 3 0 8 8 0 1 0
M 3 = M 1 + T D 110200 5 5 7 7 4 0 2 6 5 8 2 8 0 9 7 8 6 3 3 0
C U P  =  C u rre n c y  w ith  p ub lic 4 3 7 1 0 134260 5 3 0 4 8 0 1689700
C IB  =  C a sh  in b an k s 1860 8810 2 2 3 4 0 6 8 7 6 0
B D R  = B a n k e r ’s d ep o s it w ith  R B I 2 0 6 0 4 7 3 4 0 3 1 8 2 3 0 7 9 7 0 3 0
O D R  = O th e r  d ep o s its  w ith  R B I 60 0 4 1 1 0 6 7 4 0 3 7 9 6 0
D D  =  D e m a n d  d e p o s its  in b an k s 2 9 4 3 0 9 5 8 7 0 3 9 1 7 0 0 1360350
T D  =  T im e  d e p o s its  in  b an k s 3 6 4 6 0 3 2 3 5 0 0 1 7 29360 6 6 9 8 3 2 0
R a tio s
N arro w  m o n ey  m u ltip lie r  M M 1=  M 1 /M 0 2 .28 2.87 3.03 3.77 2 .9 9
B ro ad  m o n ey  m u ltip lie r  M M 3 = M 3 /M 0 1.53 1.20 1.06 1.19 1.26
C U P  to  D ep o s its 0 .66 0 .32 0 .25 0.21 0 .33
C R R  =  C a sh  re se rv e  ra tio  (s ta tu to ry ) 0 .03 0 .06 0.15 0 .1 0 0 .0 9
C L R  =  (C IB + B D R )/(D D + T D ) 0 .06 0.13 0 .16 0.11 0 .1 2
S L R  = S ta tu to ry  liq u id ity  ra tio 0 .28 0 .34 0 .38 0 .25 0 .33
C B D N  =  co m m e rc ia l b an k  d en sity 48 21 14 15 22
C U P P P  =  C U P  p e r  p erso n 81 199 636 1740 50 9
C U P P P R  =  rea l C U P  p e r  p erso n 6 5 9 12 7
C o m p o n e n t sh a res o f  MO 
B D R 4 24 36 31 25
O D R 1 2 1 1 1
C U P 91 69 60 65 7 0
C IB 4 5 3 3 4
C o m p o n e n t sh a re s  o f  M l 
C U P 59 57 57 55 56
D D 40 40 42 44 43
O D R 1 2 1 1 1
C o m p o n e n t sh a res  o f  M 3 
M l 67 42 35 32 43
T D 33 58 65 68 57
C U P 40 24 20 17 24
D D 27 17 15 14 19
G ro w th  ra te 1970-80 1981-90 1991-98 1970-98
MO 13.95 15.07 13.54 14.23
M l 11.56 13.78 15.02 13.34
M 3 16.22 15.62 16.92 16.02
B D R 31.35 19.05 11.48 21 .2 8
C U P 11.22 13.74 14.48 13.05
D D 11.81 14.08 15.56 13.69
T D 21.83 16.76 16.93 18.62
Notes: Aggregate data is the stock at the end of financial year (31 March). The ratios and shares are 
rounded-off as far as possible to avoid decimal places.
Source: See Appendix AA.
The RBI controls MO through open market operations, auctions of treasury bills, 
and trading government securities. Thus, the central bank has relatively more control 
over base money than broad money and narrow money. However, the RBI has been 
more focused on broad money growth than base money growth. As observed by 
Vasudevan (1999), the money supply in India is not worked out on the basis of a 
money multiplier. As a result, high power money may not get its due importance in
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the final assessment of broad money stock. The system is distorted due to controls at 
both ends of the conduit. In this context, examining the behaviour of base money and 
narrow money are also important in order to get a better picture of the possibilities 
for monetary policy.
6.3.2 Growth of Monetary Aggregates
The monetary aggregates (in logs) along with the log level values of the price index 
and real output are plotted in Figure 6.1. Therefore, the slope of the curve indicates 
the growth rate. Clearly, these variables are highly trended but they do not appear to 
be co-trending, which is important for a meaningful long-term relationship. This 
point will be used in analyzing money demand later in this chapter. The average 
growth rate of monetary aggregates for a block of selected periods is presented in 
Table 6.1.
Figure 6.1 Trends of output, monetary aggregates (measured in millions of rupees) 
and wholesale Price index (1970-98)
1
i
Source: See Appendix AA.
During the sample period broad money M3 grew at a compound annual rate of 
about 16 percent. Narrow money Ml and the base money MO have grown at an
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average rate of about 13 and 14 percent, respectively. This indicates that while the 
broad money multiplier has increased over time the narrow money multiplier has 
fallen down.
6.3.3 Time Series Properties of Monetary Aggregates and other Variables
All three monetary aggregates, the other relevant variables referred to earlier and to 
be subsequently used in estimation are tested for unit root using ADF test. The 
results are presented in Annexure 6.2 and summarized in Table 6.2. Since the dataset 
is small, SBC criteria of model selection has been used to decide the order of 
integration. As emphasized in Appendix AB of this thesis, too much emphasis cannot 
be accorded to the unit root property of the series in view of the fact that the dataset 
is small and the unit root tests are not very powerful with small samples. However, 
wherever there is doubt of a series being integrated due care is taken in estimations.
The test results clearly suggest all monetary aggregates are integrated of order 
one when taken in nominal values, while they trend stationary when taken in real 
values, probably because the price series itself is trend stationary. Output and interest 
rate variables of CGS1 and DR1, are all integrated of order one. For the purpose of 
analysis in this chapter a trend stationary series, which is not stationary in absence of 
trend, is treated as non-stationary, because when analyzed with other variables they 
may not all be co-trending.
Table 6.2: Summary of unit root test results for the variables used in Chapter 6
V a r i a b l e s  in l e v e l s V a r i a b l e s  in f i rs t d i f f e r e n c e
Unit  r o o t  t e s t  Unit  r o o t  t e s t
w i th  c o n s t a n t  . . w i th  c o n s t a n t  . .
. . . , c o n s t a n t  . . . , c o n s t a n t
b u t  n o  t r e n d  , .  , b u t  n o  t r e n d  . .  ,
a n d  t r e n d  a n d  t r e n d
N o m i n a l  b a s e  m o n e y  ( m O  ) I d ) 1(1) l ( 0 ) I (0)
N o m i n a l  n a r r o w  m o n e y  ( m l ) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
N o m i n a l  b r o a d  m o n e y  ( m 3 ) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
R e a l  b a s e  m o n e y  ( m O r ) 1(1) I (0 ) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
R e a l  n a r r o w  m o n e y  (m i r  ) 1(1) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
R e a l  b r o a d  m o n e y  ( m 3 r  ) 1(1) | ( 0 ) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
N a r r o w  m o n e y  m u l t ip l i e r  ( M M 1 ) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) I (0)
B r o a d  m o n e y  m u l t ip l i e r  (M M 3) KD 1(1) l ( 0 ) I (0)
P r i c e  ( p  ) HD l ( 0 ) l ( 0 ) I (0)
R e a l  G D P  ( y  ) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
P e r m a n e n t  i n c o m e  ( y p ) I (0) 1(1) I (0) l ( 0 )
B a s e  m o n e y  v e lo c i ty  (VO) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) I (0)
N a r r o w  m o n e y  v e lo c i ty  ( V 1 ) 1(1) I (0) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
B r o a d  m o n e y  v e lo c i ty  (V3) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) I (0)
B a n k  d e n s i t y  ( C B D N ) l ( 0 ) 1(1) I (0 ) l ( 0 )
F i s c a l  d e f ic i t  ( C G A P ) 1(1) 1(1) |(0) I (0)
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V a ria b le s  in le ve ls V a ria b le s  in f irs t d iffe re n ce
U nit roo t te s t 
w ith  c o n s ta n t 
bu t no trend
U n it roo t 
te s t w ith  
c o n s ta n t 
and  tren d
U n it roo t tes t 
w ith  c o n s ta n t 
bu t no trend
U n it roo t 
te s t w ith  
c o n s ta n t 
and trend
Y ie ld  on  1-5 ye a r govt, se cu rity  (C G S 1) 1(1) 1 (1 ) l ( 0 ) l( 0 )
1 -3  y e a r d e p o s it ra te  (D R 1 ) 1(1) 1(1) l ( 0 ) I ( 0 )
C a ll m o n e y  ra te  (C M R ) I ( 0 ) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 ) l ( 0 )
C a sh  re se rve  ra tio  (C R R ) ________ K D H O ) l ( 0 )
Note: All variables represented by small letters are taken in logs. The order of ADF test is chosen as 2 
in all the cases based on SBC criteria of model selection. For the period beyond 1977, the narrow 
money multiplier MM1 is found to be stationary.
Source: Annexure 6.2 of this chapter. For basic data source see Appendix AA of the thesis.
6.3.4 Velocity and Money Multiplier
As pointed out earlier, the RBI has not been working through a multiplier. However, 
in view of the fact that the RBI continues to rely on the broad money growth target, it 
is important to know the nature of important variables like velocity and money 
multipliers. A plot of base money velocity VO, narrow money velocity VI, and broad 
money velocity V3, are presented in Figure 6.2, while the broad money multiplier 
MM3, and narrow money multiplier MM1, are presented in Figure 6.3. Velocities are 
calculated using relationship V = Y*(P/100)/M; where Y is real GDP at 1993-94 
prices, P wholesale price index with base 1993-94 = 100, and M nominal stock of 
selected monetary aggregate. The broad money velocity and broad money multiplier 
both seem highly unstable throughout the sample period. This is not expected if the 
demand for broad money is to be a stable and robust function of income. The base 
money velocity has a falling trend indicating that the financial depth being acquired 
in terms of broad money creation is associated with too much liquidity, which may 
not be desired.
The ADF based unit root test results summarized in Table 6.2 (also see Annexure 
6.2 for test statistics) indicate that MM3, MM1, VO and V3 are all integrated of order 
one, while VI could be considered stationary. For the period beyond 1977, the 
narrow money multiplier MM1 is also found to be stationary. The narrow money 
multiplier experienced a big reduction during 1972-1977, probably as a result of 
large-scale expansion of the banking sector during this period, which led to a 
massive fall in bank density (CBDN), measured as thousands of people per branch of 
commercial banks in the wake of nationalization of the banking sector.
185
Figure 6.2 Income velocities of money (1970-98)
I I I
Source: Calculated by author. For basic data source see Appendix AA
Figure 6.3 Money multipliers (1970-98)
I I I I I
Source: Calculated by author. For basic data source see Appendix AA
With a non-stationary multiplier and velocity, it is hard to control broad money 
and broad money stability is questioned in the first place. Mohanty and Mitra (1999) 
report only four occasions between 1983-97 when the RBI has been able to meet 
their broad money target. This is not surprising given the way V3 and MM3 are 
drifting.
186
The presence of a unit root in the money multiplier and velocity means that 
following any shock these variables will diverge infinitely without reverting to their 
mean. The Poole (1970) analysis presented in Chapter 3 suggests that when financial 
sector volatility (money multiplier shock or money demand shock) increases, interest 
rate oriented policy procedure is more desirable than monetary aggregate procedure.
However, the interest rate is still not fully market determined in India. The 
securities market is in the process of development. In such a situation, rejecting 
monetary aggregates would make monetary policy redundant, making it preferable 
for monetary aggregates to be chosen. At this stage, it appears narrow money has less 
problems than broad money.
6.4 MONEY DEMAND
The empirical work on money demand has a long history. Comprehensive reviews of 
several important works can be found among others in Laidler (1985), and Goldfeld 
and Sichel (1990). Studies of the demand for money usually start from a presumption 
that there exists a long-term equilibrium relationship between private sector money 
holding and certain other aggregate macro-economic variables, such as price levels, 
real income (or expenditure), (some set of) interest rates and, perhaps, wealth and the 
rate of inflation (Goodhart 1989-.311). The relevant variables, to appear as arguments 
in this long-run relationship, can normally be chosen based on a priori theory, 
whether derived from Keynes’ suggested motives, from Tobin-Baumol inventory 
theory or from Friedman’s general portfolio choice model.
The theoretical literature, which draws from the Keynesian tradition, has 
identified the three most important motives for holding money. (1) The transaction 
motive, which is the demand for money in making regular payments, (2) the 
precautionary motive, which is the demand for money to meet unforeseen 
contingencies, and (3) the speculative motive, which arises from uncertainties about 
the money value of other assets, an individual can hold. Baumöl (1952) and Tobin 
(1956) applied an inventory theoretic approach to the transaction motive while Tobin 
(1958) applied mean variance analysis to model money as an asset. Friedman (1956) 
provided an intuitive account of the demand for money which attempts to unify the 
two streams -  the asset and transactions approach. In his analysis, the cost to a 
business enterprise of holding money can be represented by such variables as yields
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on the bond, market interest rate on equity, expected capital gains and average 
expected inflation. The service flow from money can be defined in terms of price P, 
the amount of goods, which can be bought with one unit of domestic currency. 
Friedman (1956) stressed money as a store of wealth, which led him to include a 
measure of wealth in the demand for money function. A discounted infinite stream of 
income could proxy wealth or, alternatively, current real income could also proxy 
wealth.
Uncertainties about the returns on risky assets lead to diversification of the 
portfolio held by an individual. Savings and time deposits, being safer assets, are 
affected by the risk assessment of the other portfolios. Thus, broad money, which 
contains time deposits, is more affected by speculative and precautionary motives, 
while narrow money and base money are more affected by transaction and 
precautionary motives. Therefore, theories that posit money yields some unspecified 
flow of services beyond the transaction motive rely on broader aggregates.
Thus, in order to capture the theoretical motives of holding money, the empirical 
literature has identified four groups of variables. The first group is widely known as 
the scale variable, which generally proxy for the volume of transactions in the 
economy. A measure of wealth, income, or expected income, is used to represent the 
scale variable, which forms an important independent variable in most conventional 
demand functions for money. Laidler (1985:88) has discussed error-learning 
hypothesis70 as a plausible alternative of measuring expected income, which can be 
used as potential income.
The second group of variables represents the opportunity cost of holding money. 
Uncertainties associated with the level of payments guide individuals to keep 
precautionary money to maintain an adequate level of liquidity for day-to-day 
requirements. Maintaining this liquidity is costly, because it requires foregone 
returns that would have otherwise been earned. Variables that represent such costs as 
the interest rate, yields on assets other than money, the yields on money itself, and
70 The error-learning hypothesis implies that the expected future value of a variable can be measured by taking an 
exponentially weighted average of current and past values of that variable, which assumes people take more 
notice of the recent past than the distant future. With this idea, in this study, a 50% weight is given to current 
income while the balance of 50% is exponentially distributed over the past 10 years such that the sum of the 
weights equal approximately one. The measure of this income can also be called permanent income represented 
by YP.
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expected inflation, fall into the category of opportunity cost. In an open-economy 
context exchange rate represents the opportunity cost for holding foreign money. The 
third group of variables, representing the level of wages and the riskiness of bonds, 
can also find place in the function for demand of money.
The fourth group of variables includes technological variables representing 
transaction technology. Goldfeld and Sichel (1990:324) note that most of the 
evidence on the effects of financial innovation is rather indirect, using trend to 
capture exogenous technological change or some function of the previous peak 
interest rate as a proxy for an endogenous reduction in transaction costs.
Issues related to the choice and measurement of proper opportunity cost as an 
important aspect of designing the money demand function have been emphasized in 
the literature. This problem is more complex for developing countries due to 
underdeveloped financial markets. In such counties, households or firms may prefer 
to hold their wealth in stocks of food, houses or machinery, rather than in financial 
assets, to avoid the cost of inflation. The public is reluctant to hold assets such as 
long-term and short-term bonds when inflation is expected unless the rate of return is 
adjusted upward to compensate for the expected erosion of real-capital value brought 
about by inflation.
In a well-developed competitive capital market, interest rates, particularly the 
term structure, will reflect inflation expectations, and hence it will not make much 
difference whether the alternative cost of holding money is measured by the interest 
rate or the inflation rate. Thus ‘to include the rate of return in a nominal asset in the 
demand-for-money function is thus to include a measure of the expected inflation 
rate therein. Moreover, the measure in question is produced by market forces, and its 
reliability does not depend on any particular hypothesis about how inflation 
expectations are formed’ (Laidler 1985:96). However, ‘when capital markets are not 
free because interest rates are regulated or have ceilings, it is often appropriate to use 
inflation, not interest rate as the measure of the alternative cost’ (Dornbusch and 
Fischer 1994:388).
In order to formalize a close economy version of the demand for money function 
in this section the following general expression is considered for demand of nominal 
money based on Laidler (1985:136). However, the expression is different to Laidler 
in some respects, because it includes a trend and because the set of opportunity costs
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include inflation in addition to interest rates. The interest rate and inflation are taken 
in fractions.
M d =  AeatPß' X ß2e ^ R[eß*R2eß5*p (6.1)
Here, A is a constant, t is time, M is the amount of the monetary aggregate 
demanded, P is the price level, X is the scale variable, and R1 is own interest rate of 
money such as deposit rate, R2 is a vector of the interest on the alternative asset, Ap 
is inflation expressed in a fraction. The exponential e has a value of 2.7183. a, ß 1, 
ß2, ß3, ß4, ß5, are parameters.
The early work in industrialized countries has almost established the following 
properties of money demand (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994: 385-388). (1) The 
demand for a nominal money balance is proportionate to the price level. There is no 
money illusion; in other words, the demand for money is a demand for real money. 
(2) The demand for real money responds negatively to the rate of interest on 
alternative assets like treasury bills, commercial papers and money market 
instruments, but it responds positively to its own rate of return, like the rates paid on 
various kinds of deposits. (3) The demand for money increases with the level of real 
income. (4) The short-run response of money demand to changes in interest rates and 
income is less than the long-run response.
Thus, in terms of signs, ßl, ß2, ß3 are expected to be positive, and ß4 and ß5 are 
expected to be negative. What should be the sign of a? Developed institutions and 
efficient means of financial transaction may lead to a fall in the demand for money. 
In that case a  should be negative. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, in the context 
of developing countries like India there are large amounts of directed credit for 
certain priority sectors like agriculture, food, self-employment and small business. 
The financial institutions fulfill this welfare motive by adopting a policy that ensures 
an easy and preferential credit policy for these sectors. The trend term is expected to 
capture such effects as well as the technological and discretionary effects. However, 
with positive and significant a, the long-term stability of demand function for money 
itself can be seriously questioned. Therefore, presence of trend in the model serves 
important aspect of specification search.
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Dividing equation (6.1) throughout by price, the expression for the real money 
balance can be arrived at as follows.
MjL = Aea,P(ß'~l)X ß2eßi R'eß* R*eßs *  (6.2)
P
Taking log of both sides of equations (6.1) and (6.2), and representing the logged 
variables in their lower case letters, the nominal and real money balances can be 
expressed as equations 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. A A before a variable represents that 
the variable is taken in the first difference.
m = a + a t + ß x p + ß 2 x + ß 3 i?l + y64/?2 + y65Ap (6.3)
m -  p = mr = a + a t + (/5, -1) p + ß 2 x + ß 2 Rl + ßJPl  + ß 5 Ap (6.4)
It can be noticed that the demand for real balance depends on price if /3, . In case
ßl = l then the demand for money is in fact the demand for real balance. With ß l= l 
equation (6.4) can also viewed as a somewhat simplified linear form of the demand 
for money equations (7) and (11) of Friedman (1956:9).
For a given data set, if ß x^ \ ; omission of the price variable from regressors may 
show itself in instability and poorness of fit in any test that uses data measured in real 
terms (Laidler 1985:136). Spencer (1985) addressed this problem in a framework of 
partial adjustment model and could not reject the hypothesis of zero price elasticity 
of real money but could reject the hypothesis that there is an instantaneous 
adjustment to price changes in the demand for real balance. Therefore, it would be 
preferable to test in the regression results whether ßl equals one or not. The problem 
of instantaneous adjustment would subsequently be taken up in the subsection on 
dynamic models. An estimation equation of the form of equations (6.3) or (6.4) 
provides long-term relationships between the dependent and independent variables.
For the purpose of empirical analysis the scale variable is alternatively 
represented by the gross domestic product (Y) and permanent real income (YP) as 
defined in Chapter 4. The three monetary aggregates MO, Ml and M3 are already 
defined. Interest rate on 1-3 year deposits in commercial banks (DR1) proxy the own 
rate of return of money. The opportunity cost represented by yield on 1-5 year 
treasury bills (CGS1) proxy rate of return on alternative assets, and inter-bank call
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money rate (CMR) is an indicator rate of liquidity position in banking sector. DR1, 
CGS1 and CMR are all expressed in fractions. The price is represented by the 
wholesale price index (P). Inflation, also in fractions, is represented by Ap. Except 
for CGS1, DR1, CMR and Ap, all other variables are taken in natural logs, written in 
lower case letters. A data summary is provided in Annexure 6.1 of this chapter and 
more details about the sources and description of the variables are presented in 
Appendix AA of the thesis.
The ADF tests of unit root for the variables are presented in Annexure 6.2 of this 
chapter and summarized in Table 6.2. Except for inflation and CMR, all of these 
variables, including the three monetary aggregates, are integrated of order one in the 
absence of trend while their differences are stationary. Inflation and CMR are 
stationary.
6.4.1 Simple Static Models of Long Run Relationship
Starting with a simple model of demand for money function with output and real 
money, additional variables are systematically added in the list of regressors in 
accordance to equation (6.4) in order to test the robustness of the output variable.71 
The regression results are presented in Tables 6.3. It may be noted that the results of 
Tables 6.3 are only a partial list of the possible combinations of the various variables 
that can find a place in a function of the demand for money. The focus is on the 
variable y, which is the log of real output.
To take care of the serial correlation problem if any, the estimation is done by 
maximizing the likelihood function with the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) method of 
iterative adjustment (see note on CO method in section AB.5 in Appendix AB). The 
order of the AR process in the residuals reported in Tables 6.3 is selected according 
to the Durbin Watson statistics . In order to exercise caution regarding the validity 
of the regressions, the residuals of the regressions were examined for stationarity but 
the same is not reported. The P-values are reported in square brackets for all 
variables. In cases where OLS estimates are free from first order serial correlation, 
the same are reported.
71 Such a method of sensitivity analysis is widely used for testing the robustness of a particular variable in 
regression equations (see Learner (1985), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997)).
72 It may be noted tat the Durbin Watson statistics is valid for AR(1) process. However, when there is first order 
autocorrelation the test statistics can be used even with second order autocorrelation.
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Several important conclusions can be drawn from the simple money demand 
equations estimated in Tables 6.3. However, before proceeding, it is important to 
note the belief of the RBI about the long run income elasticity of real broad money 
(M3R), which is considered to be about 1.58 (RBI 1998a: 34 & 69). Arif (1996) 
estimated long run income elasticity for real broad money (M3R) and real narrow 
money (MIR) at about 1.7 and 1.1, respectively. The results of the simple estimation 
of demand for real broad and narrow money presented at rows 1 and 13, respectively 
in Table 6.3 suggest income elasticities of 1.52 and 1.15, respectively, which are 
quite close to the above results, significant at the one percent level. However, the 
question of how robust these estimations are is addressed in the remainder of this 
chapter.
Looking at the coefficients and significance level of the variable y in Table 6.3, it 
clearly comes out to be a fragile variable for all three aggregates particularly when 
trend is included in the list of explanatory variable. Output is fragile in the broad and 
base money equations even without trend. Therefore, the contention of the earlier 
studies, that broad money is an especially stable function of output, is not fully 
supported in this exercise. It can be noted from Table 6.3 that in absence of trend, 
there is no perceptible change in the explanatory power of the models due to the 
inclusion of other variables, even when significant. This points to an important 
missing variable, being captured by some of the existing variables. It can be recalled 
that output, price and money are all highly trended. Therefore, models with some 
role of trend are expected to have more information. Trend in almost all the models 
of Table 6.3 is highly significant and positive, which on its own can explain between 
0.98 and 0.995 in sample variation in monetary aggregates.
It can be emphasized that either an insignificant coefficient of trend or a 
coefficient with negative sign would have been expected in order to accept these 
models as equations of the demand for money. Only in the case of narrow money the 
trend becomes insignificant in a particular specification presented at row 17 in Table 
6.3. What does a positive and significant trend mean in the money equation?
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Table 6.3 Simple long run functions of real balances estimated using Cochrane-
Orcutt method of adjustment for serial correlation if any (1970-98)
D epen­
dent
Regressors A utoregressive
Error
R2 Serial
Correlation
Variable Const. P y CGS1 Ap T U (-l) U (-2) DW LM1
m 3r
1. -13.65
[0.00]
1.52
[0.00]
0.75
[0.00]
0.992 1.61
2. -12.16
[0.005]
0.148
[0.45]
1.385
[0.00]
0.948
[0.00]
-0.39
[0.06]
0.992 1.87
3. -11.71
[0.01]
0.16
[0.43]
1.35
[0.00]
0.31
[0.75]
0.939
[0.00]
-0.40
[0.06]
0.992 1.88
4. 2.00
[0.69]
0.81
[0.00]
0.31
[0.41]
0.57
[0.43]
-0.76
[0.02]
0.98
[0.00]
-0.70
[0.00]
0.993 2.21
5 .# 14.06
[0.00]
-1.32
[0.00]
-0.12
[0.17]
-0.43
[0.01]
0.257
[0.00]
0.195
[0.00]
1.000 1.77 0.38
[0.54]
6. 8.74
[0.00]
0.082
[0.00]
0.876
[0.00]
-0.55
[0.00]
0.995 2.40
mOr
7. -12.22
[0.00]
1.36
[0.00]
0.65
[0.00]
0.983 1.64
8. -14.38
[0.00]
-0.13
[0.62]
1.53
[0.00]
0.678
[0.00]
0.983 1.73
9. 8.82
[0.49]
-0.86
[0.01]
0.51
[0.34]
-1.25
[0.15]
0.96
[0.00]
0.988 1.79
10. -1.50
[0.89]
-1.42
[0.00]
1.27
[0.02]
-1.26
[0.09]
0.92
[0.00]
0.97
[0.00]
0.992 2.34
11. 10.94
[0.07]
-1.49
[0.00]
0.053
[0.89]
-0.44
[0.43]
0.711
[0.01]
0.19
[0.00]
0.40
[0.11]
0.994 1.83
12. 7.79
[0.001
0.071
[0.00]
0.061
[0.00]
0.985 1.61
m ir
13.
Const.
-8.867
[0.00]
P y
1.15
[0.00]
DR1 Ap U (-l)
0.431
[0.02]
U (-2)
0.978 2.05
1 4 .# -16.30
[0.00]
-0.35
[0.02]
1.72
[0.00]
0.981 1.67 0.73
[0.40]
1 5 .# -16.68
[0.00]
-0.44
[0.00]
1.75
[0.00]
2.90
[0.11]
0.983 1.62 0.91
[0.34]
1 6 .# -20.79
[0.00]
-0.66
[0.00]
2.06
[0.00]
3.87
[0.03]
0.63
[0.02]
0.986 1.93 0.02
[0.88]
1 7 .# -18.04
[0.00]
-0.82
[0.01]
1.90
[0.00]
4.11
[0.02]
0.67
[0.01]
0.02
[0.43]
0.987 1.76 0.43
[0.51]
18. 18.49
[0.01]
-1.21
[0.00]
-0.52
[0.24]
3.36
[0.02]
0.19
[0.00]
0.89
[0.00]
0.988 2.45
19. 8.13
[0.00]
0.063
[0.00]
0.732
[0.00]
0.977 2.37
N o te : Values in square bracket [] are the P-values. Period of estimation: 1 9 7 0 -9 8 except when
inflation is included it is 1971-98. Equations marked # are estimated by OLS as there was no 
indication of first order serial correlation problem.
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Consider the broad money. With trend in the equations, the coefficients of the 
price variables are slightly more than one, with negative sign. Considering that the 
average change in price during the sample was about 0.082, it is easy to calculate the 
autonomous growth in the nominal broad money stock at around 17 percent. The 
coefficient of the output term is insignificant and negative. The negative sign 
suggests that whenever a slow down is observed the central bank tries to induce 
credit creation and thus increase money stock. Actual average M3 growth for the 
period 1971-98 has been 16 percent, which is consistent with about 5 percent output 
growth. When output growth tends to fall below this level, the money growth is 
increased in excess of 16 percent. When output growth is in excess of five percent 
the central bank seems to be concerned about a possible increase in inflation and thus 
money growth is brought below 16 percent. However, this represents reaction or 
supply side behaviour of the RBI and the existence of any demand-based behaviour 
is questionable.
The equations for base money also in Tables 6.3, point to a limited role for output 
in determining its long-term demand. However, output seems to be more robust in 
equations for narrow money.
There is no conclusive answer to the question of price elasticity of real balances. 
In most its coefficient is significant, so that assuming ß 1 = 1 in equation (6.2) may 
lead to the problem of a missing variable in demand for real balances and estimation 
of nominal money with price as one of the explanatory variables may be a more 
general estimate. It can be noticed that ßl = l is rejected in almost all models 
containing trend. However, a negative coefficient of more than one of price term 
suggests that inflation is significant restraint in money supply by the RBI.
In view of the fact that the macroeconomic variables are expected to have lagged 
effects, the above analysis needs to be supported with dynamic analysis. Therefore, 
role of output is investigated in partial adjustment models and cointegration 
framework in the following subsections in this chapter.
6.4.2 Long Term Analysis in Dynamic Model with Partial Adjustment
Despite several shortcomings, the partial adjustment mechanism (PAM) has often 
served as the workhorse to capture the underlying dynamics of short-run money 
demand (Goldfeld and Sichel 1987). Two alternative PAMs have been utilized in the
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literature, called real and nominal models. The primary difference between these two 
specifications is the way in which adjustment in money demand is considered with 
respect to changes in prices. The real model implies there is an instantaneous 
adjustment of money balances to changes in the price level, whereas the nominal 
model posits that this adjustment is subject to a distributed lag. Both versions of 
partial adjustment models are motivated by an underlying cost function as the one 
discussed in Hwang (1985).
In particular, under the real partial adjustment mechanism (RPAM), the equation 
for real balance has the lagged nominal money balance deflated by the lagged price 
level, whereas in the nominal partial adjustment mechanism (NPAM) the equation 
for real balance has the lagged nominal balance deflated by the current price level 
(see Spencer 1985). Given the difference, there has been substantial literature on 
formal comparison of the two models (see for example Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), 
Goldfeld and Sichel (1987), Spencer (1985), Goldfeld (1973)). As both specifications 
suffer from problems, Goldfeld and Sichel (1987) suggested a general distributed lag 
model of the form of equation (6.5), which may be a better representation of the 
dynamic behaviour of demand for real balance. All the symbols in equation (6.5) are 
the same as discussed earlier. Coefficients are represented by a, b, c and d. R is a 
vector of interest rates, y is log of real output, p is log of price level, m is log of 
nominal money, and mr represents real money balance.
»1 n2 n3 n4
mr = m -  p = a + ^ j aiyt_i + + X c<m6-< + X d<P'-i + £< (6.5)
i=0 i=0 i=l i=0
Goldfeld and Sichel (1987) argue that with the above specification the real 
balance is no longer constrained to adjust with the same geometric distributed lag to 
each independent variable. After rewriting the equation (6.5) to include inflation 
terms, it is also possible to test short-run and long run inflation effects. Finally, this 
equation is not motivated by any underlying cost function, as are NPAM and RPAM, 
and is therefore not intended to shed light on the preferred adjustment process. With 
these backgrounds, the above equation is estimated for the Indian data to obtain 
dynamic models of demand for real balances and to examine whether there is a stable 
relationship between money and output in the long term.
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Three interest rate variables, namely the interest rate on 1-3 years demand 
deposits (DR1), the yield on 1-5 years government securities (CGS1), as used earlier 
and the overnight call money rate (CMR) are selected for this experiment. However, 
only those interest rate variables, which give rise to relatively better specification of 
the models, are retained instead of all three. All three monetary aggregates are again 
modeled in the above specification. After a little experimentation, a one period lag is 
found to give a statistically preferred specification. The estimated equations are 
presented in Table 6.4. To safeguard against unit root problem the residuals are 
tested for stationarity and the ADF test statistics are presented. After 
reparameterization and removing the insignificant variables, the parsimonious 
models are presented in Table 6.6. The equations are tested for stability of 
coefficients and predictive failure after breaking the sample as indicated in the 
Tables. The results are satisfactory. Further, CUSUM of recursive errors and 
CUSUM of squared recursive errors tests (not shown here) do not show any 
structural break. Some important conclusions can be drawn from the estimated 
results.
First, output is a completely insignificant variable in the case of broad and base 
money, but not for narrow money. As discussed earlier, permanent income is also not 
found significant in the case of broad and base money. The income elasticity 
calculated and presented in Table 6.5 is not significantly different from zero in both 
cases. Thus, based on this specification, again, the existence of equation of demand 
for broad as well as base money is questionable. Second, the coefficient of lagged 
money in the case of base money as well as broad money is not different from one 
(see the test statistics in Table 6.4 and 6.5). This means only a short-term adjustment 
is taking place and equilibrium money stock is undefined. This is in line with the 
argument presented earlier that there is trend growth in money supply with some 
adjustment rather than demand based supply. Third, as can be seen from the 
parsimonious results presented in Table 6.5, inflation is a relevant opportunity cost 
for both real broad and real base money. It explains most of the variation in these 
aggregates, particularly the broad money. Fourth, in the partial adjustment 
framework base money and broad money demonstrate homogeneity with respect to 
price.
However, in the case of narrow money Ml, there is sufficient indication of 
existence of a possible function of demand for real balance and it does not
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demonstrate homogeneity with respect to price unlike broad and base money noted 
earlier. The parsimonious version of the narrow money demand presented in Table 
6.5 has satisfactory statistical properties. The long-term income elasticity of narrow 
money is around 1.87, which can be considered on the high side. With less developed 
means of financial transactions, higher income elasticity is not surprising.
Table 6.4 Dynamic models of demand for monetary aggregates with partial 
_________ adjustment (1971-98)____________________________________
D ep en d e n t V a riab le R ea l b ro ad  m o n ey R eal b ase  m oney R eal n a rro w  m oney
(m3r) (mOr) (mir)
M odel n u m b er M 3R P A 1 M 0R P A 1 M 1R P A 1
IN T E R C E P T 0 .5 5 0 (0 .6 6 4 ) 0 .7 1 6 (4 .0 6 ) -1 2 .7 2 (1 .6 3 )* *
m3r (-1) 1.065 (0 .0 6 5 )*
mOr (-1) 1.033 (0 .1 9 8 )*
mir (-1) 0 .3 7 9  (0 .2 2 7 )
y -0 .189  (0 .2 0 4 ) -0 .223  (0 .7 0 5 ) 0 .4 2 0 (0 .5 1 3 )
y  (-D 0 .1 3 2 (0 .1 8 9 ) 0 .1 7 0 (0 .5 0 8 ) 0 .8 4 7  (0 .3 8 8 )* *
P -1 .2 5 4  (0 .1 1 5 )* -1 .191  (0 .3 6 4 )* -0 .613  (0 .3 0 0 )* *
P (-D 1.223 (0 .1 1 8 )* 1.181 (0 .3 9 4 )* 0 .2 2 8  (0 .4 1 3 )
C G S l -0 .3 4 4  (0 .3 1 6 ) -1 .151 (0 .8 9 0 )
C G S1 (-1 ) 0 .4 0 5  (0 .3 1 8 ) 1 .494 (0 .8 7 7 )
D R1 5 .688  (1 .71 )*
D R 1 (-1 ) -2 .2 5 0  (2 .0 3 )
C M R -0 .7 1 0 (0 .3 8 0 )* * *
C M R  (-1) -0 .2 0 6  (0 .3 9 8 )
R -S q u a re 0 .9 9 9 0.991 0 .993
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .9 9 9 0 .987 0 .9 9 0
S .E  o f R e g re ss io n 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 4 8
D ia e n o st ic  T ests
D W  (h) -s ta tis tic s - 1.57 (0 .1 1 6 ) U n d e fin ed U n d efin ed
L M  (3) se ria l co rre la tio n 6 .06  [0.11] 2 .8 0  [0 .42] 1.46 [0.69]
A R C H  (3 ) te s t 0 .65  [0.89] 0 .5 4  [0 .91] 1.75 [0.63]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 2 .45  [0 .12] 14.6 [0 .00] 1.06 [0 .30]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 0 .8 6  [0.65] 0 .8 0  [0 .67] 0 .39  [0.82]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q  (6) 6 .0 2  [0 .42] 16.01 [0 .01] 6 .4 4  [0.38]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (8) 6 .97  [0 .54] 2 3 .9 8  [0 .00]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (10) 6 .2 9  [0.79]
R esid u a l U n it  r o o t  test
T es t s ta tis tic s  (D F ) -7 .20 -5 .1 6 -5 .1 4
F u n ctio n s  an d  R estr ic tio n s
In co m e  e la s tic ity  a = (a 3 + a 4 ) /( l-a 2 ) 0 .8 9 (1 .2 7 ) 1 .629 (6 .8 1 ) 2 .0 4  (0 .2 8 0 )*
C o e ff . o f  lag g ed  m o n ey  a 2 = l  C H S Q  (1) 0 .9 9 0  [0 .32] 0 .0 2 7  [0 .87] 7 .4 6  [0 .006]
Notes: Predictive failure test and parameter stability tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 
1992; when the number of regressors in the model exceed five then the stability test is conducted by 
breaking the sample at nearest past as permitted by the number of regressors in the equation. Unit root 
test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an unit root test with 
second order ADF; *significant at 1% level, ^significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% 
level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
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Table 6.5 Dynamic models of demand for monetary aggregates with partial
adjustment: parsimonious version (1971-98)
D ep en d e n t V a riab le R ea l b ro ad  m o n ey R eal b a se  m o n ey R ea l n a rro w  m oney
(m 3r) (mOr) (mir)
M o d e l n u m b er M 3R P A 1 M 0R P A 1 M 1R P A 1
IN T E R C E P T 0 .1 5 2  (0 .0 6 8 )* * 0 .1 2 5  (0 .1 9 0 ) -1 3 .2 9  (2 .48 )*
m3r (-1) 1.002 (0 .0 0 7 )*
mOr (-1) 1.003 (0 .0 2 1 )*
mir (-1) 0 .2 7 2 (0 .1 2 5 )* *
y  ( - D 1.362 (0 .2 3 3 )*
P -0 .4 0 2  (0 .0 9 8 )*
Ap -1 .1 4 2  (0 .0 8 6 )* -1 .0 7 9  (0 .2 3 3 )*
D R l 4 .8 0 7 (1 .6 0 0 )*
C M R -0 .763  (0 .3 5 8 )* *
R -S q u a re 0 .9 9 9 0 .9 8 9 0.991
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .9 9 9 0 .9 8 8 0 .9 8 9
S .E  o f  R e g re ss io n 0 .023 0 .0 6 3 0 .0 4 9
Diagnostic Tests
D W  (h) -s ta tis tic s -0 .76  (0 .4 4 5 ) -0 .13  (0 .9 0 ) -0 .2 9 2  (0 .77 )
L M  (3) se ria l co rre la tio n 3 .19  [0.36] 3 .58  [0 .31] 1.97 [0 .58]
A R C H  (3) te s t 0 .88  [0 .83] 1.21 [0 .75] 1.35 [0.72]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 0 .6 0  [0 .44] 2.81 [0 .09] 0 .25  [0.62]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 0 .45  [0.80] 0 .7 4  [0 .69] 0 .7 4  [0.69]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q  (6) 6.91 [0 .33] 0 .65  [0 .37] 9 .36  [0.15]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (3) 3 .5 0  [0 .32] 4 .6 9  [0 .20]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (6) 9 .3 6  [0 .15]
Residual Unit root test
T e s t s ta tis tic s  (D F ) -5 .89 -5 .09 -5 .4 4
Functions and Restrictions
In co m e  e la s tic ity 1.87 (0 .2 0 )*
C o e ff. o f  lag g ed  m o n ey  a 2 = l C H S Q  (1) 0 .0 8 6  [0 .769] 0 .0 1 6  [0 .980] 33 .8 6  [0.00]
Notes: All notes of Table 6.4 apply.
The above results are broadly consistent with the analysis made so far and the 
inferences drawn based on the behaviour of money multipliers and velocities. 
However, in view of the fact that major variables are integrated of order one, it is 
important to test the long-run relationship in a cointegration framework, and this is 
attempted in the following subsection. In view of the conflicting results about the 
existence of homogeneity conditions with respect to price, the monetary aggregates 
will be taken as nominal quantities with price as an independent variable in order to 
let it take the value most appropriate from the data.
6.4.3 Cointegration Approach to Long Term Relationship
An (n x 1) vector time series yt is said to be cointegrated if each of the series taken 
individually is 1(1), that is, nonstationary with a unit root, while some linear 
combination of the series a yt is stationary or 1(0) for some nonzero (n x 1) vector a.
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This means that while each of the series may wander arbitrarily far from the starting 
value due to permanent changes caused by many developments in individual series, 
there is some long run equilibrium relationship tying them together represented by 
the linear combination a yt . Taking advantage of the 1(1) nature of most time series
variables, in the recent literature the properties of cointegrating vectors are 
extensively exploited to study the long run relationships. The test procedure of 
cointegration followed in this chapter is the same as described in Annexure 5.3 of 
Chapter 5. More description of a cointegrated vector error correction model (VECM) 
with generalized restrictions for empirical analysis is provided in Appendix AB of 
the thesis.
The advantage of this method is exploited in this chapter for testing the existence 
of demand for money function under two previously mentioned conditions. These are 
restated as follows. (1) Whether output appears in the long run relationship according 
to the expectations and (2) whether the variables included in the functions for money 
are co-trending with money or not, and, if not, whether the trend is negative or 
positive. With a significant positive trend in the function for money and or 
insignificant or negative coefficient of output, the data generating process cannot be 
considered to emerge from a long-term function of demand for money.
The test results of cointegration under the procedure discussed above are 
presented in Annexure 6.3 and the emerging long run relationship between the 
variables is summarized in Table 6.6. Realizing that the cointegration results are 
sensitive to the order of VAR, it has been selected using a statistical technique of 
SBC criteria of model selection. Three sets of results are produced for each of the 
nominal monetary aggregates, which include simple relationships between money, 
price and output and between money, price, output, own return on money and return 
on government bonds. Trend is included in all experiments and the test statistics of 
its significance is also presented in Table 6.6.
The cointegration analysis requires all variables to be integrated of the same 
order, however, in practice, it is hard to find the relevant economic variables to 
comply with this requirement (Engle and Granger 1987). Johansen (1995), allows the 
1(0) variable to be used in cointegration analysis with other 1(1) variables, while 
Granger (1997) cautioned against resulting complications in interpretation and 
Levtchenkova, et al. (1998) argue that inclusion of 1(0) variables may result in loss of
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information. Therefore, as far as possible, this thesis avoids such mixing. The 
variables used for present cointegration analysis are all 1(1) with or without trend 
except the price variable which is 1(1) with intercept and no trend but it is stationary 
with intercept and trend (see Table 6.2).
The results from Table 6.6 are all in line with the conclusions made in earlier 
analysis. While the important variables are cointegrated, there is sufficient indication 
to infer that the long term relationships in regards to the equations for broad and base 
money are not demand for money functions. The test that the cointegrating variables 
are co-trended is rejected at all levels of significance. Second, the trend is 
significantly positive which indicates autonomous growth in money supply. Third, 
the coefficient of output variables is either insignificant or negative, which again 
reflects that these functions are reaction functions around some trend growth rate of 
money as discussed earlier. In view of this and all the earlier findings, it can now be 
concluded that demand for broad and base money is undefined in the case of India 
and should not be a basis for conducting monetary policy. Nevertheless, an effort is 
made in Chapter 7 to estimate a behavioural equation for the supply of broad and 
base money.
However, the case of narrow money Ml is different, where there is indication of 
a better-specified function for the long-term demand for narrow money. Therefore, 
further discussion on the demand for money will be confined to narrow money only. 
In all three formulations of narrow money in Table 6.6 (lines 7-9), output is 
significantly positive and trend is either insignificant or significantly negative. The 
negative sign of trend can have an interpretation in terms of technological effects, 
which reduces cash holding with respect to output growth. The signs of own rate of 
return (DR1) and returns on bonds (CGS1) are also as expected in the demand for 
money equation. It may be noticed that the long-term income elasticity of narrow 
money lies between 2.2 and 2.4, which is higher than the earlier estimate of 1.7 done 
in the tradition of partial adjustment. But how much this long relationship will be 
useful in explaining the short-term adjustment of narrow money demand is another 
vital issue that will be examined in the following discussion.
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6.4.4 ECM for Narrow Money Demand in two Steps
The long run relationship from the above analysis can be used to design an error 
correction model in the tradition of two-step ECM. The dynamics of the system is 
obtained from the error term calculated using the long-term relationship of the 
cointegrating vector.
Considering that the trend is insignificant in long-term relationships presented at 
line 8 and 9 in Table 6.6, the coefficients for other variables are re-estimated with the 
restriction that trend is zero. The design and test results for these vectors are 
presented in Annexure 6.4. The revised long-term relationships for narrow money are 
summarized in Table 6.7 with ERDM1A, ERDM1B and ERDM1C as the error 
correction terms. The deviation of narrow money stock from its long-term 
equilibrium values is a function of error correction term.
Table 6.7 Selected long run equations for estimating alternative ECM for demand
__________for nominal narrow money Ml (1971-98)__________________________
ml = 2.389 y * + 0.899 p  * - 0.053 T** + ERDM1A 
(0.242) (0.222) (0.024)
ml = 2.098 y * + 0.301 p*  + 4.447 DR1* + ERDM1B 
(0.176) (0.123) (1.172)
ml = 2.208 y * +  0.224 p  * + 6.534 DR1* - 0.931 CGS1* + ERDM1C
(0.158) (0.111) (1.827) (0.407)____________________________________________
Note: See Annexure 6.4 of this chapter for the structural design of cointegrating vectors. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis ().
Using lagged errors from long-term relationships in Table 6.7, along with lagged 
and contemporaneous difference terms of all the variables in the cointegrating vector 
and other variables that are expected to affect the money demand, the ECM 
specifications are presented in Table 6.8. Models DM1A, DM1B and DM1C include 
only the error terms, while DM1A1 and DM1B1 also include the first difference of 
interest rates. Differenced variables that are not significant are not retained in models 
DM1A1 and DM1B1 following the principle of general to specific model.
Clearly, the errors ERDM1B and ERDM1C alone have no explanatory power, 
while ERDM1A errors have significant explanatory power. This means that the long- 
run effects of interest rates are not as useful as some form of technological variable 
captured by the trend term.
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Table 6.8 ECM for demand for nominal narrow money (1971-98)
Dependent Variable Ami Ami Ami Ami Ami
Model number DM1A DM1B DM1C DM1A1 DM1B1
INTERCEPT -8.387*** -5.900 -3.360 -7.990** -8.480*
(4.220) (3.620) (3.810) (3.524) (2.840)
ERDM1A (-1) -0.317** -0.302**
(0.157) (0.131)
ERDM1B (-1) -0.284 -0.405*
(0.170) (0.134)
ERDM1C (-1) -0.153
(0.167)
ADR1 4.150* 4.940*
(1.180) (1.135)
ACGS1 -1.360** -1.520**
(0.645) (0.607)
R-Square 0.14 0.097 0.03 0.44 0.51
R-Bar-Square 0.10 0.062 -0.01 0.38 0.45
S.E of Regression 0.06 0.06 0.064 0.05 0.047
Diagnostic Tests
DW-statistics 2.01 2.2 2.34 2.01 2.07
LM (3) serial correlation 0.08 [0.90] 0.74 [0.86] 1.36 [0.72] 2.38 [0.50] 1.80 [0.62]
ARCH (3) test 0.53 [0.91] 0.47 [0.93] 0.40 [0.94] 1.65 [0.65] 1.82 [0.61]
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 0.17 [0.68] 0.40 [0.53] 0.36 10.55] 5.13 [0.02] 6.22 10.01]
Normality CHSQ (2) 29.6 [0.00] 44.3 [0.00] 48.5 [0.00] 3.57 [0.17] 1.18 [0.55]
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 5.59 [0.47] 7.77 [0.19]
Stability test CHSQ (4) 4.23 [0.37] 6.50 [0.17]
Residual Unit root test
Test statistics (DF) -5.04 -3.58 -5.89 -5.09 -5.35
Notes: Predictive failure test and param eter stability tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 
1992. Unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an unit root test 
with second order ADF; *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; 
values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
However, with inclusion of changes in the interest rate variable the error term 
ERDM1B is also significant but the functional form of the short run dynamics is not 
satisfactory. Full model corresponding to error ERDM1C is not presented as it is not 
as satisfactory as the other two. Other statistical properties of both error correction 
models, DM1A1 and DM1B1 are satisfactory but model DM1B1 is found to 
encompass model DM1 Al. The CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests did not show 
any sign of structural break. The predictive failure and stability test of coefficients 
are also satisfactory. It may be noted that the coefficients of the error terms are not 
big enough to suggest quicker adjustments from the long-term relationship. Most of 
the explanatory powers of the models are drawn from the high coefficients of the 
changes in interest rates. As in the case of broad and narrow money, output does not 
appear to play an important role for short-run narrow money demand. However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, narrow money growth is important in determining the
204
level of inflation. In this context, interest rates can be important variables in order to 
control narrow money in the short-run.
6.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Three common monetary aggregates have been analyzed in this chapter from the 
perspective of their relevance in conducting monetary policy. An attempt has been 
made to model and test the robustness of the long run relationship between output 
and broad money stock in a variety of long-term specifications of demand for real 
broad money using data for the period 1970-98, which includes the post reform 
period. The outcome is disappointing. When broad money is specified as a standard 
demand equation, output, a key variable is not at all robust to the inclusion of other 
relevant variables like, inflation, interest rate, and trend. The examination of the base 
money demand also meets the same outcome.
Therefore, it is concluded that the money-output relationship in India is very 
loose and any attempt to conduct monetary policy based on the paradigm of a stable 
demand for money is likely to be more a failure than a success. As discussed earlier, 
the loosening of the relationship between money and output may be due to the 
operation of Goodhart’s law. Discretionary supply of money due to various reasons 
such as fiscal deficit, directed credit, and interventions in foreign exchange market, 
must have helped in loosening the money-output relationship.
There is evidence to suggest the demand for narrow money is better defined but it 
may not really assist, because narrow money by definition neither represents base 
money over which the central bank has better control nor all the institutional 
categories of money. Therefore, conducting monetary policy based on narrow money 
could at best be a temporary arrangement until the interest rate becomes the major 
instrument of monetary policy.
In most studies on monetary aggregates in India, it has been assumed there is no 
public money illusion. However, simple regression analyses reveal this assumption is 
not robust. Demand for money does not imply demand for real money. The price 
level should be treated as a separate variable when modeling nominal or real money.
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Annexure 6.1 Summary definition of data used in Chapter 6
Symbol Variable description and unit of measurement
BDR
CC
CGS1
CIB
CMR
CRR
CUP
DD
DR1
GDP
MO
MOR
Ml
MIR
M3
M3R
ODR
P
SLR
TD
Y
YP
Bankers’Deposits with RBI (rupees million).
Currency in Circulation (rupees million).
Bond rate: Annual yield on 1-5 Year government of India (GOI) Securities, 
taken in fraction. Middle point has been taken for the data given in range.
Cash on Hand with Banks (rupees million).
Overnight annual call money rate of commercial banks taken in fraction 
Cash Reserve Ratio: derived according to the RBI notifications as fraction of 
time plus demand deposits. Average of the notified values during the year 
Currency with the Public (rupees million).
Demand Deposits with Banks (rupees million).
1-3 Year commercial banks annual deposit rates taken in fraction.
GDP at market prices at current prices (rupees million)
Base (Reserve) Money (rupees million). MO = CUP+CIB + BDR + ODR 
Real base money = MO/P
Narrow Money (rupees million). Ml = CUP+ODR+DD 
Real narrow money = Ml/P
Broad Money (rupees million). M3 = CUP + DD + TD + ODR
Real broad money = M3/P
Other Deposits with RBI (rupees million)
Wholesale price index (WPI) of all commodities converted to base 1993-94 = 
100
Statutory Liquidity Ratio according to the RBI notifications taken as fraction of 
time and demand deposits. Average of the notified values during the year.
Time Deposits with Banks (rupees million).
Gross domestic product at constant market prices (rupees millions)
Permanent real income calculated according to the error-learning hypothesis 
discussed in Ladler (1989:88) with geometric wt for last 10 years and weight of 
0.5 for current year’s real GDP at factor cost.
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Annexure 6.2: Unit root test for the variables used in Chapter 6 in levels and first 
differences
Lag
struc tu re
The D ickey-F u lle r re g ress ions inc lude 
an in te rcep t bu t not a trend .
The D ickey-F u lle r re g ress ions include 
an in te rcep t and a linea r trend
V ariab le 95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC S BC
95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC SBC
value va lue
CGS1 DF - 2.980 -1 .23 69 .22 67 .96 - 3.594 -1 .48 68 .69 66.81
A D F (1) -1.41 68 .94 67 .05 -2 .00 69 .09 66 .58
A D F (2) -1 .15 68 .60 66 .09 -1 .48 68 .25 65 .10
ACGS1 DF - 2.985 -3 .98 65 .66 64 .45 - 3.603 -3 .92 64 .75 62.92
A D F  (1) -3.95 65.61 63 .78 -3.91 64 .77 62 .33
CRR DF - 2.980 -1 .68 77 .54 76 .29 - 3.594 -0 .74 76 .54 74 .66
A D F (1) -1 .68 77 .03 75 .14 -1 .37 76 .44 73 .93
ACRR DF - 2.985 -4.41 76 .10 74 .88 - 3.603 -4 .26 75 .23 73 .40
A D F (1) -3.74 75 .37 73 .54 -3 .66 74 .57 72 .13
C M R DF - 2.980 -3 .67 52 .64 51 .38 - 3.594 -3 .52 51 .75 49.86
A D F (1) -3 .84 52 .52 50 .63 -3 .84 52 .13 49 .62
DR1 DF - 2.980 -1.71 85 .73 84 .48 - 3.594 -2 .99 87 .77 85 .89
A D F  (1) -1 .75 84 .88 82 .99 -4 .74 91 .64 89 .12
A D F (2) -1 .16 87 .12 84 .60 -3 .18 90 .67 87 .53
ADR1 DF - 2.985 -4 .55 80 .47 79 .25 - 3.603 -4 .55 79 .78 77 .95
A D F  (1) -5 .72 83 .52 81 .70 -5 .70 82.91 80 .47
A D F  (2) -4.71 83 .93 81 .49 -4.61 83 .22 80 .18
mO DF - 2.980 -0 .17 33 .69 32 .44 - 3.594 -2 .95 36 .86 34 .97
A D F  (1) -0 .15 32.71 30 .82 -3.41 37 .20 34 .68
AmO DF - 2.985 -4 .93 32 .06 30 .84 - 3.603 -4 .83 31 .08 29 .25
A D F  (1) -4.17 31 .64 29.81 -4 .09 30 .68 28 .24
ml DF - 2.980 1.07 33 .00 31 .74 - 3.59 -2 .19 34 .70 32.81
ADF (1) 1.49 33 .54 31 .65 -1 .77 34 .56 32 .05
A D F  (2) 1.75 33.11 30 .59 -1 .55 33 .85 30 .70
Ami DF - 2.985 -6 .30 31 .52 30 .30 - 3.603 -6.91 32 .39 30 .56
A D F (1) -4 .03 30 .59 28 .76 -4 .88 32 .14 29.70
m3 DF - 2.980 0.23 58 .45 57 .19 - 3.594 -3 .20 62 .26 60 .38
A D F (1) 0 .23 57.51 55 .62 -3 .70 62 .82 60 .30
Am 3 DF - 2.985 -5 .08 55 .66 54 .44 - 3.603 -4 .98 54.71 52 .88
A D F  (1) -4 .10 55 .09 53 .26 -4 .02 54 .14 51 .70
mOr DF - 2.980 0.02 25 .53 24 .27 - 3.594 -3 .34 29 .79 27.91
A D F  (1) -0.09 24 .77 22 .89 -4 .23 31 .58 29 .07
A D F (2) 0.02 24.01 21 .50 -4 .43 31.71 28 .57
AmOr DF - 2.985 -4 .29 24 .42 23 .20 - 3.603 -4 .20 23 .44 21 .62
A D F  (1) -3 .62 23 .66 21 .83 -3 .55 22 .70 20.26
mir DF - 2.980 0.82 26 .34 25 .08 - 3.594 -3 .46 31 .65 29 .77
A D F (1) 1.30 26.61 24 .72 -3 .04 31 .39 28 .87
A D F  (2) 1.82 26 .96 24 .45 -2 .78 31 .73 28 .58
Amir DF - 2.985 -6 .20 25 .73 24.51 - 3.603 -6 .65 26 .26 24 .44
A D F (1) -4 .49 25 .14 23.31 -5 .40 26 .93 24 .50
m3r DF - 2.980 0.45 32 .35 31 .09 - 3.594 -3.21 36 .35 34 .47
A D F (1) 0.24 32 .14 30 .25 -5 .19 41 .69 39 .17
A D F  (2) 0.42 32 .40 29 .88 -5 .16 42 .23 39 .08
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Lag
struc tu re
The D ickey-F u lle r re g ress ions inc lude 
an in te rcep t but no t a trend.
The D ickey-F u lle r reg ress ions inc lude 
an in te rcep t and a linea r trend
V ariab le 95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC S BC
95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC S BC
value va lue
A m 3 r DF - 2.985 -3.91 32 .63 31.41 - 3.603 -3 .80 31 .63 29.80
A D F (1) -4.06 32 .80 30 .97 -3 .96 31.82 29 .38
A D F (2) -3 .79 32 .43 29 .99 -3 .70 31 .48 28 .43
MM1 DF - 2.980 -2.02 28 .48 27 .22 - 3.594 -1 .39 27 .49 25 .60
A D F (1) -2.12 28 .05 26 .16 -1 .75 27 .27 24 .76
AMM1 DF - 2.985 -4 .05 25 .44 24 .23 - 3.603 -4 .17 25.01 23 .18
A D F (1) -4 .07 25 .53 23 .70 -4 .34 25 .52 23 .08
A D F (2) -2.81 24 .55 22.11 -3.11 24 .52 21 .47
M M 3 DF - 2.980 -0 .73 11.92 10.66 - 3.594 -2 .26 13.35 11.46
A D F  (1) -0 .64 10.93 9.05 -2 .40 12.83 10.31
DF - 2.985 -5.10 10.99 9.77 - 3.603 -5 .00 10.01 8.18
A M M 3 A D F (1) -3 .84 10.19 8.36 -3.76 9.21 6.77
A D F (2) -3 .70 10.36 7 .93 -3 .59 9.39 6.34
P DF - 2.980 -1 .05 38 .18 36 .92 - 3.594 -3 .20 41 .70 39 .82
A D F  (1) -0 .92 37 .90 36.01 -4 .93 46 .33 43 .82
A D F (2) -0.93 38 .80 36 .28 -4 .28 45 .75 42.61
AP DF - 2.985 -4.10 38.41 37 .19 - 3.603 -3 .97 37.41 35 .58
AD F (1) -4 .43 39 .00 37 .17 -4 .29 38.01 35 .57
A D F (2) -3 .57 38 .16 35 .73 -3 .47 37.18 34 .14
re e r DF - 2.980 0.09 29 .29 28 .03 - 3.594 -1 .90 30 .44 28.56
A D F (1) 0.00 28 .40 26 .52 -2 .02 29 .85 27 .34
k r e e r DF - 2.985 -4 .44 28 .14 26 .92 - 3.603 -4 .37 27.21 25 .39
A D F (1) -2.91 27 .27 25 .44 -2 .84 26.31 23 .87
y DF - 2.980 1.24 53 .29 52 .04 - 3.594 -2 .13 54 .93 53 .05
AD F (1) 1.58 52 .98 51 .09 -1 .85 54.22 51.71
A y DF - 2.985 -5 .70 50 .48 49 .26 - 3.603 -6 .10 50 .85 49 .02
A D F  (1) -3 .83 49 .48 47 .65 -4 .35 50.18 47 .74
yp DF - 2.980 3.31 71 .96 70 .70 - 3.594 -1 .03 71 .99 70.11
A D F (1) 2.34 71.01 69 .12 -1 .04 71 .06 68 .54
A yp DF - 2.985 -3.46 66 .12 64 .90 - 3.600 -4.52 68 .09 66 .26
A D F (1) -2 .69 65 .22 63 .40 -3.92 67.61 65 .17
VO DF - 2.980 -1.21 -31 .60 -32.85 - 3.594 -2 .58 -30.06 -31.95
A D F (1) -1 .30 -32 .38 -34.27 -3 .29 -29.12 -31.63
A D F (2) -1 .10 -3 3 .17 -35 .69 -3 .34 -29.31 -32.46
AVO DF - 2.985 -4.50 -31 .53 -32 .75 - 3.603 -4.41 -32.52 -34.34
A D F (1) -3.85 -32 .12 -33.95 -3.77 -33.10 -35.54
V1 DF - 2.980 -2 .29 -21 .19 -22 .45 - 3.594 -4 .34 -16.55 -18.43
A D F (1) -1 .59 -2 1 .72 -23.61 -3 .52 -17.46 -19.97
AV1 DF - 2.985 -6 .86 -21 .63 -22.84 - 3.603 -6 .96 -22.00 -23.83
A D F (1) -5.91 -20 .38 -22.20 -6 .37 -19.81 -22.25
A D F (2) -4 .00 -2 1 .24 -23.67 -4 .66 -20.11 -23.16
V 3 DF - 2.980 -0.88 1.25 0.00 - 3.594 -1 .90 1.75 -0 .13
A D F (1) -0 .94 0 .83 -1 .06 -2 .72 3.11 0.59
A D F  (2) -0 .92 2 .8 9 0 .38 -1 .58 3.01 -0 .14
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The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
an intercept but not a trend.______________ an intercept and a linear trend
Variable L -a ystructure 95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
AV3 DF -2.985 -3.85 1.96 0.74 -3.603 -3.82 1.18 -0.65
ADF (1) -4.71 3.66 1.83 -4.79 3.21 0.77
ADF (2) -3.28 2.66 0.22 -3.41 2.24 -0.81
Note: ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. SBC = Schwarz
Bayesian Criterion of model selection. The order of ADF test is chosen as 2 in all the cases. Numbers 
of observations vary from 23 to 26.
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Annexure 6.3 Test results for cointegration between variables in alternative 
specifications of demand for money function (reference Table 6.6) 
__________(1971-98)_____________________________________________________
__________ Maximum Eigenvalue Test________________________________Trace Test_________________ No. Of
Hypothesis_________ t- t- Critical values_______ Hypothesis _______  <,. .. Critical values vectors
Null Alternative 3 'SIC 95% 90% Null Alternative IS' 95% 90% Selected
Variable set: m3, y, p, Trend.
Eigenvalues: 0.52343, 0.43047, 0.26976, 0
r = 0 r = 1 20.75 25.42 23.10 r = 0 r = 1 45.32 42.34 39.34 1
r<= 1 r = 2 15.76 19.22 17.18 r<= 1 r<= 2 24.57 25.77 23.08
r<= 2 r = 3 8.80 12.39 10.55 r<= 2 r<= 3 8.80 12.39 10.55
Variable set: m3, y, p, CGS1, Trend
Eigenvalues: 0.72574, 0.44794, 0.31128, 0.1157, 0
r = 0 r = 1 36.22 31.79 29.13 r = 0 r = 1 66.74 63.00 59.16 1
r<= 1 r = 2 16.63 25.42 23.10 r<= 1 r<= 2 30.52 42.34 39.34
r<= 2 r = 3 10.44 19.22 17.18 r<= 2 r<= 3 13.88 25.77 23.08
r<= 3 r = 4 3.44 12.39 10.55 r<= 3 r<= 4 3.44 12.39 10.55
Variable set: m3, y, p, CGS1R, DR1R
Eigenvalues: 0.82736, 0.49966, 0.44219, 0.29579, 0.11603, 0
r = 0 r = 1 49.18 37.86 35.04 r = 0 r = 1 98.19 87.17 82.88 1
r<= 1 r = 2 19.39 31.79 29.13 r<= 1 r<= 2 49.01 63.00 59.16
r<= 2 r = 3 16.34 25.42 23.10 r<= 2 r<= 3 29.62 42.34 39.34
r<= 3 r = 4 9.82 19.22 17.18 r<= 3 r<= 4 13.27 25.77 23.08
Variable set: mO, y, p, Trend
Eigenvalues: 0.58181,0.4308, 0.34924, 0
r = 0 r = 1 24.41 25.42 23.10 r = 0 r = 1 52 22 42.34 3934 1
r<= 1 r = 2 15.78 19.22 17.18 r<= 1 r<= 2 27.81 25.77 23.08
r<= 2 r = 3 12.03 12.39 10.55 r<= 2 r<= 3 12.03 12.39 10.55
Variable set mO, y, p, CGS1R, Trend
Eigenvalues: 0.64698, 0.49492, 0.3834, 0.12111, 0
r = 0 r = 1 29.15 31.79 29.13 r = 0 r = 1 65.43 63.00 59.16 1
r<= 1 r = 2 19.13 25.42 23.10 r<= 1 r<= 2 36.28 42.34 39.34
r<= 2 r = 3 13.54 19.22 17.18 r<= 2 r<= 3 17.15 25.77 23.08
r<= 3 r = 4 3.61 12.39 10.55 r<= 3 r<= 4 3.61 12.39 10.55
Variable s e t mO, y, p, CGS1R, DR1R
Eigenvalues: 0.8653, 0.56007, 0.41435, 0.34191, 0.11499, 0
r = 0 r = 1 56.13 37.86 35.04 r = 0 r = 1 109.24 87.17 82.88 1
r<= 1 r = 2 22.99 31.79 29.13 r<= 1 r<= 2 53.11 63.00 59.16
r<= 2 r = 3 14.98 25.42 23.10 r<= 2 r<= 3 30.12 42.34 39.34
r<= 3 r = 4 11.72 19.22 17.18 r<= 3 r<= 4 15.14 25.77 23.08
Variable set: m l, y, p, Trend
Eigenvalues: 0.70125, 0.4284, 0.19029, 0
r = 0 r = 1 33.83 25.42 r = 0 r = 1 55.40 42.34 39.34 1
r<= 1 r = 2 15.66 19.22 r<= 1 r<= 2 21.57 25.77 23.08
r<= 2 r = 3 5.91 12.39 r<= 2 r<= 3 5.91 12.39 10.55
Variable set: m l, y, p, DR1, Trend 
Eigenvalues: 0.70125, 0.4284, 0.19029, 0
r = 0 r=  1 37.84 31.79 29.13 r = 0 r = 1 75.04 63.00 59.16 1
r<= 1 r = 2 17.15 25.42 23.10 r<= 1 r<= 2 37.20 42.34 39.34
r<= 2 r = 3 12.07 19.22 17.18 r<= 2 r<= 3 20.05 25.77 23.08
r<= 3 r = 4 7.99 12.39 10.55 r<= 3 r<= 4 7.99 12.39 10.55
Variable set: m l, y, p, DR1, CGS1, Trend
Eigenvalues: 0.78094,0.5698, 0.41786, 0.3236, 0.14061,0
r = 0 r = 1 42.51 37.86 35.04 r = 0 r = 1 96.48 87.17 82.88 1
r<= 1 r = 2 23.62 31.79 29.13 r<= 1 r<= 2 53.96 63.00 59.16
r<= 2 r = 3 15.15 25.42 23.10 r<= 2 r<= 3 30.34 42.34 39.34
r<= 3 r = 4 10.95 19.22 17.18 r<= 3 r<= 4 15.19 25.77 23.08
Note: The number o f cointegrating vectors is represented with r. A ll tests are done applying likelihood 
ratio test on the maximum eigenvalue and trace o f the stochastic matrix in VECM specification with 
restricted trend and unrestricted intercept. Period: 1971- 98, Order of VAR = 1.
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Annexure 6.4 Structure of the cointegrating vectors for modeling demand for narrow 
money (reference Tables 6.6 & 6.7) (1971-98)
Model -  DM1A: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: m l, y, p, Trend 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1 .
Imposed Restriction: a l= l_____________________________________________________________________
ml y p Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -2.389* -0.899* 0.053**
Std. Error (NONE) (0.242) (0.222) (0.0238)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 159.196. LR test of additional restriction (a4=0): CHSQ (1) = 
4.856[.028], LL subject to over identified restrictions = 156.768
Model-DM1B: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: m l, y, p, DR1, Trend 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1.
Imposed Restriction: a 1 = 1_________________________________________________________
ml y P DR1 Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -2.3096 -0.66984 -3.6592 0.038262
Std. Error (NONE) (0.212) (0.222) (1.715) (0.021)
Imposed Restriction: a 1=1; a5=0 
Vector: a 1.000 -2.0979* -0.3006* -4.4468* 0.000
Std. Error (NONE) (0.176) (0.123) (1.818) (NONE)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 259.99. LR test of additional restriction (a5=0): CHSQ (1) = 
3.1997[.074], LL subject to over identified restrictions = 258.393
Model -  DM1C: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: m l, y, p, DR1, CGS1 Trend. 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1.
Imposed Restriction: a l= l
Vector: a 
Std. Error
ml
1.000
(NONE)
y
-2.1894
(0.19839)
P
-0.1799
(0.30755)
DR1
-6.7080
(2.1557)
CGS1
0.97124
(0.48486)
Trend
-0.0042
(0.0274)
Imposed Restriction: a 1=1; a6=0
Vector: a 1.000 -2.2076 -0.22391 -6.5341 0.93129 0.00
Std. Error (NONE) (0.158) (0.1106) (1.8269) (0.4075) (NONE)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 343.28. LR test of additional restriction (a6=0): CHSQ (1) = 
0.0236[.878], LL subject to over identified restrictions = 343.273
Notes: Values in parenthesis () are standard errors. *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level 
and ***significant at 10% level.
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Chapter 7
Money Supply Behaviour
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The analysis in the previous chapter indicates that the functions of demand for broad 
and base money are not well defined in the case of the Indian economy for the data 
set analyzed, which includes the most recent periods. Therefore, the identity that the 
money supply equals money demanded is not well defined in the case of India 
making it important to analyze the endogenous behavioural pattern of the money 
supply. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5 inflation at least over the medium term 
is not entirely a monetary phenomenon in India. However, as Chapter 5 identified 
narrow money Ml as the appropriate monetary aggregate for accounting monetary 
effects on inflation, it is particularly important to estimate a behavioural model for 
determining the stock of Ml in the economy, so that the important variables that can 
explain Ml supply can be identified as valid control instruments. The behavioural 
model for determining the stock of the broad money M3 is also examined in this 
chapter, as M3 is the monetary aggregate that is being used as an intermediate target 
of monetary policy in India at present. This analysis facilitates a comparison between 
the behavioural models of Ml and M3 supply.
Specifically, the basic question is what determines money supply behaviour? This 
calls for modeling the broader monetary aggregates so that their supply can be 
related to the supply of base money, which can be better controlled by the RBI. As 
discussed above, since broader aggregates include institutional money, variables 
likely to determine the cash holding behaviour of people and banks become 
important in determining the total stock of money. In this context, theories of the 
supply of money dealing with inside and outside money, or more relevantly money 
produced by the government and central bank and money produced by 
intermediation, become relevant to estimation and discussion.
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The traditional literature on the supply of broader aggregates of money is 
concerned with the banking money multiplier analysis, which is basically a money 
determinants analysis with a blend of money demand and supply modeled in terms of 
the preferences of the final agents who hold money stock, such as the public, banks 
and government.73 Such preferences determine the proximate determinants of money 
stock known as currency and cash reserves to deposits ratios and stock of high power 
money (also known as base or reserve money). This assumes base money is 
exogenously determined, which does not seem to be true in the case of India, as 
indicated by the causality test in Chapter 5 and the discussion in the previous chapter. 
As broad money demand is not well defined, it is difficult to credit that base money 
supply is a response to the maintained desired rate of growth in broad money. The 
RBI may respond to the fiscal deficit and the borrowing potential of government by 
partly monetizing the deficit and thus, increase the monetary base.74 Finally, the 
central bank can resort to open market operations in response to the interest rate and 
exchange rate movements. This may leave base money itself as an endogenous 
variable.
Therefore, an attempt is made in this chapter to examine the effects of 
institutional and macroeconomic variables on the money generating process by 
estimating functions for the multipliers and base money supply. The fiscal deficit is 
used to identify the long run supply functions for base money. Other variables that 
are assumed to affect the base money supply behaviour of the RBI are identified as 
the real exchange rate, the interest rate, output, price level, foreign exchange reserves 
and inflation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 develops a simple 
analytical framework for multiplier equation and estimates and discusses the narrow 
and broad money multipliers. Nominal base money supply is modeled and discussed 
in section 7.3, where the effect of fiscal deficit on economic growth is also analyzed 
with reference to the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5. Section 7.4 concludes. Data
74 In a related context using monthly data for period 1980-2000, Jha and Rath (2001) have argued that money 
multiplier in India is endogenous.
74 The greater the amount of deficit finance, the greater will be the demand for credit and the higher the interest 
rates. High rates of interest could reduce the demand for investment in the private sector (Ghatak 1981). In order 
to maintain the interest rate and private sector investment, the central bank may find it preferable to monetize part 
of the deficit.
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description is provided in Annexure 7.1 of this chapter and Appendix AA of this 
thesis.
7.2 MONEY MULTIPLIERS
In the simplest form, the money multiplier for a particular monetary aggregate is 
defined as the ratio of the stock of that aggregate to the stock of high power or base 
money. As discussed earlier in this study, narrow money Ml and broad money M3 
are considered for analysis. The high power money or the base money (MO) is 
alternatively represented with H. As explained in detail in Chapter 6, in the case of 
India these aggregates are defined as follows.
MO=CUP+CIB+BDR+ODR 
M 1 =CUP+ODR+DD 
M3=M1+TD
CUP = Currency with public 
CIB = Cash in banks 
BDR = Banker’s deposit with RBI 
ODR = Other deposits with RBI 
DD = Demand deposits in banks 
TD = Time deposits in banks
As discussed in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.1) narrow money (Ml) in India has three 
components: currency with the public (CUP), demand deposits (DD) with 
commercial banks and other deposits (ODR) with the RBI. CUP and DD together 
constitute almost 99 percent of Ml. The broad money is the sum of narrow money 
and time deposit. In view of the fact that, the ODR component is about one percent 
of narrow money and a still smaller component of broad money, it is assumed to be 
insignificant for further discussion.
Together, CIB and BDR can be considered as the total reserve (R) in the banking 
sector, which can be divided in to two components, required cash reserve (RR), 
defined by the statutory cash reserve ratio (CRR) and excess reserve (ER) in the 
banking sector, defined by the variability of deposit flows and short term money 
market conditions. Thus CIB + BDR = R = RR+ER. Thus, high power money can be 
defined as: H = MO = R + CUP. Representing total deposits with D = DD + TD, high 
power money, narrow money and broad money can be represented in terms of the
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following ratios. The currency to deposit ratio c = CUPI D , reserves to deposit ratio 
r = RI D , and demand deposit to total deposit ratio d = DD / D . Thus,
H = R +CUP = (r + c)D (7.1)
M 1 = CUP + DD = (c + d)D (7.2)
M 3 = CUP + DD + TD = ( 1 + c)D (7.3)
From equations (7.1) to (7.3), the two multipliers for broad money (MM3) and 
narrow money multiplier (MM1) can be written in terms of their proximate 
determinants as follows:
MM 1 
MM 3
Ml _ (d + c) 
H ~ (r + c)
M3 _ (1 + c) 
H  ( r  + c )
(7.4)
(7.5)
Both multipliers increase with decreasing V. Given the fact that V is less than 
one, the broad money multiplier increases with decreasing *c\ From the data 
provided in Table 6.1, Chapter 6, it can be inferred that on average ‘d’ is more than 
V (see CLR in Table 6.1, which is the same as V). Therefore, the narrow money 
multiplier is also more likely to increase with decreasing *c\ However, it is 
important to remember that ‘d’ is not a constant and can vary with time depending 
upon other macroeconomic variables as it can be regarded as representing the share 
of the transaction deposit in total deposits. Realizing that the ratios ‘r’, ‘c’, and ‘d’ 
can change with time, in view of the fact that the behavioural pattern of the public, 
commercial banks, the RBI and the government changes with changing 
macroeconomic variables like deposit rates, bond rates, variability of deposits, 
institutional developments and the regulatory framework, the above ratios can be 
expressed as functions of such macroeconomic variables (see for example Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1994), Brunner and Meitzer (1990), Fisher (1989)). At the outset, it may 
be noted that in India, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) is one of the main regulatory 
instruments of monetary policy and is changed several times a year.
Among the potential variables that can affect individual cash holding behaviour, 
are interest rates on deposits and yields on bonds. Similarly, a variable such as the
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inter bank call money rates (CMR) can indicate the behaviour of commercial banks 
in holding cash in addition to that statutorily required by the CRR. A high CMR will 
indicate that banks hold less cash in reserve and therefore a lower ‘r \
In addition to price variables like interest rates, institutional development in a 
country can also determine individual cash holding behaviour. Commercial bank 
density (CBDN), measured in terms of thousands of population per branch, can 
proxy such a variable of institutional development in the case of a developing 
country like India. During the 1970s, CBDN dropped drastically from 48 thousand 
people per branch to 21 following bank nationalization in 1969 and the massive 
program under taken by banks to reach the people. However, this drop has slowed 
during the later decade, reaching 15 thousand people per branch during 1998-99.
The effect of the increase in the number of commercial bank branches can be 
seen directly on the changes in the composition of the monetary aggregates presented 
in Table 6.1, Chapter 6. While the CUP component of narrow money (Ml) has been 
declining, the DD component of Ml has been increasing. It may be pointed out that 
the correlation coefficient between CBDN and ratio M3 to Ml and ratio Ml to MO 
are 0.97 and 0.89, respectively. The ratio of DD to CUP has risen from 67 to 81 
percent. This demonstrates that people’s preference for keeping cash has reduced 
with an increasing number of banks branches. In other words, when banks are not at 
far off distances people prefer to keep smaller quantities of cash. Another way in 
which CBDN affects the Ml component is through the switching of demand deposits 
to high interest bearing time deposits. With more banks (low CBDN) people are 
more educated and motivated to keep money in time deposits and earn some 
interest.75
Thus, it is expected that with lowering CBDN, growth in Ml should also be 
lower. In other words, Ml growth and CBDN are expected to have a positive 
relationship. Since the effect of CBDN is drawn from the substitution of the 
component of narrow money with the time deposit component of M3. With more 
banks, people deposit their money wealth in time deposits, which reduces Ml. This
75 However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, despite large increases in the number of bank branches, the 
currency holding per person (CUPPP) in nominal terms as well as in real terms (CUPPPR) has increased several 
fold during the sample period. This simply means that institutional development in terms of opening up of new 
branches of banks is not keeping pace with rising incomes.
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means CBDN will have the opposite effect on the broad money multiplier. Thus the 
above ratios can be written in the following form:
r = f(CRR, CMR,...) 
+
(7.6)
c = f  {Deposit Rates, Yield on Bonds, CBDN,...) (7.7)
d = / ( Deposit Rates, Yield on Bonds, CBDN,...)
+
(7.8)
Substituting equations (7.6) to (7.8) in equations (7.4) and (7.5) the reduced form 
equation for multipliers in terms of the behavioural variables can be written as 
follows:
MM 1 = f{CRR, CMR, Deposit Rates, Yield on Bonds, CBDN) ^
+ +
MM3 = f{CRR, CMR, Deposit Rates, Yield on Bonds, CBDN) (7 10)
+  +  +  -
The expected sign of the partial derivatives are presented below the variables. It 
may be noted that the overall effect of deposit rates and the yield on bonds on the 
narrow money multiplier is not clear due to the opposite affects of ‘c’ and ‘d’ on 
MM1. In the case of MM3, such ambiguity is not present.
As discussed in the earlier chapters, interest rate variables, namely the average 
interest rate on 1-3 year deposits (DR1), the average yield on 1-5 years government 
securities (CGS1), and the average overnight inter bank call money rate (CMR) are 
chosen for this experiment, because the series on these data are reliably and easily 
available. A summary on data description is presented in Annexure 7.1. More details 
on data like sources and constructed data are provided in Appendix AA of the thesis.
In modeling multipliers, it is important to capture long-run relationships along 
with the short-run behaviour of the explanatory variables. This calls for modeling in 
the error correction framework. In estimation, multipliers are taken in logs and 
therefore, represented with small case letters, mml and mm3, while keeping CBDN 
as thousand persons per branch, and the interest rates (CGS1, DR1, and CMR) and 
the CRR in fractions. The time series property of the variables is assessed by
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conducting ADF based unit root tests. The unit root test results presented in 
Annexure 7.2 show CBDN and CMR are a stationary variable, while mml, mm3; 
DR1, CGS1, and CRR are all integrated of order one. Thus, key variables are not 
integrated of the same order. A cointegration test conducted with the 1(1) variables 
did not support the presence of a cointegrating vector. However, when stationary 
variables CMR and CBDN were included in the list of variables including 1(1) 
variables, it obtained a cointegrating vector, which shows that the ordinary least 
square estimation is expected to be consistent and free from the unit root problem.
Therefore, the method of the single equation restricted error correction modeling 
(RECM) procedure of Hendry (1995), which allows the model to include lagged 
dependent and independent variables along with the terms of difference, proved to be 
more flexible. A careful estimation with respect to the diagnostic properties of the 
residuals will guard against any spurious content. For this purpose the following 
unrestricted error correction form is used as followed in Chapter 4.
m- 1
A n = «  + X A'A I'm + X  B;AX,_, + C0Y,_m + C,X,_„ + >u,(7.11)
1=1 i= 0
/  m \ J "  \I'-Xa I . c,=| X MV 1=1 > ^  '= o  )
multiplier for the system. Here a  is a vector of constants, Yt is (nx 1) vector of 
endogenous variable, Xf is (&xl) vector of explanatory variables as, A, and Bi are 
(nxn)  and (nxk)  matrices of coefficients, and n t is a stochastic error term. A
preliminary experimentation with the data indicated that a lag of order one should be 
enough, which is reasonable for annual data. With equation (7.11) as the general 
specification the model is ‘tested down’ by the ordinary least square regression. The 
insignificant terms, unhelpful in explaining the multipliers are dropped 
systematically until a statistically acceptable model in a priory theoretical framework 
is obtained.
7.2.1 Narrow Money Multiplier (MM1)
The estimated dynamic function for a narrow money multiplier is presented in Table 
7.1. The long run semi elasticity of a narrow money multiplier with respect to 
CBDN, CRR, DR1, and CGS1 are also estimated using the variance covariance
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matrices and the same is presented as the long-run relationships in Table 7.1. The 
statistical properties of the model are satisfactory and there is no sign of structural 
break in the estimation when the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test are 
performed. The tests of stability of parameters and predictive failure are also 
satisfactory.
The result in Table 7.1 shows a well-specified model of narrow money multiplier 
with reasonably high explanatory power. The long-term relationships between the 
multiplier and the institutional variables are as expected. The narrow money 
multiplier decreases with cash reserve ratio and increases with an increase in interest 
rates and bank density. Decrease of narrow money multiplier with expansion of 
commercial bank branches and fall in CBDN requires explanation. As noted earlier, 
it may be recalled that the effect of CBDN is drawn from the substitution of the 
component of narrow money with the time deposit component of M3. With more 
banks (which means drop in CBDN), people deposit their money wealth in time 
deposits, which reduces Ml. CBDN will have the opposite effect on the broad money 
multiplier. With increasing returns from bonds (CGS1) and deposits the multiplier 
increases in the long run as the preferences of banks and people at large for holding 
cash falls. Similarly with an increase in deposit rates, the effect of a fall in ‘c’ 
dominates the effect of a fall in ‘d’ both in the long and short run. Therefore, the 
narrow money multiplier increases.
Table 7.1 Model of narrow money multiplier (1972-99)_______________________
Model for MM1: where mml = log (MM1) and Amml = Ami - AmO________________________________________
Amml = -0.251** -0.588 mml (-1)* +0.009 CBDN (-1)* - 2.853 CRR (-1)* + 3.690 D R l(-l)*
(0.091) (0.139) (0.003) (0.947) (1.056)
+ 1.396 CGS1 (-1)**-2 .568 ACRR* + 4.624 ADR1* - 1.384 ACGS1 (-1)** +0.372 AC MR (-1)*** 
(0.605) (0.726) (1.026) (0.656) (0.206)
R-square = 0.80, R-bar-square = 0.69. SE of regression = 0.032, DW statistics = 1.88. LM serial correlation 
CHSQ (1) = 0.05[0.83]; LM serial correlation CHSQ (3) = 0.832 [0.84], ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 1.47 [0.69], 
Functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 3.88 [0.05]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.36 [0.83], Unit root test for the 
residuals in second order ADF based on SBC model selection criterion = - 4.62. Predictive failure test (Chow’s 
second test) after breaking the sample at 1992 CHSQ (7) = 7.39 [0.39]. Test of stability (Chow test) of 
regression coefficients after breaking the sample at 1987 CHSQ (10) = 12.00 [0.29]. *significant at 1% level,
**significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values 
in square brackets [] are p-values.
Long-run Relationship:
mml = intercept + 0.015 CBDN* -4 .850 CRR* + 6.272 DR1* + 2.373 CGS1***
_________________(0.003)__________ (1.780) (1.827)_______ (1.184)___________________________________
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In the short-run CGS1, has a negative effect on the narrow money multiplier. It 
may be due to the fact that the immediate effect of a high rate on government bonds 
results in depletion of the liquidity of banks, which are the main buyers of 
government securities. The call money rate CMR is significantly positive with a lag 
in the short run, which can be expected, given the fact that the CMR is an indicator 
of the liquidity position of commercial banks. A high CMR indicates lower reserves 
with banks in the short run and therefore an increase in the multiplier with a lag.
The above results clearly show that it is possible to control stocks of narrow 
money by manipulating interest rate policy. However, it may be mentioned that the 
most effective control on narrow money can be obtained from control on base money 
itself. But, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, uncoordinated stances on base money 
growth and the institutional variables may result in ineffectiveness of the policy. 
Particularly, the opposing effects of CRR and the base money may cancel out leaving 
no effect or an undesired effect on narrow money growth.
7.2.2 Broad Money Multiplier (MM3)
Broad money, which is some of narrow money and time deposits, covers more of the 
institutional category of money. Therefore, the RBI has even lesser control over it 
and knowledge of the multiplier is important. As pointed out earlier, although the 
RBI does not work through the multiplier, an attempt is made in this section to 
demonstrate the effects of institutional parameters on broad money generation by 
estimating a function for the broad multiplier. The single equation restricted ECM is 
presented in Table 7.2.
The result in Table 7.2 clearly shows a long-term relationship between the broad 
money multiplier and the institutional variables of CRR and the deposit rate. The 
signs of the coefficients of these variables are again in accordance with the theory of 
the supply of money. An increase in CRR directly reduces the multiplier. An increase 
in the demand deposit rate would increase term deposits and, reduce public cash 
holding so that banks would be able to supply more deposits and hence increase the 
broad money multiplier. Bond rates have short-term effects. An increase in the bond 
rate leads to substitutions of cash money with bonds as people’s preference for 
holding cash decreases. With a decreasing cash holding ratio of people, the money 
multiplier increases. As noted earlier, it may be recalled that the effect of CBDN is 
drawn from the substitution of the component of narrow money with the time deposit
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component of M3. With more banks, people deposit their money wealth in time 
deposits, which reduces Ml. This means CBDN will have the opposite effect on the 
broad money multiplier as reflected in the results presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Model of broad money multiplier (1972-98)
Model for MM3: where mm3 = log (MM3) and Amm3 = Am3 - AmO
Amm3 = 0.352* - 0.419 mm3 (-1)* - 0.689 CRR (-1)*** + 2.278 D R l(-l)**  - 1.878 ACRR* 
(0.006) (0.113) (0.356) (0.891) (0.585)
+ 0.730 ACGS1*** + 0.010 ACBDN (-1)
(0.421) (0.008)
R-square = 0.63, R-bar-square = 0.51. SE of regression = 0.033, DW statistics = 2.12. LM serial correlation 
CHSQ (1) = 0.821 [0.37]; LM serial correlation CHSQ (2) = 2.061 [0.36] LM serial correlation CHSQ (3) = 7.30 
[0.07]. ARCH (2) CHSQ (2) = 0.87 [0.65]; ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 1.48 [0.69], Functional form RESET CHSQ 
(1) = 0.45 [0.50]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.88 [0.64], Unit root test for the residuals in second order ADF based 
on SBC model selection criterion = - 5.28. Predictive failure test (Chow’s second test) after breaking the sample 
at 1990 CHSQ (8) = 11.48 [0.18]. Test of stability (Chow test) of regression coefficients after breaking the 
sample at 1990 CHSQ (7) = 9.03 [0.25]. *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 
10% level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
Long-run Relationship:
mm3 = intercept - 1.62 CRR*** + 5.437 DR1* 
_______________ (0.905)_______ (1.944)
The above relationship can be applied to determine the effects of changes in the 
base money on the likely change in broad money given other variables. However, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 8, should the RBI decide to work with more than one 
instrument, their effectiveness may be compromised. However, in the absence of any 
stable relationship between output, broad money and price, the relevance of such a 
relationship is limited. Further, broad money is not found to cause inflation. On the 
contrary, inflation significantly explains real broad money growth (see Tables 6.5 & 
6.6, Chapter 6). Therefore, for inflation targeting, broad money based policy may not 
be of any significant value.
7.3 NOMINAL BASE MONEY SUPPLY: FISCAL DOMINANCE
It was argued earlier that the base money supply itself could be endogenous in the 
case of India, particularly in the presence of high fiscal deficits. In his recent
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address76 at the fourth Securities Industry summit, Y. V. Reddy (1999d), Deputy 
Governor of the RBI, commented on the behaviour of base (reserve) money creation 
observing, ‘Consistent with the targeted level of broad money expansion, is a desired 
level of reserve money expansion. The order of the reserve money expansion, 
however, has to be consistent with the likely fiscal and external payments position, 
since the main source of reserve money expansion are net RBI credit to government 
and net foreign exchange assets’ (Reddy 1999d). A critique of this statement would 
indicate the contradiction prevailing in the monetary policy regime of India. Once the 
target for broad money is fixed, why should the base money creation depend on 
anything else? However, since the RBI has another quantity control instrument in the 
form of variable CRR, it can moderate the effects of changes in base money on the 
growth of broad money due to policy responses to different factors such as the fiscal 
deficit, inflation and stabilization of the exchange rate. Therefore, in this context, it is 
important to examine the short and long run base money supply behaviour of the RBI 
and the effect of fiscal deficit in expansion of the monetary base. Policy instruments 
such as CRR and its effectiveness are analyzed in Chapter 8.
Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of sources of base money in India without 
taking into account the non-monetary liabilities77 of the RBI, which should be 
subtracted to match the accounts. Clearly the RBI credit to government has 
dominated the sources of base money supply over the sample period and more 
recently foreign exchange reserves has also become major source of money supply. 
The other sources of base money supply are the RBI credit to commercial sector , 
gross RBI claims on banks and government currency liability to public . Thus, the 
RBI holding of government securities and the net foreign exchange assets form the 
main assets of the RBI. Changes in these assets result in changes in the base money 
stock.
76 Speech at the Fourth Securities Industry Summit, organized by Invest India Pvt. Ltd., at Mumbai, on May 26, 
1999
77 Non-monetary liability is inclusive of appreciation in the value of gold following its revaluation close to 
international market price effective October 17, 1990.
78 Includes credit to both State and Central Governments.
79 Includes investments in bonds/shares of financial institutions, loans to them and holdings of internal bills 
purchased and discounted
80 Includes commercial and cooperative banks and the National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development
81 Includes Government of India one rupee notes issued from July 1940.
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Changes in the RBI assets can take place due to several activities including open 
market operations in government securities and foreign exchange reserves and that is 
what can be considered to constitute the base money supply behaviour of the RBI. 
Some of the actions of the RBI can be reactions to the changes in macroeconomic 
variables such as real exchange rate, interest rates, inflation and output. With 
inflation the real money wealth of the private sector falls and therefore private agents 
may exchange government bonds for money and consequently the RBI holding of 
government securities or the RBI credit to private sector or government may 
increase, thus increasing the base money. Part of this may result in seigniorage.
Figure 7.1 Distribution of the key sources of base money supply in India (1970-98)
□ Net RBI Credit to Government ■ RBI Credit to Commercial Sector □ Net Foreign Exchange Assets of RBI
□ Government Currency Liability to Public ■ Gross Claims on Banks
100%
1998-991970-71 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-961975-76
Source: Based on Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 1998 & 2000, RBI. All values are taken 
in rupees for calculating distribution. Non-monetary liabilities of the RBI are not considered.
However, financing of fiscal deficit and more recently private transfer of foreign 
money can be regarded as key reasons for the changes in sources of base money. 
Financing of fiscal deficit takes different routes in changing the RBI holding of 
government securities, credit to the commercial sector and gross claims on banks. 
When government borrows from the RBI and to the extent the fiscal deficit is
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monetized, base money is directly increased. When government borrows from the 
public and the commercial banks then also base money can increase, but in a 
complex way. For example, heavy government borrowing from the commercial 
banks and other financial institutions reduces credit for the private sector and may 
drive up interest rates. In such situation the commercial banks and other financial 
institutions may resort to borrowing from the RBI to meet their credit obligations and 
consequently base money may increase. In addition, in order to ease pressure on the 
interest rate the RBI may also buy back some of the government securities from the 
commercial banks and other private agents at higher prices and thus increasing the 
base money.
Therefore, the fiscal deficit has a direct as well as an indirect impact in increasing 
base money and its overall effect needs to be estimated because it cannot be 
accounted as an identity.
Private transfers of foreign money by non-resident Indians poses specific problem 
for the RBI in controlling base money as discussed in Chapter 5. Particularly, such 
money impedes the control of the RBI on base money expansion in direct (when 
foreign exchange routes through the RBI) as well as indirect (when it routes through 
commercial banks) ways.
Two questions are addressed in the following paragraphs. First, how robust is the 
fiscal deficit as a source of base money expansion? Second, how far the variation in 
the base money stock represents reaction and passive accommodation to the changes 
in output, exchange rate, inflation and interest rate? The fiscal deficit is used as the 
key variable to identify the supply functions for base money in an error correction 
specification to allow analysis of both the short and long run effects. Permanent real 
income (YP), as defined in Chapter 4, and current real income (Y) are used as 
alternative proxies for real activity. Thus, equations (7.12) and (7.13) present two 
alternative specifications of base money supply. Estimation of base money supply 
behaviour in alternative ways will allow examination of the robustness of fiscal 
deficit as the cause of base money expansion.
Altemative-I uses the scale variables of output (or permanent income) and fiscal 
deficit and price variables like the real exchange rate and interest rate, to which the 
RBI is expected to react. The second alternative uses a quantity variable like foreign 
exchange reserves and fiscal deficit along with another scale variable.
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Alternative - 1
mO = f  (scale variable, fiscaldeficit, pricelevel, (7.12)
real exchangerarte, int erest rate)
Alternative -  II
mO = /(scale  var iable, fiscaldeficit, pricelevel, foreign exchange reserves) (7.13)
Price index is included in both alternatives, because modeling is done with 
nominal base money stock without imposing the homogeneity assumption (see 
Chapter 6 on the fragility of this assumption).
As explained in Chapter 4, the combined gap between total outlay and total 
current revenue of state and central government and public sector undertakings, 
taken as a fraction of gross domestic product (CGAPZ) proxy fiscal deficit in this 
study and wholesale price index (P) proxy the price level. The real exchange rate 
(REER) is a constructed variable with trade weights of five major trading partners of 
India such that an increase indicates appreciation (see Appendix AA of the thesis for 
more details on constructed data). Yield on 1-5 year central government securities 
(CGS1) proxy interest rate. The quantity of foreign exchange reserve (FERU) is 
taken in US Dollars. As usual, all variables taken in logs are expressed in small 
letters and a A prefix indicates the variable is taken in first difference.
Examination of the ADF based unit root test of time series indicates that the 
variables of mO, reer, CGS1, p , y , fern and CGAPZ are all integrated of order 
one and yp is also integrated of order one when trend is included in the ADF test 
(details of the test results are provided in Annexure 7.2 of this chapter). Therefore, as 
followed in the previous two chapters, a cointegration-based analysis of the long­
term relationship is considered preferable. Considering key variables are trended, the 
cointegration is tested in a VECM specification with restricted trend and unrestricted 
intercept, as explained in Annexure 5.3, Chapter 5 and Appendix AB of this thesis.
The structural design of the cointegrating vectors allows testing the significance 
of the trend term in final specification of the long run relationship. The error term 
obtained from the long-run relationship represents the disequilibrium behaviour. The 
short-term dynamics of base money supply is modeled in the second step using error 
from the long-term relationship and first difference of other variables. The rest of this
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section is organized as follows. The base money supply behaviour based on fiscal 
deficit, the real exchange rate and the interest rate (alternative model-I) is first 
examined in section 7.3.1 and that based on fiscal deficit and foreign exchange 
reserves (alternative model-II) in section 7.3.2. As prefaced in Chapter 4, the long­
term effect of fiscal deficit on economic growth will be analyzed in section 7.3.3 and 
finally policy implications and concluding remarks are presented in section7.4.
7.3.1 Base Money Supply Behaviour: Alternative Model-I
Considering that key variables are trended, the cointegration is tested with restricted 
trend and unrestricted intercept and the results presented in Annexure 7.3 and 
summarized in Table 7.3. The structural design of the cointegrating vectors allows 
deletion of the trend term from the final specification of the long run relationship 
(see Annexure 7.4 for details) in both cases with Y and YP. This is an important 
result, which is possibly obtained due to the inclusion of fiscal deficit and real 
exchange ratein the money function. It may be recalled from the results and 
discussion in Chapter 6 that trend was a significant variable in the long-run 
relationship of base money which appears to have been capturing the effects of 
supply variables like fiscal deficit.
The estimated long-term relationship between base money, price, output, 
exchange rate and fiscal deficit is given below in Table 7.3 in two versions, one with 
real output and the other with real permanent income. The deviations from the long- 
run relationships are captured by ERMOA and ERMOB for model with Y and YP, 
respectively. The asymptotic standard errors of the long-term coefficients are given 
in parenthesis.
Table 7.3 Selected long run equations for estimating altemative-I ECMs for supply
of nominal base money M O _________ __________________________
rnO= 8.42 CGAPZ*+ 1.38 y * - 0.45 reer * -  1.53 CGS1* + 0.649 p * + ERSMOA . . .
(0.809) (0.156) (0.102) (0.441) (0.0695)
rn0 = 9.50 CGAPZ*+ 1.308 yp * - 0.55 reer * -  1.72 CGSl* + 0.608 P * + ERSM0B ^  
(0.860) (0.178) (0.115) (0.495) (0.076)
Note: See Annexure 7.4 of this chapter for the structural design o f the cointegrating vector. Values in 
parenthesis () are asymptotic standard errors. *significant at 1% level, ^sign ificant at 5% level and 
***significant at 10% level
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All the variables in the model are significant at the one percent level. The 
coefficient on the price term is significantly below one, which shows that the supply 
for real base money falls with inflation and the RBI does not fully accommodate 
inflation in the long-term. However, the sign of coefficients on other variables do not 
suggest that long-term supply of base money is a result of reaction to changes in 
output or real exchange rate or interest rate. In the long run, supply of base money 
increases with increasing output level or permanent income, increasing fiscal deficit, 
and an increase in the price of government securities, while the monetary authorities 
tend to accommodate part of currency appreciation. This shows a passive money 
supply.
However, the coefficient on the output term in equations (7.14) and (7.15) may be 
argued to represent the actual elasticity of base money demand with respect to real 
activity. This can be used to determine the demand for money due to real activities. If 
this hypothesis is accepted, the elasticity of broad money M3 can be calculated after 
adding the expected growth in broad money multiplier to the income elasticity of 
base money, which is 1.38. However, since the broad money multiplier is not 
constant, it is harder to target broad money. The average growth (in fraction) in 
broad money multiplier during the sample period has been about 0.02 with standard 
deviation of 0.046 and coefficient of variation of 2.44. Adding 0.02 to 1.38, the 
income elasticity of broad money is obtained as 1.40, which is less than 1.58, the 
value considered by the RBI (see discussion in Chapter 6). But, in view of the high 
coefficient of variation in multiplier, this too may not be reliable.
In the case of narrow money also, the average growth (in fractions) of narrow 
money multiplier during the full sample period has been -0.01 with standard 
deviation of 0.057 and coefficient of variation of about 7, which is much higher. 
Thus targeting any of the broader aggregates require precise forecasting about the 
multiplier growth. However, it can be argued in this context, based on the estimation 
results of the previous section that the narrow money multiplier (mml) being more 
precisely estimated, qualifies Ml as a better aggregate for targeting compared to 
broader aggregate. Further, for the period beyond 1976, the narrow money multiplier 
exhibits mean reversion as against the broad money multiplier, which remains non­
stationary (see Chapter 6).
Coming back to the other variables in equations (7.14) and (7.15), the negative 
signs of bond and real exchange rate suggest the RBI’s counter measures against
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inflationary expectations rather that reaction to changes in interest and real exchange 
rates. A high nominal interest rate may represent inflationary expectations, which 
also has a tendency to appreciate the real exchange rate. Therefore, in order to 
counter the expected inflation base money growth is reduced. It may also be noted 
that the effects of fiscal deficit and the price of government securities have an 
institutional relationship. With a high fiscal deficit the government resorts to heavy 
borrowing from the commercial banks resulting in a loss of liquidity for directed 
credit and possibly an increase in lending rates to the private sector. The government 
may impose its security on the banks at a high price. Therefore, the RBI might be 
helping banks by buying back government securities at a high price. With most 
commercial banks in the public sector and the RBI under the influence of 
government, such possibilities also exist.
The negative sign of the exchange rate also implies that in long-run there is no 
currency substitution. Rather, it is the need for meeting the imports bill that 
determines the money demand in exchange of foreign currency, which the RBI keeps 
accommodating allowing a controlled depreciation of currency.
The effect of fiscal deficit on the long-run growth of base money is quite high. 
Considering equation 7.15 (Table 7.3), at 10 percent level of fiscal deficit, each 
percentage point increase leads to about 0.95 percent growth of base money. This 
growth may be either due to direct accommodation or indirect operations of the 
central bank when it tries to create money under the fear of an interest rate rise in the 
face of heavy government borrowing.
The short-run dynamics of the base money supply corresponding to both the error 
terms discussed above are presented in Table 7.4 as models SMOA and SMOB 
corresponding to the two error terms of ERSMOA and ERSMOB, respectively, in 
Table 7.3. The error terms in both models, SMOA and SMOB are significant with 
high negative value, indicating quick adjustments for long-term deviations.
The sign and size of coefficients of all variables are similar in both models but 
the explanatory power of model SMOB is superior to model SMOA and the SMOB 
model encompasses SMOA in a non-nested test. Model SMOB has a high R-bar 
square of 0.84, with acceptable statistical properties. There was no structural break in 
the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test. Thus, permanent income appears to be a 
better scale variable in explaining the supply of base money.
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Table 7.4 Models of nominal base money supply: altemative-I (1972-98)
D e p en d e n t V a riab le AmO AmO
M o d e l n u m b er SMOA S M 0B
IN T E R C E P T -19.91  (2 .639 )* -1 7 .3 3 4 (1 .9 4 0 )*
E RSM O A  (-1) -1 .5 7 9  (0 .208 )*
ER SM O B  (-1) -1 .5 0 9  (0 .1 6 8 4 )*
AmO (-1) 0 .2 5 4 7  (0 .12 1 5 )* * 0 .1 2 7  (0 .1 0 3 )
Ay 0 .9 6 6  (0 .2606)*
Ayp 2 .2 4 2  (0 .4 2 0 )*
Ayp  (-1) 1.415 (0 .3 7 4 )*
Ap 0 .8 6 9 7  (0 .1 8 5 7 )* 0 .851  (0 .1 6 2 )*
A C G S l -2 .0 6 8  (0 .388 )* -1 .8 9 0  (0 .3 2 9 )*
A CG S1 (-1 ) 0 .7 9 3  (0 .408 )*** 1.101 (0 .3 5 8 )*
A C G A P Z 3 .5 3 2  (0 .747)* 4 .0 2 7  (0 .6 4 9 )*
A C G A P Z  (-1 ) -3 .931  (1 .127 )* -3 .9 4 6 (1 .0 0 1 )*
A re e r  (-1) 0 .4 0 8 9  (0 .143 )** 0 .4 1 7  (0 .1 2 4 )*
R -S q u are 0 .86 0 .9 0 3
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .78 0 .843
S .E  o f  R e g re ss io n 0 .0 2 9 0 .0 2 4
Diagnostic Tests
D W -sta tis tic s 2 .09 1.90
L M  (3 ) se ria l co rre la tio n 1.92 [0.59] 2 .65  [0 .45]
A R C H  (3) te s t 2 .02  [0.57] 1.96 [0 .58]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 1.12 [0.29] 1.30 [0 .25]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 1.99 [0.37] 1.19 [0 .55]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q  (6) 4 .1 4  [0.66] 2 .7 9  [0 .83]
S ta b ility  te s t C H S Q  (10 ) 3 .84  [0.95]
S tab ility  tes t C H S Q  (11 ) 4 .1 0  [0 .97]
Residual Unit root test
T es t s ta tis tic s  (D F ) -5 .12 -4 .7 0
Notes: Predictive failure test is conducted by breaking the sample at 1992; the stability test is
conducted by breaking the sample at nearest past as permitted by the number of regressors in the 
equation. Unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an 
unit root test with second order ADF; *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and 
***significant at 10% level; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets 
[] are p-values.
The coefficient of the inflation term Ap  is positive but not significantly different 
from one, which means that in the short-run the RBI almost fully accommodates the 
changes in prices. On the other hand, the coefficient of lagged exchange rate growth 
is positive, which means that in the short run the RBI has a tendency to control 
money in the face of currency depreciation although in the long-term it allows the
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currency to depreciate. This is the only clear-cut reaction in the short-run base money 
supply. This also means that in the short run the central bank buys foreign currency 
whenever the domestic currency appreciates in order to boost foreign exchange 
reserves. The instantaneous effect of increase in the fiscal deficit is significantly 
positive, which propagates in a cyclical pattern and ultimately increases the base 
money supply permanently in the long run. In the case of interest rate it can be 
argued that an increase in the interest rate indicates inflationary expectations, which 
prompts money supply to instantaneously contract.
From the foregoing discussion it is difficult to forcefully conclude that base 
money growth is a result of reactions to changes in goal variables rather than 
accommodation of the changes. On the other hand, fiscal dominance is more clearly 
demonstrated. Whether, fiscal dominance is robust to change in the specification of 
the base money supply function is examined in the following subsection.
7.4.2 Base Money Supply Behaviour: Alternative Model-II
In light of the observations of Reddy (1999d) mentioned earlier, the base money 
supply can be examined by estimating base money using those variables, which are 
linked to the sources of base money supply, particularly the fiscal deficit and foreign 
exchange reserves. The quantity of foreign exchange reserve (FERU) is taken in US 
Dollars. FERU is expressed in log, and is integrated of order one, while its first 
difference is stationary. All other variables are explained earlier. The modeling 
technique adopted is the same as above. Test of cointegration and the design of 
cointegrating vector are presented in Annexure 7.3 and 7.4.
The long run relationship is obtained from a VECM specification of order one, 
while the short-run model in error correction specification is obtained in the second 
step. The trend and price terms are not retained in the vector considering the result of 
LR test of over identifying restrictions (see Annexure 7.4, model SMOC). The null 
hypothesis of zero coefficients of trend and price terms jointly is accepted at 4.9 
percent significance level in view of the fact that LR test has a tendency to over­
reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, an almost identical vector is obtained when the 
test is carried out with unrestricted intercept and no trend. Therefore, a vector with 
joint restriction on price and trend is accepted. The corresponding long run 
relationship is presented in equation (7.16) while the error correction model is 
presented in Table 7.5.
230
mO =  9.80 CGAPZ* + 2.42 yp *  +  0.102 fern * - 0.00 p -  0.00 T +ERSM0C 
(1.570) (0.111) (0.032)
Note: See Annexure 7.4 of this chapter for the structural design of the cointegrating vector. Values in 
parenthesis () are asymptotic standard errors. *significant at 1% level, ^^significant at 5% level and 
***significant at 10% level
It can be noted from equations (7.14), and (7.15) in Table 7.3 and equation (7.16) 
that the long-term coefficient of fiscal deficit is almost same across models. This 
clearly brings out a robust long-term influence of fiscal deficit on the process of 
money creation. The average growth rate of base money for the sample period has 
been about 14.2 percent, which appears to be consistent with the 4.6 percent growth 
rate of permanent income, the 12 percent growth rate of foreign exchange reserves 
and the average annual 0.18 percentage point change in the fiscal deficit as a share 
(in fraction) of GDP.
The full-sample-period error corrected estimation of base money supply is 
presented in model SM0C (Table 7.5), where equation (7.16) has been used to obtain 
the error correction term ERCM0C. The signs of the variables are all in line with the 
idea of reserve creation by the RBI. If the foreign reserve is more, the RBI finds it 
convenient to increase reserve money, while accommodating increases in the fiscal 
deficit by holding government securities. It is important to discuss how this model 
and particularly the coefficients of the foreign reserve and fiscal deficit perform over 
time.
It can be noticed that model SMOG fails in a predictive failure test at 1992, which 
is considered a benchmark year for testing the predictive failure in this study because 
it represents the year when financial reforms began to take shape. SM0C fails in 
predictive failure test for most periods before 1993. However, the coefficients are 
stable (see Chows second test of stability). The predictive failure occurs because of 
lesser ‘in sample predictive error’ for the period prior to 1993. Therefore, estimations 
for the truncated periods, 1971-90, 1971-92 and 1971-93 are also presented, while 
keeping the same long-run relationship.
Important conclusions can now be drawn related to the role of fiscal deficit and 
foreign exchange reserves as sources of money supply. With the same variables in 
the models, the R-square of model SM0C3 is 0.76 compared with 0.58 in model 
SM0C, which includes the post reform period. The coefficients of ACGAPZ and
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error correction term ERSMOC have decreased over time. Thus, the short-run 
response to the fiscal deficit is decreasing following gradual abolition of automatic 
monetization and it can be argued that fiscal dominance is beginning to reduce.
Table 7.5 Models of nominal base money supply: alternative -II (1971-98)
Dependent Variable AmO AmO AmO AmO
Model Number SM0C SM0C1 SM0C2 SM0C3
Regressor 4(1971-98) 1971-93 (1971-92) 1971-90
-11.81* -12.80* -15.25* -19.85*
(2.478) (3.22) (3.033) (3.46)
INTERCEPT
ERSMOC (-1)
Ayp
Ap
Aferu
ACGAPZ
R-Square 
R-Bar-Square 
S.E of Regression 
Diagnostic Tests 
DW-statistics 
LM (3) serial correlation 
ARCH (3) test 
Functional Form CHSQ (1) 
Normality CHSQ (2) 
Predictive failure CHSQ (2) 
Predictive failure CHSQ (5) 
Predictive failure CHSQ (6) 
Predictive failure CHSQ (8) 
Stability test CHSQ (6) 
Residual Unit root test 
Test statistics (DF)________
-0.446* -0.48*
(0.093) (0.121)
3.295* 3.396*
(0.779) (0.850)
0.541** 0.609*
(0.245) (0.242)
0.157* 0.166*
(0.040) (0.045)
1.800*** 2.596**
(0.934) (1.093)
0.58 0.60
0.48 0.48
0.044 0.044
2.38 2.00
3.05 [0.38] 6.37 [0.10]
0.23 [0.97] 0.61 [0.89]
0.68 [0.41] 0.74 [0.39]
I. 28 [0.53] 
0.60 [0.74] 
4.66 [0.46]
II . 61 [0.07] 
18.83 [0.02] 
8.56 [0.20]
3.11 [0.21]
-6.08 -5.26
-0.576* -0.750*
(0.114) (0.130)
3.181* 3.29*
(0.758) (0.704)
0.612* 0.731*
(0.214) (0.203)
0.134* 0.121*
(0.042) (0.040)
2.677** 3.830*
(0.970) (1.067)
0.68 0.76
0.58 0.67
0.04 0.036
2.33 2.30
7.09 [0.07] 4.47 [0.22]
1.11 [0.77] 4.62 [0.20]
0.57 [0.45] 0.03 [0.87]
0.71 [0.70] 0.01 [1.00]
-5.65 -5.37
Notes: Predictive failure test and parameter stability tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 
various points; unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria 
in an unit root test with third order ADF. The error correction is obtained from equation 7.16. 
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values.
The coefficient of Aferu has increased over time whereas coefficients of all other 
variables have decreased. This is understandable, as India’s foreign exchange 
reserves including gold, which stood at just under a billion US dollars in 1970 and 
just under six billion dollars in 1990, increased to more than 33 billion dollars by the 
end of 1999. This is a more comfortable situation from the point of view of meeting
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balance of payments obligations and providing psychological strength for the 
domestic currency, but at the same time throws up a challenging situation for 
monetary control, particularly when a large proportion of the foreign reserves is due 
to private transfers, which increased almost six fold between 1990 and 1999. This 
may be the reason behind predictive failure of this model.
The third observation is about the speed of adjustment, which has slowed. This 
emphasizes lower concerns for the long-term role of a stock variable like foreign 
reserves compared to the short-term concerns. The same is not true in the case of 
alternative model-I of determining base money stock with price variables like the 
interest rate and exchange rate, in which case the adjustments for deviations from 
long-run equilibrium take place quickly.
The above observations mean that considerations in creating base money are 
changing. While there is pressure from foreign exchange flows in the short-run, the 
long-term concerns are still dominated from fiscal deficit and other variables such as 
exchange and interest rates as reflected in more stable and robust models of base 
money supply such as SMOA and SMOB presented in Table 7.4. Models SMOA and 
SMOB have much better diagnostic and explanatory properties than the models in 
Table 7.5.
7.4.3 Long-term Effect of Fiscal Deficit on Economic Growth
The long-term effect of the fiscal deficit on economic growth can be calculated 
through its impact on inflation and investment. Money creation due to the fiscal 
deficit may add to an increase in inflation beyond the 5.5 percent level, which 
produces a negative effect on economic growth. On the other hand the fiscal deficit 
helps in motivating private investment. These two effects can be calculated to 
estimate the net effect of fiscal deficit at its various levels.
According to equation 7.15, the long-term elasticity of base money with respect 
to fiscal deficit (at a deficit of 10 percent) is 0.95. Considering the recent period of 
the 1990s, the average growth of the narrow money multiplier was 0.015. Therefore, 
the long-term elasticity of narrow money (at a fiscal deficit of 10 percent) will be 
0.965. This means one percentage point of GDP increase in fiscal deficit above the 
10 percent level adds to narrow money growth by 0.965 percent.
From inflation model INFB1, Table 5.14, Chapter 5, the long run effect on 
inflation of a one-percentage point increase in narrow money growth can be
233
calculated as approximately 0.427 percentage points. The non-linear inflation model 
YPCC3, Table 4.4, Chapter 4 gives a negative effect of one percentage point increase 
in inflation above 5.5 percent as 0.16 percentage points. Thus the effect of one 
percentage point of GDP increase in fiscal deficit from the 10 percent level can be 
traced to economic growth through the inflation route as -0.066 percentage points 
(0.965*0.427*(-0.16) = -0.066). This is a substantial effect considering the fact that 
this is a perpetual effect on per capita income growth.
It may be recalled from Chapter 4 that in the long run the fiscal deficit has a 
positive effect on private sector investment. Each percentage point increase in the 
fiscal deficit contributed about a 0.72 percentage point increase in private 
investment. In the long run, each percentage point of private investment contributed 
to economic growth by about 0.06 percentage points although this effect is not 
significant. However, considering the fact that these coefficients are large, it may be 
pragmatic to account for their joint effect, which works out to be 0.043. Thus the 
total effect of the fiscal deficit on economic growth is still negative equal to -0.021 
percentage points.
At a fiscal deficit of 6.5 percent, one percentage point GDP increase in fiscal 
deficit will have a negative effect on economic growth through inflation equal to 
0.043 (=0.65*(0.066)), which evens out the positive effect of one percentage point 
GDP increase in fiscal deficit through investment. Therefore, it can be safely argued 
that the combined deficit should not increase beyond 6.5 percent of GDP, 
particularly if the inflation level is above the 5.5 percent. However, this does not 
mean the fiscal deficit can take any value if inflation is below the 5.5 percent level. 
Joshi (1998) and Joshi and Little (1996) calculate sustainable non-financial 
combined fiscal deficit of Center and State Governments as 7 percent with primary 
deficit being 1 percent of GDP. However, fiscal deficit of even 7 percent of GDP is 
argued to be high if the objective is to bring real interest rate substantially down to 
encourage private investment.
The above results have important implications in terms of efficacy of monetary 
policy. The fiscal dominance in money creation is clear. Inflation control requires a 
lower growth rate for narrow money and at the same time financial deepening 
requires a high multiplier. Both together require that the base money growth must be 
controlled, which seems a daunting task in the presence of a high fiscal deficit as 
discussed in Chapter 1. In a similar context of political economy, Sargent and
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Wallace (1981) appear to suggest that if an irresponsible fiscal authority embarks 
upon a course of action that implies a continuous deficit net of interest, the monetary 
authority cannot control inflation by its own choice of base money creation. This 
message is important in the case where the fiscal authority moves first and has 
commanding power as assumed in their 1981 paper. However, if the monetary 
authority has a mandate to control inflation, it can take an independent course 
compelling the fiscal authority to expand its tax base or depart from the planned 
deficit or to face a crisis.
7.5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The motivation for this chapter is drawn from the findings of the previous chapter, 
which concluded that the money-output relationship in the demand for money 
specification in India is very loose and any attempt to conduct monetary policy based 
on the paradigm of a stable demand for money is more likely to fail than succeed. 
Due to reasons such as the fiscal deficit, the discretionary supply of money has 
helped in loosening the money-output relationship when the money equation is 
specified as demand for money in Chapter 6. In this chapter, the supply behaviour of 
all three monetary aggregates has been analyzed from the perspective of the 
possibility of control on their growth. All three aggregates appear to be endogenous 
to macroeconomic variables. The models of money multipliers are well specified and 
it is possible to control money growth through policy instruments and institutional 
developments.
However, the critical problem arises due to endogeniety of base money growth. 
When the base money is specified like a supply equation, by including the fiscal 
deficit as an explanatory variable, it demonstrates better stability and predictive 
power. Permanent income obtained by error learning hypothesis comes out to be a 
better scale variable for explaining the supply behaviour of base money. The money 
supply increases with fiscal deficit and income. The base money supply equation 
appears to be a passive behaviour and there is less evidence of short run (or long run) 
reaction to output growth and inflation. There is some evidence of a short-run 
reaction to exchange rate change, but in the long run currency depreciation is also 
accommodated. Therefore, it is important to examine the reaction functions of the 
direct instruments of the RBI such as CRR and indirect instruments such as interest
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rates. Chapter 8 examines the RBI’s policy stances with respect to such instruments, 
where consequences of passive supply of base money on the effectiveness of the 
policy stances with respect to instruments is also examined.
There is strong evidence of a long-term fiscal dominance in base money creation. 
This erodes the independence of monetary policy and hence limits its role in 
controlling inflation in India. However, there is some indication of reduction in fiscal 
dominance during the recent period of the 1990s. Therefore, one of the key 
requirements, mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, of central bank independence for the 
success of a strict inflation targeting based monetary regime as practiced in 
developed countries, is not fully met in the case of India. However, this does not 
mean the RBI should not adopt inflation as the main goal of monetary policy. In fact 
both the RBI and the Central and State Governments of India should jointly commit 
to controlling inflation, as the long run effect of fiscal deficit is detrimental to 
economic growth, which works through the inflation channel.
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Annexure 7.1 Summary definition of data used in Chapter 7
Symbol Variable description and unit of measurement
BDR
CBDN
CC
CGAPZ
CGS1
CIB
CMR
CRR
CUP
DD
DR1
FERU
GDP
MO
Ml
M3
ODR
P
REER
TD
Y
YP
Bankers’Deposits with RBI (rupees million).
Bank density: population (thousands) per branch of commercial bank 
Currency in Circulation (rupees million).
Fiscal Deficit: Combined GAP between Total Outlay and Current Revenue 
(CTO-CCR) of both Central and State Governments as fraction of gross 
domestic product.
Bond rate: Annual yield on 1-5 Year government of India (GOI) Securities, 
taken in fraction. Middle point has been taken for the data given in range.
Cash on Hand with Banks (rupees million).
Overnight annual call money rate of commercial banks, taken in fraction 
Cash Reserve Ratio: derived according to the RBI notifications as fraction of 
time plus demand deposits. Average of the notified values prevailing during 
the year.
Currency with the Public (rupees million).
Demand Deposits with Banks (rupees million).
1-3 Year commercial banks annual deposit rates taken in fraction.
Gross international reserves (includes gold) measured in current US$ millions. 
GDP at market prices at current prices (rupees million)
Base (Reserve) Money (rupees million). MO = CUP+CIB + BDR + ODR 
Narrow money (rupees million). MO = CUP+CIB + BDR + ODR+DD 
Broad Money (rupees million). M3 = CUP + DD + TD + ODR 
Other Deposits with RBI (rupees million)
Wholesale price index (WPI) of all commodities converted to base 1993-94 
Real Effective Exchange rate of G5 Countries defined such that an increase 
indicate appreciation
Time Deposits with Banks (rupees million).
Gross domestic product at constant market prices (rupees millions)
Permanent real income calculated according to the error-learning hypothesis 
discussed in Ladler (1989:88) with geometric wt for last 10 years and weight of 
0.5 for current year’s real GDP at factor cost.
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Annexure 7.2: Unit root tests for the variables used in Chapter 7 in levels and first 
__________ differences (1970-98)__________________________________________
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
an intercept but not a trend.______________ an intercept and a linear trend
Variable structure 95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
CBDN DF - 2.980 -6.68 -31.01 -32.26 - 3.594 -2.01 -30.35 -32.24
ADF (1) -3.58 -31.67 -33.56 -1.92 -31.35 -33.07
ACBDN DF - 2.985 -3.13 -34.06 -35.28 - 3.603 -5.02 -29.70 -31.53
ADF (1) -2.60 -34.42 -36.25 -4.50 -29.86 -32.30
CGAPZ DF - 2.980 -1.47 81.63 80.37 - 3.594 -1.80 81.27 79.38
ADF (1) -1.18 81.71 79.82 -1.21 80.91 78.40
ACGAPZ DF - 2.985 -7.24 80.43 79.21 - 3.603 -7.47 80.42 78.59
ADF (1) -3.95 79.43 77.61 -4.23 79.46 77.02
CGS1 DF - 2.980 -1.23 69.22 67.96 - 3.594 -1.48 68.69 66.81
ADF (1) -1.41 68.94 67.05 -2.00 69.09 66.58
ADF (2) -1.15 68.60 66.09 -1.48 68.25 65.10
ACGS1 DF - 2.985 -3.98 65.66 64.45 - 3.603 -3.92 64.75 62.92
ADF (1) -3.95 65.61 63.78 -3.91 64.77 62.33
CRR DF - 2.980 -1.68 77.54 76.29 - 3.594 -0.74 76.54 74.66
ADF (1) -1.68 77.03 75.14 -1.37 76.44 73.93
ACRR DF - 2.985 -4.41 76.10 74.88 - 3.603 -4.26 75.23 73.40
ADF (1) -3.74 75.37 73.54 -3.66 74.57 72.13
CMR DF - 2.980 -3.67 52.64 51.38 - 3.594 -3.52 51.75 49.86
ADF (1) -3.84 52.52 50.63 -3.84 52.13 49.62
DR1 DF - 2.980 -1.71 85.73 84.48 - 3.594 -2.99 87.77 85.89
ADF (1) -1.75 84.88 82.99 -4.74 91.64 89.12
ADF (2) -1.16 87.12 84.60 -3.18 90.67 87.53
ADR1 DF - 2.985 -4.55 80.47 79.25 - 3.603 -4.55 79.78 77.95
ADF (1) -5.72 83.52 81.70 -5.70 82.91 80.47
ADF (2) -4.71 83.93 81.49 -4.61 83.22 80.18
fe rn DF - 2.980 -1.67 -1.24 -2.50 - 3.594 -1.90 -1.51 -3.39
ADF (1) -1.75 -0.84 -2.72 -2.42 -0.23 -2.74
ADF (2) -1.75 -1.70 -4.22 -2.68 -0.43 -3.58
Aferu DF - 2.985 -3.52 -1.93 -3.15 - 3.603 -3.49 -2.81 -4.63
ADF (1) -2.60 -2.88 -4.71 -2.59 -3.77 -6.21
mO DF - 2.980 -0.17 33.69 32.44 - 3.594 -2.95 36.86 34.97
ADF (1) -0.15 32.71 30.82 -3.41 37.20 34.68
AmO DF - 2.985 -4.93 32.06 30.84 - 3.603 -4.83 31.08 29.25
ADF (1) -4.17 31.64 29.81 -4.09 30.68 28.24
mm1 DF - 2.980 -2.00 36.85 35.60 - 3.594 -1.29 35.85 33.97
ADF (1) -2.06 36.24 34.35 -1.55 35.36 32.84
Amm1 DF - 2.985 -4.18 33.35 32.13 - 3.603 -4.36 33.07 31.24
ADF (1) -3.84 32.95 31.12 -4.17 33.08 30.64
mm3 DF - 2.980 -1.07 41.13 39.87 - 3.594 -2.53 42.74 40.86
ADF (1) -0.98 40.17 38.28 -2.56 42.05 39.53
Amm3 DF - 2.985 -5.20 38.87 37.65 - 3.603 -5.09 37.88 36.05
ADF (1) -3.95 38.12 36.29 -3.86 37.14 34.70
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The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
an intercept but not a trend.______________an intercept and a linear trend
Variable i_aystructure 95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
95%
critical
value
Statistic AIC SBC
P DF -2.980 -1.05 38.18 36.92 -3.594 -3.20 41.70 39.82
ADF (1) -0.92 37.90 36.01 -4.93 46.33 43.82
ADF (2) -0.93 38.80 36.28 -4.28 45.75 42.61
AP DF -2.985 -4.10 38.41 37.19 -3.603 -3.97 37.41 35.58
ADF (1) -4.43 39.00 37.17 -4.29 38.01 35.57
ADF (2) -3.57 38.16 35.73 -3.47 37.18 34.14
re e r DF -2.980 0.09 29.29 28.03 -3.594 -1.90 30.44 28.56
ADF (1) 0.00 28.40 26.52 -2.02 29.85 27.34
A  re e r DF -2.985 -4.44 28.14 26.92 -3.603 -4.37 27.21 25.39
ADF (1) -2.91 27.27 25.44 -2.84 26.31 23.87
y DF -2.980 1.24 53.29 52.04 -3.594 -2.13 54.93 53.05
ADF (1) 1.58 52.98 51.09 -1.85 54.22 51.71
ADF (2) 1.67 52.21 49.69 -1.71 53.34 50.19
Ay DF -2.985 -5.70 50.48 49.26 -3.603 -6.10 50.85 49.02
ADF (1) -3.83 49.48 47.65 -4.35 50.18 47.74
yp DF -2.980 3.31 71.96 70.70 -3.594 -1.03 71.99 70.11
ADF (1) 2.34 71.01 69.12 -1.04 71.06 68.54
Ayp DF -2.985 -3.46 66.12 64.90 -3.603 -4.52 68.09 66.26
ADF (1) -2.69 65.22 63.40 -3.92 67.61 65.17
N o te : ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. SBC = Schwarz
Bayesian Criterion of model selection. The order of ADF test is chosen as 2 in all the cases. Number 
of observations varies from 25 to 26.
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Annexure 7.3: Test results for cointegration between variables in alternative
functions of nominal base money supply (reference tables: 7.3 to 7.5) 
__________(1971-98)____________________________________________________
_________ Maximum Eigenvalue Test______________________________ Trace Test_________ ________ No. of
Hypothesis________ Statistic Critical values_______Hypothesis________ . . Critical values___ vectors
Null Alternative 95% 90% Null Alternative 3 'SIC 95% 90% Selected
Model SMOA: Variables set: mO, y, p, reer, CGAPZ, CGS1, Trend. 
Eigenvalues: 0.86607, 0.60302, 0.54063, 0.49769, 0.39428, 0.30512, 0
r = 0 r = 1 56.2913 43.61 40.76 r = 0 r = 1 147.45 115.85 110.60 1
r<= 1 r = 2 25.8685 37.86 35.04 r<= 1 r<= 2 91.16 87.17 82.88
r<= 2 r = 3 21.7809 31.79 29.13 r<= 2 r<= 3 65.29 63.00 59.16
Model Ref. SM0B: Variables: mO, yp, p, reer, CGAPZ, CGS1, Trend.
Eigenvalues: 0.86954, 0.65265, 0.5365, 0.46755, 0.425, 0.3395, 0
r = 0 r = 1 57.01 43.61 40.76 r = 0 r = 1 152.90 115.85 110.60 1
r<= 1 r = 2 29.61 37.86 35.04 r<= 1 r<= 2 95.89 87.17 82.88
r<= 2 r = 3 21.53 31.79 29.13 r<= 2 r<= 3 66.29 63.00 59.16
Model Ref. SM0C: Variables: itiO, yp, p, feru, CGAPZ, Trend.
Eigenvalues: 0.78895, 0.6084, 0.50829, 0.4361,0.14266, 0
r = 0 r = 1 43.56 37.86 35.04 r = 0 r = 1 110.04 87.17 82.88 1
r<= 1 r = 2 26.25 31.79 29.13 r<= 1 r<= 2 66.48 63.00 59.16
r<= 2 r = 3 19.88 25.42 23.10 r<= 2 r<= 3 40.23 42.34 39.34
Model Ref. SM0C1: Variables in VAR mO, yp, feru, CGAPZ, Trend. 
Eigenvalues: : 0.67895,0.45095,0.37644,0.1442,0
r = 0 r = 1 31.81 31.79 29.13 r = 0 r = 1 66.19 63.00 59.16
r<= 1 r = 2 16.79 25.42 23.10 r<= 1 r<= 2 34.37 42.34 39.34
r<= 2 r = 3 13.22 19.22 17.18 r<= 2 r<= 3 17.58 25.77 23.08
Note: All tests are done applying likelihood ratio test on the maximum eigenvalue and trace of the 
stochastic matrix in VECM specification with restricted trend and unrestricted intercept. Period: 1971- 
98, Order of VAR = 1.
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Annexure 7.4 Structure of the cointegrating vectors for modeling supply of nominal 
base money (reference Tables 7.3 to 7.5) (1971-98)
Model -  SM0A: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: mO, y, p, reer, CGAPZ, CGS1, Trend, 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1.
Imposed Restriction: a 1 = 1
mO CGAPZ y reer CGS1 P Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -8.259* -1.343* 0.444* 1.516* -0.614* -0.005
Std. Error (NONE) (1.446) (0.307) (0.110) (0.449) (0.272) (0.038)
Imposed Restriction: a l=1; a7=0
mO CGAPZ y reer CGS1 P Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -8.4156* -1.3789* 0.4493* 1.5295* -0.64903* 0.000
Std. Error (NONE) (0.8092) (0.15601) (0.10234) (0.441) (0.0695) (NONE)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 383.51. LR test of additional restriction (a7=0): CHSQ (1) = 
0.01766[0.894], LL subject to over identified restrictions = 383.50
Model -  SMOB: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector mO, yp, p, reer, CGAPZ, CGS1, Trend, 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1.
Imposed Restriction: a 1 = 1_________________________________________________________________________
mO CGAPZ yp reer CGS1 P Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -8 .183* -1.013* 0.519* 1.660* -0 .3 7 0 4 -0 .0 3 7
Std. Error (NONE) (1 .5 7 7 ) (0 .361) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .4 6 7 ) (0 .2 6 8 ) (0 .040)
Imposed Restriction: a 1=1; a7=0
mO CGAPZ yp reer CGS1 P Trend
Vector: a 1.000 -9 .4975* -1 .3077* 0 .55451* 1.7177* -0 .6 0 7 5 1 * 0
Std. Error (NONE) (0 .86 ) (0 .1784) (0 .1 1 5 4 ) (0 .4 9 5 ) (0 .0 7 5 5 ) (*NONE*)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 400.16. LR test of additional restriction (a7=0): CHSQ (1) = 
0.785[0.38], LL subject to over identified restrictions = 399.77
Model -  SMOC: List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: mO, yp, p, feru, CGAPZ, Trend. 
Period: 1971 - 98, Order of VAR = 1, Selected number of vectors =1.
imposed Restriction: a 1=1___________________________________________________________________
Vector: a 
Std. Error
mO
1.000
(NONE)
CGAPZ
-28.85
(21.15)
yp
-7.865
(5.6117)
feru
-0.3030
(0.2434)
P
-2.838
(2.431)
Trend
0.5411
(0.524)
Imposed Restriction: al = l; a5=0; a6=0
Vector: a 1.000 -9.79* -2.4218** -0.1016* 0.000 0.000
Std. Error (NONE) (1.57) (0.111) (0.0316) (NONE) (NONE)
LL subject to exactly identified restrictions = 277.41. LR test of additional restriction (a6=0): CHSQ (1) = 
5.640[0.018], LL subject to over identified restrictions (a6=0) = 274.59. LR test of additional restriction 
(a5=a6=0): CHSQ (2) = 6.051 [0.049], LL subject to over identified restrictions (a5=a6=0) = 274.39
Notes: Values in parenthesis () are asymptotic standard errors. *significant at 1% level, ^^significant 
at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level.
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Chapter 8
Monetary Policy: Reaction 
Function and Policy Effectiveness
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The analyses in the previous chapters form a basis for conducting monetary policy in 
India. The inflation process and the relationship of inflation with economic growth or 
output gap do not support the existence of a robust trade-off. Chapter 5 found a 
lagged output gap had a positive effect on inflation, which indicated the existence of 
an upward sloping short run Phillips curve, but that relationship failed with the 
inclusion of important variables describing the inflation process. However, the robust 
negative relationship between the contemporaneous output gap and inflation 
predominantly supports the view that inflation in India was considerably affected by 
supply shocks. Therefore, growth arising from productivity improvements and 
favourable weather conditions may not be inflationary.
Without any short run trade off between inflation and output, there should be no 
dilemma for the central bank (see Reddy (1999d) for such apprehensions and 
dilemma) in setting priorities. Keeping inflation at a low level should be the primary 
target for monetary policy in India. As many central banks and economists have 
canvassed, it is preferable for there to be only one goal for monetary policy and that 
goal should be inflation stability if not price stability. Regarding the vital question of 
whether the monetary authorities in India could adhere to this single goal, the answer 
emerging from the analysis in the earlier chapters is in the affirmative.
It is observed that the growth of narrow money has contemporaneous as well as 
lagged effects on inflation. It is also seen that base money, which can be used to 
control narrow money is significantly explained by contemporaneous inflation. This 
probably indicates the RBI’s responses to accommodating inflation. However, that
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this accommodation has been significantly less than full in the long run also indicates 
the RBI’s concern regarding inflation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the stated 
objective of the RBI is to help output growth through the adequate creation of credit 
whilst maintaining a reasonable control on inflation.
Whether the RBI has been more concerned with output growth or inflation is an 
empirical question addressed in this chapter by analyzing the policy instruments in 
the hands of the RBI. The analysis is in two parts. First, the policy reaction functions 
have been modeled to see how policy stance decisions respond to the changes in goal 
variables. In the second part, the transmission effects of RBI’s policy stances on goal 
variables have been analyzed using causality tests, impulse responses in VARs, and 
analysis of simple estimated models of relevant variables.
This chapter is organized as follows. In following section 8.2, plausible policy 
rules are estimated. Section 8.3, examines the role played by monetary instruments 
such as the cash reserve ratio (CRR), Central Government Securities (CGS1), and 
call money rate (CMR) on the goal variables during the sample period. Concluding 
remarks are presented in section 8.4.
8.2 ESTIMATION OF POLICY VARIABLES
Modem central banks are concerned with the real interest rate because the 
transmission of monetary policy takes place by affecting the demand side variables 
such as investment and consumption, which depend on the expected real interest rate. 
The central bank meets its objective of controlling the real interest rate by either 
injecting or draining high-powered money through open market operations in the 
financial markets or by announcing their intent. The interest rate procedure of central 
banking does not target any particular money aggregate, but is concerned with 
manipulating the money supply in such a way that the interest rate takes a value that 
the central bank desires and perceives to be optimal for hitting the targets of goal 
variables. Accordingly, researchers have designed and estimated the reaction 
functions of central banks with some interest rate as the functions of desired goal 
outcome or target variables (see discussion on policy rules in Chapter 3).
The main instrument for conducting monetary policy in India has been the cash 
reserve ratio (CRR). Interest rate instruments are also available but unlike the case in 
developed countries they have not been fully market determined, and are therefore
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considered comparatively less effective.8- Following implementation of the financial 
reforms in 1991, and since 1993, the RBI introduced several other interest rate 
instruments, such as 91 days treasury bills, 180 days TB, 365 days TB and repo.
83Efforts are being made to groom interest rates as a monetary policy instrument. 
However, the RBI can also conduct its policies through a quantity control instrument 
like the CRR without changing the base. By increasing the CRR, the RBI is able to 
reduce the multiplier and influence broader aggregates like broad money (M3) and 
narrow money (Ml), which, in turn, affect inflation and output growth, which are the 
stated goal variables of the RBI.
In view of the persistent current account deficit, the response of the exchange rate 
to adjustments in the instruments may also be an important consideration of policy 
stance. Therefore, the real exchange rate has also been included in the models of 
instrument rule. Thus, in this analysis, output growth, inflation and real exchange 
rate change are considered to be the variables of interest.
For the purpose of the policy analysis in this thesis, the central bank’s reaction 
functions with the call money rate (CMR), yield on short-run (1-5 years) 
Government of India’s security (CGS1), and cash reserve ratio (CRR) have been 
estimated in two versions. The first is in the tradition of the Taylor (1993) type rule 
with forward-looking behaviour suggested in a recent paper by Clarida, et al. (1998). 
The second method is a simple backward looking error correction estimation of the 
instrument variable with goal variables as the explanatory variables. The justification 
for such specification follows. It may be noted that the CMR is more about the 
liquidity constraints of commercial banks taking overnight loans from each other. It 
has a signaling effect for central bank policy actions on other instruments like the 
CRR and the stock of reserve money.
8.2.1 Policy Reaction Functions with Smoothing Behaviour
The model suggested by Clarida, et al. (1998) is modified to hypothetically estimate 
the probable monetary policy reaction function for India with respect to different
82 It may be noted that the CRR can be classified as a direct instrument of quantity control, while interest rates 
can be classified as an indirect instrument.
83 As the annual data series for the new interest rate instruments is too short to carry out a detailed analysis, the 
effectiveness of interest rate policy based on the monthly data for the period 1993-99 is examined by Singh and 
Kalirajan (2000), the VAR analysis indicates that the 91 days Treasury Bill rate is beginning to respond as a short 
run instrument.
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instruments of CRR, CGS1 and CMR. The methodology suggested by Clarida, et al. 
(1998) is based on the deviations of inflation, output and other variables from their 
bliss (equilibrium) points. More specifically, it is based on expected deviations of 
actual from potential output, of expected inflation from the target and of the other 
variables of interest from their trend.
As pointed out earlier, in the case of a developing economy like India, policy 
stances are likely to be more concerned with the growth rate of output and so be 
more in reaction to deviations from expected growth rates. Further, due to persistent 
current account deficits, currency depreciation attracts immediate policy concerns. 
Therefore, the policy equation of Clarida, et al. (1998) is modified accordingly. 
Clarida, et al. (1998) consider forecasted inflation between quarters t and t + n at 
alternative horizons (different n ) to capture the concerns for real interest rate. There 
is no series available in India on expected inflation and for annual data current 
inflation is taken as future inflation. However, in line with their assumption, within 
each operating period the central bank sets a target for the nominal policy rate (CRR 
or interest rates) X*, based on the state of the economy. The target is assumed to 
especially depend on expected inflation, output growth and exchange rate change. 
Thus, the target rate of the central bank is written as follows:
X* = X+ a\(E[APt|Q, ] -  Ap*) + a2(E[Ay,p t ] -  Ay*) + a3(E[Az,|Q, ] -  Az*) (8J)
Here X-bar is the long-run equilibrium policy rate (CRR or CGS1 or CMR) taken 
in fractions; E the expectation operator; Q/ the information set available to the 
central bank at the time of setting the policy rate; Ap, the rate of inflation (in 
fractions); y real output; and z is a variable besides inflation and output that is of 
concern to the central bank. The bliss points for inflation, output growth and 
exchange rate change are represented by Ap*, Ay*, and Az*.
As mentioned above, z is the real exchange rate. Variables represented by a 
lower case letter are taken in log and a A before the variable indicates it is taken in 
first difference. Both, output and the real exchange rate are taken in log. Thus, the 
above equation represents the policy stance with respect to the deviation from the 
targets of expected growth, exchange rate change and inflation.
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The central bank is supposed to follow smooth changes in policy rates to avoid 
disruption of the capital market and loss of credibility. In order to capture the 
smoothing factor, the partial adjustment of the policy variable is written as follows:
X ' = ( l - p ) X ;  + p X t_l + v, ( 8.2)
Here, p 6 [0,1] is the degree of interest rate smoothing and vt is a white noise
error. Combining (8.1) and (8.2) and letting ß  = X -a lA p*  -a2Ay* -  a3Az* yields 
the following policy rule.
t ( l - p ) ( ß  + al(E[Ap4Qt ]) + a2(E[Ay{ Q.t ]) + a3(E[Azt ])) + pX , + v t t - 1 / (8.3)
In order to obtain an estimable equation, the unobserved forecast variables can be 
eliminated by writing the policy rule (8.3) in terms of the realized variables as 
follows:
X , = (1 -  p){ß + a\Apt + a  2 Ay, + a3Azt ) + pXt_x + £, (8.4)
Now, £,, is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation, output growth 
and currency appreciation and the exogenous disturbance vt . Thus £, can be 
expressed as
e, = -d -p ){« l(A p , -  E[p, |£2, ]) + a2(Ay, -  £[A y,|ß ,]) + a3(Az, -  £[Az,|Q, ])) + v, 
Under the assumption that £, is orthogonal to the information set of the central 
bank, equation (8.4) can be estimated using the non-linear least square technique.
A number of important inferences can be drawn from the sign and magnitude of 
the parameters a l  and a2 depending upon whether X is the interest rate or the CRR. 
If X is the nominal interest rate, then successful stabilization of output growth and 
inflation require that a l  is greater than one (a l> l)  and a2 is positive. If a l  were less 
than one (with a2 >0), raising the nominal interest rate would not result in the rise in 
the real interest rate required for bringing down output growth. However, in the 
Indian context, there is a negative relationship between contemporaneous inflation 
and growth. Therefore, the values of a l  and a2 would need more careful
246
interpretation, while discussing the results. Additionally, the above specification 
allows recovery of the target values of particular goal variables if the other targets 
are known using the following relationship. With a real interest rate rule, suppose the 
sample average of the real interest rate is taken as the long run equilibrium real 
interest rate RR , then, the target inflation rate can be recovered as 
Ap* = (R R -  ß  + a2Ay* + «3Az*)/(crt -1 ). However, when the authorities do not 
follow the real interest rate rule, the implied target inflation rate can be obtained from 
the straight formula Ap* = (R -  ß  - a2Ay* - a3Az*)/ a \ , where an equilibrium
nominal interest rate R is used. The latter relationship is more plausible in the Indian 
context, where CRR is the main instrument and interest rates may not be fully 
adjusted for the expected inflation.
While estimating equation (8.4), the ex-post realized value of average inflation 
during the year is considered the expected value of inflation. The values of the 
instruments are the average of the policy stances during the year. Similarly, the 
exchange rate is the average value for the year. All the variables are tested for unit 
root. CRR and CGS1 are integrated of order one, while CMR and goal variables are 
stationary. Therefore, the residuals from the estimations are tested for statistical 
consistency. As explained in Chapter 7, the exchange rate is five-country trade 
weighted foreign currency price of domestic currency (see Appendix AA for details). 
An increase in the value of the exchange rate means appreciation of the domestic 
currency. A lagged value of exchange rate change is also included in the estimation 
equation. The estimation results for the three chosen instruments are presented in 
Table 8.1, while the plots of their actual and fitted values are presented in Figures 8.1 
to 8.3. Two important observations can immediately be made from the plots of the 
fits. First, CRR is better explained than the CGS1 and CMR. Second, both CRR and 
CGS1 fit quite well for the post reform period in comparison to CMR.
General observations from the results of Table 8.1 are as follows. From the 
coefficients of p, it is clear the central bank is more concerned with smoothing the 
CGS1 and the CRR than with the CMR. However, the CMR captures the effects of 
inflation and real exchange rates more significantly than CGS1. These reactions in 
the call money market could be due to the policy stances taken by the central bank on
84 This is conditional on the data not containing disinflation episodes. In the Indian context there was only one 
such episode.
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CRR. With regard to the explanatory power of the models, CRR clearly appears to be 
more precisely estimated than the interest rates. As CRR has been a more effective 
tool than interest rates, this is in line with expectations. Regarding the size of the 
coefficient of inflation, a l  in the interest rate equations is less than one in both cases, 
which means the central bank has not been following any kind of real interest rate 
target for the economy. This is not surprising given that the RBI loosely targets broad 
money through the application of quantity control rather than the interest rate. The ß 
coefficient is not at all significant in any of the equations. This means there is no 
strong linkage between the targeted values of the goal variables and the long run 
average values of the instruments.
Table 8.1 Non-linear models of policy instruments with smoothing behaviour
Non-linear Regression Formula:
X =( 1 -p)* [ß+a 1 * Ap +a2* Ay +a3* Areer +a4* Areer (-l)]+p*X (-1)
Dependent V ariab le X Cash reserve ratio A verage yield on 1-5 Average in ter-bank
(CRR) years T reasury Bill call m oney rate
(CG S1) (CM R)
R egressor coeffic ients 1972-98 1972-98 1971-98
P 0.806 (0.057)* 0 .794 (0.102)* 0.343 (0.174)***
ß -0.030 (0.042) -0 .003 (0.059) 0.029 (0.032)
a t 0 .643 (0.281)** 0 .565 (0.405)+ 0.564 (0.249)**
a2 1.031 (0.396)** 0.549 (0.575) 0.218 (0.294)
a3 -0.372 (0.183)*** -0.511 (0.294)*** -0.363 (0.149)**
a4 -0.450 (0.164)* -0.245 (0.224)
R-Square 0.94 0.87 0.42
R-Bar-Square 0.93 0.84 0.32
S.E of R egression 0.01 0.02 0.03
F-statistics F (k -1, n-k) 71.62 [0.00] 27.87 [0.00] 4.12 [0.01]
D ia q n o s tic  T e s ts
LM (1) serial corre lation 0.03 [0.87] 0.60 [0.44] 0.63 [0.43]
LM (3) serial corre lation 2.77 [0.43] 3.58 [0.31] 6.08 [0.11]
ARCH (3) test 1.97 [0.58] 0.44 [0.93] 3.48 [0.32]
Functional Form C H SQ  (1) 0.58 [0.45] 5.37 [0.02] 1.40 [0.24]
Norm ality C H SQ  (2) 0.19 [0.91] 0.77 [0.68] 4.57 [0.10]
R e s id u a l U n it ro o t
Test statistics (DF) -4.40 -4.17 -6.01
Note: unit root test statistics are presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an 
unit root test with second order ADF; ^significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and 
***significant at 10% level, +significant at 20 percent; values in parenthesis () are standard errors and 
values in square brackets [] are p-values. In F-statistics k is number of regressors including intercept 
and n is the number of observations.
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Figure 8.1 Actual and fitted values of CRR (1972-98)
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Figure 8.2 Actual and fitted values of CGS1 (1972-98)
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Figure 8.3 Actual and fitted values of CMR (1971-98)
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Most of these observations are not encouraging, as the data does not demonstrate 
the desired sophistication imbedded in modem central banking in developed 
countries, where financial markets are highly developed allowing for application of 
the interest rate channel of policy transmission all the time. Nevertheless, this does 
not prevent further analysis.
Considering the CRR policy first, all the three goal variables are significant. An 
increase in inflation prompts the CRR to be raised in order to reduce the money 
supply causing the aggregate demand schedule to shift backwards and reduce 
inflation. The results in Table 8.1 also indicate a positive and significant relationship 
between output growth and the CRR. This implies that when output growth is 
expected to fall, the CRR is reduced in order to increase the credit-creation capacity 
of commercial banks.
The coefficient of inflation is 0.64 compared to 1.03 for output growth. This 
means that to increase output growth by one unit, CRR has to be reduced more than 
it has to be increased for decreasing inflation by one unit. As observed in previous 
chapters, it appears that due to the negative effect of inflation on growth, any attempt 
to lower the CRR (which, would lead to an excess increase in money supply and 
hence, an increase in inflation) in the hope of increasing output may also result in a 
fall in output because of an increase in inflation. Therefore, the net effect on output 
growth may be lower than expected. This can be clarified as follows. Suppose, 
during its mid-term review, the bank perceives output is likely to be less than 
previously anticipated, creating a need to increase credit. This means increasing the 
broader money supply either by either decreasing the CRR or increasing base money. 
Suppose the bank decides to lower the CRR? This will raise the monetary aggregate 
and that will cause inflation creating a trade off for the policy stance. However, as 
has been demonstrated earlier, any increase in inflation would also reduce output, as 
is the case in India. Therefore, the net effect on output is ambiguous.
The coefficients of exchange rate change are significant only when a lagged term 
is included. This shows a disparate attempt by the central bank to arrest continuous 
depreciation of the currency by increasing CRR.
In the case of CGS1, the significant variables are exchange rate change and the 
lagged value of the interest rate. Therefore, to control a sliding currency, the 
monetary authorities appear to use both the interest rate, CGS1 as well as the CRR. 
However, this does not reflect the trading activity of the central bank in foreign
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currency. In this regard, it can be noted that India achieved article VIII status of the 
IMF in 1993. Therefore, most of the effects might be captured from the post 1993 
period.
The money market rate, CMR, also appear tailored to the policy stances regarding 
CRR and CGS1. However, the response of CMR to exchange rate movement is 
contemporaneous and does not appear to have been based on past trends. This shows 
it to be a faster instrument in response than either Treasury bill rates or CRR.
The average values of CGS1, CMR and CRR for the sample period are 8.8 
percent, 9.96 percent and 9.04 percent, respectively, while the average values of Ap, 
Ay and Areer are 0.082, 0.046, and -0.0395, respectively. Based on this information, 
it can be assumed the central bank could target real output growth of about 5 percent 
and a currency appreciation of about -4  percent. Then, using the formula, 
Ap* = (X -  ß  -  a2Ay* -  (a3 + a4) Areer*) / a \ , the implied target for inflation could 
be calculated for all three cases. With CRR, the value of target inflation comes out at 
0.061, while with CGS1 and CMR it comes out as 0.063 and 0.077, respectively. 
From these values, the relative importance of the concern for inflation in adopting a 
particular policy stance is quite evident. The CRR and CGS1 policy stance is taken at 
a lower inflation rate compared to CMR.
8.2.2 Policy Reaction Function in an Error Correction Framework
With insignificant ß in the above non-linear estimation, it can be inferred that the 
changes in the policy variables are not motivated by any bliss points of output 
growth, inflation or the exchange rate. This appears to be consistent for a developing 
country, where the equilibrium output and corresponding inflation or exchange rate 
are not achieved. Therefore, an alternative strategy of estimating policy could shed 
more light on the policy stances of the RBI i.e. some kind of long-term policy with 
respect to output and inflation along with short-term adjustments in policy variables. 
This kind of reaction function for the central bank can be modeled in an error 
correction specification. In view of the fact that the variables of interest are not 
integrated of the same order, the general to specific method of single equation 
restricted error correction modeling discussed in Chapter 4 (see equation 4.17) has 
been used to model CRR, CGS1 and CMR. It is an exercise of specification search
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and only those variables found relevant in specifying the model are retained. 
Therefore, this exercise also provides a search for the behaviour of the central bank. 
The estimated models are presented in Table 8.2 and the plots of the fitted values and 
the regression residuals are presented in Figures 8.4 to 8.7. All three models have 
satisfactory statistical properties.
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) of recursive errors and CUSUM of the square of 
recursive errors (not reported) are also within 5 percent significance level for CRR 
and CGS1, indicating there is no structural break. However, in the case of CMR, the 
CUSUM of squares shows a mild problem of structural break between the periods of 
1988-92. The equations are tested for non-linear effects of inflation and no such 
evidence is found.
The results presented in Table 8.2 provide strong support for some of the earlier 
conclusions and also shed more light on the priorities of policy makers. For example, 
in the long run as well as in the short run all policy instruments seem to be directed 
towards controlling inflation. CRR policy is also significantly explained by short-run 
and long run movements in output growth and real exchange rate depreciation. The 
CGS1 policy seems to have long run concern for the level of output instead of output 
growth in addition to inflation and currency depreciation.
From Figure 8.4, it is clear that during the late seventies and early eighties there 
were either smaller or no movements in the CRR and the central bank did not use it 
actively, whereas, after the late eighties, there is more variation in the CRR. 
Particularly, the CRR is being reduced. With policy being given more orientation 
towards interest rate instruments, reduction in the CRR may be under active 
consideration by the RBI. This is also evident from recent movements in the interest 
rate, which was almost static during the earlier periods (see Figure 8.5).
The policy stances on interest rates are also intuitive. It is clear from Figures 8.5 
and 8.6 that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, there were smaller movements in the 
CGS1 and CMR and the central bank did not actively use interest rates, whereas, 
after the late eighties, there is more variation in interest rates. Therefore, most of the 
explanatory power for these models is derived from the later years of bank activities. 
With respect to inflation, exchange rate depreciation and output, the long term and 
short-term stances are as expected. It can be mentioned that the real exchange rate 
has a depreciating tendency, which may not be considered conducive to the health of 
an economy. Therefore, all three instruments are applied to support the currency.
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Table 8.2 Error correction models of policy instruments
D e p e n d e n t V a riab le A C R R  (C h an g e  in cash  
re se rv e  ra tio )
A C G S 1 (C h an g e  in 
y ie ld  o n  1-5 y ear 
g o v e rn m e n t secu rity )
A C M R  (C h an g e  in 
ca ll m o n ey  ra te)
R e g resso rs 1972-98 1973-98 1972-98
IN T E R C E P T -0 .0 1 3 6  (0 .0 .0 1 ) -1 .0 6 3  (0 .2 7 5 )* -0 .0 1 8 (0 .0 1 8 )
C R R  (-1) -0 .2 3 8 (0 .0 6 1 1 )*
C G S1 (-1) - 1 .1 1 6 (0 .2 2 7 )*
C M R  (-1) -0 .9 1 5 (0 .1 4 7 )*
Ap(-i) 0 .1 4 4  (0 .0 6 5 )* * 0 .5 6 5  (0 .1 2 9 )* 0 .5 3 2  (0 .1 2 4 )*
y(-1) 0 .0 6 8  (0 .0 1 8 )*
Ay (-1) 0 .415  (0 .1 3 5 )* 0 .3 4 0  (0 .1 3 9 )*
Ay (-2) 0.220 (0.101)** 0 .3 5 4  (0 .1 5 7 )* *
Areer (-1) -0 .1 6 0  (0 .0 4 4 )* -0 .405  (0 .0 9 0 )*
Areer (-2) -0 .1 1 6 (0 .0 5 0 )* *
A(Ap) 0 .2 1 8 (0 .0 6 2 )* 0 .2 0 6 (0 .0 7 1 )* 0 .3 4 9  (0 .1 0 2 )*
A(Ay) 0 .3 0 2  (0 .0 8 7 )*
tsreer -0 .2 9 4  (0 .0 7 7 )*
A(A reer) -0 .097  (0 .0 3 4 )* -0 .1 4 6  (0 .0 4 7 )*
A C G S l (-1) 0 .5 6 6  (0 .1 8 3 )*
D R A IN 0 .0 6 4  (0 .0 3 )* *
D R A IN (- l) 0 .1 4 5  (0 .0 3 7 )*
R -S q u are 0 .58 0 .7 2 0 .76
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .42 0 .5 0 0 .68
S .E  o f  R e g re ss io n 0 .099 0.012 0.021
F - s ta t i s t i c s  F  (k-1, n-k) 3 .68  [0.01] 3 .23  [0 .02] 9 .93  [0.00]
D ia g n o stic  T ests
D W -sta tis tic s 2 .15 2 .28
D W -h -s ta tis tic s -1 .3 9  [0 .16]
L M  (1 ) se ria l co rre la tio n 0 .22  [0 .64] 0 .6 0  [0 .44] 1.18 [0 .18]
L M  (3) se ria l co rre la tio n 0 .43  [0 .93] 3.01 [0 .39] 6 .55  [0 .09]
A R C H  (3) te s t 1.77 [0 .62] 5 .5 0  [0 .14] 5 .2 0  [0.16]
F u n c tio n a l F o rm  C H S Q  (1) 0 .1 0  [0 .78] 0 .05  [0 .82] 0 .2 8  [0 .60]
N o rm a lity  C H S Q  (2) 2 .44  [0 .29] 0 .93  [0 .63] 0 .33  [0 .85]
P re d ic tiv e  fa ilu re  C H S Q  (6) 5 .57 [0 .47] 4 .78  [0 .57]
R esid u a l U n it  r o o t  te s t
T es t s ta tis tic s  (D F ) -5 .17 -5 .4 0 -5 .57
Notes: Predictive failure test is conducted by breaking the sample at 1992. Unit root test statistics are 
presented corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in an unit root test with second order 
ADF; *significant at 1% level, **significant at 5 % level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values. In F-statistics k is 
number of regressors including intercept and n is the number of observations.
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Figure 8.4 Actual and fitted values of change in CRR (1972-98)
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Figure 8.5 Actual and fitted values of change in CGS1 (1973-98)
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Plot of residuals of change in CGSland two standard error bands (1973-98)
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Figure 8.6 Actual and fitted values of change in CMR (1972-98)
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Variation of monsoon season rainfall from the normal (DRAIN) taken as a 
fraction is also used to model interest rates and found to be significant. On occasions, 
the RBI takes a forecast about likely agricultural output from rain conditions. When 
rain is better than normal (negative DRAIN), the RBI tends to increase interest rates,
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probably in fear of increased inflation. However, this is not appropriate policy for a 
supply side dominated economy with a steep aggregate demand curve as discussed in 
Chapter 5, where it is argued that with a favourable supply shock demand side 
stimulus will be better strategy. However, a positive sign of DRAIN also means the 
RBI reduces interest rate with adverse rainfall with an idea of boosting industrial 
output and compensating for the expected fall in agricultural output, which can be 
inflationary.
8.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY VARIABLES: AN EVALUATION
The reaction functions estimated above demonstrate the intent of the RBI. However, 
it is not clear from the foregoing analysis, whether the policy stance taken at time 
zero effectively performed its job in subsequent periods. More specifically, the 
questions, such as did an increase in CRR cause future inflation to fall or exchange 
rate to appreciate, are not addressed.
This section examines the behaviour of the instruments available to the RBI in 
respect of their effects on the goal variables of output growth, inflation and the 
exchange rate change. As mentioned earlier, the RBI has used both quantity and 
price controls to implement its policies, with CRR considered to be a powerful 
quantity control instrument. As decided earlier, the price control instruments 
considered for examination are the yield on 1-5 year government securities (CGS1), 
which proxy the opportunity cost of base money, and the overnight inter-bank call 
rates (CMR) of commercial banks. It is important to know how these instruments 
affect future output growth, inflation and the exchange rate. In other words, the 
question to be addressed here is which instrument is most important for each of the 
goal variables.
Future outcomes are considered either as the result of policy stances taken in the 
past, or the current period in anticipation of the likely movements in the goal 
variables. It is not evident from the RBI publications that they work with published 
targets for inflation, output or the exchange rate. However, some reference is made to 
the money supply growth (also see discussion in Chapter 1). Therefore, it is not 
claimed here that the tests conducted below represent the exact behaviour of the RBI 
per-se with respect to targets. Instead, the objective is to discover what the policy 
stances taken in period zero have done to the variables of interest from period one
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onwards. For this purpose Granger causality test is considered useful in shedding 
light on what happens to the goal variables when an instrument is increased or 
decreased. The test is applied in a VAR setup using ex-post realized values of the 
variables. In a related context, Bemanke and Mihov (1997) have applied the idea of 
the Granger causality test on monthly data in a VAR setup to discover whether the 
central bank of Germany (Bundesbank) has been targeting money growth or 
inflation. For that they attempted to see whether the instruments have caused twelve 
months ahead forecasted inflation or money growth and concluded that targets of 
money were missed in favour of meeting the requirements of lower inflation.
In order to implement the Granger non-causality test in the present context, a six 
variable VAR of order one is used to obtain the equations of the goal variables in 
terms of lagged values of instrument variables of CRR, CGS1 and CMR and goal 
variables of output growth, inflation and real exchange rate change. The order of the 
VAR for this test is selected based on the SBC model selection criteria. The OLS 
equations of the goal variables are used to test whether lagged values of the 
instruments are significantly different from zero or not. If lagged value of an 
instrument is found not to assist in explaining the variables of interest, it can be 
concluded that it did not cause the goal variable. The results of this test are presented 
in Table 8.3. Since VAR includes two 1(1) variables, statistical properties of the 
estimated equations including tests for serial correlation, functional form, normality 
and unit root in residuals is also presented in order to guard against spurious 
regression.
The results presented in Table 8.3 suggest policy instruments do not have any 
effect on output growth. However, there is significant effect from call money rates in 
reducing inflation but at the same time causing currency depreciation. Indicated from 
this result, inflation is probably more responsive to the call money rate than the 
nominal exchange rate. It can also be argued that with uncovered interest rate parity a 
high interest rate causes the spot exchange rate to appreciate and the expected 
exchange rate to depreciate. It is likely that the latter effect shows up in annual data 
but not the immediate effect. Further, a high call money rate indicates liquidity 
constraint of the banks. Therefore, these effects can also be attributed to the 
conditions of reserve money an issue that will be discussed later.
The CRR is significant (at 10 percent level) in affecting the exchange rate. An 
increase in CRR results in appreciation of currency, an outcome that is normally
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expected. Yield on the government security (CGS1) does not appear to significantly 
affect any of the variables of interest. However, lagged CGS1 was significantly 
positive (result not shown) in the equation of CRR (but not vice versa), which means 
some of the effects of changes in the yield in government security might be reflected 
through effects of CRR. The overall significance of the three instruments can be seen 
from the Granger block non-causality test (see Chapter 4 for details of the test). 
Table 8.4 presents the statistics for testing that the coefficients of the instrument 
variables are zero in the equation for all other variables in the above six variable 
VAR.
Table 8.3 Test results: policy instrument variable Granger causes dependent 
_________ variables in OLS equation from a six variable VAR (1972-98)
In stru m en t v a r ia b le  G ran ger  c a u s e  the  
d e p e n d en t v a r ia b le
E q u a tio n  d e p e n d en t v a r ia b le  (g o a l v a r ia b le s  o f  in terest)
A ree r Ap Ay
C a sh  r e se rv e  ra tio  C R R  (-1 ) +  1 .35  [0 .0 8 3 ] +  0 .7 2  [0 .1 7 0 ] +  0 .0 4  [0 .9 0 2 ]
Y ie ld  on  1-5 y ea r  s ec u r ity  C G S 1  (-1 ) - 1 .18  [0 .1151 - 0 . 2 6  [0 .6 0 4 1 +  0 .2 4  [0 .4 8 5 ]
C a ll m o n e y  rate C M R  ( -1 ) - 1 .1 4  [0 .0 3 6 ] - 0 . 9 9  [0 .0 0 7 ] +  0 .1 4  [0 .5 6 3 ]
E q u a t io n  P r o p e r t ie s
R -S q u a re 0 .3 2 0 .4 2 0 .2 6
R -B a r-S q u a re 0 .1 2 0 .2 5 0 .0 4
L M  (1 )  ser ia l co rr e la tio n 0 .1 7  [0 .6 8 ] 1.71 [0 .1 9 ] 0 .0 2  [0 .8 9 ]
L M  (3 )  ser ia l c o rre la tio n 1 .2 7  [0 .7 4 ] 2 .5 1  [0 .4 7 ] 3 .1 5  [0 .3 7 ]
F u n c tio n a l F orm  C H S Q  (1 ) 1 .45  [0 .2 3 ] 0 .0 4  [0 .8 5 ] 1 .6 2  [0 .2 0 ]
N o r m a lity  C H S Q  (2 ) 0 .2 1  [0 .9 0 ] 1 .4 9  [0 .4 7 ] 5 .0 1  [0 .0 8 ]
H e te r o sc e d a s t ic ity  C H Q  (1 ) 0 .5 6  [0 .4 6 ] 1 .3 2  [0 .2 5 ] 1 .37  [0 .2 4 ]
A R C H  (3 )  te s t 7 .5 7  [0 .0 6 ] 4 .4 9  [0 .2 1 ] 1 .1 9  [0 .7 6 ]
U n it  roo t te s t  fo r  r es id u a ls  (D F ) -4 .8 7 -7 .1 3 -5 .0 9
Notes: For the sake of clarity in presentation of the results, coefficients of the variables being tested 
for causality only are presented. VAR system includes an intercept. Values in square brackets [] are P- 
values. P-values presented besides the estimated coefficients of the instruments correspond to the 
Wald test statistics of significance of the instrument variables in the OLS equation of the dependent 
variable, taken from the 6-variables VAR of order 1. Unit root test statistics are presented 
corresponding to the SBC model selection criteria in a unit root test with second order ADF. Critical 
value for the unit root test at 5 percent significance level is -2.99.
Table 8.4 Test results: block Granger non-causality of policy instrument variables 
_________ in a six variable VAR (1972-98)________________________________
CRR CGS1 CMR
9.62[0.087] 14.36 [0.013] 18.35 [0.003]
Notes: Values in square brackets [] are P-values, which correspond to the CHSQ (5) Wald test 
statistics of significance of the instrument variables in the equation of all other 5 variables in the 6- 
variables VAR of order 1. VAR system includes an intercept.
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The results in Table 8.4 suggest that the instrument variables have significant 
interaction in the system though their effects are not all as expected and significant. 
The loss of effectiveness of the instruments, particularly CRR and the CGS1, with 
respect to inflation and output growth need some explanation.
As seen in the earlier chapters, inflation in India is a phenomenon affected both 
from the supply as well as the demand side, which reduces the direct role of the 
demand side instrument. In addition, the discussion in Chapter 1 on the style of 
conducting monetary policy in the RBI suggests the possibility of losing coordination 
in the application of different instruments and the process of money creation. It was 
pointed out that the RBI does not work through a money multiplier but there is some 
target for broad money growth calculated using income elasticity and at the same 
time considerations for creating base money are dependent on fiscal conditions, and 
foreign reserve position, an entirely different set of considerations (see Vasudevan 
(1999), and Reddy (1999d). Besides, CRR is used to moderate the liquidity for credit 
creation. In such a situation, it is hard to know the stock of broader aggregates unless 
there is a behavioural model to forecast multipliers as estimated in Chapter 7.
In addition, an analysis of the data on the different components of monetary 
aggregates shows the commercial banks have more liquidity than required by the 
CRR (see CLR in Table 6.1, Chapter 6), which also works in the direction of 
weakening the policy stances with respect to the CRR.
As demonstrated earlier, there is no evidence of the RBI targeting the real interest 
rate; the interest rate has a history of administrative control and does not fully 
represent the behaviour of the private sector. In the absence of fully market related 
interaction between the interest rate and the money stock it is possible the effect of 
interest rate instrument on inflation and output growth is neutralized or even 
dominated by effects of such actions on base money as motivated from the fiscal 
deficit and movements in foreign exchange reserves.
Similarly, nominal exchange rate appreciation, in the presence of capital control 
as is the case in India, may be more on account of movements in the current account 
and flows in foreign exchange reserves rather than changes in the interest rate. 
Nevertheless, monetary policy can affect the real exchange rate through inflation. For 
example, a base money expansion (or a fall in CRR) may cause both inflation and 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. With a dominant inflation effect, the real 
exchange rate will appreciate and adversely affect exports. However, the resulting
259
deterioration in current account may in turn cause nominal depreciation. With an 
overshooting exchange rate effect, the real exchange rate may depreciate improving 
the current account, which in turn appreciates the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, 
knowledge of the responsiveness of the nominal exchange rate to the monetary 
expansion and current account position is also important. If nominal exchange rate 
appreciation is more affected from current account positions, then the role of 
monetary policy in controlling the exchange rate is limited compared to other 
policies oriented to improve the current account. However, in the short-run, 
monetary authorities can influence nominal exchange rate appreciation through the 
process of sterilization.
In order to make above the point more transparent issues related to monetary 
actions with respect to reserve money and the instruments and the role of current 
account in nominal exchange rate depreciation are discussed below.
Parallel Stance on Base Money
A correlation matrix between the policy instruments and the reserve money (MO) 
presented in Table 8.5 shows a high positive correlation between CRR and mO, 
CGS1 and mO, and CRR and CMR. It may be noted that the call money rate, CMR is 
more about the liquidity constraints of commercial banks and depends upon the CRR 
and reserve money in the system. Whenever policy instruments are raised, action on 
the reserve money either accompanies or follows. If that is true the instrument should 
be able to significantly explain base money stock.
Table 8.5 Correlation matrixes of policy instruments and reserve money (1971-98)
CRR CMR CGS1 mO ACRR ACMR ACGS1 AmO
CRR 1
CMR 0.59 1
CGS1 0.88 0.57 1
mO 0.89 0.36 0.80 1
ACRR 0.02 0.11 -0.03 -0.22 1
ACMR 0.04 0.51 -0 .04 -0.08 0.45 1
ACGS1 -0.13 0.21 0.16 -0.09 -0 .05 0.22 1
AmO 0.16 -0.12 0.03 0.08 0.48 P . l l -0 .33 1
Base money is a highly trended variable, while instruments are not expected to 
follow trend. Therefore, the relationship between base money supply and the policy
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stances with respect to the chosen instrument variables can be better analyzed in the 
presence of a trend variable that is around a trend growth path of base money. Trend 
is expected to proxy observed and un-observed supply side variables other than the 
policy instruments. The resulting estimated equation is presented in Table 8.6 and the 
following inferences can be made from this estimation.
First, the coefficient of CRR and CGS1 are statistically significant with positive 
sign. Therefore, this estimate can be dubbed the parallel reaction of the central bank 
to its own previous actions on the instruments. An increase in base money follows an 
increase in CRR or the yield on the government security. Importantly, the motivation 
for such actions may be entirely different (such as fiscal deficit) from the motivations 
for increasing the policy instruments (such as currency depreciation or inflation). It 
may be recalled from Chapter 5 that contemporaneous money growth causes 
inflation, which is neutralizing past actions on the CRR and CGS1.
Second, the coefficient of CRR is high positive value, which means that increases 
in base money following each percentage point increase in CRR would offset the 
effects of CRR on the multiplier. The average CRR and currency with the public as 
percentage of deposits during the sample period were 0.09 and 0.33, respectively (see 
Table 6.1, Chapter 6), which together yield a multiplication factor of 2.38, a quantity 
smaller than 2.72, the coefficient of CRR in Table 8.6. Therefore, the actions of the 
RBI is such that the broader aggregates grow more on account of actions on base 
money with a neutralizing effect on CRR stance.
Table 8.6 Policy instruments as explanatory variables for reserve money stock 
__________ (1971-98)____________________________________________________
m0 = 10.55* + 2.72 CRR(-l)* -  1.76 CMR(-l)* + 0.745 CGS1(-1)***+ 0.138 T*
(0.024) (0.666)________ (0.313)_________(0.414)______________(0.00)_____________________
R-square = 0.9991, R-bar-square = 0.999. SE of regression = 0.041, DW statistics = 1.90. LM serial 
correlation CHSQ (3) = 2.58 [0.46]. ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 0.33 [0.95]. Functional form RESET 
CHSQ (1) = 0.586 [0.44]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.232 [0.89], Predictive failure test CHSQ (6) = 
10.32 [0.11]. Unit root test for the residuals in second order ADF based on SBC model selection 
criterion = - 5.33.
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values._____________________
The negative sign of coefficient associated with CMR confirms it as an indicator 
variable and a lower call money rate explains more than required base money supply. 
However, its negative sign also suggests the monetary authorities do not react to the
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indications provided by CMR. Probably, this is the reason an increase in CMR 
explains a fall in inflation with a lag, an argument presented earlier based on the 
results in Table 8.3.
The cash reserve ratio provides a general framework of monetary policy and 
variables such as the call money rate are likely to reflect stances taken on the CRR 
and base money supply. In order to shed light on the response of the call money rate 
to the changes in the cash reserve ratio and base money, an estimate of the call 
money rate is presented in Table 8.7. Clearly, a higher CMR indicates higher 
contemporaneous CRR and/or lower base money. There is a significant long-term 
relationship between CRR and CMR and between base money and CMR. However, 
CMR responds more to CRR in the long term than base money. Thus, CMR can 
provide some indications about base money growth in the short run for a given value 
of CRR. However, as discussed above, there is no evidence from the results in Table 
8.6 and 8.7 that the monetary authorities are using the indications from CMR to take 
action on base money.
Table 8.7 Call money rate as a function of cash reserve ratio and reserve money 
__________stock (1971-98)____________________________________________
CMR = 0.332* +1.280 CRR* -  0.025 mO* -  0.157 AmO**
(0.09) (0.27) (0.009) (0.08)______________________________________________
R-square = 0.56, R-bar-square = 0.51. SE of regression = 0.024, DW statistics = 1.98. LM serial 
correlation CHSQ (3) = 2.59 [0.46]. Heteroscedasticity CHQ (1) = 2.45 [0.12]. ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) 
= 8.97 [0.03]. Functional form RESET CHSQ (1) = 2.13 [0.14], Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.08 [0.96]. 
Unit root test for the residuals in second order ADF based on SBC model selection criterion = - 5.57.
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values._____________________
Nominal Exchange Rate Behaviour
As argued above monetary policy may have little effect on nominal exchange rate 
movements compared to other factors such as current account position. In popular 
discussion, the current account has always been recognized as an important 
determinant of exchange rate (Dornbusch 1980:239). However, there are several 
competing theories such as the one in Keynesian tradition, which do not assign any 
role to the current account. The portfolio balance model of exchange rate 
determination also suggests the nominal exchange rate is a function of domestic 
bonds, foreign exchange assets and domestic money held in country (Hailwood and 
MacDonald 1995: chapter 10). In the absence of free mobility of international
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capital, it can be argued that the current account being a flow concept, a current 
account imbalance will have an effect on the stock of assets and thus on the exchange 
rate over time. Therefore, the current account can be considered an important 
determinant of nominal exchange rate in a country like India. The average current 
account deficit in India has been around 1.1 percent of GDP with a coefficient of 
variation of one.
However, the monetary authority can influence the exchange rate in the short 
term through trading in foreign exchange and sterilization activities. Draining foreign 
exchange reserves in order to buy domestic currency would appreciate the nominal 
exchange rate. In the next step, the central bank buys government securities at a 
higher price to restore liquidity in the system. This is easy for the RBI as most of the 
financial institutions that form the major buyers of government security in India are 
government owned including the commercial banks.
In order to see the role of money, current account and the sterilization process in 
affecting nominal exchange rate depreciation, a simple model of nominal exchange 
rate appreciation is estimated in an error correction specification under the 
assumption that the change in nominal exchange rate has the following reduced form 
function.
Aneer = f (CAZ,feru, CGS1, mO) (8.5)
Here neer is the log of nominal exchange rate, CAZ the current account as a 
fraction of GDP, feru the log of foreign exchange reserves in millions of US$, CGS1 
the yield on government securities as described earlier, and mO the log of base money 
in millions of rupees. A detailed description of data is provided in Annexure 8.1 of 
this chapter and Appendix AA of this thesis.
The nominal exchange rate change ( A neer) and all other variables are integrated 
of order one (see Annexure 8.1 of this chapter). A cointegration test in VECM 
specification as followed in earlier chapters indicates a cointegrating vector of long 
terms relations between A neer and other variables but no variable except CAZ was 
found to be significant when the cointegrating vector was normalized with A neer. 
When CAZ is removed from the list of variables, cointegrating vector is not 
obtained. However, CAZ and A neer are strongly cointegrated and supports a long
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run relationship between current account and depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate in India.
Therefore the specification search for the variables that can explain nominal 
appreciation is preferred in the tradition of general to specific modeling. 
Accordingly, a dynamic error correction equation for the nominal exchange rate 
appreciation ( Aneer) in terms of current account, foreign exchange reserves, base 
money and yield on government security is carefully estimated, following general to 
specific modeling and presented in Table 8.8. Variables, found unhelpful in 
explaining exchange rate change are not included in the reported equation. Thus, 
base money does not demonstrate any effect on nominal appreciation.
Table 8.8 An error correction model for nominal exchange rate change (1973-98)
A(Aneer) =0.015 -0.802 &neer(-l)* + 5.658CAZ(-1)* - 1.837 ACAZ (-1) -  3.745 ACAZ (-2)* 
(0.015) (0.152) (1.194) (1.196) (0.829)
- 0.091 Aferu ** - 1.080ACGS1 **
(0.040) (0.507)
R-square = 0.81, R-bar-square = 0.75. SE of regression = 0.038, DW statistics = 2.11. F (6.19) = 13.39 
[0.00]. LM serial correlation CHSQ (1) = 0.36 [0.55]. LM serial correlation CHSQ (3) = 4.19 [0.24]. 
Heteroscedasticity CHQ (1) 1.19 [0.28], ARCH (3) CHSQ (3) = 6.86 [0.08]. Functional form RESET 
CHSQ (1) = 0.54 [0.46]. Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.90 [0.64]. Predictive failure test (Chow’s second 
test) after breaking the sample at 1992 CHSQ (6) = 7.17 [0.31]. Test of stability (Chow test) of 
regression coefficients after breaking the sample at 1990 CHSQ (7) = 4.80 [0.68]. CUSUM and 
CUSUM of square errors do not suggest any structural break. Unit root test for the residuals in second 
order ADF based on SBC model selection criterion = - 5.00.
^significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and ***significant at 10% level; values in 
parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [] are p-values._____________________
The estimate demonstrates a significant long-term relationship between the 
current account and nominal exchange rate change. The long-term current account 
elasticity of nominal depreciation is about 7, suggesting each percentage point GDP 
increase in the current account will result in nominal appreciation of about seven 
percentage points in the long run.
Negative signs of the short-term coefficients of foreign exchange reserve and the 
yield on the government securities suggest sterilization process leading to currency 
appreciation. The RBI intervenes in the foreign exchange market and sells foreign 
exchange reserves to support the currency. However, in the next step, the RBI buys 
government bonds at higher prices and restores the liquidity of the financial
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institutions. Both actions taking place during the same period, a currency 
appreciation is associated with a fall in foreign exchange reserves and government 
bond rate CGS1. If this story were accepted, it would appear that the results 
corresponding to the stances on CGS1 in Table 8.3 are also consistent as far as real 
exchange rate change is concerned.
However, it may be noted that this action may not be coordinated with stances on 
CRR and at the same time this supports the view that monetary policy has a limited 
role in affecting currency appreciation and cannot provide a long-term solution to 
currency depreciation in India. What is feared in such operations is that the crucial 
objective of inflation control may lose track.
Currency stabilization requires a reduction in the current account deficit by 
improvements in export performance. The Indian economy is not known to be export 
driven. During the sample period of 1970-71 and 1998-99 the volume of exports 
moved from 4 to 13 percent of GDP. This is despite the fact that the average 
depreciation of the real exchange rate and nominal exchange rate during this period 
was about 4 and 7 percent per annum, respectively, most of which took place in the 
last fifteen years. Therefore, it is not the exchange rate alone that matters for export 
performance. Other factors, such as product selection, product quality, production 
cost, infrastructure for export promotion, and participation of multinational 
enterprises may be strategically much more important. There is a limited role for 
monetary policy in these areas. What monetary policy can contribute is stable general 
inflation at a low level, so that inflation is not an important consideration in the 
decision-making process of businesses and households.
From this analysis, it can be argued that it appears difficult to work 
simultaneously with instruments of quantity and price control. It may be suggested 
that the RBI should shelve the CRR and concentrate more on interest rates for 
conducting monetary policy, as is the case in developed countries. With an effective 
interest rate as the main policy instrument, the amount of reserve money would be an 
outcome of a systematic process. However, it certainly began efforts to develop the 
interest rate as a main instrument after the process of financial liberalization 
commenced. Second, the RBI should clearly define its priorities and the instrument 
application should be directed more towards achieving that particular objective. This 
thesis suggests the primary objective should be inflation control. Aiming for several
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objectives and taking policy stances at different fronts erodes the effectiveness of the 
policy.
8.4 CONCLUSION
The motivation for this chapter is to estimate the behaviour of the RBI with respect 
to its instruments and goals. It is argued that monetary policy should have the one 
goal of maintaining inflation stability if not price stability. This argument gives rise 
to the question of whether monetary authorities have such a policy stance? Therefore, 
the central theme of this chapter is to ascertain whether the RBI does have a main 
policy stance of inflation stability. Accordingly, this chapter attempts to identify the 
reaction function of the RBI and the impact of the RBI’s policy stances on major 
macroeconomic variables and asks whether the RBI has been more concerned with 
output growth, inflation, or depreciation of the currency. The analysis has been in 
two parts. First, policy reaction functions are modeled to see how decisions on policy 
stance respond to the changes in goal variables. Second, the transmission effects of 
policy stances on goal variables are analyzed using causality tests and simple 
regression analyses.
The analysis in this chapter sheds light on the way in which the RBI’s policy 
instruments respond and affect the goal variables (inflation, output growth, and real 
exchange rate change). The RBI has been using these instruments more actively from 
the late eighties. The estimated reaction functions clearly suggests that all three 
policy instruments, namely, cash reserve ratio, call money rate and yield on 
government securities are increased when inflation and output growth rise or the real 
exchange rate depreciate. With the CRR, the value of the implied inflation target 
comes out as 0.061, while, with CGS1 and CMR, its value works out as 0.063 and 
0.081, respectively. From these values it is evident that the CRR and the CGS1 
policy stances are taken at a relatively lower inflation rate compared with CMR.
However, the analysis of the effectiveness of the instruments on the goal 
variables is not encouraging. None of the policy instruments is found to cause 
significant changes in output. CRR policy seems to lose effectiveness due to the 
parallel actions of the RBI in respect to the base money supply. There is no clear 
evidence to suggest the policy actions are reducing inflation except in the case of the
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call money rate, which fundamentally seems to be a result of lower base money 
stock.
There is some evidence to suggest the RBI is involved in controlling exchange 
rate depreciation through selling foreign exchange reserves in the short run. 
However, it appears that not much can be done to stabilize the currency unless policy 
measures are taken to improve the current account.
From this analysis, it can be argued that it is difficult to work simultaneously with 
instruments of quantity and price control. It may be suggested that the RBI should 
shelve the CRR and concentrate more on interest rate for conducting monetary 
policy, as is the case in developed countries. With an effective interest rate as the 
main policy instrument, the amount of reserve money would be an outcome of a 
systematic process. Finally, it is suggested that the RBI should clearly define its 
priorities and the instrument application should be directed more towards achieving 
that particular objective. This thesis suggests the primary objective should be 
inflation control.
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Annexure 8.1 Summary definition of data used in Chapter 8
Symbol Variable description and unit of measurement
CAZ
CGAPZ
CGS1
CMR
CRR
FERU
GDP
MO
NEER
P
REER
Y
Current account deficit as a fraction of gross domestic product
Fiscal Deficit: Combined GAP between Total Outlay and Current Revenue
(CTO-CCR) as ratio of gross domestic product.
Bond rate: Yield on 1-5 Year government of India (GOI) Securities, taken in 
fraction. Middle point has been taken for the data given in range.
Overnight annual call money rate of commercial banks, taken in fractions 
Cash Reserve Ratio: derived according to the RBI notifications as fraction of 
time plus demand deposits. Average of the values prevailing during the year. 
Gross international reserves (includes gold) measured in current US$ millions. 
GDP at market prices at current prices (rupees million)
Base (Reserve) Money (rupees million).
Nominal Effective Exchange rate of G5 Countries defined such that an increase 
indicate appreciation
Wholesale price index (WPI) of all commodities converted to base 1993-94 = 
100
Real Effective Exchange rate of G5 Countries defined such that an increase 
indicate appreciation
Gross domestic product at constant market prices (rupees millions)
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Annexure 8.2: Unit root test for the variables used in Chapter 8 in levels and first 
_________ differences___________________________________________________
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include The Dickey-Fuller regressions include
Lag
structure
an intercept but not a trend. an intercept and a linear trend
Variable 95% 95%
critical Statistic AIC SBC critical Statistic AIC SBC
value value
CAZ DF -2 .98 -2.96 81.76 80.50 -3 .59 -3.41 82.07 80.18
ADF (1) -1.85 81.87 79.98 -2.18 81.61 79.09
ACAZ DF -2 .99 -9.50 81.01 79.79 -3 .60 -9.61 80.82 78.99
ADF (1) -5.78 80.62 78.79 -5.86 80.47 78.03
CGAPZ DF -2 .980 -1.47 81.63 80.37 -3 .594 -1.80 81.27 79.38
ADF (1) -1.18 81.71 79.82 -1.21 80.91 78.40
ACGAPZ DF -2 .985 -7.24 80.43 79.21 -3 .603 -7.47 80.42 78.59
ADF (1) -3.95 79.43 77.61 -4.23 79.46 77.02
CGS1 DF -2 .980 -1.23 69.22 67.96 -3 .594 -1.48 68.69 66.81
ADF (1) -1.41 68.94 67.05 -2.00 69.09 66.58
ADF (2) -1.15 68.60 66.09 -1.48 68.25 65.10
ACGS1 DF -2 .985 -3.98 65.66 64.45 -3 .603 -3.92 64.75 62.92
ADF (1) -3.95 65.61 63.78 -3.91 64.77 62.33
CRR DF -2 .980 -1.68 77.54 76.29 -3 .594 -0.74 76.54 74.66
ADF (1) -1.68 77.03 75.14 -1.37 76.44 73.93
ACRR DF -2 .985 -4.41 76.10 74.88 -3 .603 -4.26 75.23 73.40
ADF (1) -3.74 75.37 73.54 -3.66 74.57 72.13
CMR DF -2 .980 -3.67 52.64 51.38 -3 .594 -3.52 51.75 49.86
ADF (1) -3.84 52.52 50.63 -3.84 52.13 49.62
f e r n DF -2 .980 -1.67 -1.24 -2.50 -3 .594 -1.90 -1.51 -3.39
ADF (1) -1.75 -0.84 -2.72 -2.42 -0.23 -2.74
ADF (2) -1.75 -1.70 -4.22 -2.68 -0.43 -3.58
A feru DF -2 .985 -3.52 -1.93 -3.15 -3 .603 -3.49 -2.81 -4.63
ADF (1) -2.60 -2.88 -4.71 -2.59 -3.77 -6.21
mO DF -2 .98 -0.17 33.69 32.44 -3 .59 -2.95 36.86 34.97
ADF (1) -0.15 32.71 30.82 -3.41 37.20 34.68
AmO DF -2 .99 -4.93 32.06 30.84 -3 .60 -4.83 31.08 29.25
ADF (1) -4.17 31.64 29.81 -4.09 30.68 28.24
neer DF -2 .980 1.56 31.69 30.43 -3 .954 -1.50 33.10 31.21
ADF (1) 0.85 32.53 30.65 -1.68 33.99 31.47
ADF (2) 0.12 32.98 30.46 -2.13 35.02 31.87
Aneer DF -2 .985 -2.96 31.30 30.08 -3 .603 -3.43 31.63 29.80
ADF (1) -1.68 32.08 30.25 -1.98 31.70 29.26
ADF (2) -1.52 31.08 28.64 -1.87 30.79 27.74
AAneer DF -2.991 -9.31 32.14 30.92 -3 .612 -9.13 31.27 29.44
ADF (1) -4.74 31.29 29.46 -4.67 30.43 27.99
Ap DF -2 .98 -4.10 38.41 37.19 -3 .60 -3.97 37.41 35.58
ADF (1) -4.43 39.00 37.17 -4.29 38.01 35.57
reer DF -2 .98 0.09 29.29 28.03 -3 .59 -1.90 30.44 28.56
ADF (1) 0.00 28.40 26.52 -2.02 29.85 27.34
Areer DF -2 .99 -4.44 28.14 26.92 -3 .60 -4.37 27.21 25.39
ADF (1) -2.91 27.27 25.44 -2.84 26.31 23.87
y DF -2 .98 1.24 53.29 52.04 -3 .59 -2.13 54.93 53.05
ADF (1) 1.58 52.98 51.09 -1.85 54.22 51.71
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Lag
s truc tu re
The  D ickey-Fuller regressions inc lude 
an inte rcept but not a trend.
T he  D ickey-F u lle r reg ress ions include 
an in te rcep t and a linea r trend
V ariab le 95%
critica l S tatistic A IC  S BC
95%
critica l S ta tis tic A IC S BC
va lue va lue
Ay DF -2.99 -5.70 50 .48 49 .26 -3.60 -6 .10 50 .85 49 .02
A D F (1) -3.83 49 .48 47 .65 -4 .35 50 .18 47 .74
Note: ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. SBC = Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion o f model selection. The order of ADF test is chosen as 2 in all the cases. Number 
of observations varies from 23 to 26.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis is developed with two sets of objectives, one general and the other 
specific. The general objective is to understand the processes of monetary policy in 
theory and practice with a specific reference to the problems of a developing country 
such as India. In order to achieve the goal of the general objective, some specific 
objectives in the form of questions were asked in the introduction of the thesis that 
have their origin in the current debate on the objectives and means of conducting 
monetary policy in India. This is also an unfinished debate in most other countries. In 
order to summarize the findings of this study, the objective questions are re-stated 
and the conclusions follow based on the empirical analysis of the thesis. Annual data 
for the period 1970-71 to 1989-99 has been used for the empirical analysis.
1. Why should the RBI be concerned with inflation above anything else?
2. How best can the inflationary process in India be identified and 
modeled? More specifically, to what extent is inflation a monetary 
phenomenon in India and how much is it a supply side effect? Do all 
monetary aggregates behave alike or do they have different roles in 
determining inflation in India?
3. What is the prospect of money demand based monetary policy in India? 
What determines the money stock, is it money demanded or a reflection 
of money supply behaviour?
4. How best can the behaviour of the RBI be explained with a policy rule for 
the existing monetary instruments? Specifically, how best can CRR and 
interest rates be modeled for India in terms of goal variables and whether 
such policy stances are effective?
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9.1 Need for Inflation Control
Several recent studies based on cross-country, panel, and single country time series 
regressions and other types of calculations, particularly on tax effects and surveys 
have shown long-run negative effects of inflation on economic growth. Business and 
households are thought to perform poorly when inflation is high and unpredictable. It 
is therefore argued that the expected rate of change of the general level of prices 
should be so low that it ceases to be a factor in the individual and business decision 
making process. Thus, there is growing consensus among policymakers that inflation 
needs to be controlled. It is argued, that central banks should emphasize price 
stability as the single objective of monetary policy and eschew consideration of other 
goals such as growth or employment. Although there is unlikely to be a single 
optimal level of inflation, in several studies on developed countries around two per 
cent is considered a benchmark of price stability. In the case of a developing country 
such as India this limit can be higher due to the possible higher incidence of 
measurement errors, an underdeveloped financial sector, a lower degree of market 
integration and government intervention of various kinds including populist policies 
and involvement in the production process.
The analysis in Chapter 4 of this thesis has clearly brought out a negative long­
term effect of inflation on economic growth in India, while the analysis in Chapter 5 
shows a robust positive effect of money growth on inflation. A long-term negative 
effect of inflation on growth and a positive effect of excess money growth on 
inflation also mean non-neutrality of money, but, in this situation, instead of helping, 
excess money growth is detrimental to economic growth. Therefore, it is pragmatic 
for monetary policy to concentrate on inflation in preference to anything else.
Analysis in Chapter 4 specifically identifies a robust threshold level of inflation 
for India at 51/2 percent in a well-specified growth model. Every percentage point 
increase in inflation over percent causes per capita output growth to fall by about 
0.16 percentage points in the long run, which is a significant impact. Incidentally, the 
average inflation rate in major trading partner countries of India during the sample 
period of 1971-98 was also in the same range. Thus, historical evidence suggests that 
India should be careful to prevent inflation from exceeding 51/2 percent. The results 
also show that inflation does not exert any significant indirect effect on economic 
growth through investment. Further, while the nominal interest rate on lending as
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well as deposits appears to decrease private investment, the fiscal deficit seems to 
exert a positive influence on private investment. However, when the result of 
Chapter 7, which demonstrates fiscal dominance on money creation, is taken into 
account, via the effect of money growth on inflation and the effects of inflation on 
growth, it comes out that the combined fiscal deficit of states and the central 
government should be kept to a level below 6 V2 percent; the combined gap between 
outlay and revenue during 1998-99 was about 10 percent of GDP.
Further Inflation is also inequitable because it hits poor people the most. The 
government can draw some benefits by way of collecting an inflation tax but that 
may not help the large mass of people in India living below the poverty line. On the 
contrary, increasing the purchasing power of the rupee by reducing inflation would 
be of direct help and would provide a more conducive environment for economic 
activities by reducing social tensions.
9.2 Inflationary Process
The survey of the theory of inflation presented in Chapter 2 has been helpful in 
understanding of the current literature on inflation and its relevance in the Indian 
context. The discussion in Chapter 2 supports the point that the mechanism of 
inflation is far from being a settled issue. Episodes such as the combination of low 
inflation and low unemployment enjoyed by the United States in the late 1990s 
questions a short-run trade-off between the two variables. This brings to the forefront 
the importance of country specific empirical studies. However, it can be argued that 
money growth captures several sources of inflation, including that transmitted from 
abroad, and inflation can be influenced by controls on money growth. In economies 
where financial markets are fully developed, an instrument such as short-term 
interest rates can find the same role. Nevertheless, wage setting behaviour; supply 
shocks; and structural rigidities are equally important in modeling inflation. The 
most appropriate model remains specific to the nature of the economy.
The possibility of supply side inflation accompanied by monetary 
accommodation is often discussed in economic surveys of the Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India. The main sources of supply shocks could be oil prices, 
currency devaluation, flow of foreign currency, weather conditions affecting 
agricultural prices, productivity improvements, and price competition, together with 
a changing economic environment due to economic reform. Government
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interventions in the price setting of administered goods and lump sum increases in 
wages arising out of periodic adjustment particularly in the public sector also 
contribute to supply side effects on inflation. Finally, in the absence of transparency 
and the desire to stimulate the economy to a higher growth path, monetary authorities 
can always generate inflation of the type of discretionary policy, though this may be 
with ad hoc decisions instead of model optimization.
While it is complex to decipher the inflationary process in India, an attempt has 
been made in Chapter 5 to address this problem. This chapter uses the concept of the 
output gap to identify whether the Indian economy is dominated by demand-side or 
supply-side factors. The interesting outcome of this chapter is the negative 
association between inflation and the contemporaneous output gap. With a 
downward sloping aggregate demand schedule and upward sloping supply schedule, 
a negative relationship between inflation and the output gap indicates the profound 
impact of the supply side of the economy. It also shows that the output gap contains 
important information about the inflationary process in India and both supply and 
demand side variables are important in understanding this process. The supply side 
variables that significantly explain variation in output gap are identified as rainfall, 
mineral and edible oil price inflations, and growth in international reserves.
Using the information content of the output gap, a mark-up price model of 
inflation with discretionary narrow money growth, wage inflation, oil prices 
inflation, and growth in international reserves has been developed and evaluated. It 
shows that such a model performs well in explaining inflation in India and the 
performance of the model can be enhanced if more information about the output gap 
can be foreseen. To the basic question of ‘can monetary policy affect inflation in 
India’ the answer is clearly ‘yes’. However, the role of monetary policy is limited by 
the presence of significant supply side effects.
There is a clear unidirectional causality running from narrow money growth to 
inflation in India and not vice-versa. By contrast, base money growth and broad 
money growth demonstrate bi-directional causality with inflation. Therefore, narrow 
money growth has been identified as an important causal variable for inflation and 
systematically introduced in inflation models. To control inflation, the monetary 
authority should be concerned with the growth rate of narrow money rather than with 
other aggregates. The long run effect on inflation of a one-percentage point increase 
in narrow money growth is approximately 0.43 percentage points.
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However, narrow money is not an instrument controlled by the central bank; the 
instrument is base money or the interest rate or cash reserve ratio (CRR). Therefore, 
the narrow money multiplier is modeled in Chapter 7. It comes out that the narrow 
money multiplier is significantly explained in an error correction specification by 
institutional variables such as cash reserve ratio, deposit rate, yield on government 
securities, call money rate and commercial bank density representing institutional 
development. Therefore the analysis provides a framework to calculate monetary 
effects on the inflation process in India.
9.3 Monetary Policy Evaluation
Chapter 3 presents a brief survey of the developments, which have led to the current 
framework of conducting monetary policy in developed and developing countries. It 
is noted that financial market volatility has led modem central banks to choose 
interest rates as the main instrument for conducting monetary policy, and, at the same 
time, a breakdown of the stable relationship between output and monetary aggregate 
and the failures of exchange rate pegs has motivated most central banks to adopt an 
inflation rate as the primary goal of monetary policy. Recently, forecasted inflation 
has emerged as one of the key intermediate targets for monetary policy because of 
the argument that it is to be highly correlated with the socially optimal inflation rate, 
the goal variable.
The RBI conducts monetary policy based on the notion of a stable function of 
demand for real broad money with income elasticity of about 1.58. Since RBI studies 
have stressed the stability of real broad money demand, an attempt has been made in 
Chapter 6 to model and test the robustness of the demand for broad money, (and also 
narrow and base money) in a variety of long-term specifications such as Orcutt- 
Cochrane method, partial adjustment and cointegration. The outcome is not 
encouraging. While income elasticity of about 1.52 is obtained in simple regression 
of real broad money on output, it fails miserably in robustness tests. When real broad 
money is specified as a standard demand equation, output, the key variable is not at 
all robust to the inclusion of other relevant variables such as, inflation, interest rate, 
and trend. The examination of the base money demand also meets the same outcome.
Therefore, it is concluded that the money-output relationship in India is very 
loose and any attempt to conduct monetary policy based on the paradigm of a stable 
demand for money is more likely to fail than succeed. As discussed earlier, the
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loosening of the relationship between money and output may be due to the operation 
of Goodhart’s law. Discretionary supply of money due to various reasons, such as a 
fiscal deficit, directed credit, and interventions in the foreign exchange market, must 
have helped in loosening the money-output relationship.
There is evidence to suggest that demand for narrow money is better defined but 
it does not really assist, because narrow money by definition neither represents the 
base money where the central bank has better control nor all the institutional 
categories of money. Therefore, conducting monetary policy based on narrow money 
could be a temporary arrangement at best until the interest rate becomes the major 
instrument of monetary policy.
Most studies on monetary aggregates in India are based on the assumption that 
there is no public money illusion. However, simple regression analyses in Chapter 6 
reveal this assumption is not robust. Demand for money does not imply demand for 
real money. Price level should be treated as a separate variable while modeling 
nominal or real money.
The motivation for Chapter 7 is drawn from the findings of Chapter 6, which 
conclude that the money-output relationship in the demand for money specification 
in India is very loose. In Chapter 7, the supply behaviour of all three monetary 
aggregates has been analyzed from the perspective of the possibility of control on 
their growth. The narrow and broad money multipliers both appear to be endogenous 
to institutional variables. The models of multipliers are well specified and it is 
possible to control money growth through policy instruments and institutional 
developments. However, the critical problem arises due to endogeniety of base 
money growth itself. When the base money equation is specified like a supply 
equation, by including the fiscal deficit as an explanatory variable, it demonstrates 
good stability and predictive power. Permanent income obtained by error learning 
hypothesis comes out to be a better scale variable for explaining the supply 
behaviour of base money. The fiscal deficit is introduced in two alternative 
specifications: in one the external effect is represented by real exchange rate and 
interest rate, while in the other the external effect is represented with foreign 
exchange reserves. In both specifications the long run money supply increases with 
fiscal deficit and income. There is pressure on money creation from foreign exchange 
flows, which makes monetary control harder.
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The short-run response to the fiscal deficit is found to be decreasing, following 
gradual abolition of automatic monetization and it can be argued that fiscal 
dominance is beginning to reduce. The above results have important implications in 
terms of possibilities for monetary policy. Inflation control requires a lower growth 
rate for narrow money and at the same time financial deepening requires a high 
multiplier. Both together require that the base money growth must be controlled, 
which seems a daunting task in the presence of a high fiscal deficit.
The base money supply equation appears to indicate passive behaviour and there 
is no evidence of short run reaction to output growth and inflation. There is some 
evidence of a short-run reaction to exchange rate appreciation but in the long run 
currency depreciation is also accommodated. With fiscal dominance and anticipated 
inflation there is evidence to suggest the RBI is conducting open market operation in 
government securities to counter inflationary expectations rather than to maintain a 
nominal interest rate. In the long-run inflation is not accommodated fully.
Therefore, it is important to examine the reaction functions of the direct 
instruments such as CRR and indirect instruments such as interest rates. Chapter 8 
examines the RBI’s policy stances with respect to such instruments, where 
consequences of passive supply of base money on the effectiveness of the policy 
stances with respect to instruments is also examined.
The main instrument for conducting monetary policy in India has been the cash 
reserves ratio (CRR). While interest rate instruments are also available but have not 
been fully market determined, as in the developed countries and are therefore 
expected to be comparatively less effective. Following an examination of the 
different interest rate series available in India, the yield on 1-5 years Central 
Government Securities (CGS1) and the overnight inter-bank call money rate (CMR) 
have been selected along with the CRR in order to analyze the RBI policy stances in 
Chapter 8. The analysis has been done in two parts. First, policy reaction functions 
are modeled to see how decisions on policy stance respond to the changes in goal 
variables. Second, the transmission effects of policy stances on goal variables are 
analyzed using causality tests and simple regression analyses.
The analysis in this chapter sheds light on the way in which the RBI's policy 
instruments respond and affect the variables of interest. It is of interest that the RBI 
has used these instruments more actively from the late eighties, particularly 
following the commencement of liberalization in mid of 1991. With the CRR, the
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value of the implied inflation target comes out as 0.061, while, with CGS1 and CMR, 
its value works out as 0.063 and 0.081, respectively. From these values, the relative 
importance of the concern for inflation in adopting a particular policy stance is quite 
evident. The CRR and CGS1 policy stances are taken at a relatively lower inflation 
rate compared with CMR. A significant long run relationship between output and 
interest rate variables in ECM suggests the central bank takes into consideration the 
long-term effects of interest rates on output when deciding on these instruments.
The estimated reaction functions clearly suggests that all three policy 
instruments, namely, cash reserve ratio, call money rate and yield on government 
security are increased when inflation and output rise or the real exchange rate 
depreciates. Rainfall conditions are also taken into account when taking decisions on 
these instruments. However, the analysis of the effectiveness of the instruments on 
the goal variables is not encouraging. None of the policy instruments is found to 
cause significant changes in output. CRR policy seems to lose effectiveness due to 
the parallel actions of the RBI in respect to the base money supply. There is no clear 
evidence to suggest the policy actions are reducing inflation except in the case of the 
call money rate, which fundamentally seems to be a result of lower base money 
stock.
There is some evidence to suggest the RBI is involved in controlling exchange 
rate depreciation through selling foreign exchange reserves in the short run. 
However, it appears not much can be done to stabilize the currency unless policy 
measures are taken to improve the current account.
The analysis in Chapter 8 provides strength to the argument that it is difficult to 
work simultaneously with instruments of quantity and price control. It may be 
suggested that the RBI should shelve the CRR and concentrate more on price 
variables for conducting monetary policy, as is the case in developed countries. With 
an effective interest rate as the main policy instrument, the amount of reserve money 
would be an outcome of a systematic process. Finally, it is suggested that the RBI 
should clearly define low inflation as its main priority and the instrument application 
should be directed more towards achieving this particular objective. Aiming for 
several objectives and taking policy stances at different fronts erodes the 
effectiveness of the policy.
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9.4 Prospects of Inflation Targeting
From the discussion in Chapter 3, it is evident that among the different monetary 
regimes inflation targeting on the one hand requires relatively more discipline in 
terms of fiscal management and central bank independence while on the other hand it 
requires greater financial depth and sophistication in manipulation of instruments. 
Developing countries, such as India, find it hard to qualify on these accounts. With 
the combined fiscal deficit of Central and State Governments during 1990s 
remaining in the range of 8-10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), more than 
25 percent of the time and demand liability of the banking sector held in government 
securities as SLR and the ratio of gross to net borrowing of the government resting at 
0.67 does not bode well central bank independence in India. Because of the high 
fiscal deficit the central bank finds it difficult to drastically reduce CRR. In addition, 
to avoiding interest rates rises in the face of Government borrowing the RBI is 
constrained to finance it at lower cost.
The analysis in Chapter 7 provides clear and robust evidence of fiscal dominance 
in base money creation in India in the long run. This erodes the independence of 
monetary policy and hence limits the role of monetary policy in controlling inflation 
in India. Therefore, as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, one of the key requirements of 
central bank independence for the success of a strict inflation targeting based 
monetary regime as practiced in developed countries, is not fully met in the case of 
India. However, this does not mean the RBI should not adopt inflation as the main 
goal of monetary policy. In fact, both the RBI and the Central and State 
Governments of India need to commit to controlling inflation, as the long run effect 
of fiscal deficit is detrimental to economic growth, which works through the inflation 
channel. The encouraging result in Chapter 7 is that there appears to be some 
indication of reduction in short run fiscal dominance during the recent periods of the 
1990s as the response to the fiscal deficit is found to be decreasing following gradual 
abolition of automatic monetization.
Further the reforms are a recent phenomenon in India. Market depth for the short­
term instruments of monetary policy and effectiveness of OMO is beginning to 
develop. There has been no liberalization in the area of directed credit. Commercial 
banks are required to direct 40 percent of their commercial advances to the priority 
sector, which consists of agriculture, small-scale industry, small-scale transport
279
operators, artisans etc. At present the percentage of directed credit appears too high 
and needs to be narrowed down to potentials growth and highly focused areas.
Thus, it may take quite some time before all the pre-requisites of inflation 
targeting as available in the developed economies are achieved in India. After the 
financial sector reforms that commenced in 1991 the situation must have improved, 
particularly with the abolition of automatic monetisation, decontrol of most deposit 
and lending rates and reduction in quantitative controls since 1997. Therefore, it does 
not prevent the monetary authorities in India from commencing the process of 
inflation targeting.
Moreover, chapter 5 found a lagged output gap had a positive effect on inflation, 
which indicated the existence of an upward sloping short run Phillips curve, but that 
relationship failed with the inclusion of important variables describing the inflation 
process. In absence of any clear short run trade off between inflation and output, 
there should be no dilemma for the central bank in setting priorities. Keeping 
inflation at a low level should be the primary target for monetary policy in India, 
which can best be achieved by adopting a monetary regime such as inflation 
targeting.
The spirit of the monetary regime directed towards inflation control need not 
necessarily be the exact form of inflation targeting practiced in developed countries. 
The most important thing is to understand the behaviour of the economy and develop 
an inflation model based on the maximum available information and then to work 
with model improvements as time passes. The objective of this thesis has the same 
spirit.
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A A: Data Sources and Variable 
Definition
AA.l A GENERAL NOTE ON DATA
The official data in India is published mainly in two frequencies, monthly and 
annual. However, data related to several important macroeconomic variables inter- 
alia gross domestic product, investment, savings, and employment are not available 
in monthly frequency. The output data available in monthly series is the usual 
industrial production index (IPI), which is considered highly volatile. Further, 
industrial production in India which accounts for just around a quarter of a share in 
the total value addition in the economy, can at best be a poor proxy to the real 
activity. The quarterly series on output commenced only in 1996, which is a very 
short period and cannot be used for the present analysis.
In the literature on monetary economics and monetary policy analysis in 
developed countries, data on all three frequencies have been extensively used 
depending upon the nature of the analysis. For the VAR analysis monthly data has 
been widely used probably because the contemporaneous correlation between 
monthly data is expected to be zero and at the same time monthly data provide much 
longer time series. Further, variables like short-term interest rates and exchange rates 
interact with a very short lag captured by the monthly data. However, due to the 
presence of volatility in monthly data on output and prices, several studies prefer 
quarterly data.
In the absence of quarterly data the natural substitute is the annual data. The main 
problem with using annual data for the analysis is the contemporaneous relationship 
between the variables. During a year the variables are able to interact and feed to 
each other and therefore constructing a lag structure for the variables poses a 
problem. The short-term in annual data is at best one year and most of the 
transmission effects are completed within two years. Therefore, policy instances 
during the year cannot be deciphered. Nevertheless, results based on annual data are
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expected to be more robust than those based on monthly data because of the reduced 
volatility of the former.
In the light of such problems, it is proposed in this study to analyze Indian 
monetary policy using annual data which will be more helpful in analyzing the 
behavioural aspects of the Indian economy.
Most of the official annual data available on India is for the financial year, which 
starts on April 1 and ends on March 31. For example, year 1990-91 means April 
1990 to March 1991. For the sake of convenience, the financial year 1990-91 is 
written as 1990, for which most months are covered. The same convention is 
followed in World Development Indicators (WDI) of The World Bank. As far as 
possible this convention is maintained. While converting the monthly data into 
annual data also the same convention is followed. Unless otherwise stated all 
aggregates are measured in millions (mn) of rupees. However, the foreign currency 
reserve is measured in millions of US Dollars. Wherever applicable, the annual data 
is converted to the base period of 1993-94 following the practice in WDI 2000.
Sources of data for this study are discussed in section AA.2 and listed in Table 
AA.l. Some of the variables, such as Capital Stock, effective exchange rate, 
international prices and international interest rates are constructed in section AA.3.
Table AA.2 presents the list of variables along with their description and sources. 
Basic data (untransformed) used for regression analysis is presented in Table AA.3.
AA.2 SOURCES OF DATA
The major sources of macroeconomic data on India are: the Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO) in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; the 
Economic Survey (ES), which is an annual document published before the budget 
presentation by the Ministry of Finance; and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
documents which compile data from various sources including its own departments. 
Other sources are organizations like the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE) and the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). 
Important international institutions like The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund also compile Indian data supplied by various government 
organizations in India. The advantage with international institutions is that they
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provide consistent and coherent series based on the standard definition and same 
base year.
There are several online international databases which are useful for monthly data 
and keep updated series taken from the original sources. EconData Pty Ltd. 
Armadale in Australia is one such organization, which provides online data from the 
IMF, World Tables and regional databanks like the China Economic Information 
Center (CEIC). CEIC data on India are also collected from the official sources stated 
earlier. The Australian National University subscribes to the online facility of 
EconData for International Financial Statistics and the online CEIC dataset, which 
has been very useful for this study, particularly in getting the latest data on monthly 
frequency. The quality of data from the online source is confirmed for reliability by 
counter checking with the published data in hard copy of the original sources.
There are two series of annual data in Indian Documents, one with 1980-81 as the 
base year, which has now been discontinued and other with 1993-94 as the base year 
starts from the same year. The World Bank annual data given in World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2000 CDROM for India are all converted to the 1993-94 base year 
and therefore, has been used as far as possible as the first choice of constant price 
annual data for the sake of consistency. Data not available in WDI2000 is 
complemented from Economic Survey, RBI documents, and other sources like CSO, 
NCAER, and CMIE. Similarly, for monthly data, the base source considered is IFS, 
where the data is available with the base year of 1995. However, for constructing 
annual data from the monthly series, all data is converted to 1993-94 as the base year 
if required. Details of these sources are provided in Table AA.l. Table AA.2 presents 
the list of variables along with their description and sources. Basic data 
(untransformed) used for regression analysis is presented in Table AA.3.
AA.3 CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES 
AA.3.1 Permanent Income
In the literature, wealth is considered to be the discounted present value of expected 
future income. With the rate of discounting remaining constant, wealth would vary in 
the same way as income. Laidler (1985:87) argued, studying the relationship between 
variations in money and variation in wealth it is not important whether wealth 
measured directly or as expected value, also called permanent income, is used as
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proxy for wealth. Laidler suggested the error learning or adaptive expectation 
hypothesis for modeling expected behaviour from the actual behaviour of the 
variable under consideration. Representing the variable by X, expectation of the 
future value of X held in period t by Xf+1|, and a positive fraction by X ,  the error­
learning hypothesis can be written as
X , „ | , - X , h = A ( X , - X , 1 m ) (AA.l)
This can be written as follows:
X l t l], = A X, + (1-A (AA.2)
By continuous back-substitution, the expected value of X can be written in terms 
of the realized values of X in the past as follows:
X,+1|, = A X, + A (1 -  A ) X , _ ,  + A (1 -  A )2 X,_2 +  + A (1 -  A )" X,_.... (AA.3)
With X  =  0.5 and n=10 the sum of the geometric coefficients on X is equal to 0.5 
+ 0.25 + 0.125 + 0.0625 + 0.03125 + 0.015625 + 0.0078125 + 0.00390625 + 
0.001953125 + .000976563 + 0.000488281 = 0.999511719, which is very close to 
one. If X is some measure of real income then, Xf+1|, can be treated as the permanent
income for period t. Thus permanent income calculated using this procedure with 
^.=0.5, has a fifty percent weight for current income while the rest of the fifty percent 
weight is geometrically distributed in the past ten year period. The simple 
assumption underlying this procedure is that people take more notice of the recent 
past than of more distant time while making an assessment of future income. Laidler 
(1985:88) states that real national income measured by applying this procedure has 
often been used as a scale variable in demand for money functions. It may be noted 
that the choice of the value of X  =  0.5 is as arbitrary as any other value could have 
been. However, with X  =  0.5, the immediate past two years have reasonable weights.
For calculating the permanent income YP for the period 1970-98 in the present 
study, real gross domestic product at factor cost (RGDPF) for the period 1960-1998 
at 1993-94 prices is taken from WDI 2000 as the measure of income and the above 
relationship is used with X  =  0.5 and n = 10. The expected income for the period t+1 
is considered as the permanent income for the period t.
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AA.3.2Net Fixed Capital Stock
The measure of capital K(t) at any time t used for estimating the potential output in 
this study is the real net fixed capital stock (NFCS), which is obtained by the method 
of perpetual inventories, considering 1993-94 as the base year, such that t = 0 for 
1993-94. A depreciation of 5% is used in the following relationship:
Kt = 0.95*(Kt_i) + RGDFIt for t > 0, years beyond 1993-94 and
(AA 4)
Kt = [Ki+t -  RGDFIi+t]/0.95 for t < 0, years before 1993-94
Ko is the 1993-94 stock of fixed capital at current prices taken from the National 
Account Statistics 1997, statement 21 published by the CSO (refer document CSO- 
NAS in Table AA.l) and its value is Rs. 18634480 million. RGDFI is the real gross 
fixed investment at 1993-94 prices taken from WDI 2000.
AA.3.3 International Variables
An attempt is made in this section to find the proxy price, output, and exchange rate 
for the rest of the world with respect to India. These variables are first generated at 
monthly frequency and then converted to annual frequency, by taking averages of the 
monthly values. It is assumed that the international economy for India can be 
represented by a group of five-countries (G5), namely the United States of America, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. During 1990-91 -  1998-99, 
together these five countries constitute an average 40 percent of exports and 31 
percent of imports resulting in 36 percent of India’s trade with the rest of the world. 
The Indian monetary authorities closely monitor the movement of currencies and 
monetary stances of these countries. The changes in output, prices and exchange rate 
in these countries are expected to have more effects on the Indian economy than 
other countries.
Trade being the main channel of transmission for the effects of changes in prices 
and output from one country to the other, it is found appropriate to use trade based 
weight for creating composite indices of consumer price index (CPIG5), producer 
price index (WPIG5) and an industrial production index (IPIG5) for G5 countries to 
proxy international prices and industrial production index (IPI). The trade weight is 
the relative share of each of the G5 countries in their combined bilateral trade 
volumes with India.
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Trade weights are also used for calculating the effective exchange rate (EER). 
The assumption here is that the international dollar equivalent of the demand and 
supply of the domestic currency is largely affected through trade activities,
oc
particularly when the exchange rate is market determined and free floating . The 
problem is simplified by taking the same composite bilateral trade (export + 
import)86 weights for all three variables under discussion. While several countries 
use fixed weights to arrive at the EER or trade competitiveness, the OECD and 
Banque de France use current weights (see Durand, et al. (1992)). However, a current 
weight based EER suffers from the criticism that the contemporaneous exchange rate 
and trade volume feed to each other which mixes the direction of causality in the first 
place. On the other hand the advantage of using a fixed weight lies in the fact that the 
rate of variation in the EER remains the same irrespective of whether indexed or 
actual value of exchange rates are used. In addition, with constant weight, any year 
can be selected to index the resulting EER series.
In respect to the weighting system, the preferred mathematical formula is 
“geometric”, but an arithmetic formula is also used as in the case of the Federal 
Reserve Board of the United States.
Another important question is about the selection of period to draw the trade- 
related weights. It can be a single year or an average of some specified period. In the 
case of India it is found that the trade weights do not change too much from year to 
year but can change substantially from month to month. Selecting one particular 
year, as the representative year is problematic, and would be highly subjective, 
considering the fact that there are six different countries involved in the process. 
Therefore, the average trade volume of the G5 countries during the period 91-92 to 
97-98 is used to calculate the weights. A similar procedure is followed in the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI 1993; RBI 1998c).
The effective nominal exchange rate (NEER) is calculated in terms of unit of G5 
composite currency (G5C) per unit of rupee. The NEER is weighted by the domestic 
wholesale price index (WPI) and the composite consumer price index of G5 to get 
the real effective exchange rate (REER). Domestic WPI is used instead of domestic 
CPI in order to give export orientation to REER. Moreover, the WPI for India can be
85 Indian Rupee is free floating since March 1993 (GOI 1996:103)
86 Several possibilities exist in using trade-based weights, like import weights, export weights, multilateral 
weights, and elastic weight.
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considered a closer equivalent to the underlying CPI of developed countries, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. The weight and the formulae used for calculating CPIG5, 
WPIG5, IPIG5, NEER, REER are as follows.
Trade Weights ( w,)
U SA G erm any Japan U K France
0.394 0.194 0 .184 0.168 0 .060
World Consumer Price index (CPIG5) CPI* = ]”J(C P /(.)
1=1
5 w>
World producer price index (WPIG5) WPI* = jQ  (WP7,)
i = i
5
World industrial production index (IPIG5) IPI* = |~ [( /P /1)
WPI A  WPI 'Effective relative price ERP =---- — = ]^[(------ )
CP I ,=i CP I j
5 w i
Effective exchange rate Of G5 countries in terms of units of SDR e* =
NEER -  = Y\ (—) w‘ where, weight vvf = ——1— ; and ^  w( =1
& i'=l i=l
Real effective exchange rate REER = NEER * ERP = NEER WPI
CPI*
Where, suffix i = USA, Germany, UK, Japan, France; e is the exchange rate of 
the Indian rupee expressed in terms of SDR per unit of national currency ( SDR/ nc ); 
et is the exchange rate of the i,h country currency in terms of SDR Inc . X t is the
average merchandise trade between India and country ’/ ’ during the period 1991-97. 
A ’*’ on the variable indicates that it is a world value represented by the G5 countries 
composite value, e.g. e* represents units of SDR per unit of G5C. The NEER is units 
of composite currency G5C per unit of rupee. Thus, an increase in NEER or REER 
represents appreciation of the rupee and therefore a fall in competitiveness. All the 
variables are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), that is, IPI: line
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62, WPI: line 63, CPI: line 64 and exchange rate: line aa. All these data series are 
first generated at monthly frequency and then converted to annual frequency by 
taking averages.
Table AA.l Sources of data
SI.
N o.
D ocu m en t or database used A bbreviated
as
D eta ils  o f  the o rgan iza tion  o f  orig in  o f  
d ocu m en ts and  d atab ases
1 H a n d b o o k  o f  S ta tis tic s  on  
In d ian  E c o n o m y  1998, 2 0 0 0
R B I-A R e se rv e  B a n k  o f  In d ia , M u m b a i.
2 R B I B u lle tin  v a rio u s  issu e s R B I-B -D O -
3 E c o n o m ic  S u rv e y  v a rio u s  
is su e s
ES O ff ic e  o f  e c o n o m ic  a d v is e r  (O E A ), M in is try  
o f  F in a n c e , g o v e rn m e n t o f  In d ia .
4 N a tio n a l A c c o u n ts  S ta tis tic s : 
S o u rc e s  a n d  M e th o d s
C S O -S M C e n tra l  S ta tis t ic a l  O rg a n iz a tio n  (C S O ), 
D e p a r tm e n t o f  S ta tis tic s , M in is try  o f  
P la n n in g  a n d  P ro g ra m  im p le m e n ta tio n , 
g o v e rn m e n t  o f  In d ia
5 N a tio n a l A c c o u n ts  S ta tis tic s C S O -N A S -D O -
6 W o rld  D e v e lo p m e n t 
In d ic a to rs  2 0 0 0 , C D R O M
W D I2 0 0 0 T h e  W o rld  B a n k
7 In te rn a tio n a l  F in a n c ia l 
S ta tis tic s , v a r io u s  is su e s
IFS In te rn a tio n a l  M o n e ta ry  F u n d , W a sh in g to n  
D C .
8 E C O N -D A T A E C O N D A T A E c o n D a ta  P ty  L td , A .C .N . 0 0 6 4 6 3 0 9 2 , 31 
B e a tty  A v e n u e  A rm a d a le  V ic to r ia  3 1 4 3 , 
A u s tra lia .  T e l  (0 3 )  9 8 2 4 -7 3 9 3  F a x  (0 3 ) 
9 8 2 2 -9 0 3 8
9 N C A E R N C A E R N a tio n a l  c o u n c il  o f  a p p lie d  e c o n o m ic  
re se a rc h , N e w  D e lh i
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Table AA.2Basic data: definitions and sources
Sym bol V ariab le  descrip tion  and unit o f  m easurem ent D ata Source
C A C u rre n t a c c o u n t d e fic it (ru p ees  m illio n ) as on  M a rc h  31. R B I-A , B
C A Z C u rre n t ac c o u n t d e fic it as a fra c tio n  o f  g ro ss  d o m e s tic  p ro d u c t. 
C A Z = C  A /G D P
C a lc u la te d
C B D N B an k  d en sity : p o p u la tio n  ( th o u san d s) p e r b ra n c h  o f  c o m m e rc ia l b an k  
c a lc u la te d  as C B D N  = (1 0 0 0 * P O P )/C B P O P .
C a lc u la te d
C B P O P N u m b e r o f  B ra n c h e s  o f  C o m m e rc ia l B an k s  (as  o n  Ju n e  30) E S
C G A P C o m b in e d  gap  (C G A P ) b e tw e e n  to ta l o u tla y  a n d  c u rre n t re v e n u e  o f  
c e n tra l an d  s ta te  g o v e rn m e n ts  an d  u n io n  te r r ito r ie s  ( in c lu d in g  
in te rn a l an d  e x tra -b u d g e ta ry  re so u rc e s  o f  p u b lic  se c to r  u n d e rta k in g s  
fo r  th e ir  p lan s) (ru p ees  m illio n ).
E S
C G A P Z F isca l D efic it: C o m b in ed  gap  b e tw een  to ta l o u tla y  an d  c u rre n t 
re v e n u e  as f ra c tio n  o f  g ro ss  d o m e s tic  p ro d u c t. C G A P Z = C G A P /G D P
C a lc u la te d
C G S 1 B o n d  ra te : Y ie ld  on  1-5 Y e a r G o v e rn m e n t o f  In d ia  (G O I) S e c u ritie s , 
ta k e n  in  frac tio n s . M id d le  p o in t h as b e e n  tak en  fo r th e  d a ta  g iv e n  in 
ran g e .
R B I-A , B
C P IG 5 C o n su m e r  P ric e  In d ex  o f  G 5 C o u n trie s  (base : 1 9 9 3 -9 4 = 1 0 0 ) 
c a lc u la te d  by  tak in g  a v e ra g e  o f  th e  m o n th ly  s e r ie s  c re a te d  fo r 
C P IG 5 .
R e fe r  sec tio n  
A A .3 .3
C R R C ash  R e se rv e  R atio : a v e ra g e  o f  th e  n o tified  v a lu e s  a n n o u n c e d  b y  th e  
R B I d u rin g  th e  fin an c ia l year. T h is  is th e  s ta tu to ry  d e p o s it 
c o m m e rc ia l b an k s  are  re q u ire d  to  k eep  w ith  th e  R B I as th e  fra c tio n  
o f  th e ir  tim e  p lu s  d e m a n d  d ep o sits .
R B I-A
D R 1 A n n u a l in te re s t ra te  on  1-3 Y e a r co m m erc ia l b a n k s  d e p o s its  ta k e n  in 
f ra c tio n .
R B I-A
D R A IN F ra c tio n  c h a n g e  in ra in fa ll in d ex  fro m  th e  5 0 -y e a r  a v e ra g e  in d ex  fo r 
Ju n e -S e p . D R A IN  = (R A IN A  -  R A IN N )/R A IN N
C a lc u la te d
E E x c h a n g e  ra te  in te rm s o f  S D R /R s  ca lc u la ted  as a v e ra g e  o f  m o n th ly  
d a ta  g iv e n  in IF S : M 5 3 4 .A A  a fte r  inv ertin g .
C a lc u la te d  
fro m  IFS
E G 5 E ffe c t iv e  e x c h a n g e  ra te  o f  G 5 co u n tr ie s  in  te rm s  o f  S D R / G 5 C : 
c a lc u la te d  b y  g eo m e tric a lly  w e ig h tin g  IF S  lin e  a a  S D R  m o n th ly  
ra te s  o f  G 5 c o u n tr ie s  by  th e ir  re la tiv e  trad e  sh a re  w ith  In d ia . T h e  
m o n th ly  se r ie s  is th en  u sed  to  g e t the  an n u a l ra te  b y  a v e ra g in g  o v e r  
th e  f in a n c ia l y ear. G 5C  re p re se n ts  e ffec tiv e  G 5  c u rre n c y .
R e fe r  sec tio n  
A A .3 .3
F D IN Z I F o re ig n  d ire c t in v es tm en t, n e t in flo w s as f ra c tio n  o f  G D I. L in e  
B X .K L T .D IN V .D T .G I.Z S  o f  W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
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Sym bol V ariab le descrip tion  and unit o f m easurem ent D ata Source
F E R U G ro ss  in te rn a tio n a l re se rv es  (in c lu d es  g o ld ) m e a su re d  in c u rre n t U S $  
m illio n s . L in e  F I.R E S .T O T L .C D  o f  W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
G D IZ P B G ro ss  d o m e s tic  in v es tm en t in p u b lic  sec to r as f ra c tio n  o f  G D P E S
G D IZ P V G ro ss  d o m e s tic  in v es tm en t in p riv a te  sec to r as fra c tio n  o f  G D P E S
G D P G D P  a t m a rk e t p rice s  a t cu rren t p rices  (ru p ees  m ill io n ) . L in e  
N Y .G D P .M K T P .C N  o f  W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
G N S Z G ro ss  n a tio n a l sav in g s in c lu d in g  N C T R  (c u rre n t p r ic e s )  as a  f ra c tio n  
o f  G D P . L in e  N Y .G N S .IC T R .Z S  o f  W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
IP IG 5 In d u s tr ia l P ro d u c tio n  In d ex  o f  G 5 c o u n tr ie s  c a lc u la te d  b y  ta k in g  th e R e fe r  sec tio n
a v e ra g e  o f  the  m o n th ly  series o f  IP IG 5 . T h e  m o n th ly  IP IG 5  se r ie s  is 
tra d e  w e ig h te d  g eo m etric  m ean  o f  in d ices g iv e n  in  lin e  6 6  o f  IF S . 
B ase : 9 9 3 -9 4 = 1 0 0
A A .3 .3
L A B T T o ta l la b o u r fo rce  (m illio n ). L in e  S L .T L F .T O T L .IN  o f  W D I 2 0 0 0 . W D I 2 0 0 0
L IT L ite ra c y  ra te  am o n g  to ta l you n g  ad u lt as fra c tio n  o f  p e o p le  ag ed  
a b o v e  15 y ea rs . C a lc u la te d  from  illite racy  ra te , line  
S E .A D T .IL IT .Z S  o f  W D I 2000 .
W D I 2 0 0 0
MO B a se  (R e se rv e ) M o n ey  (ru p ees m illio n ). M 0  =  C u rre n c y  w ith  th e  
P u b lic  (C U P ) +  C u rre n c y  in h an d s o f  c o m m e rc ia l b a n k s  (C IB ) + 
B a n k e rs ’ D ep o s its  w ith  R B I (B D R ) + O th e r  D e p o s its  w ith  R B I 
(O D R )
R B I-A & B
M l N a rro w  M o n e y  (ru p e e s  m illio n ) . M l  =  C u rre n c y  w ith  th e  P u b lic  + 
D e m a n d  D ep o s its  w ith  B an k s (D D ) + O th e r D e p o s its  w ith  R B I
R B I-A & B
M 3 B ro a d  M o n e y  (ru p ees m illio n ). M 3 =  M l  +  T im e  D e p o s its  w ith  
B a n k s
R B I-A & B
N E E R N o m in a l E ffe c tiv e  E x c h a n g e  ra te  (N E E R ) in te rm s  o f  G 5 C  /  R s R e fe r sec tio n
c a lc u la te d  as N E E R  = E /E G 5 . A A .3 .3
N F C S E stim a te d  n e t fix ed  cap ita l s to ck  a t 1993-94  p r ic e s  w ith  5 %  
d e p re c ia tio n  (ru p ees  m illio n ). R e fe r ap p e n d ix  se c tio n  A A .3 .1 .
C a lc u la te d
P W h o le sa le  p rice  in d ex  (W P I) o f  all c o m m o d itie s  (a v e ra g e  o f  th e  
w e e k s) c o n v e rte d  to b a se  1993-94  =  100
E S
P E O W h o le sa le  p ric e  in d ex  o f  e d ib le  o il p rice s  (a v e ra g e  o f  th e  w eek s) 
c o n v e rte d  to  b a se  1993-94  = 100
E S
P G 5 P ro d u c e r  P ric e  In d ex  o f  G 5 C o u n trie s  (base : 1 9 9 3 -9 4 = 1 0 0 ); R e fe r  sec tio n
c a lc u la te d  fro m  the  m o n th ly  se rie s , w h ich  is c o n s tru c te d  by  
g e o m e tr ic a lly  w e ig h tin g  IFS  line 63 in d ex es  o f  G 5 c o u n tr ie s  b y  th e ir  
re la tiv e  tra d e  sh a re  w ith  Ind ia .
A A .3 .3
P M O W h o le sa le  p ric e  index  fo r m in era l oil (a v e ra g e  o f  th e  w eek s) 
in c lu d e d  in th e  b ask e t o f  g en era l W P I a t b a se  1 9 9 3 -9 4  =  100
E S
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Sym bol V ariab le descrip tion  and unit o f m easurem ent D ata Source
P O P P o p u la tio n  in m illio n s  (m id  year e s tim a te ) IF S  line: A 5 3 4 .9 9 Z . IF S :
D o w n lo a d e d  fro m  E C O N -D A T A  at R S P A S , A N U , 2 4 -Ja n -2 0 0 0 . A 5 3 4 .9 9 Z
R A IN A A ctu a l ra in fa ll in d ex  b ased  on  food  g ra in  u n -irr ig a te d  a c e ra g e  
w e ig h ts  fo r  th e  p e rio d  Ju n e -S ep .
N C A E R
R A IN N N o rm a l ra in fa ll index  =  823  (50  years (Ju n e -S e p ) av e ra g e ) . N C A E R
R E E R R e a l E ffe c tiv e  E x c h a n g e  ra te  o f  G 5 C o u n trie s . R e fe r  a p p e n d ix , 
se c tio n  A A .3 .3 .1
C a lc u la te d
R G D F I R ea l g ro ss  d o m es tic  fix ed  in v estm en t. L in e  N E .G D I .F T O T .K N  o f  
W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
R G D P F R ea l G D P  a t fa c to r co s t (ru p ees m illio n ). L in e  N Y .G D P .F C S T .K N  
o f  W D I 2 0 0 0
W D I 2 0 0 0
R IM Im p o rts  o f  g o o d s  and  se rv ice s  at c o n s tan t p ric e  ( ru p e e s  m illio n ). 
L in e  N E .IM P .G N F S .K N  o f  W D I 200 0 .
W D I 2 0 0 0
L R S B I A v e ra g e  a n n u a l len d in g  ra te  o f  S ta te  B a n k  o f  In d ia  (S B I) e x p re s se d  
as f ra c tio n . F o r  th e  d a ta  g iv en  in ran g es  th e  m id d le  p o in t is tak en .
R B I-A  &  C
S L R S ta tu to ry  L iq u id ity  R a tio  acco rd in g  to  th e  R B I n o tif ic a tio n s N C A E R
T O T T e rm s  o f  tra d e  ca lc u la te d  as T O T  =  U n it v a lu e  in d ex  o f  e x p o rt 
(U V IE )/ U n it v a lu e  in d ex  o f  im p o rts  (U V II). B ase : 1 9 9 3 -9 4
E S
U T ID U n it T ru s t o f  In d ia  (U T I) an n u a l d iv id en d  ra te  e x p re s se d  as fra c tio n R B I-A
W A G P E m o lu m e n ts  o f  p u b lic  se c to r em p lo y ees  e x p re s se d  as ru p e e s  p e r 
c a p ita
E S
Y G ro ss  d o m e s tic  p ro d u c t a t c o n stan t m a rk e t p ric e s  ( ru p e e s  m illio n s ) . 
L in e  N Y .G D P .M K T P .K N  o f  W D I 2000 .
W D I 2 0 0 0
Y P P e rm a n e n t rea l in co m e  c a lc u la ted  acco rd in g  to  th e  e rro r- le a rn in g R e fe r to
h y p o th e s is  d is c u sse d  in L a d le r  (1 9 8 9 :8 8 ) w ith  g e o m e tr ic  w t fo r  las t sec tio n
10 y e a rs  an d  w e ig h t o f  0 .5  fo r c u rren t y e a r ’s re a l G D P  a t fa c to r c o s t 
(R G D P F ).
A A .3 .1
Y P C R e a l in c o m e  p e r c a p ita  (ru p ees  p e r p e rso n ) c a lc u la te d  as Y P C  = 
Y /P O P
C a lc u la te d
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AB: Quantitative Methods
A variety of principles, ideas and econometric methodologies popular in applied 
economics have been used in this thesis. Several, such as ordinary least squares 
estimation are so common they need no extra elaboration, while some, such as 
causality tests, have been elaborated at the first appropriate place of application. Yet, 
several principles are referred to in this appendix for more detail. Therefore, an 
attempt is made in this section to provide more information on such econometric 
methods as unit root tests, error correction representation, cointegration, cointegrated 
vector error correction models, generalized restrictions for structural design of 
cointegrating vectors, generalized impulse response function, Hendry methodology, 
and some of the diagnostic tests.
AB.l ADF BASED UNIT ROOT TEST
Unit root is considered to characterizes a series if the data generating process (DGP) 
can be written as:
(1 -L)y ,  =ju + v,
with ju = a, ju = ß t , ju = 0, t = 1,2.... ,n
(AB.l)
Where a and ß are constants, vt is a stationary process and L is a lag operator. 
Condition ju = a , is a case of random walk with drift, ju = ß t  is a trend stationary 
process and ju = 0 is pure random walk. In all cases, the characteristic equation has a 
single root equal to 1; hence the name. Basically, the presence of unit root in a time 
series indicates a completely unsystematic motion of a variable from its previous 
point, such as random walk, with or without drift. Such variables are called non­
stationary. However, they can be made stationary by differencing or sometimes de­
trending. As a common definition, a data series is said to be integrated of order d 
denoted with equires to be differenced d times to achieve a stationary
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series. In the real world, most macroeconomic time series data as in the present study 
are found to be 1(1). The presence of such variables in a regression needs to be 
treated carefully as it can result in spurious results as demonstrated in Granger and 
Newbold (1974). Particularly, jU = a in equation (AB.l) produces a trend and 
therefore those series characterized by fx = a and jU = ß t  are likely to produce 
significant relationship as a result of underlying trend, whether or not there is any 
regression at work (Greene 1997). If a structural variable such as real output, is truly 
1(1), shocks to it will have permanent effects and such observation would have 
serious consequences for macroeconomic policy analyses. However, when two 1(1) 
series are such that there exists a linear combination of their values producing series 
of stationary residuals, they are said to be cointegrated and the resulting regression 
will be super consistent (Engle and Granger 1987; Hamilton 1994). Cointegration 
will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
Therefore, as an essential step of analyzing time series properties, all the 
variables in this study are tested for stationarity using unit root tests. There are 
several versions of testing unit root. However, in this study, the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller (ADF) unit root test has been uniformly used in two versions, one with 
intercept only and the other with intercept and trend included in the regression. The 
ADF test is proposed to accommodate error autocorrelation by adding lagged 
differences of the time series yt under examination as the following Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) specification.
Dickey-Fuller (DF): yt = a  + (\-(t))öt + (j>yt_x +£, t = 1,.... ,n (AB.2)
ADF: yt = a  + ( l - 0 ) S t  + 0y,_l + £, (AB.3)
i = i
Which can also be written as:
ADF: Ayl = a  + p ö t - p y t_1+'£/YiAyt_i+£', t = 1,.... ,n (AB.4)
i=l
Where s is iid. A series is said to be trend stationary if \(f)\ < 1 , while it is 
difference stationary if (j)=\ with non-zero drift a .  Attempts to distinguish the 
difference stationary process from the trend stationary series have generally taken the 
form of a (one-sided) test of the null hypothesis of a unit auto regressive root against 
the alternative of stationarity as follows.
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H 0 :0 = 1 against H l :0 <1 (AB.5)
In the case of equation (AB.4), the null hypothesis is
H0 :p = 1 -0  = 0 (AB.6)
It is important to note that the estimator of (j) is biased downwards and standard t- 
statistic for hypothesis test is not applicable. Therefore, critical values of the non­
standard Dickey-Fuller unit root distribution are used rather than the standard normal 
distribution.
Although, ADF based unit root test is the most common tool of examining time 
series properties, it has some limitations. It is not considered very powerful in finite 
sample for alternatives H { : (f) = (j)Q < 1 when </)0 is near unity. In addition, there is a 
size-power trade-off depending on the augmentation (p) used in dealing with the 
problem of residual serial correlation. In the case of autocorrelated disturbances, the 
size distortion of the uncorrected DF test is considerable. The ADF(p) test performs 
better, and with a sufficiently high enough value for p. However, this happens at the 
expense of power. The ADF test with large value of p relative to the sample size has 
almost no power. Since the true order of p is not known, the two step procedure is 
recommended, whereby model selection criterion such as the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) are used to select the order 
of the ADF regression, and the test is then performed (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997). 
Therefore, in this study, the ADF test is carried out with two-step procedure.
Some times a data series may have experienced one period shock or a permanent 
change in the level resulting into structural break. In such a situation, the ADF test 
may have a bias towards accepting the null of a unit root as demonstrated in Perron 
(1989). Therefore, it is possible to confuse a structural break and unit root. In the 
presence of a suspected structural change, a trend stationary series can be mistaken 
as non-stationary. In such a situation if the analysis is predominantly contingent upon 
series being 1(1), it may lead to erroneous conclusions. However, it is also important 
to note that it is extremely difficult to ascertain structural break in a small data set. In 
the light of such problems, most of the analysis and policy conclusion in this study 
are carried out based on economic relationship rather than the time series property of 
any individual variables.
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AB.2 CONCEPT OF ERROR CORRECTION REPRESENTATION
The concept of error correction model (ECM) can be presented in a simplified way 
using a two variable dynamic system as follows, where the current value of y is 
affected by its own one period lagged value and current and one period lagged value 
of x .
y , = a  + ß 0x, + ß xxt_x + yyt_x + 6, (AB.7)
Which can be written as:
y, ~ y,-\ = 0 + fioxt ~ A)*m + A v .  + A>*m + yy,~i -  y,~i + e,
Or Ay, = a + /50Ax, + {ßx + ß 0 )x,_, + (y -  l)y,_! + £,
Or Ay, -  O' + f t  A*, + |(A  + ß 0)
(AB.8) 
(AB.9)
(AB. 10)
If x and y have long-term association represented by cointegrating vector 
((ß x + yÖ0) (y -  1)) then in the steady state Ax and Ay are zero and the long term
multiplier is obtained as fy-i _ A) + A
d-V i Y  ~ 1 
vector is normalized by (y - 1) such that yM
T.  Now suppose the cointegrating 
=  2X,_, + A - 1  then the estimated error
A
term t?,-i must be stationary and can be consistently plugged in to the above 
equation to obtain:
Ay, = a +  AAx, + ( l - / ) ( y M - v c t_x) + et = a  + ß 0Axt + (1 - y)&t_x+ et (AB. 11)
Equation (AB. 11) is the error correction representation of model (AB.7), which 
can be consistently estimated and provides short-term dynamics as well as long-term 
adjustment coefficient. The coefficient ( l - j O  gives speed of adjustment at which
the variables achieve steady state. The short-term multiplier is given by
dAy,
dAx, A-
Davidson, et al. (1878) proposed an economic interpretation of error correction 
representation as cited in Hamilton (1994: 581). They examined a relationship 
between the log of consumption spending and the log of income in a homogeneous 
ECM (z = 1). For ( l - ) 0 < 0 ,  the model asserts that if y (say consumption) had
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previously been larger than the normal share of jc (say income) (so that #f_, is larger 
than normal), then that causes y  to be lower for any given value of the other 
explanatory variables. The coefficient of error term gives correction to the dependent 
variables for this error. It may be noted that for stability of the basic system absolute 
value of coefficient y must be less than one, which implies that the value of 
coefficient (1 -  y ) <0 must lie between zero and minus two.
It is consistent to separately estimate the cointegrating vector 
((/), +/50) {y -1)) and use the error correction term in the dynamic model with 
Ay as the dependent variable. Such a procedure of ECM is known as two-step error 
correction modeling largely due to Engle and Granger (1987).
AB.3 COINTEGRATION AND VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION 
REPRESENTATION
A (n x 1) vector time series y t is said to be cointegrated if each of the series taken 
individually is 1(1), that is, nonstationary with a unit root, while some linear 
combination of the series a y t is stationary or 1(0) for some nonzero (n x 1) vector
‘a’. In the case of a single equation, the residual-based method of testing 
cointegration proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) is common, where residuals are 
tested for unit root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The variables are 
cointegrated if residuals are found to be stationary. However, when the number of 
1(1) variables in the equation is more than two, this method is not efficient (Pesaran 
and Pesaran 1997:291). Further, it is important to note that the critical values for 
testing unit root for residuals, when there are more than two 1(1) variables in the 
equation, are not the same as those used for testing unit root of a single variable case. 
With a small data set and a large number of 1(1) variables in the system, this method 
is likely to be even more inefficient.
As discussed above in a specific representation, distributed lag models can be 
rearranged to incorporate variables in their levels as well as their differences, 
allowing the analysis of both short-run and long run properties of the variables. 
When this is done in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, the resulting error 
correction representation is called the Vector Error Correction model (VECM). 
Whether the variables in the VAR are cointegrated, can be tested using Johansen’s
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maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen 1988, 1991), which is considered to be a 
more efficient method. Drawing on Hamilton (1994: chapters 18, 19), Johansen 
(1995: Chapter 4), Pesaran & Smith, (1998), Pesaran and Shin (1998), a brief 
description of a cointegrated vector error correction model (VECM) with generalized 
restrictions as used in this thesis for empirical analysis is presented below.
Suppose y, is a m xl vector of all jointly determined endogenous variables, 
which can be represented as a non-stationary p  th-order augmented vector auto 
regression:
0(L )y , = ö0 + + TV, + w, (AB.12)
Where O(L) = In -  0 ,L  -  0 2L2 ------- O pLp ; L is the lag operator such that
Lyt = yM; w, is a q x  1 vector of exogenous 1(0) variables, ut is a m i l  vector of 
unobserved disturbances. {O,,i = 1,2,-•• p]  and T* are m x m and m x q  coefficient 
matrices. The intercept and the trend coefficients a0 and ax are m i l  vectors and, t 
is a linear time trend. The unobserved disturbances are assumed to satisfy the
conditions: E(ut )= 0 ; E\ w,w, ] = Z for all t,  where S = • { p j  = l,2---,m] is a
m x m  positive definite matrix, e \ u lu i 1 = 0 for all t = t' and e (mi|w1)= 0 . The
roots of Im -  = 0 satisfy |z| > 1 or z = 1.
Rearranging the VAR into its error correction form gives the following 
cointegrating vector error correction model (VECM) with 1(1) endogenous variables 
and 1(0) exogenous variables.
Ay, = a0 + a,t -  Yly^  + jjT T, Ay,_(. + TV, + u,
i=1
(AB. 13)
Here n  = 0(1) is s long run multiplier matrix of order m x m ,  ITy,^ is an error 
correction term and ^  O . for i = 1, • • •, p -  1 are p  - 1  matrices of
7=»+l
orderm xm  representing short-run dynamics of the system. The necessary and 
sufficient condition for cointegration is |fl| = 0. The matrix n  must have a rank less
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than m . For rcink(Y\) = r <m there exist r linearly independent cointegrating 
vectors. Existence of r cointegrating vectors means that there exists m x r matrices 
ß and a such that 0(1) = n  - a ß '  then n  y,_, = a ß y t_x -  az,_{ where zt_x = ßy,_ x 
is the cointegrating relationship, often interpreted as deviation from equilibrium 
which is 1(0) and a is now the matrix of adjustment in the VECM, which measure 
how strongly the deviation from equilibrium, the r stationary variables /5yM,
feedback onto the system. In view of the fact that most of the variables are expected 
to have deterministic trend, trend and the intercept terms are retained in the model. 
However, at the same time, to avoid any quadratic trend in the solution for yt which 
may lead to changing nature of trend in yt with a changing number of vectors 
(discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1998)), the coefficient of trend term is restricted by 
setting cix=Yly where y is m xl vector of unknown coefficients. With trend 
included in the vector of variables the coefficient matrix of cointegration will have a 
size of (m + l)x r and the estimated VECM is rewritten as follow:
Ay, = a0 -  aß'. (y*_,) + Ay,_(. + Tw, + ut (AB. 14)
i = i
Here y*_x = ( t,y ’_1)’ and ß. =
L .
ß . The VECM is estimated by maximizing
the log likelihood function of the VECM for a selected rank of n* = aß* which is 
equal to the number of cointegrating vectors. The VECM is estimated by maximizing 
the log Likelihood function of the VECM for a selected rank of n  which is equal to 
the number of cointegrating vectors. The number of cointegrating vectors is obtained 
by applying likelihood ratio tests on the maximum eigenvalue and trace of the 
stochastic matrix as follows (see Pesaran, et al. (2000), (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997). 
The test statistics are computed in Pesaran, et al. (2000).
The cointegration analysis requires all variables to be integrated of the same 
order, however, in practice, it is hard to find the relevant economic variables to 
comply with this requirement (Engle and Granger 1987). Johensen (1995), allows the 
1(0) variable to be used in cointegration analysis with other 1(1) variables, while 
Granger (1997) cautioned against resulting complications in interpretation and
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Levtchenkova, et al. (1998) argue that inclusion of 1(0) variables may result in loss of 
information. Therefore, as far as possible, this thesis avoids such mixing in 
cointegration analysis.
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics
Pesaran, et al. (2000), and (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997) discuss test statistics for a 
variety of cases in relation to the assumptions regarding trend and intercept terms in 
VECM and report critical values obtained from stochastic simulations. For the 
specific case of unrestricted intercept and restricted trend and without exogenous 1(1) 
variables, followed in this thesis, the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations and 
the calculation of test statistics can be presented as follows.
H r : Rank(Uy) = r (AB.15)
Against the alternative hypothesis
H r+l:Rank(Uy) = r + l (AB. 16)
For r = 0, 1, 2, ...., m-1, in the VECM (AB. 14). Then the appropriate test 
statistics is given by the log-likelihood ratio statistics as
LR(Hr\Hr+l) = -n \o g ( l-A r+l) (AB.17)
/v t h
Where A, is the r largest eigenvalue of the characteristic matrix defined as
n
S ^ S 0lS^'S{0 with StJ = n-1 ^ ritrjt ; i , j  = 0,1; t = 1, 2, ....n; r0l is the residual vector
r=l
from OLS regressions of Ay, on (1, Ay,_,, Ay,_2, .... , Ay,_p+1, w,) and ru is the residual
vector from OLS regressions of
t
y t~\
on (1, Ayf_,, Ay,_2,.... , Ay,_p+1, w,).
Trace Statistics
For testing the null hypothesis H(r) defined in (AB. 15) against the alternative of 
trend-stationary, that is
H m : Rank(ny) = m (AB.18)
For r = 0, 1, 2, .... m-1, in the VECM (AB. 14). The log-likelihood ratio statistics 
for this test is given by
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(AB.19)L R (H ,\H J  = -n  £ l o g ( l - i , )
i=r+l
Where Ar+l, Ar+l ... Am are the largest eigenvalues of S ^ S 0lSuySl0
Generalized Restriction on Cointegrating Vectors
The structural estimation of the cointegrating relation requires maximization of a 
concentrated log-likelihood function subject to appropriate just-identifying or over­
identifying restrictions on ß . The direct procedure of identification as discussed in 
Pesaran and Smith (1998) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) is adapted, where long- 
run equilibrium properties of the underlying structural economic model are utilized 
in deciding the restrictions, while the likelihood ratio test statistics are used to 
examine the statistical acceptability of the restricted vector against the just identified 
vector.
AB.4 THE HENDRY METHODOLOGY OF GENERAL TO SPECIFIC 
MODELING
The general to specific methodology (GSM) of setting up a dynamic econometric 
model, formally discussed and summarized in Hendry and Richard (1982) and 
Hendry (1995), owes a lot to Sargan's (1964) paper and oral tradition developed 
largely at the London School of Economics (Pagan 1987). Therefore, this 
methodology is also known as Hendry methodology or London School of Economics 
methodology (LSM). The methodology essentially comprises the following four 
steps (Pagan 1995).
1. Formulate a general model that is consistent with what economic theory 
postulates are the variables entering any equilibrium relationship and 
which restricts the dynamics of the process as little as possible.
2. Reparameterize the model to obtain explanatory variables that are near 
orthogonal and which are ‘interpretable’ in terms of the final equilibrium.
3. Simplify the model to the smallest version that is compatible with the data 
(‘congruent’)
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4. Evaluate the resulting model by extensive analysis of residuals and 
predictive performance, aiming to find the weakness of the model designed 
in the previous step.
Hendry favours starting with a sufficiently general model so that the need for a 
more general model should not be a surprise. The parameters must be estimable from 
the available data and the model should be logically identifiable, so that it is possible 
to learn about the parameters of interest using the model. Finally, the model must 
characterize the joint distribution of all the variables at the outset (Hendry 1995:270).
As an illustration based on economic principles, an econometric model can be 
written as an autoregressive distributed lag model as follows:
m m
Y, = a  + X  A Yt-i + X  + (AB. 20)
1=1 i=0
Here a  is a vector of constants, Yt is (äzaT) vector of endogenous variables, X t 
is (&jd) vector of explanatory variables, A, and Bi are (n x n ) and (nxk)  matrices 
of coefficients, and /ut is a stochastic error term. As the second step, equation
(AB.20) can be rearranged in many different ways, all of which would yield the same 
estimates of the unknown parameters, but each of which package the same 
information differently and consequently may be easier to interpret and understand. 
Generally, Hendry prefers to rewrite equation (AB.20) in an error correction 
mechanism (ECM) (Pagan 1995:11). The unrestricted error correction model 
(UECM) in terms of differences and lagged levels as one of the alternative 
representation of (AB.20) may look as follows.
m -l m- 1
&y, = a  + ' ^ A ’AY,.i + 'Z B ;A X l_l +C0Y,_m+ClX,_m+ß, (AB.21)
1=1 1=0
where C0 = -
(  m \
/ -S a . c , =
(  m \
I*.l i=! ) l'=° )
, and CQXCX represents the long-run
multiplier for the system. An inspection of the parameters estimated in the first step 
is very helpful in formulating the specification for the second step. However, in the 
process of re-formulating the problem second and third steps get blurred in practice. 
The third step involves decision to simplify (AB.20) or (AB.21) by deletion of
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variables that are not helpful in explaining the dependent variable. Hendry argues the 
final model must be useful. How the final model is derived is largely irrelevant; it is 
either useful or not, and that characteristic is independent of whether it comes purely 
from whimsy, some precise theory, or a very structured search (Hendry and Mizon 
1985, cited in Pagan 1995:13). It is in this sense that some economists feel 
uncomfortable about this procedure.
The fourth step is considered the most important step in the whole process. 
During the process of specification search, routine examination of such items as the 
autocorrelation function, appropriateness of the functional form and recursive 
estimation of parameters is important. Residuals from the fitted model need to be 
checked for serial correlation, Heteroscedasticity, and normality.
It may be noted that if the fitted model satisfies the fourth step, which means the 
model is correctly specified and diagnostically sound, the disequilibrium error of the 
specification will be stationary. In that case, it would be free from spurious 
regression even if some of the variables in the regressors were non-stationary as they 
could be considered cointegrated with other variables. This advantage of the Hendry 
methodology makes it versatile in applications where the relevant variables are 
integrated of different orders, a commonly encountered problem in applied 
econometrics (Athukorala 1998). Studies such as Inder (1993), and Phillips and 
Loretan (1991) have demonstrated usefulness of GSM in such situations. ECM 
representation is particularly preferred as it has a first-differenced dependent 
variable, which is expected to be stationary for most time series variables and at the 
same time facilitates examination of short-term as well as long-term dynamics of the 
variables.
From the above discussion, it appears that the common practice of testing 
variables for time series properties such as unit root is by and large irrelevant for 
final modeling. In the case of smaller data sets, the unit root tests are not considered 
particularly effective anyway. However, it can still be argued that examination of 
time series properties is too important to be ignored. Particularly, if time series 
properties indicate a set of relevant variables are integrated of the same order then 
more sophisticated methods of testing cointegration and designing long-term 
relationships can be applied to separate out the long-term relationships from the 
short-term dynamics. The same is followed in this thesis as far as possible.
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AB.5 COCHRANE-ORCUTT ITERATIVE METHOD
Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) Iterative procedure is specifically employed in Chapter 6 for 
simple regressions with adjustment for serial correlation. Let y be a n x  1 vector of 
observations on the dependent variables, X n x k  matrix of observations on the 
regressors including intercept term and U n x  1 vector of disturbances. The 
Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) estimation method employs the iterative procedure to 
compute ML estimator of y = Xß + U under the assumption that the disturbances ut , 
follow the AR(m) process (AB.22) with fixed initial values.
m
u, = ^ j p iul_i+£t , £' ~ N(0,<j 2£) , t = l,2....,n (AB.22)
i = i
The procedure discussed in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and the software program 
Microfit 4.0 has been used for estimation. Some important points related to the 
estimation need to be noted. The CO method maximizes the likelihood function
n
(which is equivalent to minimizing ^ e 2) with respect to {ß', a 2e,p ' ) ' ,
t=m+1
p = (pv p 2,.. ,pmY by iterative method of successive substitution involving two 
steps. In the first step the LL function is maximized with respect to ß  taking p as 
given and in the second step ß is taken as given and the LL is maximized with 
respect to p. In each of the steps, OLS estimation solves the optimization problem.
The primary justification of treating initial value as fixed is asymptotic, and is 
plausible only when (AB.22) is stationary and n is large. Therefore, the program 
displays warning if the estimates of p {, p 2, ..., p m result in a non-stationary error 
process. In such a case, inferences based on the reported standard errors can be 
misleading. The estimated standard errors computed with this method are 
asymptotically valid even if the regression equation contains lagged values of the 
dependent variable.
AB.6 A NOTE ON DIAGNOSTIC AND OTHER TESTS
Almost all of the regression results in this study are tested for important time series 
properties of the residuals and the stability of the parameters. These tests are very 
important in their own right to ensure that the basic assumptions underlying the 
regressions are not severely violated. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) version of test
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statistics considered to be more stringent on the null hypothesis is used in most cases. 
However, in case of uncertainty, F-version of test statistics is also used in a few 
places. All tests are conducted using the software Microfit (Pesaran and Pesaran 
1997).
Godfrey’s test (Godfrey 1978a, 1978b), is used for testing serial correlation in 
residuals up to third order. In the case of regression with instrumental variables the 
serial correlation in residuals is tested using Sargan’s statistics (Sargan 1976, 
Breusch and Godfrey 1981). Ramsey’s RESET test (Ramsey 1969, 1970) using 
squares of the fitted values is employed to test the function form. The normality of 
the regression residual is tested using Jarque-Berra’s test of normality (Jarque and 
Bera 1980, Bera and Jarque 1981). The residuals are also tested for autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) up to third order in most cases using LM 
statistics as proposed in Engle (1982).
Predictive failure of the models is tested using second test discussed in Chow 
(1960), which also tests general specification error. The first test proposed in Chow 
(1960) is the usual test of the stability of regression coefficients. The cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and CUSUM of squares tests based on recursive residuals described in 
Brown, et al. (1975) and Kalirajan (1995) have been employed to test the robustness 
of the regressions against structural breaks.
Wald test for parameter restrictions has extensively been used to test the causal 
relationship of explanatory variables as and when required.
In order to make comparison between competing models for explaining same 
dependent variable concept of non-nested tests for linear regression (Pesaran 1987, 
McAleer and Pesaran 1986) and model choice criteria such as the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) based on Akaike (1973, 1974) and the Schwarz Bayesian 
criterion (SBC) based on Schwarz (1978) have been used. The non-nested tests 
include Cox's (1961, 1962) N-test, adjusted Cox test (NT test); Wald Type test (W- 
test) discussed in Godfrey and pesaran (1983); the J-test proposed in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) based on an artificial OLS regression; the JA-test proposed in 
Fisher and McAleer (1981); the encompassing test proposed in Deaton (1982), 
Dastoor (1983), Gourierous, et al. (1982).
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